USA vendono armi a Taiwan la Cina minaccia sanzioni

[Leviathan]

La Cina è "profondamente indignata" contro gli Stati Uniti e ha dichiarato di essere pronta a intervenire contro la decisione del governo americano di vendere armi per 6,5 miliardi di dollari a Taiwan.

 

 

 

"Gli Stati Uniti rischiano di avvelenare i buoni rapporti e lo sviluppo degli scambi di questi ultimi anni con il nostro paesé, ha reso noto Hu Changming, portavoce del ministero della Difesa cinese. Il governo americano ha esposto lo scorso venerdì al Congresso il piano di vendita di armi a Taiwan, ma la Cina pretende che l'America retroceda dalle sue posizioni per non danneggiare i rapporti diplomatici e non compromettere la stabilità nello stretto di Taiwan.

 

 

 

Pechino accusa inoltre gli Stati Uniti di non tenere fede alle promesse fatte su Taiwan all'interno di tre comunicati congiunti, firmati negli anni e minaccia ritorsioni. "Ci riserviamo il diritto di prendere ulteriori misure", ha affermato il portavoce. "Ricordiamo agli Stati Uniti che esiste un'unica Cina, di cui Taiwan fa parte", ha aggiunto il portavoce del ministero degli Esteri Liu Jianchao.

 

 

http://italiainformazioni.com/giornale/est...armi-taiwan.htm

[Tuccio14]

"Ricordiamo agli Stati Uniti che esiste un'unica Cina, di cui Taiwan fa parte", ha aggiunto il portavoce del ministero degli Esteri Liu Jianchao.

Non mi è ben chiara quest'ultima frase, probabilmente non sono aggiornato sulla situazione di Taiwan...

[vorthex]

Non mi è ben chiara quest'ultima frase, probabilmente non sono aggiornato sulla situazione di Taiwan...

semplicemente la Cina non riconosce Taiwan come un entità separata, ma come una "provincia ribelle". però, vabbè, le solite ciarle cinesi... evidentemente non hanno ancora ben capito che è la Cina ad aver bisogno del mondo, non in contrario.

[Dominus]

E' un ipocrisia della diplomazia internazionale.

In pratica per mantenere lo status quo Taiwan non dichiara l'indipendenza ma afferma di essere il governo di tutta la cina, compresa quella continentale (Republic of China), e esattamente lo stesso fà la Repubblica Popolare.

Infatti la RPC ha più volte che non accetterà mai l'indipendenza di Taiwan, e che è pronta ad arrivare all'attacco armato nel caso di dichiarazione unilaterale.

A mio parere alla fine si arriverà ad un annessione parziale, sul modello "un paese, due sistemi", a meno che qualcuno non dia di matto, ma a nessuno conviene qualcosa del genere.

[Leviathan]

taiwan non è riconosciuta dall'ONU

 

A mio parere alla fine si arriverà ad un annessione parziale, sul modello "un paese, due sistemi", a meno che qualcuno non dia di matto, ma a nessuno conviene qualcosa del genere.

tipo Hong Kong?

[Dominus]

Si, è la cosa che conviene di più a tutti quanti alla fine.

Quanto al riconoscimento all'ONU una volta era il contrario, con la presidenza Nixon, invece, gli USA cominciarono ad appoggiare i Cinesi continentali in chiave anti-Sovietica e da allora la PRC ha preso il posto della RoC nel consiglio di sicurezza, con relativo diritto di veto.

[Tuccio14]

Grazie per le delucidazioni.

 

Quindi secondo Taiwan gli USA stanno vendendo armi a Taiwan, secondo la Cina gli USA stanno vendendo armi ad un governo inesistente...

[Dominus]

Neanche gli USA riconoscono Taiwan, è una situazione ingarbugliata tipicamente orientale.

 

Per farti capire la situazione

 

The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Republic of India, Pakistan and Japan have formally adopted the One China policy, under which the People's Republic of China is theoretically the sole legitimate government of China. However, the United States and Japan acknowledge rather than recognize the PRC position that Taiwan is part of China. In the case of Canada and the UK, bilateral written agreements state that the two respective parties take note of Beijing's position but do not use the word support. The UK government position that "the future of Taiwan be decided peacefully by the peoples of both sides of the Strait" has been stated several times. Despite the PRC claim that the United States opposes Taiwanese independence, the United States takes advantage of the subtle difference between "oppose" and "does not support". In fact, a substantial majority of the statements Washington has made says that it "does not support Taiwan independence" instead of saying that it "opposes" independence. Thus, the US currently does not take a position on the political outcome, except for one explicit condition that there be a peaceful resolution to the differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.[13] All of this ambiguity has resulted in the United States constantly walking on a diplomatic tightrope with regard to the China/Taiwan issue.

