Marina Cinese

[SU-27]

Qualcuno sta come stanno coi motori? So che la Varyag era completa come scafo, ma priva di motori ed elettronica. E penso sopratutto i primi saranno (o sono stati?) la fonte dei maggiori problemi per i tecnici cinesi che non hanno mai lavorato su qualcosa di neanche lontanamente così grosso.

 

Esatto Rick86, i motori ora come ora sono l'ambito in cui i cinesi si trovano più in difficoltà e in tutti i campi: dal tank ZTZ-99G al turbofan WS-10A che ancora arranca nei confronti dell'AL-31 fino alle TAG per la propulsione navale.

 

Il motore della Varyag è tuttora un incognita, non si esclude che abbiano ottenuto dei componenti sottobanco dall'Ucraina

[SU-27]

La varyag nella sua nuova collocazione, notate quanto materiale sia ammassato sul ponte.

 

[cloyce]

Un imagine interessante da Rand Study: Air Combat Past, Present and Future

MRBM range(DF-21C) vs F-18 range

 

Qui c'è il raggio di scoperta dei radar OTH contro navi di grosse dimensioni

 

OTH range

Da notare che sono in programma diversi progetti di UAV dedicati al ruolo di Ricognizione marittima.

 

Qui c'è un articolo interessante a riguardo: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/11/oth-ra...sbm-threat.html

 

A quanto pare i satelliti servono solo per confermare l'entità del bersaglio, ovvero distinguere una semplice nave mercantile da una CV.

Il grosso del lavoro viene fatto dal Terminal Homing del missile (secondo voi di quanto riuscirà a muovere la CV in 10 minuti?)

 

Ultimima cosa. Questa volta non è la solita notizia inventata per ingrossare la minaccia cinese.

Dalle parti della Cina è da 2 anni che si discutte di questa arma, ne hanno parlato ampiamente sul problema della manovrabilità dal rientro atmosferico e sul fatto di poter usare le cluster bomb per danneggiare il deck delle CV in modo da impedire il decollo dei velivoli.

 

Un ufficiale del PLA ha dichiarato che finchè la testata non è ancora in fase di rientro atmosferico c'è spazio per le manovre di correzioni.

Quindi presumo che il nuovo missile dovrà "prendere la mira" da fuori atmosfera e poi "tufarsi a massima velocità" confidando sulle cluster bomb.

Modificato 2 Maggio 2009 da cloyce

[madmike]

mi pare se ne sia abbondantemente parlato un mesetto fa su questo thread.

[SU-27]

Riporto un paio di citazioni di Obi Wan Russel su sinodefence forum che penso meritino una certa attenzione.

 

Sulla possibilità di installare delle catapulte sul ponte angolato della Varyag:

 

The flight deck isn't the only structural member of a carrier's hull. Many WW2 vintage carriers were retro fitted with steam catapults for which they were obviously not designed. Steam catapult technology is something the Varyag's Soviet designers would have been well aware of (I would lay odds the KGB archives had complete blueprints of every British and American Steam Catapult built prior to 1989), indeed the follow on design (Ulyanovsk) had two steam catapults in the angled deck as well as a ski jump at the bow. Her design was an enlargement of the Kuznetzov class, but the angled deck area was much the same. I would be surprised of the angled deck structure of the Kuznetzov class hadn't been designed with future retrofitting of a pair of Steam Catapults in mind. Otherwise the Soviet fleet would have been left in the curious position of having a fleet of Ulyanovsk class CVNs operating a range f aircraft types and two Kuznetzovs with only limited air groups. Steam Catapults are not complex pieces of kit, remember they were invented by a nation with a war ravaged economy and the prototype was ready for testing at sea in less than a year. All the design work was done on drawing boards assisted by slide rules without a computer or a PhD in sight. There are a number of qualified engineers experienced in the operation an maintenance of Steam Catapult from several nations worldwide who would be quite happy to lend their expertise to China for a reasonable sum.

