Afghanistan - Topic ufficiale

[Andrea75]

Haqqani network hit with U.N. sanctions: U.S. envoy

 

The U.N. Security Council's Taliban sanctions committee on Monday added the Pakistan-based Haqqani network, accused of high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, to a U.N. blacklist, the United States said.

 

The Security Council committee's move also singled out Qari Zakir, an operational commander involved in many of the network's highest-profile suicide attacks, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice said in a statement.

 

"These sanctions oblige all U.N. member states to implement an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo against Zakir and the Haqqani Network," Rice said.

 

New additions to the Taliban sanctions list are relatively rare, since such moves are usually agreed upon unanimously. Council diplomats said it was especially significant that Pakistan, a member of the 15-nation council until the end of 2013, did not stand in the way of the moved.

[Andrea75]

OLTRE 2.100 MISSIONI PER GLI AMX IN AFGHANISTAN

 

Il colonnello Carlo Moscini è il nuovo comandante della Joint air task force (Jatf), l’unita’ dell’Aeronautica militare da cui dipende l’impiego degli aerei italiani schierati in Afghanistan. Ad Herat, presso l’aeroporto, la cerimonia di avvicendamento con il colonnello Andrea Fazi. Dalla Jatf dipende tra l’altro il task group ‘Black cats’, cioe’ i quattro caccia Amx che da quest’anno possono compiere, oltre ad attivita’ di ricognizione, anche bombardamenti a supporto delle forze della coalizione ed afgane: gli Amx hanno raggiunto il traguardo delle 6.000 ore di volo, portando a termine circa 2.100 missioni operative, sia di giorno che di notte, riprendendo più di 6.000 ‘target’ e fotografando oltre 3.000 chilometri di itinerari. Il task group ‘Albatros’ è invece composto da velivoli da trasporto C-130J e C-27J e un C-27 Jedi (questi ultimi dotati di disturbatori elettronici che neutralizzano gli ordigni radiocomandati piazzati lungo le strade), che hanno garantito il necessario supporto alle operazioni della missione Isaf della Nato anche in zone remote del Paese difficilmente raggiungibili via terra e in condizioni meteorologiche e operative estreme. Nell’ultimo anno, in particolare, sono stati effettuati 46 aviolanci per rifornire militari italiani e afgani. Dipendente dalla Jatf anche il task group Astore, con i velivoli senza pilota ‘Predator’ che hanno superato le 9.400 ore di volo, totalizzate in circa 1.100 sortite.

[TT-1 Pinto]

Alla ricerca di misure per contrastare un nuovo tipo di minaccia ....

 

Marines Look for New Ways to Spot Wood and Fertilizer Bombs ....

 

Finding a roadside bomb was never easy, even back when insurgents made their improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from old artillery shells and other metal parts.

But now that militant bomb-makers favor wood and fertilizer as the main components for their IEDs, detection has become a complete nightmare.

Fonte .... http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/non-metallic-bomb-detector/

 

[Andrea75]

Italian PM vows Afghan support will continue after troops pull out

 

Italy's prime minister vowed Sunday that his country will continue supporting Afghanistan even after combat troops pull out.

 

"It is important that the relationship between Afghanistan and the international community is modified to reflect the new conditions, but that it doesn't stop," Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti said Sunday in a joint news conference with Afghan Prime Minister Hamid Karzai.

 

NATO leaders are on a timetable to withdraw all of the alliance's combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014.

 

"It will be a presence based less on military contributions," Monti said. "It will be a presence based far more on economic cooperation, it will be cooperation on the exploration and use of Afghanistan's important mineral resources and it will be a cooperation, as it already is in this phase, of institution-building to make Afghanistan an ever more solid country."

 

Monti met with Karzai after visiting Italian forces on a surprise trip to Herat, Afghanistan, where Italy's troops there are based.

[Andrea75]

Un nuovo 'assetto' impiegato in teatro da For Afghan troops, donkeys are the new helicopters

 

 

Already, hundreds of donkeys are sustaining the bases that Americans built, fought to defend and, eventually, left. The shift underscores the vast gulf separating U.S. and Afghan forces, and the inevitable technological regression that will occur once American troops leave.