Modificato 6 Ottobre 2008 da Dominus

[Tuccio14]

 

Che confusione... Speriamo solo non sfoci in una crisi diplomatica, la Georgia ci è bastata!

 

Mah...

[Dominus]

Beh è da anni che ci sono continue crisi diplomatiche e militari, ma in questo momento la Cina non ha alcun interesse ad attaccare Taiwan, a meno che qualcuno, da una parte o dall'altra non compia gesti avventati (e questo purtroppo non è da escludere visto che una componente di follia o di avventatezza è comune prima dell'inizio delle guerre moderne).

In ogni caso, a parte un attacco nucleare, la Cina può poco contro l'isola ribelle, che ha forze armate moderne, studiate ed addestrate apposta per respingere attacchi o invasioni dall'altra parte del canale.

[Leviathan]

se i cinesi impongono sanzioni agli USA potrebbero fare davvero male in un momento del genere e non solo smetterli di comprare titoli di stato, ma può arrivare persino a confiscare proprietà di ditte statunitensi in territorio cinese o riconoscere ossezzia del sud e acbasia

Modificato 6 Ottobre 2008 da Leviathan

[Dominus]

Non so se hai chiaro che i Cinesi sono legati a triplo filo con gli USA e non sono assolutamente nella posizione di applicare qualsivoglia sanzione.

[vorthex]

se i cinesi impongono sanzioni agli USA potrebbero fare davvero male in un momento del genere e non solo smetterli di comprare titoli di stato, ma può arrivare persino a confiscare proprietà di ditte statunitensi in territorio cinese o riconoscere ossezzia del sud e acbasia

auhauahuahuahauh questa è comica

 

la Cina, come ha già detto Dominus, non è nelle posizione di poter applicare sanzioni a chicchesia.

Modificato 6 Ottobre 2008 da vorthex

[cama81]

più che altro ai cinesi continentali conviene aspettare sono sempre di più i taiwanesi che vorrebbero la riannessione e i cinesi vorrebbero non uccidere la gallina dalle uova d'oro!

[Dominus]

Guarda l'opinione pubblica Taiwanese è frammentatissima a riguardo, come risulta dagli ultimi sondaggi.

In generale è per il mantenimento dello status quo

[Ospite intruder]

auhauahuahuahauh questa è comica

 

la Cina, come ha già detto Dominus, non è nelle posizione di poter applicare sanzioni a chicchesia.

 

 

Il problema è che neppure noi siamo nelle condizioni di poter applicare sanzioni alla Cina.

[Ospite Su-35]

hanno venduto anche aerei?

[vorthex]

si.

[Andrea75]

... i sogni di grandezza (sopravvivenza) di Taiwan si scontrano con problemi di bilancio source

 

Despite budgetary problems, the CRS report identified a long list of arms Taiwan has expressed interest in procuring. These include a signal intelligence aircraft, C-27J Spartan medium transport aircraft, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Stryker armored wheeled vehicle, CH-53X minesweeper helicopter, T-6C trainer aircraft, HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter, Perry-class frigates, Newport-class landing ship tank, Athena C4ISR situational awareness system, Aegis Ashore land-based missile defense system, and the Sky Warrior tactical unmanned aerial vehicle.

 

The question remains whether Taiwan’s defense budget will be able to afford such procurements. There is also the issue of drawdown in tensions between China and Taiwan as political dialogue continues to expand.

[Andrea75]

Taiwan Deploys Anti-China Missiles

 

Taiwan has for the first time deployed cruise missiles capable of striking key military bases along the southeast coast of the Chinese mainland, local media reported May 28.

Mass production of the Taiwan-made “Hsiungfeng” (Brave Wind) 2E, which have a range of 300 miles, has been completed and the missiles have come into service, the Liberty Times said, citing an unnamed military source.