 

Sulle caldaie necessarie a produrre il vapore per le catapulte:

 

The Kuznetzov class are steam powered by design; even if the propulsion is switched to diesels for this ship she will still have space for dedicated boilers for the cats. Diesel engines would only physically replace the turbines in the engine room, the boilers are in a separate compartment (usually forward of the turbine/engine room). Some carriers when refitted with steam catapults were also given extra boilers to supply the cats, eg HMS Victorious, which recieved two 'wing' boilers forward of the main boilers so that speed would be unaffected during launching operations. The Kuznetzovs are twice size of that ship.

[Leviathan]

segnalo anche vecchie discussioni correlate sulla marina cinese per chi vuole approfondire:

 

http://www.aereimilitari.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=3222

(la cina compra obsolete portaerei per scopi turistici?)

 

http://www.aereimilitari.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1809

( la Varyag )

[Ospite intruder]

(secondo voi di quanto riuscirà a muovere la CV in 10 minuti?)

 

Altrettanti chilometri, e se non hai una testata da 1 Mt il tuo missile fa pippa. Comunque ne abbiamo dibattutto lungamente un paio di settimane fa.

[diavolo rosso]

Riporto un paio di citazioni di Obi Wan Russel su sinodefence forum che penso meritino una certa attenzione.

 

Sulla possibilità di installare delle catapulte sul ponte angolato della Varyag:

 

The flight deck isn't the only structural member of a carrier's hull. Many WW2 vintage carriers were retro fitted with steam catapults for which they were obviously not designed. Steam catapult technology is something the Varyag's Soviet designers would have been well aware of (I would lay odds the KGB archives had complete blueprints of every British and American Steam Catapult built prior to 1989), indeed the follow on design (Ulyanovsk) had two steam catapults in the angled deck as well as a ski jump at the bow. Her design was an enlargement of the Kuznetzov class, but the angled deck area was much the same. I would be surprised of the angled deck structure of the Kuznetzov class hadn't been designed with future retrofitting of a pair of Steam Catapults in mind. Otherwise the Soviet fleet would have been left in the curious position of having a fleet of Ulyanovsk class CVNs operating a range f aircraft types and two Kuznetzovs with only limited air groups. Steam Catapults are not complex pieces of kit, remember they were invented by a nation with a war ravaged economy and the prototype was ready for testing at sea in less than a year. All the design work was done on drawing boards assisted by slide rules without a computer or a PhD in sight. There are a number of qualified engineers experienced in the operation an maintenance of Steam Catapult from several nations worldwide who would be quite happy to lend their expertise to China for a reasonable sum.

 

Sulle caldaie necessarie a produrre il vapore per le catapulte:

 

The Kuznetzov class are steam powered by design; even if the propulsion is switched to diesels for this ship she will still have space for dedicated boilers for the cats. Diesel engines would only physically replace the turbines in the engine room, the boilers are in a separate compartment (usually forward of the turbine/engine room). Some carriers when refitted with steam catapults were also given extra boilers to supply the cats, eg HMS Victorious, which recieved two 'wing' boilers forward of the main boilers so that speed would be unaffected during launching operations. The Kuznetzovs are twice size of that ship.

 

Interessante!!!!!

Modificato 3 Maggio 2009 da diavolo rosso

[Ospite intruder]

China Links Power To Economic Security

 

By Richard D. Fisher, Jr. www.aviationweek.com

 

 

 

China is expanding its force-projection capabilities on land, sea and in the air with a range of weapons. The primary goal is to protect economic interests through control of the western Pacific. But China also seeks to counter U.S. naval power in the region and make alliances with strategically placed countries like Iran and Pakistan.

 

China’s military buildup was acknowledged in the 2009 edition of the Pentagon’s China Military Power report to Congress. “China’s economic development is increasingly dependent upon sustained international stability and secure access to foreign markets and resources,” it states. “[M]ilitary and civilian strategists have begun to discuss the role of the armed forces in protecting and advancing China’s broader political and economic interests.”

 

In the first two installments of this three-part series, we covered China’s gains in increasingly sophisticated information technologies (DTI March, p. 39) and precision weapons (DTI April, p. 48). This report examines its moves to expand conventional systems.

 

Such evolution is reflected in official and semi-official Chinese statements, military exercises and deployments, and in the development or acquisition of new means to project power. In late 2004, President Hu Jintao began saying that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “must provide a security guarantee for national interests.” The next year, for the first time, China invited Russian military forces to the Shandong Peninsula to conduct joint and combined-arms “Peace Mission” exercises under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

 

In December 2006, China’s national defense white paper stated that the army looks to develop “transregional mobility,” the PLA navy “aims at the gradual extension of the strategic depth of offshore defensive operations,” and the PLA air force seeks “strategic projection.”

