Afghanistan - Topic ufficiale

[Andrea75]

New Pakistan Taliban chief emerging, will focus on Afghan fight

 

Pakistan's Taliban, one of the world's most feared militant groups, are preparing for a leadership change that could mean less violence against the state but more attacks against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, Pakistani military sources said.

Hakimullah Mehsud, a ruthless commander who has led the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for the last three years, has lost operational control of the movement and the trust of his fighters, said a senior Pakistan army official based in the South Waziristan tribal region, the group's stronghold.

The organization's more moderate deputy leader, Wali-ur-Rehman, 40, is poised to succeed Mehsud, whose extreme violence has alienated enough of his fighters to significantly weaken him, the military sources told Reuters.

"Rehman is fast emerging as a consensus candidate to formally replace Hakimullah," said the army official, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter. "Now we may see the brutal commander replaced by a more pragmatic one for whom reconciliation with the Pakistani government has become a priority."

The TTP, known as the Pakistan Taliban, was set up as an umbrella group of militants in 2007.

Its main aim is to topple the U.S.-backed government in Pakistan and impose its austere brand of Islam across the country of 185 million people, although it has also carried out attacks in neighboring Afghanistan.

The militants intensified their battle against the Pakistani state after an army raid on Islamabad's Red Mosque in 2007, which had been seized by allies of the group.

[Andrea75]

qualche "statistica" USAF Launched 114 Remote Strikes in Afghanistan Last Month

 

The U.S. Air Force launched 114 November strikes in Afghanistan from remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), according to Air Force statistics, representing roughly a quarter of the 447 strikes launched for the year.

Air Force RPAs are now averaging about 1.4 remote-controlled strikes per day in the theater, reflecting the continued commitment by the Obama administration to use remotely piloted aircraft in battle. As RPA use has increased, the average number of manned flights in which weapons were used has dropped from 165 a month in 2011 to136 a month this year.

The numbers were released Dec. 6 as part of the monthly Combined Forces Air Component Commander airpower statistics. Data on the number of RPA strikes were included in the monthly report for the first time in October. The statistics include only strikes in Afghanistan because the Air Force is no longer actively supporting activities in Iraq.

The new statistics come with a caveat that data “may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification.” The 2009 total increased by two strikes and 2010 by one strike compared with previously released numbers. A request for information on whether the 2012 statistics were updated was not returned immediately.

Since 2009, there have been 1,277 Air Force strikes in Afghanistan. That number reflects only weapon releases on the battlefield, and not the controversial targeted attacks that have been carried out around the globe.

[Andrea75]

Afghanistan: AMX distruggono antenne dei ribelli

 

Mercoledì 5 Dicembre, due velivoli AMX dell’Aeronautica Militare hanno distrutto, con bombe a guida laser, due antenne per le comunicazioni radio utilizzate da un gruppo di ribelli che opera nel distretto di Bakwa, nella regione occidentale dell’Afghanistan.

Si tratta del secondo obiettivo di questo tipo distrutto a distanza di poche settimane e sempre nella stessa area a pochi chilometri dalla base operativa avanzata "Lavaredo", dove è schierata la Task Force South East costituita dagli alpini del 2° reggimento.

Gli analisti di immagini del Task Group "Black Cats" hanno individuato gli apparati alimentati da pannelli solari, collocati in cima ad una montagna, dopo aver visionato centinaia di immagini rilevate dai sistemi di scoperta.

Il successo dell’operazione è stato garantito dall’utilizzo di armamento di precisione e dallo stretto coordinamento con il team della Task Force South East in collegamento con gli aerei, nonché dall’utilizzo di velivoli a pilotaggio remoto ‘Predator’ del Task Group "Astore" che hanno costantemente sorvegliato dall’alto la zona dove erano ubicate le antenne. Da febbraio di quest’anno i velivoli AMX dell’Aeronautica Militare schierati ad Herat hanno effettuato, senza causare danni collaterali, interventi a supporto delle truppe di terra.

Il Task Group "Black Cats", dotato di velivoli cacciabombardieri AMX, svolge missioni di ricognizione e di supporto aereo ravvicinato alle forze alleate e afghane sul terreno, con piloti e specialisti proveniente dal 51° Stormo di Istrana, dal 32° Stormo di Amendola (Foggia) e dal 3° Reparto Manutenzione Velivoli di Treviso.

Il Task Group è inquadrato nella Joint Air Task Force dell’Aeronautica Militare di stanza a Herat, la quale ha il compito di gestire gli assetti di volo assegnati al Comando operativo NATO per l’Afghanistan che operano prevalentemente nella regione occidentale attualmente sotto la responsabilità della Brigata alpina Taurinense.

 

 

Afghan AF, NATO Air Training Command sign joint strategic flightplan

 

Maj. Gen. Abdul Wahab Wardak, commander of the Afghan air force, and Brig. Gen. Steven Shepro, commander of NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan, signed the first-ever combined strategy into effect at a Nov. 28 ceremony at the NATC-A headquarters at the Kabul International Airport here.

All three Wings and key leaders witnessed the ceremony. The 54-page strategic flightplan guides both commands to execute a jointly developed decree of vision, goals and key tasks, with milestones focused on 2012-2013. The ceremony capped a three-month bottom-up planning effort across the groups, Afghan air wings, AAF headquarters, NATC-A and the 438 Air Expeditionary Wing staff.

"This is for everyone -- each function is specifically identified," said Wahab, among both AAF and NATC-A headquarters staffs, with the AAF wings joining by video teleconference. "This is also a plan with a timeline. By the end of 2013, we should accomplish these goals."

The strategy prioritizes efforts along key transitional and operational goals:

· A strong, professional Afghan Air Force that successfully leads its missions and personnel

· Effective AAF resource management and stewardship

· A culture of safe and effective aviation, maintenance and support

· Afghan planned, led, and coordinated operations that impact 2013 fighting season victories

"Our combined strategy initiative not only provides a clear roadmap out to 2013," explained Lt. Col. Kouji Gillis, NATC-A strategist, "the initiative provided the Afghan air force members insight to our strategy-development process, for their own future independent planning".

The document is the culmination of a bottom-up approach to organizational strategy, told Gillis. NATO mentors and Afghan leaders across each Afghan air force function, ranging from personnel to logistics, partnered to evaluate risks, assumptions, constraints, and develop the goals that feed into larger, over-arching guidance.

