Marina Cinese

[madmike]

Sulle portaerei cinesi si è detto molto, soprattutto in via non ufficiale.

 

Se guardiamo alle dichiarazioni 'ufficiali' o quasi, nel 2009 si parlò di due unità, una da 50.000 t a propulsione convenzionale, da costruire a Changxing sul mar giallo, e un altra, di 65.000 tonnellate, a propulsione nucleare, che sarebbero state varate nel 2010-2011.

 

Di queste navi, anche dai controlli via satellite, non c'e' traccia.

 

Nel 2011 fu annunciato un altro programma per 1\2 unità da 50\60.000 tonnellate da varare nel 2014 nel cantiere di Changxingdao, a Shangai.

 

Di tutte queste portaerei, l'unica in 'servizio' è la ex Varyag rimodernata, che a questo punto serve alla Marina Cinese per acquisire esperienza in un campo parecchio difficile come l'aviazione navale, per poi valutare il da farsi.

 

Per quanto ovvio, le portaerei cinesi non potrebbero, per svariati decenni, confrontarsi con le omologhe unità della USN: troppo il divario tecnico e dimensionale. E nemmeno, probabilmente, nella strategia cinese, essere utilizzate contro Taiwan (che, allo stato, non rappresenta più un problema ma una opportunità visti i riavvicinamenti politico-economici degli ultimi anni).

 

Di certo, unità come la Varyag (65000 t, 50 fra aerei ed elicotteri, una autonomia in mare di una quarantina di giorni) servono alla proiezione di potenza e all'intervento in acque lontane, ovvero a quella che è dal dopoguerra la missione delle portaerei. Per la Cina, il controllo dello Stretto di Malacca, delle isole di fronte alla madrepatria (il 'filo di perle') e via così.

 

Certo che quello che conta saranno gli esiti degli attuali esperimenti con la Varyag, e la strategia che i cinesi vorranno adottare in campo maritimo, cosa che ad oggi è tutta da definire anche per loro (la Marina cinese è ad oggi ancora una marina, sostanzialmente, da difesa costiera).

 

Consideriamo anche che i Cinesi hanno sempre dimostrato di ragionare diversamente dagli occidentali: per dire, checchè se ne pensi non sono la terza potenza nucleare, ma la quarta, dietro la Francia per numero di armi atomiche. La strategia, che prevede la costruzione e l'uso di una ventina di ICBM, contro le centinaia russi e americani, prevede semplicemente una capacità di ritorsione, sulle città avversarie, tale da sconsigliare l'impiego di armi nucleari.

 

Una politica che alla fine non è mai stata seguita da nessuno. La loro originalità, forse, la vedremo anche nel campo delle portaerei.

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

 

Si tratta di un quadro d'insieme dello sviluppo della Marina Militare Cinese, quadro che include anche gli aspetti politici e gli obiettivi geostrategici (accesso a risorse energetiche).

Il paper prosegue poi con considerazioni sulla US Navy e sulle 'contromisure' da adottare in tempi di tagli al budget

 

Inoltre segnalo questo articolo Chinese aircraft: the art of 'modelology' to predict trends

Modificato 6 Agosto 2012 da Andrea75

[nik978]

99 pagine di documento da leggere..lo sto facendo e lo consiglio (grazie Andrea)

Son appena ll'inizio

 

Copre molti punti di cui abbiamo discusso qui ed è interessante vedere come la marina cinese abbia giustamente pensato di investire su sottomarini diesel silenziosi (molto silenziosi) visto gli annosi problemi sui vari "type 09x" nucleari che a tutt'oggi non sono soddisfacenti.

Del resto in un contesto di sea denial per me la marian cinese è già a posto. Ovvio che una potenza dle genere non può permettersi di restare a quel livello, ma già adesso con le tencnologie cheha in campo per me può dire la sua. Il che in contesti in cui si cerca di minimizzare rischi, conflitti e perdite, è un buon deterrente.