 

The hopeful take of U.S. officials is that this is the kind of “Afghan sustainable” approach that, though not ideal, will endure even as Western funding tapers off. But Afghan leaders aren’t happy. After a decade of joint operations and exposure to cutting-edge technology, they want their military to look like the American one they have seen up close. U.S. officials say that is impractical and financially un­realistic.

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Come facevano gli Alpini decenni fa.

[cama81]

mi sembra che anche oggi ci siano truppe somarizzate negli alpini

[madmike]

i muli (non somari, che sono altri) non sono più in servizio con le Truppe Alpine Italiane dal 1993.

[Franky]

@MadMIke: ti sbagli perchè tempo fa, in un servizio sulla TF-45, apparve un'immagine sulla rivista Raids (non ricordo il numero) in cui Alpini paracadutisti del reggimento Monte Cervino si recavano in un villaggio a bordo di un mulo per discutere con l'elder locale. E se non erro (in un video su youtube) in alcuni C.O.P. posti sul crine di una collina sono stati impiegati muli per il trasporto materiali.

[madmike]

no, non mi sbaglio: i muli non fanno più parte delle truppe alpine dal 93, il che non significa che, specie in un teatro come quello afghano, si possa affittare un mulo, o anche un cavallo. Senza che, per questo, siano ritornati 'in dotazione' i quadrupedi.

 

http://www.maistrac.it/home/wp-content/files/muli-asini.pdf

Modificato 11 Novembre 2012 da madmike

[Andrea75]

Closing patrol bases in a cost-effective way

 

As the Afghan National Security Forces increasingly take responsibility for security, so some ISAF patrol bases are being broken down. As they are, kit and equipment that was in the base is returned to Bastion to await its destiny, which may well be reuse and reallocation.

[madmike]

Gaiani sulla morte dell'alpino Chierotti:

 

http://www.analisidifesa.it/2012/11/lalpino-chierotti-ucciso-da-militari-afghani-la-difesa-non-lo-aveva-detto-e-tace/

 

I talebani hanno attivato due soldati per uccidere degli italiani” ha dichiarato il maggiore Gul Ahmad, capo della polizia afghana di Bakwa raccontando come due militari afghani (dei quali cita il nome) del presidio di Siav abbiano atteso l’arrivo degli italiani per attaccarli con lanciarazzi e raffiche di mitragliatrice in un’imboscata che ha visto anche l’intervento di gruppi di insorti appostati nelle vicinanze. Un punto importante perché a Siav c’è un avamposto controllato da un plotone di soldati dell’Afghan National Army. Impossibile quindi per i talebani appostarsi nel villaggio o nelle sue vicinanze senza che i soldati se ne accorgessero ed è quindi più che lecito sospettare della complicità dei soldati con gli insorti.

 

Episodi di “green on blue” che già in passato avevano provocato almeno un morto e una mezza dozzina di feriti tra il nostro contingente. Un silenzio spiegabile forse perché parlare dei talebani in uniforme afghana significherebbe ammettere che le truppe di Kabul non sono pronte a rilevare le forze italiane in rapida ritirata dalle zone più calde dell’Ovest. Gli “insider attacks” smentiscono la favola della transizione ordinata tra alleati e forze di Kabul e qualcuno preferisce tacerli. Si tace forse per non contraddire il ministro Giampaolo Di Paola che l’11 ottobre aveva definito questi attacchi “in diminuzione” nonostante quest’anno abbiano raggiunto il record rispetto agli 11 anni precedenti di presenza internazionale in Afghanistan. O forse per non contraddire le numerose dichiarazioni di generali e ministri (non solo italiani) che negli ultimi tempi hanno celebrato l’accresciuta efficienza dell’esercito di Kabul. Del resto proprio il reportage di Biloslavo spiega che a dicembre i nostri alpini se ne andranno da Bakwa lasciando la base di Camp Lavaredo a un centinaio di soldati afghani chissà quanti dei quali in combutta con talebani e milizie narcos.

 

barra al centro, avanti tutta.

[TT-1 Pinto]

L'articolo di Biloslavo (apparso su "Il Foglio" del 6 Novembre) citato da Gaiani nel suo pezzo ....