"We are doing many great things", explained Shepro. "It is important that we do the right things, and on the same sheet of music. This precedent provides joint direction, cohesion and motivation to build needed airpower capability to succeed in next year's fight, and to develop capacity of the Afghan air force's most important asset -- its airmen -- to sustain that success."

Modificato 10 Dicembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

Déjà 181 vols de gros porteurs pour évacuer 560 véhicules et 490 containers d'Afghanistan

 

Outre les deux mille soldats rapatriés depuis mai 2012, 39% des matériels et véhicules concernés par la première phase du repli français ont regagné la métropole. D'ici à la fin de l'année, ce chiffre sera porté à 48%. La seconde phase devrait durer six mois et déboucher sur le retrait d'un autre millier de soldats.

 

Le colonel Michel André, le commandant en second du CMT (centre mutimodal des transports, chargé des acheminements stratégiques en liaison, en ce qui concerne l'Afghanistan, avec le CPCO, le CICLO et PAMIR), précise que le fret concerné englobe "2 680 unités dont 1 150 véhicules et 1 530 containers".

 

Selon lui, lors des dernières semaines de décembre et des premières de janvier, "un gros effort va être consenti car les conditions climatiques seront optimales, le froid ambiant permettant de charger au maximum les gros porteurs". Ces Antonov et Boeing 747 assurent, au départ de KAIA, actuellement tout le transfert hors des emprises afghanes. "181 vols ont déjà eu lieu; 20 à 30% de ces vols (pour rapatrier du fret sensible: hélicoptères, munitions...) directement vers la France, le reste vers les EAU" où le fret est alors chargé sur des bateaux.

[Andrea75]

paper su In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress

 

On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid out U.S. government approaches for “winding down” the war in Afghanistan.1 While a

number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to “wind down” a war, the Administration’s commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war

in Afghanistan is clear.

Many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners—that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international engagement has been extended. For the U.S. government, the broad strategic issues at stake in the war in Afghanistan include:

• What fundamental national security interests does the United States have in Afghanistan and the region?

• What minimum conditions—political, economic, security—would need to pertain in Afghanistan in order for those U.S. interests to be protected?

• How appropriate are current and projected future U.S. approaches, until and after 2014, for helping Afghans establish those conditions?

• When and to what extent are Afghans likely to be able to sustain those conditions with relatively limited support from the international community?

• Ultimately, how important is this overall effort—given its likely timeline, risks, and costs—compared to other U.S. government priorities?

At this apparent turning point in both strategic thinking and activity on the ground, this short report considers issues that may be of interest to Congress as it considers the strength and

duration of further U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, to 2014 and beyond.

...

Troop Levels and the Campaign

For many observers, whether supporters or critics of the effort, U.S. troop levels are the starting point of the debates—the most powerful, visible marker of the extent of U.S. commitment and an indication of how far the fight has progressed. A number of observers have argued for “accelerating” the pace of U.S. troop drawdowns from Afghanistan, while others, including some commanders on the ground, have supported keeping as many troops in theater as possible through the 2013 fighting season, as well as retaining a residual troop presence after 2014.

...

Transition and Change of Mission

All major stakeholders have agreed that central to the way forward in Afghanistan is shifting increasing responsibility for security to Afghan forces. That shift is codified at the strategic level in the formal process of Transition, and in NATO and U.S. government pledges to change the mission of coalition forces; and it is usually discussed, at the operational level, in terms of the concrete ways that coalition forces “pull back” as Afghans step forward. These strategic- and operational-level approaches to transition writ large are linked but not isomorphic, and dynamics in both arenas are constantly changing.

...

Economy

Afghanistan’s ability to sustain itself after reductions in contributions by the international community was long the little-discussed “elephant in the room” in strategic-level debates,

perhaps because the challenge seemed so daunting. More recently, however, the Afghan government and the international community have worked more concertedly to craft realistic

economic development plans. That intensified focus was catalyzed by one of the largest looming challenges—sustaining the ANSF.

...

Governance

For many practitioners, an array of triggers has brought concerns about Afghan governance to the forefront. These include deep concerns about the conduct and outcome of the 2014 Afghan presidential elections; recognition of the challenges the Afghan judicial system has faced in addressing allegations of wrongdoing arising from the 2010 Kabul Bank crisis; and wide

recognition among practitioners on the ground that the leverage of the international community is likely to diminish, including the particular fears of many military commanders that international civilian efforts are likely to be sharply curtailed. Yet those concerns are counter-balanced somewhat by what many observers characterize as diminishing appetite on the part of the international community to attempt to shape outcomes in this arena.

...

Pakistan

Successful counter-insurgency generally relies on “smothering” an insurgency within a closed environment. Pakistan—Afghanistan’s permanent neighbor—has long posed a conundrum for the campaign in Afghanistan by offering safe havens to Afghan insurgent leaders and fighters. The access those havens provide to recruiting, financing, training, and leadership direction grossly complicates the campaign in Afghanistan, making it far more difficult to deprive the insurgencies of the “oxygen” lifelines they need.

...

How Does This End?

Many observers suggest that, particularly in the wake of the NATO Chicago Summit, an unprecedentedly clear “way forward” has emerged for Afghanistan, including major components

of the effort as well as a longer and more realistic timeline for international engagement. Yet some suggest that these major components are still not linked together in a single coherent

strategic roadmap, one that begins with a vision of endstate that protects U.S. interests, includes the minimum essential conditions necessary to realize that endstate, articulates a strategic logic that connects the major components of the effort, and juxtaposes that roadmap against a clear timeline.

In particular, some suggest, grave conceptual confusion persists within U.S. policy about how the war itself ends—that is, the “theory of victory” for the war in Afghanistan, or the logic that links current approaches to a desired endstate. One approach, particularly prevalent at the operational and tactical levels, emphasizes the gradual accretion of gains in Afghan civilian and security capability, together with an incrementally diminished insurgency. But military commanders are usually the first to add that such an approach is most likely to lead to real war termination only if that campaign is complemented by a multi-faceted political settlement process.