 

Il DF21D a mio parere è ancora tutto da dimostrare, non a caso gli stessi cinesi affermano di avere problemi a gestire e sviluppare un prodotto del genere... sicurcamente sarà già in dotazione di qualche reparto (nello stile cinese), ma da qui ad avere lèoperatività piena a mio parere ce ne vorrà di tempo...

[Andrea75]

99 pagine di documento da leggere..lo sto facendo e lo consiglio (grazie Andrea)

 

... è un piacere

 

aggiungo una nuova segnalazione

 

China developing new class of guided missile destroyer

 

The Chinese Navy is developing a brand new class of guided-missile destroyer, a “new type” of naval warship with upgraded air-defence missiles, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles, official media reported.

The new destroyers are equipped with two 32-unit vertical launch systems capable of launching HQ-9B air-defence missiles, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles, official media quoted China Military News as saying.

The new destroyer is comparable to the “Aegis” equipped destroyers of the US Navy which use powerful computers and radars to track and guide weapons to destroy enemy targets, it said.

The 160 metre long and 18 metre wide, Type 052D ship is slightly larger than its predecessor, the Type 052C, and is believed to weigh in over 6,000 tonnes, official China.Org.Cn website reported.

Reports indicate the vessel will use a Type 346 Active Phased Array Radar System and a Type 518 L-band long-range radar, it said.

[nik978]

E intanto la Varyag-ShiLang o come da ultime news "una provincia della cina" ha terminato il 10mo viaggio dopo degli interventi di manutenzione "correttiva"

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/730991.shtml

 

I dettagli mancanti sono oramai pochi e adesso è pure dotata di numero (16).

Si vocifera che il prossimo viaggio sarà con j-16 ed elicotteri imbarcati e alcuni armamenti...

[Simone]

Sarebbe molto interessante sapere se,in questi giorni, la marina cinese ha cambiato qualche aspetto della propria routinee quotidiana o se si sta preparando discretamente a qualche azione dimostrativa. All'epoca del conflitto per le Falkland-Malvinas la marina argentina salpò con un preavviso brevissimo e fece sbarcare,come sapete meglio di me, un corposo contingente, oggi la Cina non possiede una vera portaerei,però esistono lungo la costa prospicientente alle isole alcuni aeroporti-ed altri possono essere allestiti in poco tempo-per cui se la marina riuscisse a far sbarcare un contingente a fare da presidio l'aviazione potrebbe poi,penso io, dissuadere il Giappone dal reagire con la forza. Comunque al momento sembrano opzioni molto remote, dato che la diplomazia di mezzo mondo si è attivata per far calmare gli ardori

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Un'esercitazione c'è stata, ma in collaborazione con gli USA.

[nik978]

http://economictimes...ow/16516658.cms

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jS3JaMd6elU

 

Consegna ufficiale della Lianoning. La prima portaerei delal marina cinese e la seconda al mondo della sua classe

 

Displacement: 33,000 t (32,000 long tons) currently

53,000 to 55,000 t (52,000 to 54,000 long tons) standard

66,000 to 67,500 t (65,000 to 66,400 long tons) full load

Length: 304.5 m (999 ft) o/a

270 m (890 ft) w/l

Beam: 75 m (246 ft) o/a

38 m (125 ft) w/l

Draft: 10.5 m (34 ft)

Propulsion: Steam turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 200,000 hp (150 MW)

2 × 50,000 hp (37 MW) turbines

9 × 2,011 hp (1,500 kW) turbogenerators

6 × 2,011 hp (1,500 kW) diesel generators

4 × fixed pitch propellers

Speed: 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph)

Range: 3,850 nautical miles (7,130 km; 4,430 mi) at 32 knots

Endurance: 45 days

Complement: 1,960 crew

626 air group

40 flag staff

3,857 rooms

Armament:

 

 

After refit:

• 3 x Type 1030 CIWS

• 7 x FL-3000N (18 Cell Missile system)

• 2 x ASW 12 tube rocket launchers

• 3 x decoys and chaffs 24 tubes

 