 

http://www.ilfoglio.it/soloqui/15645

[Andrea75]

Pakistan frees Taliban prisoners in attempt to boost Afghan reconciliation talks

 

Pakistan on Wednesday released several Afghan Taliban captives, a gesture meant to nudge along on-again, off-again reconciliation talks aimed at ending the war in Afghanistan, Pakistani officials said.

The Afghan government has long sought access to such prisoners in hopes of establishing a dialogue with the Taliban insurgents who have battled for 11 years to topple the U.S.-backed Afghan government.

“It is a gesture of support for the Afghanistan reconciliation process,” a Pakistani military official said. Reports varied on the number of Taliban prisoners set free from jails around the country, but the Foreign Ministry said there were eight.

Whether Islamabad’s gesture to Kabul eases the deep mistrust between the neighboring nations remains to be seen. It came during a four-day visit by an Afghan High Peace Council delegation to the Pakistani capital, where on Wednesday both sides urged that safe passage be provided to members of the Taliban or other armed opposition groups who come to the table.

Negotiators for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States have concluded that political reconciliation is the only viable path to ending the war. But Taliban leaders have continually affirmed their unwillingness to negotiate with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Karzai regularly criticizes Pakistan for what he calls its support of terrorist attacks and militant operations against Afghan and NATO troops. But he also recognizes that Pakistan can play a key role in brokering any peace pact — ideally before the end of 2014, when the United States is to pull its last combat troops out of Afghanistan, leaving the country more vulnerable than ever to Taliban assaults.

Pakistani officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to be named as spokesmen, said that Abdul Ghani Baradar, the former Taliban second-in-command behind Mohammad Omar, was not among the prisoners released.

[Andrea75]

Remarks With Australian Foreign Minister Robert Carr, Australian Defense Minister Stephen Smith, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

 

un brano della conferenza congiunta: a parlare è il Ministro della Difesa Aussie Smith

 

Secretary Panetta and I have also had conversations about Afghanistan and the post 2014 transition presence in Afghanistan, and I, again, very much welcome and appreciate his very strong and kind remarks about the contributions Australian Defense Force personnel have made in Afghanistan in the fine tradition of the Australian Defense Force working closely with the United States counterpart since World War II.

[Andrea75]

USMC General: U.S. Forces To Remain in Afghanistan Past 2014

 

The general tapped to become the top American and NATO military official in Afghanistan would not say coalition troops are winning the 11-year-old conflict while testifying at a Senate confirmation hearing Nov. 15, but he also said that U.S. forces will likely stay past the 2014 withdrawal date.

 

In response to a series of questions from Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., about what missions U.S. forces might conduct after December 2014 — which the Obama administration has set as the end date for the U.S. combat mission there — Marine Corps. Gen. Joseph Dunford said that “counterterrorism operations and advise and assist” duties would be the most crucial.

 

While he didn’t offer specifics, keeping those missions active would allow Special Operations forces to continue hunting terrorists, while U.S. soldiers would continue to train the Afghan Army and police. Those missions will continue to be “an enduring role [that] will exist after 2014,” Dunford said. Any other missions after 2014 “will be informed by the gaps that remain” in Afghan capability, he said.

 

Dunford also stressed that the U.S. and Afghan governments will need to sign a bilateral security agreement no later than May 2013 to grant American forces legal protections against arrest and prosecution, because “we’ll be there beyond 2014 to secure our objectives.”

 

Any such agreement would help to define a “clear and compelling narrative of commitment” by the U.S. to Afghanistan post-2014.

[Andrea75]

French Troops End Combat Mission in Afghanistan

 

French troops on Tuesday ended their last combat mission in Afghanistan by withdrawing from Kapisa province as part of an accelerated departure from the war-torn country.

The last 400 soldiers deployed to the volatile province started to leave Nijrab, the French base in Kapisa, at 10:00 am (0530 GMT) after a departure ceremony.

Of the 2,200 French soldiers still left in Afghanistan, a military official said that about 700 would return to France by the end of the year.

Around 50 trainers will remain based in Wardak province, west of Kabul, and 1,500 would stay in the Afghan capital, where most will be tasked with organising the final departure of French troops by the summer of 2013.