The second prevalent approach, also supported by U.S. policy, stresses achieving a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and top insurgent leaders through a reconciliation process in which the U.S. aims to facilitate “Afghans talking with Afghans.” Efforts to date have, by all accounts, been stymied by the lack of substantive overlap, and thus the lack of bargaining space, between the major parties to the conflict. Yet, observers suggest, there may be an even more fundamental flaw in this logic: the Afghan people generally perceive their own government as corrupt and view it with suspicion, and they generally fear the Taliban. It is not obvious to many observers, therefore, how the Afghan people, arguably the ultimate arbiters of stability in Afghanistan, would respond to a deal brokered between these two entities.

[Andrea75]

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

 

During the reporting period of April 1 to September 30, 2012, the Coalition and our Afghan partners blunted the insurgent summer offensive, continued to transition the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) into security lead, pushed violence out of most populated areas, and coalition member nations signed several international agreements to support the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan. In May, President Obama and President Karzai signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, reflecting the two governments’ desire for an enduring partnership. At the May 2012 Chicago Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations also pledged to support Afghanistan

through 2017. This was followed in July by the Tokyo Conference, at which the international community declared its support for Afghanistan by linking specific reforms in governance and rule-of-law by the Afghan government with sustained financial assistance through 2015.

During the reporting period enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) were up one percent compared to the same period last year, due in large part to a shortened poppy harvest employing low-level insurgents far less than in past years. However, EIAs are down 3 percent from January to September 2012 compared to the same period in 2011, after dropping nine percent in 2011 compared to 2010. EIAs are now disproportionately occurring outside of populated areas, and the security of many of Afghanistan’s largest cities increased substantially during the reporting period.

Security progress and the development of the ANSF during the reporting period have enabled the security transition process to continue in accordance with the framework agreed to at the 2010 Lisbon Summit. As of the end of September 2012, roughly 76 percent of Afghans are living in areas where the ANSF has begun to assume the lead for security.

Despite these and other positive trends during the reporting period, the campaign continued to face challenges, including a rise in insider attacks. The rise in insider attacks has the potential to adversely affect the Coalition’s political landscape, but mitigation policies and a collective ISAF-ANSF approach are helping to reduce risks to coalition personnel, and to sustain confidence in the campaign. The cause of and eventual solution to this joint ISAF and ANSF problem will require continuous assessment; it remains clear that the insider threat is both an enemy tactic and has a cultural component. The many mitigation policies recently put in place will require additional time to assess their effects, although the number of insider attacks has

dropped off sharply from the peak in August.

The insurgency’s safe havens in Pakistan, the limited institutional capacity of the Afghan government, and endemic corruption remain the greatest risks to long-term stability and sustainable security in Afghanistan. The Taliban-led insurgency and its al-Qaida affiliates still operate from sanctuaries in Pakistan, however, the insurgency and al-Qaida continue to face U.S. counterterrorism pressure within the safe havens. U.S. relations with Pakistan have begun to improve following the re-opening of Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs), and there has been nascent improvement with respect to cross-border cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Although the insurgency’s kinetic capabilities have declined from their peak in 2010, the insurgents remain resilient and determined, and will likely attempt to regain lost ground and influence through continued assassinations, intimidation, high-profile attacks, and the emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Widespread corruption continues to limit the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Afghan government. Despite these challenges, the Coalition continued to make measured progress toward achieving its strategic goals during the reporting period.

 

The ISAF Surge is Now Complete

The United States completed the final stage of the phased recovery of the U.S. surge forces during the reporting period. As of September 20, 2012, the United States completed the drawdown of all 33,000 surge forces, consistent with the plan outlined by President Obama in June 2011. Despite this redeployment of forces, EIAs continued to decline through the first nine months of 2012, due in part to the increased capability of the ANSF. Between March 1st and September 30th, the United States decreased its military forces in Afghanistan by 25 percent, while other Coalition forces increased by one percent.

Approximately 68,000 U.S. forces now remain in Afghanistan, and planning continues to determine future force level requirements. The U.S. remains committed to the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan. The end of the surge provides an opportunity to look back upon its accomplishments. Many security metrics have improved during the last two years. The comparison in violence between 2012 to date and 2010 (the first year with surge-level forces present for the same nine month

period) is stark: EIAs have declined by 12 percent, IED explosions have declined by nine percent, ISAF-caused civilian casualties have declined by 28 percent (insurgent-caused civilian casualties increased by 11 percent), Direct Fire (DF) attacks have declined by nine percent, and indirect fire attacks are down by 24 percent. The ANSF has grown by 88,464 personnel, and has dramatically increased its capabilities. The areas of the country influenced by the insurgents and the ability of the insurgency to attack the population have been significantly diminished.

Although challenges remain and progress in Afghanistan has been uneven in many areas, the security gains resulting from the surge are clear.

 

Security Progress

The improvement in the security of the populated areas of Afghanistan was the most significant security-related development of the reporting period. Security dramatically improved in most of Afghanistan’s five most populous districts, with EIAs in the first nine months of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011 dropping 22 percent in Kabul, 62 percent in Kandahar, 13 percent in Herat, 88 percent in Mezar-e-Sharif, and rising 2 percent in Kunduz.2 In many of the most contested areas of the country, insurgent attacks are becoming more isolated, and are occurring further away from population centers. The majority of Afghanistan’s 405 districts now experience very low levels of EIAs; 80 percent of attacks occur in districts encompassing only 20 percent of the population, and nearly one half of all attacks country-wide occur in just 17 districts – that contain only five percent of the population. The Taliban’s ability to attack the people of Afghanistan has been diminished, particularly in Kandahar, the operational and ideological base of the Taliban. The slight rise in EIAs this reporting period when compared to the same period in 2011 was caused by a number of factors. In past years, many low-level insurgent fighters took part in the

poppy harvest, substantially lowering attack levels for roughly six weeks. The harvest period this year was approximately 2-3 weeks due to weather conditions, as opposed to the 6-8 weeks observed in past years, effectively freeing up these low-level fighters to begin the fighting season early. This contributed to unusually high EIAs in April, May, and June. Conversely, the remainder of the reporting period had lower levels of EIAs when compared to last year. Major ISAF and ANSF operations also increased 21 percent compared to last year, and many of the EIAs that occurred during the reporting period were a result of this increased operational tempo.