As designed:

• 8 × AK-630 AA guns (6×30 mm, 6,000 round/min/mount, 24,000 rounds)

• 8 × CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS (each 2 × 30 mm Gatling AA plus 16 3K87 Kortik SAM)

• 12 × P-700 Granit SSM

• 18 × 8-cell 3K95 Kinzhal SAM VLS (192 vertical launch missiles; 1 missile per 3 seconds)

• RBU-12000 UDAV-1 ASW rocket launchers (60 rockets)

Aircraft carried: Shenyang J-15

As designed:

× 26 fixed wing aircraft

× 24 helicopters

 

 

Come già si era discusso, notare una riduzione dei sistemi missilistici, caratteristica originale della categoria rispetto ad altre portaerei di altre classi.

 

Pagina dedicata su Facebook http://www.facebook.com/PLAN083?ref=ts

avendo più di 200 fans, non possono più cambiare il nome dall'originale previsto (PLAN 083..... invece che 16 attuale)

Modificato 24 Settembre 2012 da nik978

[nik978]

Oggi leggevo sul cartaceo di china Daily questo articolo

 

Beijing dismissed yesterday reports that China is building a second aircraft carrier and emphasised its newly commissioned first carrier's defensive nature amid speculation that China will use its increasing maritime strength to resolve territorial issues.

 

"Such reports are inaccurate," China's Ministry of National Defence spokesman Yang Yujun told a regular news conference. He was responding to a report in the Hong Kong-based newspaper Mingpao that said a second aircraft carrier is under construction on Shanghai's Changxing Island and is expected to be unveiled by the end of the year.

 

"China will plan the development of aircraft carriers in an all-round way, taking its national economic and social development, as well as the needs of national defence and military construction, into consideration," Yang said.

 

China's naval power took a landmark leap on Tuesday when its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, with the hull number 16, was commissioned in China Navy in Dalian.

 

It makes China the last permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to have an aircraft carrier, and comes as Beijing and Tokyo are locked in the dispute over East China Sea's Diaoyu Islands (known in Japan as Senkaku), which have belonged to China since ancient times.

 

Most media view the Liaoning as a signal of China's rising power, although it will be used mostly for training and testing for now. Most Japanese media said it has put pressure on Japan amid the territorial tension.

 

Shigeru Iwasaki, chief of the joint staff of Japan's Self Defence Forces, said yesterday Japan will continue collecting information and focusing on China's aircraft carrier and military modernisation, Kyodo News reported.

 

When asked about the aircraft carrier's influence on the islands issue, Yang reiterated China's commitment to peaceful, independent and defensive policies, saying China's weaponry was developed to safeguard national security.

 

But he did not deny reports that on Sept. 20 two Chinese frigates were spotted 80 kilometres northwest of the islands, saying it is totally justified and legitimate for Chinese frigates to conduct combat-ready patrols and exercises in its territorial waters.

 

The Chinese military adheres to combat-ready patrols to handle any maritime emergency and resolutely safeguards the country's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, Yang said, adding that the military also strengthened cooperation with the departments of fishing and surveillance to guarantee maritime safety.

 

Yang also urged Tokyo to reflect on its aggressive history during World War II and to gain its neighbours' trust through practical actions, instead of raising regional tensions by emphasising an agenda related to military security, such as the recent joint drill conducted by Tokyo and Washington on the Western Pacific island of Guam. The drill aimed to strengthen their ability to defend remote islands from a foreign assault.

 

The debut of the carrier at this critical time reflects Beijing's firm resolution to defend its territories, but owning an aircraft carrier does not mean China will soon resolve the disputes by force, said Li Daguang, a professor at the University of National Defence.

 

The news has inspired Chinese people and carries a lot of meaning for China, and it has told "the Japanese government it will eventually eat bitter fruit if it makes no effort to correct its mistakes", he said.