[Andrea75]

segnalo un link ad un articolo sul procurement di Taiwan A Special Report on Taiwan’s Defense

 

A record US$12 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan was transacted in 2010-2011.

 

One element that has not changed over the decades is Taiwan’s heavy dependence on the United States as a source of military equipment. With a few exceptions unlikely to be repeated – such as France’s sale of Mirage fighters and Lafayette frigates in the 1990s, as well as the Netherlands’ supply of a pair of submarines – the United States has been the only government willing to risk Beijing’s wrath by helping to arm Taiwan. Although Washington ended formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1979, at the same time terminating the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed by Congress that year commits the United States to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

 

Recently, some of Taiwan’s supporters in the United States, including prominent members of Congress, have questioned whether the U.S. government has been upholding that commitment to maintain Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They point mainly to the Obama administration’s apparent reluctance to meet Taiwan’s request to purchase 66 F-16C/D fighter aircraft under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Instead the U.S. administration has so far been willing only to approve a deal covering the upgrading of the 145 less-advanced F-16A/Bs already in service in the Taiwan air force. Lockheed Martin will serve as the systems integrator for the upgrade, while Northrop Grumman and Raytheon are competing to supply the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar systems.

 

In an effort to press the White House to approve the F-16C/Ds, Republican Senator John Cornyn of Texas went so far as to hold up the confirmation for half a year of President Obama’s nominee to become Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Cornyn let the appointment go through only after receiving a letter from the White House this past April that promised to give “serious consideration” to selling the F-16C/Ds without explicitly promising to do so.

 

More encouraging to proponents of the arms deal was a statement in the letter acknowledging the widening gap in air power between Taiwan and China, and providing assurance that the United States would find a way to deal with the problem in the “near term.” Previously the U.S. position was that the A/B upgrades alone would adequately meet Taiwan’s current needs.

 

The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap, a report released last month by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, analyzes the extent of the problem. It notes that Taiwan is preparing to retire its fleet of 45 aged F-5 aircraft, while the availability rate of its 56 Mirage 2000 fighters and 126 F-CK-1 Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) is steadily declining due to the need for increased maintenance or retrofitting. With up to a squadron of the F-16A/Bs now due to be out of service each year while undergoing upgrading between 2016 and 2023, the report notes, “Taiwan may be left with as few as 73 operational F-16A/B fighters to handle its peacetime and wartime contingencies.”

 

It is unclear what “near-term” solution the United States may have in mind, although one rumored option is the lending of 24 F-16A/Bs to replace those being taken out of commission in phases for upgrading.

 

U.S. officials have sought to rebut the notion that American hesitation to supply the advanced F-16C/Ds represents any diminishing of Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense or a sign of unwillingness to anger Beijing. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last fall, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Lavoy noted the US$5.85 billion package covering defense systems and training announced in September 2011 “demonstrated our resolve to fully live up to that commitment.” He added that “this is matched by the US$6.4 billion in sales to Taiwan in 2010 that brings us to a total of over US$12 billion in sales in a two-year period – more than any comparable two-year period since the passage of the TRA.”

 

Inclusion of an additional arms package in 2008 would bring the total to nearly US$19 billion in the past four years, most of which Taiwan is still paying for. Some sources raise the question of whether Taiwan would in fact have the money – as much as another US$10 billion – to purchase the 66 F-16C/Ds. On the other hand, Taiwan officials and legislators have reportedly assured the U.S. government that the budget would be forthcoming if Washington were to approve the transaction.

 

Voices both for and against an F-16C/D deal can be heard in both the United States and Taiwan. The “anti” position emphasizes that Taiwan can get “more bang for the buck” by using the same money for other weapons systems, especially since aircraft could be vulnerable to Chinese precision missile strikes while still on the ground. On the other side of that question, Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, argues that “the requirement for the air force is for a whole range of contingencies to protect the national air space – all-out war is not the only situation for which you need a robust air force.” He notes that seventy-plus planes will be insufficient, and that “Korea and even Singapore have significantly larger air forces.”