The security situation in Regional Command South (RC-S) improved slightly during the reporting period, with EIAs down four percent compared to last year, most notably in populated areas in and around Kandahar City. ISAF transferred security responsibility to ANSF lead in Kandahar City in May 2012, after which the security situation improved significantly compared to last year, due largely to Coalition-initiated operations. Attacks were instead concentrated in less densely populated but highly contested areas in the “Taliban heartland,” Maiwand, Zharay, and Panjwa’i; these districts accounted for more than 12 percent of nationwide EIAs, but have less than one percent of the nationwide population.

The security situation for populated areas in Regional Command Southwest (RC-SW) also improved during the reporting period, despite a two percent increase in overall EIAs compared to the same period last year. The populated areas in RC-SW saw a decrease in EIAs, with much of the fighting now occurring in remote areas. Nahr-e Saraj is the most violent RC-SW district, with 10 percent of total EIAs for all of Afghanistan, and yet has less than 0.5 percent of the Afghan population.

Progress in security in Regional Command - North (RC-N) and Regional Command – West (RCW) was mixed. EIAs were up by 28 percent in RC-N and 44 percent in RC-W compared to the same period last year. However, these areas are still much less violent than southern and eastern Afghanistan. EIAs in RC-W and RC-N combined make up just eight percent of total EIAs in Afghanistan. Additionally, the rise in RC-W EIAs was likely the result of spillover from RCSW, as ANSF and ISAF operations have pushed insurgents from populated areas in the Helmand River Valley north into Farah and Ghor Provinces. Despite the progress of ANSF-led security efforts, insurgents also assassinated several political leaders, garnering international media attention. In RC-N and RC-W, attacks are increasingly criminal in nature; as the insurgency recedes, narcotics trafficking and criminal patronage networks are becoming more prominent.

Pakistani-based sanctuary for insurgents, such as the Haqqani Taliban Network in North Waziristan, as well as the financial and operational support that insurgents receive from various sources, keeps the security situation along the border with Pakistan in Regional Command - East (RC-E) volatile. Although EIAs decreased by 1 percent in RC-E compared to last year during the reporting period, eastern Afghanistan accounted for almost a third of all insurgent attacks throughout the country. The death in August of Baddrudin Haqqani, the senior operational commander for the Haqqani Taliban Network, may have temporarily disrupted Haqqani operations, but the full impact of this event remains unclear.

In Regional Command - Capital (RC-C), sustained National Directorate of Security (NDS) and ANSF-led operations resulted in greatly improved security throughout Kabul, which was already far more secure than most of the country. Progress was highlighted by successful Afghan security responses to the April 15 and June 22 complex-coordinated attacks in which coordinated ANSF responses effectively contained the attacks with only minor ISAF support. EIAs decreased by 25 percent compared to last year, and high-profile attacks (HPAs) dropped from 12 during the same period in 2011 to just six this year.

Unsuccessful Insurgent Military Offensive

The insurgency was unable to re-take significant territory during the reporting period, despite stating this as one of its chief goals during the fighting season. Instead, the insurgency continued to lose territory overall, including much of its main safe havens in Southern Afghanistan. The insurgency is resilient, and its sanctuaries in Pakistan prevent their decisive defeat in the nearterm. But the growth of the ANSF combined with high ISAF force levels enabled the Coalition to secure much of the country. The insurgents’ ability to threaten major population centers has been significantly weakened. Insurgent attacks, particularly in RC-S and RC-SW, have shifted from primarily offensive operations in Afghan population centers, to primarily reactive

operations in areas that had previously been safe havens. Taliban territorial influence and control decreased last year; this trend continued during this reporting period.

The insurgency has nevertheless retained its capability to carry out attacks at almost the same level as last year during the reporting period. After a substantial decline in 2011 and early 2012, a number of violence indicators, including IED incidents and EIAs, have remained constant. Despite this leveling off of the number of attacks, the insurgency’s ability to carry out these attacks in populated areas has been greatly diminished. The insurgency has also retained the capability to carry out coordinated attacks infrequently, as evidenced by the attack on Camp Bastion on September 14 (in which six aircraft were destroyed, and another two were severely damaged).

[Andrea75]

Afghanistan: inizia la transizione di Farah alle autorità afgane

 

Si è svolta questa mattina la cerimonia formale che ha segnato l’inizio della transizione alle autorità afgane di sei distretti della Provincia di Farah.

Alla cerimonia, che si è tenuta presso il Comando della 2^ Brigata dell’Esercito afgano, oltre al Comandante del Regional Command West di ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), Gen. B. Dario Ranieri, hanno partecipato il Ministro dell’Istruzione Obaidullah Obaid, numerose Autorità civili e militari afgane e di ISAF.

Per la Regione Occidentale dell’Afghanistan si tratta del secondo evento nell’arco di pochi giorni che riguarda il processo di transizione, denominato ‘Inteqal’, in base al quale il Governo afgano assumerà, entro la fine del 2014, la leadership della sicurezza del Paese.

Martedì era stato, infatti, siglato il documento ufficiale che sancisce il passaggio alle Forze di Sicurezza locali della responsabilità della sicurezza in numerosi distretti della Provincia di Herat.

La transizione è stata suddivisa in cinque tranches sulla base dei progressi ottenuti nello sviluppo dei settori giudiziario, economico e della governance in ambito distrettuale, oltre alla sicurezza.

I distretti che inizieranno la transizione oggi – Farah, Bala Boluk, Anar Dara, Lash-e-Juwayn, Qala-e-Kah e Shayb Koh - sono inseriti nella terza tranche, portando a 30, su un totale di 43, i distretti attualmente in transizione situati nella regione dove opera il Contingente italiano. La partnership con le Forze di Sicurezza afgane continuerà con un cambio di ruolo, per i militari italiani, da una missione attiva ad un compito di sostegno.

 

[Andrea75]

In Sign of Normalization, Pentagon to Reimburse Pakistan $688 Million

 

The Pentagon quietly notified Congress this month that it would reimburse Pakistan nearly $700 million for the cost of stationing 140,000 troops on the border with Afghanistan, an effort to normalize support for the Pakistani military after nearly two years of crises and mutual retaliation.

The biggest proponent of putting foreign aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan on a steady footing is the man President Barack Obama is leaning toward naming as secretary of state: Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts. Mr. Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has frequently served as an envoy to Pakistan, including after the killing of Osama bin Laden, and was a co-author of a law that authorized five years and about $7.5 billion of nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan.