 

Washington has played down the importance of the aircraft carrier, saying after its first sea trial in August 2011 that it had "limited" capability. But the Pentagon also said the vessel was the first step toward a future fleet of carriers expected to be built domestically in the coming years.

 

The type of aircraft to be deployed on the carrier is key to the Liaoning's combat power, but this information has not been disclosed. The Associated Press said it will take years to build proper aircraft, train pilots to land in adverse weather on a moving deck and develop a proper carrier battle group.

 

Yang said the carrier-borne aircraft are being independently developed by China, based on homemade aircraft.

 

Qiao Liang, a professor at the Air Force Command Institute, told Chinese media that the first carrier has brought China closer to its dream of more than 100 years to have a "blue-water navy" — a maritime force capable of operating on the high seas — but the Chinese navy still has a long way to go.

 

When responding to comments by Manila on Tuesday that Chinese drones may be shot at if they enter the airspace over Huangyan Island, Yang said China's use of drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, over Huangyan Island, the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters is "justified and legal", and warned that China opposes any military provocation in the South China Sea.

 

China has indisputable sovereignty over Huangyan Island (also known as Scarborough Reef), the Nansha Islands (also known as Spratly) and their adjacent waters, he said.

 

 

 

 

http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=36905&sec=1

 

 

 

 

Già alla fine di quest'anno mi sembra un po prestino, anche se si sapeva che a Changxing qualcosa era in ballo

 

Vedremo!

 

Sempre su china daily cartaceo un bel servizio sulla Lianoning, ma con un refuso che a me suonava un po strano: ho letto spesso la arola "catapulte"... su una classe Kuztenov?:blink: si saranno sbagliati..

 

 

[Andrea75]

Top 5 reasons not to ballyhoo china's carrier

 

Now christened Liaoning, China’s flattop does not begin to approach the size or capability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered carriers. Nor can its crew match the skill and experience of U.S. CVN crews. Herewith, my list of the Top 5 reasons why the Liaoning is outclassed by its American counterparts:

5. No air wing

4. Size

3. Non-nuclear propulsion

2. Escorts and combat logistics

1. Human excellence

[Andrea75]

New Destroyer a Significant Development for Chinese Sea Power

 

One development that carries broad implications for the enhancement of Chinese sea power is the recent launch of the first editions of the new 6,000-ton Type 052D Luyang III-class destroyer, which marks a new stage in the PLAN’s prolonged period of experimentation with different destroyers.

The Type 052D represents an evolution of the existing Type 052C Luyang II-class destroyer. The latter are now in mass production, with 8 hulls in service, the first commissioned in 2004. At least six 052Cs have been launched since the end of 2010, according to Chinese media reports, of which two are reportedly in service at present. Beijing appears to have decided that the Type 052 series, a rough analog of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that form the backbone of the U.S. Navy, is the latest class of warship whose design is good enough to justify large-scale production.

...

Why mass production of the Type 052D matters strategicallyThe 052D differs significantly from its predecessor the Type 052C in several important ways. It has a completely different type of vertical launch system (“VLS”), with missile canisters instead of what look like revolvers; a different gun system; and what appear to be bigger phased-array radar faces. The VLS system is potentially the biggest development. The 052C’s likely complement of 64 VLS tubes with a more advanced surface-to-air missile (“SAM”) will offer strong area air defense capability, which can enhance the combat effectiveness of other PLAN surface ships and submarines by protecting them from enemy strike and anti-submarine warfare aircraft.

Meanwhile, China’s long-established cruise missile industry is producing a wide range of extremely capable anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). China’s record to date of developing advanced ASCMs gives every reason to believe that new variants of even greater capability will continue to emerge and be outfitted on PLAN vessels like the Type 052D.

...

The Type 052D appears to be a very modern warship that, with continued improvements in China’s maritime surveillance and targeting infrastructure and more intensive training of crews, can help make the PLA Navy even more formidable throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Regional neighbors such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea are likely to respond by augmenting their own navies and reaffirming diplomatic and security ties with the U.S.