 

The meaning of these terms was partially defined by the Peace Mission exercises, which saw the PLA make a small but unprecedented combined-arms deployment. An air force airborne unit with mechanized armor joined a medium-weight army unit that traveled by train, and JH-7A fighter-bombers and army helicopters deployed by air. Plans are underway for SCO forces to exercise in China, likely in August.

 

Writing in the Communist Party journal Quishi in July 2007, navy commander Adm. Wu Shengli listed as among his service’s missions maintenance of “the safety of oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy.” Most of China’s tanker-carried petroleum travels though the Strait of Malacca. Last December, China sent a small task force of one Type 052B and one Type 052C air-defense destroyers and a support ship to join navies protecting shipping from Somali pirates. One of the destroyers was replaced in April by a new Type 054A air-defense frigate.

 

While this is a small start for naval deployments, it is possible that China may turn its investments in new ports and facilities in Myanmar, Chittagong harbor in Bangladesh and the port of Gwadar in Pakistan into access for warships. Academy of Social Sciences expert Ye Hailin in February termed the Indian Ocean China’s “sea of destiny,” and advocated reducing reliance on the Strait of Malacca by building energy routes on land via ports in Pakistan and Myanmar. In March, China and Pakistan held a 10-day naval exercise.

 

Pakistan and Iran are SCO “observers.” They could see increasing bilateral or multilateral military exercises with China if they become full members.

 

China’s navy might be larger and better able to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond by the end of the next decade. On Mar. 20, defense minister Liang Guanglie may have put to rest decades of speculation when he told his Japanese counterpart, Hamada Yasukazu, “China’s navy is . . . rather weak; we need to develop an aircraft carrier.” Such development actually began in the 1980s under then-navy commander Liu Huaqing, who became principal vice chairman of the central military commission (CMC). Liu famously quipped that he would “die with his eyes open” if China did not build a carrier

 

In leaks to Japanese and Hong Kong reporters in January, PLA and Chinese shipbuilding officials said that by 2020, the navy may have up to four indigenously designed and built aircraft carriers, two conventional and two nuclear. In addition, the Russian-Ukrainian carrier Varyag, acquired by China in 2002, will be refurbished for training.

 

Russian technology may figure heavily in carrier designs. In April, a Chinese television show interviewed experts who speculated that the new carrier would be similar to the Varyag, and employ a ski-jump. But the show also explored a unique configuration with up to six catapults. Carriers may be built at Dalian, the location of the Varyag, and at an expanded shipyard on Changxing Island near Shanghai. An early base for China’s carrier force will likely be a new naval base on Hainan Island.

 

China’s carrier air wing is also gathering. Candidate aircraft may include: upgraded Sukhoi Su-33s from Russia; a version of Shenyang Aircraft Corp.’s J-11 modified for carrier operations; a new Shenyang fighter sometimes called J-13, which is smaller than the Su-33 but has stealth features; and a carrier version of Chengdu Aircraft Corp.’s J-10 fighter.

 

It is expected that Hongdu’s L-15 twin-engine supersonic trainer will become a carrier trainer. Sources indicated in 2005 that China could be developing a carrier-based AWACS.

 

China’s carrier may also feature unmanned combat aerial vehicles. An L-15 carrier trainer would be one candidate, while purpose-designed versions like Shenyang’s Warrior Eagle could also go to sea.

 

Heavy naval amphibious capabilities will increase over the next decade. In late 2006, China launched its first 20,000-ton Type 071-class LPD (landing platform dock), which has a well deck that can hold a hovercraft for over-the-horizon force transport. This could be followed by a similarly sized flat-deck LHD (landing helicopter dock) called Type 081. Some sources suggest the PLA will build an initial force of six Type 081s and three Type 071s, which could carry several thousand troops and supporting armor. Marine and army amphibious units are deploying a new family of fast amphibious armored vehicles, which use water pump jets and planing surfaces for high speed.