The United States also provides about $2 billion in annual security assistance, roughly half of which goes to reimburse Pakistan for conducting military operations to fight terrorism.

Until now, many of these reimbursements, called coalition support funds, have been held up, in part because of disputes with Pakistan over the Bin Laden raid, the operations of the C.I.A., and its decision to block supply lines into Afghanistan last year.

The $688 million payment — the first since this summer, covering food, ammunition and other expenses from June through November 2011 — has caused barely a ripple of protest since it was sent to Capitol Hill on Dec. 7.

[Andrea75]

Afghanistan: inaugurati nuovi progetti a sostegno della popolazione

 

Nei giorni scorsi sono stati inaugurati diversi progetti di assistenza in favore della Provincia di Herat, realizzati dal Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) – CIMIC Detachment italiano, l’unità militare specializzata nella ricostruzione e sviluppo che opera nell’ambito del Contingente nazionale in Afghanistan.

Nel centro rurale di Cha-Bulbul sono stati effettuati diversi interventi a sostegno dell’agricoltura locale, tra i quali la realizzazione di undici pozzi per l’acqua potabile, il recupero di altri 9 e lo scavo di un canale di raccolta e convogliamento delle acque lungo 1 km.

Altri due progetti hanno riguardato la rete stradale della Provincia, con l’apertura dell’ultimo chilometro dell’asse che collega la periferia orientale di Herat al centro della città.

Il PRT italiano - che in passato aveva realizzato numerosi tratti della stessa strada – ha inoltre avviato i lavori della diramazione che collegherà la Ring Road (la principale arteria viaria dell’Afghanistan, che unisce Herat a Kabul) al distretto di Injil, interessato quest’anno da altri quattro progetti del Contingente italiano.

Sono stati, infine, avviati i lavori di costruzione di un’area destinata al commercio nel distretto di Guzara, a lato della Ring Road e a poche centinaia di metri dall’aeroporto di Herat. Il progetto del PRT italiano è stato fortemente auspicato dalle Autorità di Herat, che intendono sviluppare le capacità commerciali della città in un’area strategica a ridosso delle due principali arterie di comunicazione.

[Andrea75]

... ulteriore problema Study: Monkey bites are the latest challenge in the Afghan war

 

Just when you thought the 11-year, U.S.-led war effort in Afghanistan couldn’t go any worse, the Center for Disease Control drops this bombshell on us (via journalist Brendan Koerner):

 

Bites from Macaca mulatta monkeys, native to Afghanistan, can cause serious infections. To determine risk for U.S. military members in Afghanistan, we reviewed records for September–December 2011. Among 126 animal bites and exposures, 10 were monkey bites. Command emphasis is vital for preventing monkey bites; provider training and bite reporting promote postexposure treatment.

 

That’s right: U.S. servicemembers have suffered 10 rhesus macaque monkey bites during the Afghan war, a problem bad enough that the CDC says it requires “command emphasis” to address.

And the problem is expected to get worse:

 

As the mission in Afghanistan shifts from combat to ANSF mentoring and reconstruction, US and coalition troops will come into increasingly close contact with ANSF and Afghan civilians. Accordingly, the likelihood of deployed US military members being exposed to monkeys in Afghanistan will probably increase.

Still don’t see it? According the column labeled “monkey ownership,” the primate responsible for biting a 26-year-old Air Force man was owned by the United States military. Why, exactly, does the U.S. military force in Afghanistan own monkeys, or at least a monkey? The CDC report doesn’t say, but does hint at a possible explanation by noting, “Explicit orders prohibit deployed US military members from adopting local mascots.”

Since the war began in 2001, 2,148 U.S. service members have died in Afghanistan. Though monkey bites have not been responsible for any of those, one does have to admire the CDC for trying to protect Americans in Afghanistan however it can.

 

... l'articolo del Center for Disease Control (CDC) Monkey Bites among US Military Members, Afghanistan, 2011

 

Military members deployed to Afghanistan face many risks; among these are bites from Macaca mulatta monkeys and possible subsequent infections. In August 2011, a 24-year-old US Army soldier died of a rabies infection contracted while in eastern Afghanistan. This tragedy highlights the threat that animal bites pose to deployed military members.

During 2001–2010, a total of 643 animal bites among deployed US military members were reported (1). Dogs were implicated in 50% of these bites, but several other animals pose risk as well. Prominent among these is the nonhuman primate M. mulatta (rhesus macaque), native to and commonly kept as a pet in Afghanistan (2) (Figure). Risks from M. mulatta monkey bites include physical trauma and/or infection with B-virus (Macacine herpesvirus 1), oral bacteria (including Clostridium tetani), and rabies virus. Although not well characterized in Afghanistan, the risk for exposure to M. mulatta monkeys has been described (3) for researchers (4), tourism workers (5), and US pet owners (6). We examined this risk for US military

members deployed to eastern Afghanistan. The work presented herein was reviewed and deemed exempt from internal review board oversight by the Joint Combat Casualty Research Team, the human subjects review board responsible for oversight of human subjects research affecting US military members in Afghanistan.

[Andrea75]

... estratto del parere del GAO sul ritiro dall'Afghanistan Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations (DOD Decision Makers Need Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess Equipment)

 

What GAO Found

 

In summary,

 

The military services and DOD agencies have applied some, but not all, of the relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown to their planning for equipment reductions in Afghanistan. For example, the drawdown from Iraq demonstrated the importance of early planning for equipment drawdown, and the military services have already issued guidance and orders outlining the processes and procedures for drawing down equipment in Afghanistan. However, not all relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown have been applied in Afghanistan. For example, during the Iraq drawdown, the Army identified that contractor equipment must be inventoried and entered into an automated records accounting system, yet inventories in Afghanistan did not include this equipment. We note, however, that USFOR-A officials told us they are establishing a Contractor Drawdown cell that would improve visibility of contractor equipment in Afghanistan.