After that date, only several hundred French soldiers involved in cooperation or training missions will remain in the country, the military official said.

[Andrea75]

segnalo il paper Pashtunwali for peace

 

At any rate, next year (2013) will be crucial in determining what vision for the political future of Afghanistan will ultimately prevail, and the outcome will also be crucial for the future of US-Pakistan relations. Obviously, the Pakistani Generals would like to be able to realise their vision of a neutered Kabul ruled by a southern Pashtun, possibly Ghilzai, where Indian influence is in check, Pashtun vagaries on the Durand line quelled and foreign policy is drafted by Islamabad, all of course while remaining in the American circle of friends.

...

The pivot of a hypothetical Western counterstrategy builds on the sense of effective entrapment the Taliban feel vis-à-vis their position within Pakistan and their dealings with the ISI. The full knowledge that “protection” comes with a price, namely carrying out Pakistan‟s bidding, particularly of the gruesome kind (insurgencies are after all a dirty business), maybe not to a mujahid, but is deeply dishonourable to a Pashtun “lion”.

...

Moreover, there are many commanders and influential Taliban who would view a political settlement very favourably, as an effective way to remove themselves from the clutches of the ISI, go back to their ancestral lands and re-integrate in Afghan political life. The spectre of an indefinite continuation of the strife and bloodshed in a civil war against driven and powerful (much more than in the past) Northern warlords is enough to sway the “political commission” of the Quetta Shura that breaking with AQ and ejecting any iteration of its doctrine is the right thing to do.

...

For the West, engaging in direct talks with the Taliban may indeed go a long way towards a prospective reconciliation with the Pashtun. The provisions for peace-making (nanawatei) in the age-old code of the Pashtunwali could definitely be leveraged, as indeed the Pashtun have depended upon them for thousands of years to resolve conflicts and blood feuds.

Lodged in between Iran and Pakistan, the Hindu Kush and the plains descending towards the Arab Sea, the Pashtun occupy a particularly strategic geographic location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

[Andrea75]

L'alpino Tiziano Chierotti vittima dei soldati afghani. Un reportage svela la verità che la difesa ha taciuto

 

Il caporale Tiziano Chierotti, ultimo dei 52 caduti italiani in Afghanistan, è stato ucciso da militari afghani. Lo scontro a fuoco del 25 ottobre nel villaggio di Siav, a 20 chilometri dalla base del Secondo reggimento alpini a Bakwa (provincia di Farah), è stato scatenato dalle armi di due militari afghani rinnegati, probabilmente talebani infiltrati, che hanno teso un agguato alla pattuglia italiana.

Lo racconta (non smentito) sul quotidiano Il Foglio il reporter Fausto Biloslavo in un dettagliato articolo dal villaggio Siav nel quale cita le testimonianze dei militari che hanno partecipato al combattimento. Un reportage che completa e in parte smentisce la scarna e lacunosa versione ufficiale fornita dal comando di Herat e dalla Difesa che aveva riferito di un attacco condotto "da un gruppo di insorti".

"I talebani hanno attivato due soldati per uccidere degli italiani" ha dichiarato il maggiore Gul Ahmad, capo della polizia afghana di Bakwa raccontando come due militari afghani del presidio di Siav abbiano atteso l'arrivo degli italiani per attaccarli con lanciarazzi e raffiche di mitragliatrice in un'imboscata che ha visto anche l'intervento di gruppi di insorti appostati nelle vicinanze. Nella sparatoria durata una quindicina di minuti uno dei militari rinnegati è stato ucciso ma l'latro è riuscito a fuggire con i miliziani . Il reportage è ricco di dettagli e testimonianze che fanno onore agli uomini del Secondo plotone che hanno risposto al fuoco nemico senza coinvolgere gli abitanti del villaggio ma fornisce anche informazioni sulla presenza di miliziani ceceni al fianco dei talebani e delle milizie narcos nel distretto caldo di Bakwa.