 

The PLA is also developing large transport aircraft and mechanized forces for distance projection. While Russia and China work out the sale of 32-34 new-build Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft with 50-ton load capabilities, China is reorganizing its aircraft industries in a way that may streamline the development of heavy airlifters. This could still involve a great deal of help from Russia and Ukraine, which had hoped to promote a turbofan version of the Antonov An-70. A 2007 concept from the former AVIC-1 consortium showed a 60-ton-capable C-17-like airlifter. This program, however, will also depend on China successfully developing large, high-bypass turbofan engines, a traditional weakness.

 

In the meantime, the PLA is mechanizing airborne forces, which are nominally under air force command but controlled by the CMC. After Russia failed to sell China its BMD series airborne tank, China revealed its own BMD-like infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in 2005, which uses the same heavy airborne parachute. In 2006, the PLA revealed a new family of medium-weight 8 X 8 combat vehicles. The IFV version, the VN-1, was shown for the first time at IDEX in Abu Dhabi last February. This 18-25-plus-ton family will feature an air-transportable 105-mm. tank and 122-mm. artillery versions. The VN-1 is expected to gradually replace 6 X 6 fighting vehicles, and be used to form more medium-weight army units that could follow rapidly deployed but lighter mechanized airborne units.

 

If budgets continue to increase, the PLA could be capable of deploying modest long-range naval and airborne mechanized army forces by the 2020s. While the PLA may not be able to project large-scale forces and may still lack the basing infrastructure of the U.S., China can be expected to gain considerable political leverage from its potential to make distant-force deployments. This could significantly constrain American strategic options and erode security guarantees, forcing many U.S. allies to greatly increase defense spending to deter China.

 

 

Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center of Arlington, Va., and author of China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Praeger, 2008)

[Ospite intruder]

Se ne era già parlato un mese fa, ma trovo questo approfondimento molto interessante, anche perché pubblicato da Proceedings:

 

 

On the Verge of a Game-Changer

 

By Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang

 

A Chinese antiship ballistic missile could alter the rules in the Pacific and place U.S. Navy carrier strike groups in jeopardy.

 

Chinese leaders and strategists have been thinking of using land-based missiles to hit threatening sea targets for more than three decades. Today, the discussion is increasingly widespread, technical, and operationally focused. This suggests the possibility that China may be closer than ever to mastering such a system—with perhaps a strategically publicized test sometime in the future—or even to using it in the event of conflict. Indeed, the mere perception that China might have an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability could be a game-changer, with profound consequences for deterrence, military operations, and the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

 

While Chinese ASBM capability remains uncertain, relevant U.S. government sources state consistently that Beijing is pursuing an ASBM based on a variant of the 1,500 km-plus range DF-21/CSS-5 solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). According to the Department of Defense, if supported by "a sophisticated command-and-control system," e.g., accurate real-time target data, from China's growing family of terrestrial and space-based sensors, ASBMs could hold U.S. carrier strike groups at risk in the Western Pacific. Further, China's use of submunitions might render a carrier operationally ineffective without sinking it, thereby achieving its objectives with a (perceived) lower risk of escalation¹.

 

If China ultimately deploys a successful ASBM, rapid progress in its development will be traced to the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which convinced China's leadership that carrier strike groups (CSGs) would be a vital platform for American power projection in any future Taiwan conflict in which Washington elected to intervene. Related military development has since accelerated markedly.

 

Asymmetric in nature and anti-access in focus, the resulting new platforms and weapon systems target the full range of vulnerabilities inherent in CSGs. One potential capability stands above the rest. An ASBM would exploit six decades of Chinese ballistic-missile experience, be fired from mobile, highly concealable platforms, and be able to strike targets hundreds of miles from China's shores. The Second Artillery Corps (the People's Liberation Army's version of the former Soviet Union's Strategic Rocket Forces) published a feasibility study in 2003, suggesting that related concepts have been under development for well over five years, and perhaps for more than a decade².

 

While such mentions have appeared over the last few years in official reports and brief commentaries in various fora, the ASBM issue has only recently received widespread public attention in the United States. Two articles by a Chinese military affairs columnist, one claiming that by 2010 the Second Artillery will have a brigade of DF-21E ASBMs and giving a detailed notional sequence of their use, were translated, posted, and discussed on a naval affairs blog, which was then covered widely by the mainstream media³.