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Mi chiedo se quest'inflazione della marina cinese, si porta dietro anche le capacità per gestirla, gli equipaggi non crescono sotto i cavoli, e la Marina li deve addestrare.

Con tutte queste navi in giro per il sud-est asiatico, prima o poi si scontreranno con qualcuno, e li si capirà come la Cina si pone in materia di diritto internazionale, o alla fine si capirà almeno che piani hanno in politica estera.

[TT-1 Pinto]

Mi chiedo se quest'inflazione della marina cinese, si porta dietro anche le capacità per gestirla, gli equipaggi non crescono sotto i cavoli, e la Marina li deve addestrare.

Stanno mettendo troppa carne al fuoco e, mi domando, le loro risorse sono davvero infinite o accadrà, prima o poi, che finiranno per scoppiare a causa delle eccessive spese militari ?

 

Questo articolo, che risale a un paio di settimane fa, potrebbe essere interessante .... http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/26/the_calm_before_the_storm

Modificato 10 Ottobre 2012 da TT-1 Pinto

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Esattamente questo. Mi ha colpito l'ultima parte:"What is significant, however, is that Zhang was realistic about these challenges and that he discussed them in excellent English, the designated international language at sea. These are hallmarks of embracing a weighty historical mission that will take time to realize but will ultimately transform China into a very different sea power from what it is today. Given ongoing disputes and uncertainty about Beijing's future capabilities and intentions, neighboring countries are bound to worry. But Zhang's predecessors surely could not be prouder."

Che siano sulla strada giusta per forgiare una classe di marinai veramente capaci?

[madmike]

Beh ma quello credo sia il progetto. La Varyag è, a tutti gli effetti, una nave sperimentale.

 

Servirà all'addestramento, alla formazione di tattiche, eccetera. Ovvero quello che serve per avere una aviazione imbarcata efficente.

 

Come sempre, in Oriente si ragiona sul lungo termine, senza dimenticare che i Cinesi (inteso come Impero Cinese) ha storicamente una tradizione secolare di navigatori abilissimi.

[Andrea75]

A J-15 may have performed a touch-and-go on China’s recently commissioned Liaoning carrier

 

Delicate Touch: Flight Operations Begin on China’s First Aircraft Carrier

 

Less than a month after China officially commissioned the Liaoning, its first aircraft carrier, photos appearing to show aircraft operating over the carrier have raised a host of questions, including how long it might take for China to make the carrier fully operational.

The photo spread – published earlier this week by the Global Times, a tabloid under the aegis of the official Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily – includes several images of a J-15 fighter aircraft flying just above the deck of the Liaoning, as well as images of a Z-8 search-and-rescue helicopter taking off from the carrier.

The first question is what the photos actually show.

Based on the images themselves and circumstances of their publication, it’s most likely that the J-15 was performing a “touch-and-go” flight pattern when it was photographed.

 

Foto

 

 

Aircraft carrier needs three stages to achieve combat effectiveness

 

 

... e Landing grids: DCNS wins new orders in China

 

DCNS has been awarded two new contracts for landing grids compatible with helicopters and rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicles. The grids will be installed on two new patrol boats under construction for China Marine Surveillance.

Modificato 19 Ottobre 2012 da Andrea75

[-{-Legolas-}-]

A forza di provare, prima o poi ci riusciranno.

[Andrea75]

Analysts: China Adapting New Fighter for Carrier Operations

 

“Imagery of a prototype of the Shenyang J-15 show the aircraft being flown on practice final approaches and over-flying the deck, likely as part of the initial trials for carrier operation,”

...

Cliff said it will be several years before China has a carrier with a fully operational air wing, “although that is in part because they probably don’t have enough carrier-capable aircraft right now, and in part because the Liaoning isn’t big enough for a full wing of aircraft.”

When China begins carrying out flight operations at maximum operating tempo, launching and landing aircraft has to be a carefully choreographed operation, he said.