L'aspetto più grave e preoccupante riguarda però la scarsa affidabilità delle fonti ufficiali italiane che, a Herat come a Roma, risultano ancora una volta incomplete, lacunose quando non restìe a fornire informazioni e dettagli circa gli scontri che coinvolgono le nostre truppe a volte uccidendo o ferendo militari italiani. Non è la prima volta che fonti giornalistiche fanno luce su scontri e caduti italiani nella guerra afghana sulla quale tutti i governi, incluso evidentemente quello dei tecnici, hanno cercato di tenere nascosti aspetti spinosi che nulla hanno a che vedere con il segreto militare. Paradossale che ufficiali afghani raccontino senza reticenze degli insider attacks (i cosiddetti "green on blue" che vedono militari e poliziotti di Kabul sparare sui soldati alleati) dei quali le autorità italiane preferiscono a quanto sembra non parlare.

E' accettabile per le nostre forze armate subire lezioni di trasparenza e comunicazione dagli afghani? Quest'anno statunitensi, britannici, francesi e australiani hanno reso noto senza censure i dettagli delle uccisioni di una sessantina di loro soldati colpiti dagli "alleati" afghani. Roma sembra voler nascondere questi episodi che già in passato avevano provocato almeno un morto e una mezza dozzina di feriti tra il nostro contingente. Forse perché parlare dei talebani in uniforme afghana significa ammettere che le truppe di Kabul non sono certo pronte a rilevare le forze italiane in rapida ritirata dalle zone più calde dell'Ovest smentendo così le numerose dichiarazioni ufficiali che hanno celebrato negli ultimi tempi l'accresciuta efficienza dell'esercito di Kabul.

 

 

Afghanistan: operazione “Zafar 14”, arrestato il capo di una cellula di insorti

 

L’operazione “Zafar 14”, è stata condotta dalle Forze di sicurezza afgane, con il sostegno dei militari del Contingente italiano.

Si è conclusa nei giorni scorsi, nella zona orientale della provincia di Farah, l’operazione “Zafar 14”, che ha portato all’arresto del capo di una cellula di insorti che opera nell’area, al fermo di altri 17 individui e al sequestro di un’ingente quantità di oppio.

L’attività è stata pianificata e condotta da unità della 2^ Brigata del 207° Corpo dell’Esercito afgano, del Comando Provinciale della Polizia e del Direttorato Nazionale per la Sicurezza, insieme alla Task Force South di Farah - su base 9° Reggimento alpini dell’Aquila.

L’operazione si è svolta con successo anche grazie al ruolo dei Military Advisor Team italiani – i nuclei che assistono le unità dell’esercito afghano a tutti i livelli – i quali hanno garantito efficacemente il coordinamento delle attività sul terreno tra le forze locali e quelle italiane.

La “Zafar 14” si inquadra nella serie di operazioni in partnership tra le Forze afgane e quelle internazionali, volte ad assicurare la libertà di movimento lungo la Ring Road, e rappresenta un passo importante nell’ottica della transizione della responsabilità della pubblica sicurezza alle Forze di Sicurezza locali.

Modificato 21 Novembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

pienamente operativi gli elicotteri NH90 Italian army aviation fully operational with NH90 in Afghanistan

 

Italy's Task Unit Nemo has quietly assumed full operating capability with the NH90 helicopter in Afghanistan.

 

The first of five Italian Army NH90s deployed to Herat aboard a US C-17 on 20 August and the last arrived on 22 September (all personnel had arrived by 6 September), but details have just emerged that the force has become operational on NH90's first deployment into theatre. The helicopters are now operating under Task Force Fenice, supporting Italy's contingent in Regional Command-West (RC-W) with troop lift and medical evacuation.

 

The unit performed 89 day and night sorties before full operational capability was reached on 25 September. Five full aircrews are currently deployed, enabling the unit to provide 60 flying hours during a 30 day period, but the ultimate goal is to reach 90 hours with four aircrews: eight pilots, four flight engineers, and eight door gunners.

 

The Herat-based NH90s were all brought up to an enhanced Initial Operational Capability configuration before deployment. According to Italian defence reports, NH90 has so far offered good dust resistance and overall robustness. Low-light night flying capabilities are said to have significantly improved with the introduction of Configuration 3 of the Thales TopOwl helmet-mounted sight/display before deployment.

[Andrea75]

... un parere controcorrenteWhy U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan

 

Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan. The answer can be yes only if we pursue and support the current strategy, retaining roughly 68,000 troops in Afghanistan into 2014 and about half that number thereafter.