 

In light of these developments, it is useful to survey relevant Chinese writings for possible insights into the challenges that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) faces in developing a successful ASBM system, and how it might ultimately seek to use it in the event of tension or conflict.

 

 

 

 

Chinese Discussion of ASBMs

 

Three types of relevant writings are openly available. First are the technical analyses of specific ASBM issues. These tend to be theoretical, and it is unclear how readily they can be translated into concrete engineering solutions. Some claim that the theories involved have been validated, and actual solutions may be contained in other documents. Second, PLA doctrinal publications describing how ASBMs might be used in operational scenarios suggest that programs are under development, but they leave unclear to what extent the PLA has mastered necessary capabilities. Finally, generalist deliberations on the feasibility of such weapons, with varying extents of doctrinal discussion, show tremendous disagreement even on fundamental issues. Some sources offer very specific details, but many of them contain obvious technical errors and mistaken assumptions.

 

These writings reach several points of general consensus.

 

First, any ASBM would be based on an upgraded version of an existing Chinese MRBM, e.g., the DF-21/CSS-5. A DF-21D variant is reportedly closest to an antiship version, though some Chinese writings say this of the "C" version, and others refer to future modifications as well (e.g., a DF-21E). The prototype for such a weapon is generally held to be the U.S. Pershing II theater ballistic missile, deployed from 1984-88.

 

In addition, ASBMs would offer a variety of operational effects and value for Chinese maritime strategy—particularly with regard to Taiwan. Were this vision achieved, it could impose significant restrictions on U.S. naval operations during a Taiwan crisis, especially as complementary discussions in Chinese writings suggest holding U.S. theater land bases—such as those on Okinawa—at risk.

 

Finally, key technical challenges are target acquisition and terminal guidance. However, there appears to be little discussion in the Chinese literature about specific Chinese capabilities in these areas, except general statements of feasibility and implicit assumptions in doctrinal publications that ASBMs are available for use, or will be soon.

 

 

 

Technical Sources

 

The Second Artillery dominates available technical ASBM assessments, suggesting that it may control the majority of any Chinese ASBM programs. As the PLA's strategic rocket force, with equal attention devoted to (and the vast majority of its recent acquisitions in) conventional forces, and 78.2 percent of its cadres now holding a bachelor's degree or above, it would seem the logical choice to handle such a challenging new mission. Most of the available technical articles devoted explicitly to ASBM issues are written in full or in part by individuals associated with the Second Artillery Engineering College in Xi'an, suggesting that this institution may play a major role in ASBM development. The most prolific contributor is the PLA uniformed civilian Tan Shoulin, a leading professor at the college who advises master's students and specializes in "missile weapon firepower applications."

 

Second in institutional prominence is the Second Artillery Equipment Department in Beijing—with some involvement by the Second Artillery Equipment Research Institute as well, the latter of which may suggest that some degree of procurement, or at least active consideration thereof, is under way. Individuals associated with Second Artillery bases are occasionally involved as well.

 

 

 

 

Doctrinal Sources

 

How does the Second Artillery think about using ASBMs? Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, which likely serves as an educational handbook for the service, details five possible tactics:

- "Harassment strikes against the military bases of the enemy's allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle groups."

 

- Frontal firepower deterrence by firing intimidation salvos in front of a CSG "to serve as a warning."

 

- Flank firepower expulsion: interception of a CSG by PLAN forces coupled with intimidation salvos "launched toward the enemy carrier battle group opposite our relatively threatened flank."

 

- Concentrated fire assault: "When many carrier-borne aircraft are used in continuous air strikes against our coast, in order to halt the powerful air raids, the enemy's core carrier should be struck like a 'heavy hammer.' The conventional missile forces should be a select group carrying sensitive penetrating submunitions and, using the 'concentrated firepower assault' method, a wide-coverage strike against the enemy's core carrier should be executed, striving to destroy the enemy's carrier-borne planes, the control tower [island] and other easily damaged and vital positions."