 

DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment from Afghanistan in that it has (a) established command structures and guidance; (b) made efforts to improve property accountability; and © established and expanded transportation options, but challenges still remain. Command structures and guidance, property accountability, and transportation options are three areas that we have previously identified as important for drawdown operations. Concerning command structures and guidance, CENTCOM has established USFOR-A as the supported command for retrograde operations, and USFOR-A has published a base closure and transfer guide that outlines processes for the handling of equipment during transition. Regarding planning for property accountability, in September 2011, USFOR-A directed an inventory of all the equipment in Afghanistan to identify items not previously accounted for in DOD's systems of record. However, as described in Objective 1, DOD officials acknowledge that they lack visibility over contractor equipment. In the area of transportation options, DOD has established and increased the potential capacity of transportation routes out of Afghanistan. However, some of the transportation options have limited operational capability for the return of equipment due to the region's complex geopolitical environment.

 

Consistent with DOD's supply chain materiel management policy, DOD has issued additional guidance requiring the services to analyze the costs and benefits of transferring or destroying equipment. However, there is no specific guidance requiring the military services to assess and document the costs and benefits associated with the return of equipment from Afghanistan, and they have not done so. Some services told us that they conduct informal cost-benefit analyses to support the return of major end items from Afghanistan. However, none of the services was able to provide us with documentation of these cost-benefit analyses. As a result, the extent to which these analyses are being performed is uncertain. Based on our analysis, this is particularly problematic when considering whether or not to return equipment that is excess to current requirements. When an excess item is returned without consideration of the costs and benefits, there is increased risk of unnecessary expenditures on transportation and storage of unneeded items.

 

In conclusion, the military services can return major end items without documentation of cost and benefit considerations or analyses used in the decision-making process. Because the services have not consistently performed and documented analyses to support decision making concerning the return of excess major end items from Afghanistan, there is a risk that the costs of returning excess items may outweigh the benefits of returning them.

 

Why GAO Did This Study

 

In June 2011, the United States announced plans to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The remaining U.S. forces will work to support the U.S. objective of a transition to Afghan-led security by December 2014. The Department of Defense (DOD) has begun planning for this reduction and, as part of its planning, has identified more than 750,000 major end items--equipment important to operational readiness to support the combat forces, such as weapons and vehicles--that can be returned from Afghanistan (to DOD inventories), transferred to another U.S. government agency or another country, or destroyed in theater. According to DOD, this equipment, estimated to be worth more than $36 billion, has accumulated during a 10-year period. DOD officials also estimate that it could cost $5.7 billion to return or transfer equipment from Afghanistan.

 

We initiated this review to provide Congress with information concerning DOD preparations for the drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan, and prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. We provided a briefing of our preliminary observations to the House Armed Services Committee on October 10, 2012. We also provided this briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 24, 2012, and to the Senate and House Defense Appropriations Subcommittees on November 14, 2012.

 

This report formally transmits the information developed for that briefing and provides information on the preparations for the Afghanistan drawdown, specifically the extent to which DOD has (1) applied relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown in its planning for equipment reductions in Afghanistan; (2) planned for the reduction of equipment in Afghanistan by establishing command structures and guidance, property accountability, and transportation processes; and (3) considered costs in its planning for equipment reductions in Afghanistan.

What GAO Recommends

 

To reduce the risk of returning excess major end items from Afghanistan without full consideration of costs and benefits, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the Service Secretaries and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, conduct and document analyses to support the decisions to return excess major end items by taking the following two actions:

 

1) Conduct and document analyses to compare the costs of returning excess major end items with the benefits of returning them. These analyses might include considerations of factors such as:

 

Repair;

Transportation and storage;

Handling;

Condition of the item; and

Sensitivity of the item.

 

2) Use these cost-benefit analyses as a key factor in decision making concerning the return of excess major end items.

 

 

... qui il documento completo Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess Equipment (45 pagine)

 

 

... sempre in tema di ritiro, dal UK: Prime Minister announces reduction in UK troop numbers in Afghanistan

 

UK force levels in Afghanistan are to reduce to around 5,200 by the end of 2013, the Prime Minister announced today.

The Prime Minister told Parliament that UK forces would shift from mentoring Afghan troops at battalion level to brigade level next year. This reflects the progress made in Helmand and the increasing ability and confidence of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to lead security operations.

The drawdown, agreed by the National Security Council this week, is in line and consistent with both UK military advice and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization strategy agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, under which International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces continue to operate across the country.

UK forces will end combat operations by the end of 2014. It is part of transition to an enduring commitment to Afghanistan.

Today’s announcement comes as the previously announced reduction of UK force levels from 9,500 to 9,000 is being achieved with service personnel due to arrive home in time for Christmas.

Detailed work on how force levels will reduce in 2013 is ongoing and will be conducted in line with operational requirements and the transition process which remains on track.

But as the Afghan forces increasingly take the lead, UK combat operations will give way to an increasing focus on training and advising. By the end of 2013, it is expected that UK forces will not routinely need to mentor Afghan forces below brigade level, allowing the reduction in numbers.

Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said:

 

The real progress being made on the ground in Helmand province will allow us, on current planning, to reduce British troops to around 5,200 by the end of 2013. This is a direct result of the success of the Afghan National Security Forces in assuming a lead role in delivering security for the Afghan people.

 

The phased process of transition of security responsibility agreed at the Lisbon Summit is well advanced and on track.

 

We have consistently said that there will not be a cliff-edge reduction in troop numbers at the end of 2014. This gradual drawdown is firmly in line with the planning of our ISAF partners and the advice of military commanders.

 

UK forces will continue to operate alongside their Afghan counterparts, albeit in lower numbers, until our combat operations cease at the end of 2014.

 

There remain huge challenges ahead for the Afghan people. Our combat mission is drawing to a close, but our commitment to the Afghan people is long term.

Modificato 20 Dicembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

... i costi del disimpegno USA http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-high-cost-of-disengagement/2012/12/26/c9d85764-4e0b-11e2-8b49-64675006147f_story.html

 

 

The United States has spent nearly $600 billion over the past 10 years putting combat forces into Afghanistan. Now it’s going to cost an additional $5.7 billion over the next year or two just to transfer or return most of the troops and equipment we shipped into that country, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office.