“If you want to get all your combat aircraft in the air at the same time, you have to be able to bring them up from the hangar deck and launch them in rapid succession,” Cliff said. “Otherwise, the first planes to take off will have burned through half their fuel by the time the last aircraft takes off. When the mission is complete, you have to be able to recover them one by one and get them out of the way before the last one runs out of gas.”

Then comes the demands of required maintenance, refueling and rearming the planes as quickly as possible, and “then things get really complicated if you are trying to launch and recover at the same time,” he said. “The less efficiently you do all this, the fewer sorties you generate, and the less effective combat power the carrier has. I’m sure they will master all that in time, though.”

[Andrea75]

China Releases Photo of Naval UAV

 

In all probability, this is a training device used for basic familiarization purposes

[Andrea75]

China is becoming a world class military shipbuilder

 

China’s military shipyards now are surpassing Western European, Japanese, and Korean military shipbuilders in terms of both the types and numbers of ships they can build. If Beijing prioritizes progress, China’s military shipbuilding technical capabilities can likely become as good as Russia’s are now by 2020 and will near current U.S. shipbuilding technical proficiency levels by 2030. China is now mass producing at least six classes of modern diesel-electric submarines and surface warships, including the new Type 052C “Luyang II” and Type 052D “Luyang III” destroyers now in series production

[Andrea75]

China submarines to soon carry nukes, draft U.S. report says

 

China in the meantime remains "the most threatening" power in cyberspace and presents the largest challenge to U.S. supply chain integrity, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission said in a draft of its 2012 report to the U.S. Congress.

China is alone among the original nuclear weapons states to be expanding its nuclear forces, the report said. The others are the United States, Russia, Britain and France.

Beijing is "on the cusp of attaining a credible nuclear triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and air-dropped nuclear bombs," the report says.

...

"Building strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China's international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China's modernization drive," Hu said in a speech on Thursday at the opening of the Chinese Communist Party's once-every-five-years congress.

To address a wide variety of security threats, "we must make major progress in modernizing national defense and the armed forces," Hu said.

That means China must "complete military mechanization and make major progress in full military IT (information technology) application by 2020," he said.

The deployment of a hard-to-track, submarine-launched leg of China's nuclear arsenal could have significant consequences in East Asia and beyond. It also could add to tensions between the United States and China, the world's two biggest economies.

...

Beijing already has deployed two of as many as five of a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The JIN-class boat is due to carry the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile with an estimated range of about 7,400 km (4,600 miles).

The new submarines and the JL-2 missile will give Chinese forces its "first credible sea-based nuclear capability," the U.S. Defense Department said in its own 2012 annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving China.

The JL-2 program has faced repeated delays but may reach an initial operating capability within the next two years, according to the Pentagon report, released in May.

The Pentagon declined to comment directly on China's march toward creating a credible nuclear "triad" involving strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The final version of the report is to be released next Wednesday by the U.S.-China commission, a 12-member bipartisan group set up in 2000 to report to U.S. lawmakers on security implications of U.S.-China trade.

The draft, in its section on cyber-related issues, called on the Congress to develop a sanctions regime to penalize specific companies found to engage in, or otherwise benefit from, industrial espionage.

Congress should define industrial espionage as an illegal subsidy subject to countervailing duties, it added.

[Andrea75]

... seguendo la scia dei sottomarini cinesi segnalo questo articolo (è del 2008, ma può essere interessante per vedere la programmazione cinese e perchè opera un paragone con le altre nazioni dotate di assetti simili/paragonabili) China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities

 

China’s Nuclear Posture

To test the applicability of the undersea deterrent models postulated above to China, it is necessary to assess the evolution of broader Chinese nuclear doctrine and force posture. Over the past four decades, China has carved out a rather unique niche among the five declared nuclear weapon states. Since China demonstrated its ability to fire ballistic missiles at intercontinental ranges in 1980, its nuclear posture has remained surprisingly modest and remarkably resistant to change. China maintains what many Western analysts call a doctrine

of minimum deterrence, which calls for:

- strictly defensive posture

- small arsenal

- pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons

- commitment not to attack or threaten nonnuclear states.