 

- Information assault: "Directed against the enemy's command and control system or weak links in the Aegis system, conventional missiles carrying anti-radiation submunitions or electromagnetic pulse submunitions can be used when enemy radar is being used and their command systems are working, with anti-radiation submunitions striking radar stations and EMP submunitions paralyzing the enemy's command and control system"⁴.

 

 

The document states that theater ballistic missiles extend the Second Artillery's strike range and seems to assume that it would have ASBM inventory sufficient to permit a wide variety of warning shots. It ignores the possibility that these could easily be misinterpreted as failed attempts to strike the CSG and thus be dangerously escalatory.

 

Technical and doctrinal materials would seem to be more authoritative, but such literature has limitations. Specialized studies might reflect championing of programs that could be expected to benefit the Second Artillery, as well as jockeying for publicity among researchers. Doctrinal publications would seem to be far less prone to service-bias but may reflect aspirations or projected capabilities (as opposed to the existence of concrete hardware and supporting infrastructure). It is thus useful to examine the generalist literature, wherein there is widespread debate on all major aspects of ASBM development and employment, for indications of challenges and dilemmas China may face as it proceeds in these areas.

 

 

 

Utility and Feasibility

 

The generalist literature is broadly consistent concerning the operational effects of ASBMs and their potential value for Chinese maritime strategy. ASBMs are promoted as a means to overcome conventional inferiority by exploiting technological asymmetry, deter intervention to give China more maneuvering space, and offer both escalation control and a "trump card" for victory if deterrence fails. Skeptics writing in a China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation journal, however, charge that ASBMs offer limited power-projection capabilities, are highly escalatory if employed, and might trigger nuclear retaliation⁵.

 

Chinese debates about ASBMs' utility parallel widespread disagreements over their technical feasibility. Analysts generally agree that five major technical challenges must be surmounted to achieve a functioning ASBM:

 

- Detection. Pessimists claim that carriers are too small relative to the potential search area to be detected by satellite images. Optimists maintain that CSGs—with their massive electromagnetic footprints—can be detected, e.g., with space-borne sensors.

 

- Tracking. Skeptics maintain that requisite satellite coverage is unattainable, as are sufficient naval and surveillance craft and overseas bases for signals intelligence. They believe that China's other tracking methods are inadequate, even in combination. Strangely, they seem to overlook the possibility of China possessing relevant land-based over-the-horizon radars.

 

- Target defense penetration. Skeptics, with their claims that slowing the warhead for terminal guidance makes it prohibitively vulnerable to interception, seem relatively unpersuasive. Optimists advocate multi-axis saturation attacks to overwhelm CSG defenses, without appearing to acknowledge the difficulty of coordinating them.

 

- Hitting a moving target. How to strike a CSG that moves during location, data transmission, and ASBM delivery? Skeptics contend that ballistic missiles are less accurate than cruise missiles because the former's trajectory is relatively fixed. But optimists maintain that as long as the initial ASBM trajectory is reasonably accurate, appropriate homing corrections can be made. They suggest improving precision with passive radiation homing and activating terminal guidance at higher altitude to allow the seeker to scan a larger area, and selecting opportune moments for attack, e.g., when tailwinds or at-sea replenishment preclude significant mobility.

 

- Causing sufficient damage. Several experts detail CSG damage-control equipment. But the conventional wisdom seems to be that multi-axis saturation attacks (to defeat defenses) and/or submunitions (to distribute damage), delivered accurately, can achieve a mission kill by targeting critical exposed areas (e.g., the carrier's aircraft, island, and C4ISR equipment).

 

 

 

 

Inter-Service Rivalry?

 

A noticeable pattern in ASBM analyses may be interpreted as signs of Second Artillery-PLA Navy bureaucratic competition. The Second Artillery produces many technical analyses, invariably optimistic, that tend to assume that ASBM development is feasible, perhaps because it will—or already does—control an ASBM program. Students at the Second Artillery Engineering Academy have written far more ASBM-related master's theses than have naval students. Even an officer from the Naval Command Academy has written that "the Second Artillery is the major factor in successfully attacking an enemy [CSG]"⁶.

 

By contrast, the vast majority of PLAN- and shipbuilding industry-affiliated analyses suggest that ASBM development is technically problematic or use of the weapons would have dangerous unintended consequences. Perhaps this is because ASBMs would not be controlled by the PLAN and might reduce its resources.