 

[Andrea75]

... un papaer scettico sul futuro: 10,000 Troops In Afghanistan Is Not Enough:Rightsizing NATO’s Developmental Support Force Beyond 2014 http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/CommandPerspectives_DevelopmentalSupportForce.pdf

 

 

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is arguably the most respected institution in Afghanistan. Keeping it that way as it becomes more self-sufficient will contribute to all of NATO’S post-2014 strategic aims: improving governmental legitimacy and creating an environment for economic progress and reconciliation, as well as continuing counter-terrorist operations within Afghanistan and the region. NATO political and military leaders should be brutally honest with themselves as to the actual requirement associated with ANA development beyond 2014, and they must avoid a dangerous pitfall endemic in this kind of decision.
Maintaining the ANA’s positive developmental trajectory is a necessary component to both NATO’s and America’s post 2014 strategy.

 

... queste le domande, a cui in paper cerca di rispondere

 

First, will any of the ANA units have partner NATO units or will the developmental effort be executed solely through a set of embedded developers?

Second, if NATO uses only embedded teams, at what levels and in which units will these teams be employed?

Third, what kind of headquarters will be necessary to coordinate these efforts?

 

Finally, what direct support—combat support (intelligence, lift and medical evacuation aviation, medical, and air and ground fires) and combat service support (supply, maintenance, ground transport, and logistics)—must be available to the ANA as well as toNATO’s embedded development teams?

 

[Andrea75]

Predator [italiano] in volo per 24 ore consecutive http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Predatorinvoloper24oreconsecutive_281212.aspx

 

 

Per la prima volta in una missione operativa in Afghanistan, un velivolo a pilotaggio remoto Predator ha volato per 24 ore consecutive portando a termine quattro missioni senza mai riattaccare. Il primato – conseguito nel mese di dicembre - spetta a tutti i militari dell’Aeronautica Militare che hanno fatto parte del Task Group ‘Astore’.

Nell’arco delle medesime 24 ore, il Predator AV0002 ha operato innanzitutto nel distretto di Bakwa in supporto di una pattuglia della Task Force ‘Victor’ impegnata nella sorveglianza di un itinerario destinato al passaggio di un convoglio italiano.

 

Successivamente, il velivolo ha seguito dall’alto una importante fase del ripiegamento della Task Force 'South East' dalla base ‘Lavaredo’ di Bakwa, ceduta all’esercito afghano. Sempre nello stesso distretto, il Predator ha assistito la missione di due AM-X che hanno distrutto con due bombe a guida laser due antenne per telecomunicazioni utilizzate da un gruppo di insorti presente nella zona. Nel corso dello stesso volo è stata infine effettuata la mappatura di un villaggio nei pressi di Shindand, dove è schierata la Task Force 'Center', all’interno del quale era stata segnalata la presenza di un deposito di armi.

Il risultato, che supera di quasi due ore il precedente record, è il frutto di un’attenta pianificazione della missione in ogni dettaglio. Per garantire il successo della missione, gli equipaggi costituiti da piloti, analisti, operatori dei sensori video, esperti di intelligence e dello spazio aereo, ingegneri di volo e tecnici, si sono alternati ogni due ore, dedicando gli intervalli di tempo al controllo dei task, delle condizioni meteorologiche nonché al necessario riposo.

Il colonnello Carlo Moscini, Comandante della JATF - la task force dalla quale dipendono gli assetti di volo dell’Aeronautica Militare in Afghanistan - ha elogiato i “protagonisti di questa impresa aeronautica per la professionalità e la dedizione nell’impiegare il velivolo MQ-1C Predator, utilissimo per il supporto alle forze che operano sul terreno”.

Il Task Group Astore inquadrato nella Joint Air Task Force opera in teatro con velivoli APR (Aeromobili a Pilotaggio Remoto) Predator MQ-1C del 32° Stormo. Svolge missioni di ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconaissance) a supporto delle truppe a terra nazionali ed alleate, così da contribuire all'aumento della Situation Awareness delle forze ISAF.

 

[Andrea75]

... notizie dal nostro contingente: Afghanistan: meeting tra i responsabili delle Forze di Sicurezza afgane della Regione ovest http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/012013Afghanistan_sicurezzaRegioneovest.aspx

 

 

 

Si è svolto nei giorni scorsi a camp Arena l’incontro mensile tra le Autorità di vertice della Regione deputate alla sicurezza del territorio.

La riunione svoltasi nella sede del Regional Command West è la terza voluta dal Governo di Kabul per fare un punto di situazione sulla sicurezza nella Regione e coordinare in maniera sinergica le attività future.

Per la prima volta, l’incontro si è svolto a Camp Arena a dimostrazione della stretta collaborazione esistente tra il Contingente multinazionale ISAF e le Forze di Sicurezza afgane.

Alla riunione, oltre al Comandante del RC-W, Gen. B. Dario Ranieri, hanno preso parte tutti i responsabili a livello regionale delle Forze di Sicurezza afgane (ANSF, Afghan National Security Forces). Ogni ufficiale di vertice afgano è stato accompagnato dal rispettivo advisor della coalizione multinazionale ISAF incaricato di affiancarlo e fornire consulenza.

Queste iniziative rivestono particolare importanza nell’ottica del processo di transizione, denominato “Inteqal”, che prevede, entro la fine del 2014, l’assunzione della leadership della sicurezza del Paese da parte del Governo afgano.
Da pochi giorni è stato annunciato da parte del Governo di Kabul il quarto gruppo di Province e Distretti afgani – dei cinque previsti – che consentirà al processo di transizione di portare sotto il controllo delle Forze di Sicurezza locali circa il 90% dell’intero territorio nazionale.

 

 

... segnalo questo paper: Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

 

 

The United States and its partner countries are gradually reducing military involvement in Afghanistan as the Afghan government and security forces assume ever greater responsibility in preparation for the end of international mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Afghan forces are to assume much of the security lead nationwide by mid-2013. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to a “pre-surge” level of 66,000 as of September 20, 2012, and will likely continue to draw down as the transition proceeds. No U.S. decision has been announced on the rate of that drawdown, or on the size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014. U.S. military recommendations for the post-2014 force reportedly range from 6,000 to 20,000, mostly advisors and trainers but including some forces that will continue to combat Taliban forces. The drawdown and post-2014 size decisions will likely hinge on assessments of the performance of the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF), insurgent strength, and the progress of reconciliation talks with Taliban figures, resiliency. The post-2014 U.S. presence is dependent on finalization of a bilateral security agreement, currently under negotiation with the Afghan government, pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. In keeping with that agreement, on July 7, 2012 (one day in advance of a major donors’ conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo), the United States named Afghanistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” further assuring Afghanistan of long-term U.S. support.
The Administration view is that, no matter the U.S. and allied drawdown schedule, Afghan stability after the 2014 transition is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 2014, will be not experience the fraud of the elections in 2009 and 2010. A potential contributor to stability would be a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010, but, by the end of 2012, began to evolve into a discussion of specific proposals to settle the conflict. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement, fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing.
To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs have begun or are beginning. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success.
Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2012, the Afghan intervention has cost about $557 billion, including all costs. About $9.7 billion in economic aid and $82 billion in additional U.S. military costs are requested for FY2013. As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, Administration economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue at current levels through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.