The principal terrorist concentrations in South Asia are in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas. Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have sought safety in Afghanistan primarily in Konar and Nuristan provinces. U.S. forces could target terrorists without maintaining a ground presence in three ways: using armed Predator drones, special mission units or precision-guided munitions dropped from manned aircraft. Without bases in Afghanistan, the tyranny of distance rules out the first two options; the requirement for accuracy and certainty rules out the last.

North Waziristan is more than 600 miles from the nearest coastline; the other sanctuaries are farther. The U.S. Air Force reports that armed Predator drones have a range of about 1,150 miles — not enough to get to Waziristan and back again from the coast, much less to orbit and observe a target. Special mission units would have to parachute from transport aircraft because no helicopter in the U.S. inventory can fly that far. But they could not return because aircraft cannot land in the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan or in Pakistan. Manned aircraft can drop precision weapons on targets in Afghanistan, but they fly too fast to loiter over potential targets. Their bombs hit precisely what they are aimed at, but fast-moving aircraft cannot ensure that the target was actually there. There is no over-the-horizon solution to targeting terrorists in South Asia.

Bases in Afghanistan obviate all these problems. U.S. forces operating from Khost, Jalalabad and Kandahar can strike targets in Afghanistan (or Pakistan) with Predators and special mission units. Such operations have been critical to the success of counterterrorism operations in this region, including the killing of Osama bin Laden (Abbottabad is about 150 miles east of Jalalabad, 750 miles from the Indian Ocean).

The minimum U.S. footprint to sustain counterterrorism operations requires bases near Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar to reach known terrorist havens (Khost and Jalalabad are less than 100 miles apart but are separated by a 10,000-foot mountain range). Each base requires an airstrip to fly Predators and move supplies by air. Each must also have aircraft ground crews and support the special mission units.

Amateurs can discuss imaginary, over-the-horizon “light footprint” strategies. Professionals must consider logistics. Physics and military reality dictate the minimum number of troops needed to have any U.S. presence in Afghanistan without inviting calamities worse than the events in Benghazi, Libya. The presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan alone permits counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. It’s this simple: Either we keep the necessary number of troops in Afghanistan or operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan cease.

Base security and support impose serious troop requirements. These bases are in dangerous places, and we surely will not entrust the protection of U.S. personnel to local forces as we did in Benghazi. Securing the perimeter would require at least two companies of soldiers (alternating guard duty) and a company-size quick-reaction force — a battalion, in other words. Each base must also have the helicopters needed to move around and conduct operations — at least a combat aviation battalion — and a field medical facility able to handle severe trauma. That adds up to one combat brigade (3,500 soldiers) and one combat aviation brigade (5,000 to 6,000 soldiers).

That’s about 10,000 troops — without counting the supply or command and control of these forces. Even if we supply each base directly by air from outside Afghanistan, with no facility near Kabul, each base still needs logistical elements, probably at least 3,000 to 5,000 combat service support troops. The most idealized version of the limited counterterrorism footprint, therefore, is around 15,000 troops. At that strength we would not be able to advise, enable, support or rely on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since they, like our NATO allies, depend on U.S. enablers such as reconnaissance, helicopters, medevac and route-clearance packages, most of their operations would cease.

[TT-1 Pinto]

Quanti soldati USA rimarranno in Afghanistan dopo il 2014 ?

 

Dal "Daily Report" dell'AFA di questa mattina ....

 

 

DOD: No Decision Yet on Post-2014 US Presence in Afghanistan

 

 

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has yet to forward a recommendation to the White House on how many US military personnel should remain in Afghanistan after 2014, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told reporters on Nov. 26.

 

"It's entirely premature to speculate on troop numbers in Afghanistan between now and the end of 2014 or beyond," said Little.

 

His comments came following press reports claiming that the United States would maintain some 10,000 troops in Afghanistan for training and counterterrorism activities after NATO's combat mission there formally concludes at the end of 2014.

 

See, for example, UK Guardian report .... http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/26/us-afghanistan-troops-10000-longterm

 

 

Little said Panetta is scheduled to speak on Nov. 27 with Marine Corps Gen. John Allen, the top US and coalition general in Afghanistan, to discuss a range of matters.