 

In an interesting suggestion of at least some cooperation between the Second Artillery and the PLAN on ASBM-related issues, however, PLAN representatives have cowritten ASBM-specific articles with researchers from the Second Artillery Engineering College, and PLAN-affiliated institutions research intensively such related topics as ship detection and tracking.

 

 

 

Sending a Message

 

How and to what extent might Beijing be seeking to influence strategic communications regarding ASBMs? Information manipulation should certainly be expected; discussion is likely regulated to send a desired message. Given the sensitivity of the topic, we might suppose that the current Chinese literature on ASBM development is a carefully controlled discussion. We should probably assume that at least a large portion of articles published are intended to influence U.S. perceptions, especially as available technical analyses are published in journals fairly accessible to foreigners, complete with English titles and abstracts.

The writings could also represent an inexpensive partial deterrent. China's media were studiously reticent following the nation's successful anti-satellite test on 11 January 2007, and to this day China's government has remained virtually silent even in the face of repeated inquiries by foreign governments and non-governmental organizations. By contrast, there has been far more (unofficial) chatter surrounding the ASBM program, and yet no public indication has emerged that any weapon of this kind will be tested in the near future. From a signaling perspective, this may be a highly cost-effective way to achieve some deterrent effect until the capability is fully realized. If so, public discussion might decrease as capabilities mature.

 

Another possibility is that the writings could signal ongoing ambivalence. Confusion and contradictions in the generalist literature might reflect larger debate within China concerning the efficacy of ASBMs in practice regardless of their technological feasibility. They might also serve as a targeted effort to mask actual capabilities by diverting attention from existing systems, or ones in rapid development. Manipulating selected articles in journals known to be read outside China would be a particularly effective instrument in an informational campaign.

 

At some point, when its capabilities are developed sufficiently, Beijing might reveal to the world a dramatic test—with or without advance warning—geared to influencing official and public opinion in the United States, Taiwan, and Japan. Such an unprecedented public demonstration might signal either growing Chinese power during a time of stability, or Chinese resolve in a time of diplomatic tension or crisis. The fact of a hit, however manipulated, could change the strategic equation.

 

 

 

What To Do

 

While there is ongoing public debate concerning their feasibility and efficacy, the idea of developing ASBMs is clearly appealing to many in China, particularly in the Second Artillery. From the Chinese analytical perspective, any successful ASBM deployment would have three implications:

 

- Reinforcement of land-based approaches to maritime security.

 

- Emphasis on multi-axis saturation attacks.

 

- Greater confidence in PLA ability to restrict U.S. Navy operations and control escalation—even under ambiguous circumstances.

 

All does not hinge on putative ASBM capability: demonstration of other anti-access capabilities (e.g., streaming antiship cruise missile [ASCM] attacks) could have substantial effect. But ASBMs pose a threat qualitatively different from ASCMs. The United States has not had decades to address the problem, interception windows are far shorter, and launch platforms cannot be targeted (i.e., "shooting the archer instead of the arrow") without contemplating highly escalatory strikes in mainland China.

 

Any signs of Chinese ASBM capability are therefore likely to greatly concern the U.S. Navy. The U.S. military as a whole must also face the issue, however, as its operations in East Asia writ large could be affected. Such a prospect should make American planners seek lasting solutions. Land-based air power in theater will not solve the problem, as land attack is already a common operational approach and mission of the Second Artillery. China is clearly pursuing conventional missiles to attack land air bases, whose coordinates are known, at ever longer ranges. It may be possible to render a CSG sufficiently safe through the use of decoys, obscurants, and electronic countermeasures to confound China's over-the-horizon targeting and missile seekers. Should this prove unrealistic, however, it may be necessary to place a greater proportion of high-level combat capabilities on submarines, unmanned aerial platforms, long-range air based beyond China's strike range, and low-observable surface platforms so that some easily detected platforms lacking relative counter-targeting (e.g., CSGs) need not be forward deployed.

 

At the political level, Washington must emphasize to Beijing that ASBM development on its part would undermine the 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between Washington and Moscow, which has prevented both nations from possessing conventional and nuclear ground-launched ballistic (and cruise) missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km (e.g., the U.S. Pershing II). Chinese demonstration of the strategic value of missiles with precisely such characteristics would likely motivate other nations to develop ASBMs of their own. The resulting strategic tension would fuel additional military procurement and energize long-term investment to counter or balance against Chinese ASBM capabilities, an arms race that would leave all parties worse off than before.