 

Next to jet fighters, the most controversial defense issue is whether Taiwan should spend additional billions of dollars to buy or build submarines. The argument in favor is that the best defense against submarines are other submarines, and that without its own operational subs, Taiwan would be unable to adequately carry out air and sea training in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Currently Taiwan has four submarines, but two of them – World War II-era Guppy-class vessels – are too old to be safely operational. The two Dutch-built Zwaardvis-class subs are also out-of-date, and given maintenance and training requirements, they are usually available only one at a time for sea duty.

 

In 2001, the George W. Bush administration approved an arms package for Taiwan that included eight diesel-electric submarines, but the catch is that the United States no longer produces such vessels – its own fleet is now wholly nuclear-powered. The design would have to come from a third country. With that political complication, plus budget concerns and debates over whether the subs should be built in a Taiwan shipyard rather than in the United States, more than a decade has passed without substantial progress.

 

According to Vice Defense Minister Andrew N.D. Yang, the latest plan is to request help from the United States in arranging for Taiwan to acquire two used subs from another country. Without additional vessels, the Taiwan navy will be hard-pressed to maintain a well-trained force of submarine crewmen.

 

Taiwan is also hoping to obtain two or more Perry-class frigates from among a number of vessels that the U.S. Navy is preparing to decommission. Legislation reportedly is being drafted to enable Congress to grant approval.

 

In terms of arms sales cooperation, training assistance, and overall military-to-military communication, Vice Minister Yang speaks positively of the current U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship. “We’re quite satisfied with the current interactions and the mechanisms that have been established to facilitate constructive discussions and exchanges,” he says. “We’ve achieved a great deal of mutual confidence and trust, and that’s a good sign.”

 

Recent U.S. Arms Sales Packages

 

January 2010

 

• 60 UH-60M Blackhawk utility helicopters.

 

• 2 PAC-3 firing units, one training unit, and 114 missiles for upgraded missile defense.

 

• Technical support for Taiwan’s C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) system.

 

• 2 Osprey-class mine-hunting vessels.

 

• 12 Harpoon telemetry missiles.

 

September 2011

 

• Retrofit for 145 F-16A/B fighter jets, including radar, weapons and structural upgrades.

 

• Five-year extension of F-16 pilot training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.

 

• Aircraft spare parts for sustaining Taiwan’s F-16s, F-5s, and C-130s.

 

Uncle ROC Needs You!

 

After studying the experience of the United States, Japan, and other countries that converted from a conscription system to an all-volunteer military, Taiwan is embarking on the same course, with the aim of completing the transition by the end of 2014.

 

The main impetus for the change is the sophistication and complexity of modern weapons systems. “Our ongoing military transformation requires more professionalism in terms of operating the technologies,” notes Vice Defense Minister Andrew N.D. Yang. With a draftee serving for only for 11 or 12 months, training is barely completed before the period of service is over. A secondary reason is Taiwan’s changing demographics. The number of young people is falling, which will make it increasingly difficult to meet manpower needs through conscription, says Yang.

 

The transition is unlikely to be easy, however. Vice Minister Yang notes that “it takes a lot of money to support this program – that’s the biggest challenge.” Although official figures have not been made public, defense analysts have estimated that gradually introducing an all-volunteer force will cost an additional US$5 billion annually between FY2012 and FY2016.

 

So far, necessary funding has been allocated for this year and next, Yang says. The additional budget is needed to adjust the pay structure and fringe benefits to levels sufficient to attract and retain more talent for military careers, and to provide more on-base housing and social, healthcare, and recreational services for servicemen with families.

 

Besides the funding, many of the needed changes require revisions to existing laws and regulations. Some of those proposed amendments have yet to be acted on by the Legislative Yuan. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) also needs to coordinate with a number of other government departments, such as the Ministry of Education in expanding the ROTC-like military training offered as an elective at high schools and colleges. The on-campus training will be an important channel for attracting future recruits.

 

The courses will also give draftees a head start in their introduction to military life, since the nominally “all-volunteer” force will in fact not eliminate conscription entirely. Instead of one year of service, all males under the age of 19 will be required to serve just four months for basic training, after which they will be assigned to a reserve unit until they turn 35. The result is that instead of reaching a full 100%, the proportion of volunteers in the service will be capped at 90% at the end of 2014. Before that time, the total authorized force is to be reduced to 215,000 from the current 275,000 (the number on active duty is put at 235,000). The decrease is part of a streamlining effort set out in MND’s Quadrennial Defense Review in 2009 with the aim of making the armed forces more efficient.