 

"As we've made clear on several occasions, any US presence would only be at the invitation of the Afghan government, and aimed at training Afghan forces and targeting the remnants of al Qaeda," said Little.

 

Ultimately, President Obama will make the call, he added.

 

AFPS report by Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr. .... http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118624

 

See also .... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2012/September%202012/September%2024%202012/Desurged.aspx

 

Inoltre ....

 

Still a Force in Southwest Asia even with the Pacific Shift .... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/November%2027%202012/StillaForceinSouthwestAsiaevenwiththePacificShift.aspx

Modificato 27 Novembre 2012 da TT-1 Pinto

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, è una interessante "fotografia" dell'attuale scenario afghano

 

The capacity and transparency of Afghan governance are crucial to the success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014. The capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but nepotism is entrenched in Afghan culture and other forms of corruption are widespread. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anticorruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, provided Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption. On July 26, 2012, Karzai appeared to try to meet his pledges to the Tokyo conference by issuing a “decree on administrative reforms”—a document of sweeping policy directives intended to curb corruption.

Even though the government is weak, President Hamid Karzai has tried to concentrate authority in Kabul through his constitutional powers of appointment at all levels. Karzai has repeatedly and publicly denied assertions by opposing faction leaders that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of his second term, but there are concerns he plans to use state election machinery to support the election of a successor. International efforts to curb fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) largely failed and Afghan efforts to improve election oversight for the 2014 election are behind schedule, although the issue is being closely watched by Afghan civil society groups. Organized opposition political parties are working together to ensure a fair election.

No matter how the 2014 election works out, there is concern among many observers that governance will founder as the United States and its partners wind down their involvement in

Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders—who have always been at least as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure—is expected to assert itself after 2014 should governing institutions falter. However, the reassertion of informal leaders might produce even more corruption and arbitrary administration of justice than is the case now. Karzai has thus fare been unable to marginalize these ethnic faction leaders, in part because they have large constituencies, but he relies more closely on the loyalty of several close, ethnic Pashtun allies, particularly those from the Qandahar area. The non-Pashtun faction leaders generally oppose Karzai’s willingness to make concessions to insurgent leaders in search of a settlement. There are fears that a reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics will further set back progress in human rights and the rights of women and boost Pashtun power.

Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment in particular regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. Women, media professionals, and civil society groups have made substantial gains since the fall of the Taliban, but traditional attitudes contribute to the judicial and political system’s continued toleration of child marriages,

imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence, judgments against converts from Islam to Christianity, and curbs on the sale of alcohol and Western-oriented programming in the Afghan media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.

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Grave attentato al contingente ISAF di Jalalabad, in cui sono rimasti feriti numerosi militari dell'ANA, dell'ISAF stessa, ed alcuni civili morti. Nove gli attentatori uccisi durante l'assalto.

 

FOnte: lasottilelinearossa

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo articolo Allies Absent in Afghanistan - Helicopters Hired che tratta della manuenzione degli elicotteri usati in Afghanistan.

 

Lo posto qui perchè viene citato il contributo fornito dagli alleati, con anche una menzione per l'Italia

 

Afghanistan is shaping up as a test of the NATO alliance. Thus far, the report is mixed. While a number of allied countries have committed troops, few of the NATO countries’ available helicopters have been committed, despite promises made and commanders’ requests from the field. Britain, the Netherlands, and the USA had contributed much of the combat helicopter support in the most active combat zones, alongside some CH-47s from non-NATO partner Australia. They’ve been supplemented by helicopters from some east bloc countries like Poland and the Czech Republic (Mi-8/17s), and by a few CH-47D Chinooks and Bell 412ERs from Canada. The sizable helicopter fleets belonging to NATO members like France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have also seen some use in Afghanistan, with the Italian contingent (currently CH-47s, NH90s and A129 attack helicopters) covering a wide area to the west. The most serious fighting, and corresponding need, remains in the south.

That has created political tensions within the alliance, especially when set against the backdrop of European shortfalls in meeting NATO ISAF commitments. At one point, the USA was forced to extend the deployment of 20 CH-47 heavy helicopters by 6 months, in order to try and make up the shortfall.