Official Chinese documents have repeatedly reaffirmed these minimalist principles. While there is an ongoing debate in China and the West on the merits of rejecting nuclear minimalism, authorities in Beijing appear committed to existing policy. In the most detailed articulation of Chinese nuclear policy to date, China’s latest Defense White Paper forcefully states:

China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. . . . China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at

building a lean and effective nuclear force. . . . It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force.

Such nuclear minimalism has exerted significant influence on China’s nuclear posture, suppressing the size and readiness of the force structure. According to one analyst:

China’s small but effective nuclear counter attacking force . . . is significantly smaller, less diverse, and less ready to conduct actual operations than any of the arsenals maintained by

the other four nuclear powers recognized under the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]

...

Sufficiency Goes to Sea

Defense planners in Beijing face several basic questions regarding the future of undersea deterrence. What types of force structures would Beijing consider viable? What factors might induce leaders to rely more heavily on the PLAN’s nascent fleet of ballistic missile submarines? In short, how much is enough? Sizing the fleet is both an analytical exercise and an art, not least because of the political ramifications of deploying the most destructive single platform known to mankind. A large SSBN fleet not only would impose a substantial financial burden but also could trigger competitive responses from potential adversaries. Thus, China faces a delicate balancing act that seeks to meet strategic requirements without unduly alarming other great powers.

...

At present, the forecast number of Chinese SSBNs remains a subject of contention. The U.S. Intelligence Community and Pentagon project that neither the JL–2 ballistic missiles nor the Jin-class submarine will enter service until the end of the decade. According to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, USA, “the 8,000+ kilometer range JL–2 . . . likely will be ready for deployment later this decade.” The Pentagon’s most recent assessment of Chinese military power speculates that the JL–2 will achieve initial operational capability in the 2007–2010 timeframe. The U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence believes that the Type 094 may enter service as early as 2008 and that “a fleet of probably five Type 094 SSBNs will be built in order to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence.” The open-source literature provides even more disparate estimates concerning the number of SSBNs that the Chinese plan to, or will be able to, build. Conservative assessments of China’s strategic forces tend to agree with the U.S. Intelligence Community, while other studies have drawn a more alarming picture. Simply put, the future size of the fleet is still anybody’s guess.

...

the only power with the capacity to inflict a disarming preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear forces on land and at sea simultaneously for the foreseeable future will be the United States. This reduces if not eliminates China’s requirement to conduct deterrent patrols against lesser nuclear powers such as India, and perhaps even Russia. In other words, the SSBN would only have to cope with one threat vector across the Pacific. Third, this study assumes that the U.S. ability to degrade the survivability of an SSBN would not improve radically over the coming decade—say, by making the oceans transparent to U.S. sensors and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weaponry.

Potential Deployment Patterns

Beyond the question of force sizing, Beijing must also consider a range of possible deployment patterns. ...

only two Chinese SSBNs would need to be at sea at any given time to ensure that one survived a first strike

...

if Washington overtly seeks to deny China a retaliatory option, Beijing will almost certainly respond with a larger and faster buildup that includes its undersea strategic forces

 

... le isole contese con il Giappone (e con Taiwan) sarebbero indispensabili nella strategia cinese come base per sommergibili (secondo un comandante in pensione della Marina giapponese) Beijing's Senkaku goal: Sub 'safe haven' in South China Sea

 

But according to Sumihiko Kawamura, a former rear admiral and commander of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's antisubmarine air wing, Beijing has a more critical but less-articulated goal that, if achieved, could tip strategic military superiority from the United States to China in the Pacific.

Kawamura believes Beijing is trying to turn the South China Sea into "a safe haven" for its nuclear-powered submarines, which are armed with ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. For that purpose, seizing the Senkakus — just 190 km east of Taiwan and close to the northern gateway to the South China Sea — is indispensable, Kawamura says.