Modificato 9 Gennaio 2013 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/some-in-obama-administration-push-for-only-a-few-thousand-us-troops-in-afghanistan-after-2014/2013/01/08/847597a4-59d2-11e2-9fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_story.html

 

Some in administration push for only a few thousand U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014

 

 

Groups within the Obama administration are pushing to keep no more than a few thousand troops in Afghanistan after 2014, U.S. officials said, raising the prospect that the United States will be unable to keep its promise to fully train and equip Afghan security forces.

As the debate over the size and scope of the post-2014 coalition mission nears its end, some in the administration are pressing for a force that could be as small as 2,500, arguing that a light touch would be the most constructive way to cap the costly, unpopular war.

Those troop levels are significantly lower than what some senior military officials have advocated, arguing that a sudden disengagement could lead to the collapse of a frail state and the onset of a new civil war. The low number also is a far cry from figures in the 10,000-to-30,000 range discussed among NATO allies and some U.S. officials as recently as a year ago.

The scope and size of a post-2014 force are at the top of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s agenda during his visit to Washington this week, which includes a meeting with President Obama on Friday.

White House officials said Tuesday that they have not ruled out leaving no troops at all when the U.N. security mandate sanctioning the international coalition expires, saying they might find non-military means to meet U.S. objectives in Afghanistan.

Modificato 10 Gennaio 2013 da Andrea75

[davide9610]

Mi è stato detto da un mio amico che fa il sergente in Afghanistan che le perdite della Nato sono molto più alte di quello che ci fanno credere,ad esempio gli Americani da soli avrebbero perso 7000 uomini oppure quando lui era arrivato al reggimento erano appena morti 2 uomini.

Voi che ne pensate ?

[vorthex]

panzane. i morti non si possono nascondere, non siamo mica in dittatura.

piuttosto, trovo grave che un militare si dia a tale disinformazione (la quale, magari, poteva anche essere intesa come un "le cose non vanno bene"... ma c'è modo e modo per dirlo) e questo, ancora una volta, la dice lunga circa la preparazione dei nostri uomini.

Modificato 14 Gennaio 2013 da vorthex

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Un articolo su Wired, che narra di come un tentativo dei Talebani di eliminare autorità importanti ad un meeting sulla sicurezza di Sharana, sia un esempio di come potrebbe essere Afghanistan, dopo il ritiro dell'ISAF nel 2014.

 

Buona lettura

[TT-1 Pinto]

Il nuovo SecDef in visita ....

 

Dal "Daily Report" dell'AFA di questa mattina ....

 

 

First Stop Afghanistan ....

 

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the withdrawal of US combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will be challenging, but obtainable.

"We will manage . . . in partnership with our coalition partners and with the Afghan forces," he said on March 9 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, after arriving the previous day in Kabul on his first trip to Afghanistan as Defense Secretary.

Hagel met with US, coalition, and Afghan leaders to assess the situation on the ground.

"You are working under stressful and difficult conditions, and you have my profound gratitude, and the gratitude of the American people, for your service and your sacrifices," he told coalition troops in a message.

"You have my full support."

Hagel also addressed Afghan President Hamid Karzai's comments suggesting that the United States was conspiring with the Taliban to ensure US troops would remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014.

"We did discuss those comments. I told the president it was not true," said Hagel.

On March 9, a car bomb detonated outside the Afghan defense ministry building in Kabul, reportedly killing some Afghans and wounding more.

Hagel said he heard the blast from the NATO facility he was in at the time.

Hagel transcript .... Includes AFPS report by Karen Parrish and second Parrish report ....

 

Un commento italiano ....

 

"It's complicated" ....

 

Il primo viaggio del segretario alla Difesa americano Hagel in Afghanistan è stato una catastrofe ....

 

Fonte .... http://www.difesa.it/Sala_Stampa/rassegna_stampa_online/Pagine/PdfNavigator.aspx?d=12-03-2013&pdfIndex=56

[-{-Legolas-}-]

La sua storia in italiano Pakistan, attentato alla bambina anti-taleban

Malala comincia la scuola.

 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/20/taliban-victim-malala-yousafzai-school

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Un simpatico augurio di matrimonio al fratello, mentre sta volando con l'Harrier.

 

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=_Jy2bzCbi58

Modificato 11 Aprile 2013 da -{-Legolas-}-

[-{-Legolas-}-]

La nuova impostazione del contingente USA in Afghanistan, prevede che le forze di polizia afgane si arrangino da sole, mentre i soldati USA non sono più chiamati in compiti di pattugliamento proattivo, gli elicotteri vengono usati solo per evacuare il personale ferito su specifica richiesta delle autorità sul posto.

 

Così è a QALAT.

[madmike]

ahimè come si temeva, ma come era anche piuttosto prevedibile.

 

http://www.analisidifesa.it/2013/05/dopo-il-ritiro-italiano-la-riscossa-talebana-a-bala-murghab/

[TT-1 Pinto]

Per favore .... non andatevene ....

 

Ora Mosca prega la Nato di non lasciare Kabul ....

 

La prospettiva del ritiro delle forze alleate dall'Afghanistan nel 2014 allarma Mosca.

Il ministro della difesa, Sergueï Shoïgou, ha trasmesso nei giorni scorsi le proprie inquietudini al collega francese, Jean-Yves le Drian, in visita nella capitale russa.

«Non abbandonate il paese», ha esortato il capo dell'armata russa.

 

 

Fonte .... http://www.italiaoggi.it/giornali/dettaglio_giornali.asp?preview=false&accessMode=FA&id=1826989&codiciTestate=1&sez=edicMF&testo=&titolo=Ora%20Mosca%20prega%20la%20Nato%20di%20non%20lasciare%20Kabul