 

Yang says the proportion of professional personnel in the armed services has already been brought up to about 70% – compared with under 50% previously – “so we need to reach another 20%.”

 

Some sources consider that the goal may be hard to achieve – in part for cultural reasons. Unlike the United States, where the military traditionally has enjoyed a high degree of respect and many young people choose to volunteer out of a combination of pride and patriotism, in Taiwan a military career has not been among the options that the best and brightest students typically look at. Many people still take to heart an ancient Chinese proverb that says “the highest-quality metal doesn’t go to make nails, and the highest-quality manpower doesn’t go to make soldiers.”

 

“The biggest hurdle will be convincing parents that it’s a wise move for their children – if not in itself, at least as a steppingstone or viable path to a good career,” says an American defense specialist who is highly familiar with Taiwan’s security situation. He suggests that MND devise recruitment programs that emphasize opportunities to receive language and computer training, and otherwise obtain marketable technical and management skills, including those recognized by certification. He also sees a need to recruit more women into the armed services to take advantage of their potential contribution to an advanced-technology modern military.

 

“Young people are Taiwan’s most important resource,” he notes, and they will become an increasingly scarce resource in future as Taiwan’s population starts declining. “How can the military recruit enough people in competition with business and academia?” He suggests that MND work out “cooperative programs with domestic industries and universities to share this resource” – for example, allowing a certain amount of time each day or week for military personnel to spend in a private-sector workplace or in a university classroom.

 

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has expressed doubts about the plan to move to a career military. “We have strong reservations about going to a full-volunteer force,” says Michael Tsai, who served as vice minister and then minister of defense in the Chen Shui-bian administration. The DPP views the program as having originated as a campaign promise by Ma Ying-jeou as a presidential candidate in 2008, to appeal to young voters. So as not to alienate those same voters, Tsai acknowledges, the DPP has refrained from being too vocal about its opposition.

 

“Eliminating the conscription system implies that the military threat from China is no longer a concern,” says Tsai. “But how can you say that when China is rapidly increasing its military budget and building up its capability to use coercive means against Taiwan? We still need young people to perform military service when we’re faced with a big potential enemy only 100 kilometers away.”

 

A second reason for the DPP’s reservations, Tsai says, is concern about the budgetary impact. In the past decade, he notes, personnel costs, including pensions, have grown to the point that they now account for around 50% of the national defense budget – compared with less than 30% in the United States and 15% in Korea. The move to an all-professional military will place even more pressure on the budget, he argues, leaving less money for equipment procurement, operations, and other necessary expenses.

 

Alexander Huang, professor of strategic studies at Tamkang University, also worries about the consequences if the push to form an all-volunteer force squeezes the defense budget too hard. Postponing implementation of the new system would be almost impossible, he says, “because we’ve already restructured the barracks and the command structure.” Since payment schedules to contractors for equipment systems are fixed, the only choice to save significant amounts of money may be to reduce training and maintenance – in effect reducing readiness. “That’s the compromise we’d have to make,” he says. “Do we want to see that happen? No. Do we have another solution? Maybe only one – get the economy in better shape to generate more tax revenue.”

[Andrea75]

... segnalo questo paper: U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41952.pdf

 

 

The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the issues in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the “Six Assurances” of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)

For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2011, Taiwan was the 10th-largest U.S. trading partner and the 6th-largest market for U.S. agricultural exports. Taiwan is a major innovator of information technology (IT) products. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is a significant autonomous actor in the world.

Today, 23 countries including the Vatican have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy self-governance with free elections. After Taiwan’s presidential election in 2008, the United States congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy.” Taiwan’s democracy has allowed its people a greater say in their status, given competing party politics about Taiwan’s national political identity and priorities. Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections on January 14, 2012. Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election against the candidate from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed concerns about steps seen as needed to be taken by the United States and by Taiwan to strengthen their relationship. Another approach has viewed closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to expand cooperation with a rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales and other dealings with Taiwan. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending that they have pursued a positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support for his policies, including Taiwan’s entry in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and proposed talks on maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Other policy issues include whether to approve arms sales, restart Cabinet-level visits, and resume trade talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), or TIFA talks. The United States has cited concerns about Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S. beef, even as Taiwan seeks support in international organizations.