 

 

... ed un ariticolo di commento Run Silent, Run ‘Soviet?’

 

I have no quarrel with the idea that Chinese SSBNs will roam the South China Sea in the coming decades. The submarine base at Sanya, on Hainan Island, is convincing evidence of that. Three points, though. One, the South China Sea may be more than a bastion. It may be an outlet to the Pacific Ocean via the Luzon Strait, which separates the southern tip of Taiwan from the northern Philippines. Stationing SSBNs well to the south allows the PLA Navy to stretch allied ASW defenses. Short of operating from Taiwan or the Philippines—neither a realistic prospect—JMSDF and U.S. Navy ASW forces will find it hard to continuously monitor the strait. That improves Chinese commanders’ chances of slipping into the open sea—as they must until weapons engineers extend the range of PLA Navy SLBMs sufficiently to hold the American mainland at risk from Southeast Asia. Admiral Kawamura may be overselling allied fleets’ capacity to impose blanket coverage along the island chain.

 

Two, there are good reasons apart from technology for Beijing to keep the fleet closer to home. Western navies are remarkably easygoing about letting captains vanish beneath the waves for weeks on end, taking doomsday weapons with them. Authoritarian regimes like the Soviet Union and Communist China fret about political reliability. As Kawamura predicts, the PLA Navy undersea fleet may operate from the South China Sea, or even from the Bohai Sea, at Beijing’s nautical door, once missile technology permits. But political reasons could account for such relatively restrained deployment patterns. Chinese nuclear strategy need not be a rerun of Soviet strategy—despite the two communist powers’ similar offshore geography and kindred autocratic regimes.

 

And three, it’s unclear to me how occupying the Senkakus would significantly tighten Chinese ASW defenses in southern waters. Admiral Kawamura furnishes few details in Japan Times, so it’s hard to say what he has in mind. It is possible, I suppose, that the islets could supply the eastern terminus for a line of underwater hydrophones, helping PLA Navy ASW forces detect Japanese or American boats transiting north-south along the Asian seaboard. Such an arrangement would hark back to the far more extensive, deep-water SOSUS array NATO strung across the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap to impede Soviet access to the Atlantic. Or perhaps a PLA outpost in the Senkakus could guard against adversaries’ attempts to disrupt such a listening array. It’s worth remaining on the lookout for such developments.

[Andrea75]

An Aircraft Carrier’s Relevance to China’s A2/AD Strategy

 

The acquisition of an aircraft carrier is the foundation and ultimate symbol of a navy's blue-water strategy. There is no more important reality for the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as it starts operating its first carrier.

 

The full ramifications of the PLAN's ambitious acquisition of naval air power are as yet uncertain.

 

The ultimate outcome depends upon maintaining a balance between a variety of contradictory postures and strategies.

[Andrea75]

Shipbuilder: China Should Build Aircraft Carriers

 

China should independently build its own aircraft carriers, the country’s largest shipbuilder said at a pivotal Communist Party meeting where Beijing announced plans to become a “maritime power.”

The China Daily reported Nov. 20 the call for China to match its growing global influence with new military hardware after Beijing in September commissioned its first carrier, the Liaoning, which was purchased from Ukraine.

The launch of the carrier was viewed as a symbolic milestone for the growing military power of China at a time of regional anxiety over Beijing’s rise.

It also sparked speculation on when China would domestically construct its own carriers.

Hu Wenming, chairman of China State Shipbuilding Corp (CSSC), said his company was ready to build “seagoing airbases”, the China Daily reported.

Ww must enhance our independent weapons and equipment research and production capacity to match the country’s clout, and independently build our own aircraft carriers,” he told the state-run newspaper on the sidelines of a Communist Party congress which ended last week.

[cloyce]

I primi aerei J-15 atterrano sulla portaerei Liaoning.

 

fonte immagini : http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-11/25/c_123998037_2.htm

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Qualcuno più esperto mi sà dire il perchè non hanno verniciato i aerei?

Modificato 24 Novembre 2012 da cloyce