Responding to these unprecedented strategic challenges will require the U.S. military and its civilian leadership to face hard truths. The most perilous approach would be one in which these vital guardians of our national credibility continue to insist that the United States maintains its previous ability to keep the peace in critical strategic areas (e.g., the Taiwan Strait), when in fact the military advantages that underpinned that ability are diminishing, at least in a relative sense. Such a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality—particularly if perceived by the public—would steadily erode Washington's regional credibility and might at the same time encourage overconfidence by Beijing in its own capabilities.

 

Either of these factors might heighten the perceived value of, and make more likely, a public demonstration of Chinese anti-access capability. Striking a surface vessel or mockup with an ASBM in peacetime, if not met with a proper U.S. response, could undermine Washington's standing by making it appear that ways of war had undergone radical change, to the detriment of U.S. power projection and influence. In the event of war, the consequences could be catastrophic, particularly if the PLA overestimated its ability to regulate escalation. To hedge against these negative outcomes, the United States must redouble its efforts to promote peace and cooperation while ensuring that its own capabilities remain strong should deterrence fail. These challenges, which confront an already time- and resource-pressed Obama administration, demand close scrutiny from scholars, analysts, and policy makers alike.

 

 

 

NOTES:

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress, pp. 21, 48.

 

2. Huang Hongfu, "Conception of Using Conventional Ballistic Missiles to Strike Aircraft Carrier Formation," Scientific and Technological Research, Scientific and Technological Committee of the Second Artillery Corps, 2003, No. 1, pp. 6-8.

 

3. Qiu Zhenwei, "Operational Process of the Chinese ASBM," http://blog.huanqiu.com/index.php?uid-6885-action-viewspace-itemid-2010.

 

4. Yu Jixun, ed., People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 401-

 

5. Huo Fei and Luo Shiwei, "Arrows Without Bows?An Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Employment of Anti-Aircraft-Carrier Ballistic Missiles," Modern Ships, No. 325, April 2008, p. 28.

 

6. Nie Yubao, "Combat Methods for Electronic Warfare Attacks on Heavily fortified Enemy Naval Formations," Military Science Editorial Group, Research Questions about Information Warfare in the PLA (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999), pp. 183-87.

 

 

Dr. Erickson is an associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute, Strategic Research Department, Naval War College. His co-edited volume on evolving maritime roles for Chinese aerospace power will be published by the Naval Institute Press.

 

Mr. Yang is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He was previously a visiting research fellow at Stanford University and began his career as an avionics software engineer at Lockheed Martin.

 

 

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/...p?STORY_ID=1856

[Ospite intruder]

An Undersea Deterrent?

 

 

By Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Chase

 

China's investment in a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine force and the accompanying infrastructure indicates a major effort to take the boats to sea. Increasingly aggressive Chinese harassment of U.S. survey vessels came to a head on 8 March when five Chinese ships surrounded the ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23), with one Chinese crew member even apparently attempting to snag her towed array with a grappling hook. The Impeccable was operating in international waters 75 miles south of China's new Yalong Bay submarine base on Hainan Island, prompting speculation that the Chinese actions represented a coordinated effort to dissuade the United States from monitoring China's latest nuclear-powered submarines and their area of operations. According to Xiamen University South China Sea expert Li Jinming, "It is well known that the submarine base was established [at Hainan], so it is unacceptable for China to have the U.S. Navy snooping around so close." This incident suggests that Beijing may be particularly sensitive about U.S. activities in this region, in part because it appears poised to become the home base of China's second generation of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), the Type 094, or Jin-class.

 

The emergence of the Jin appears to represent a substantial improvement over its first-generation Type 092 Xia SSBN. China may build five Type 094 SSBNs, each of which will be outfitted with 12 developmental JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that have an estimated range of at least 7,200 km and are equipped with penetration aids.¹ China's single Xia is equipped with short-range (1,770 km) JL-1 SLBMs and it is thought to never have conducted an extended patrol.

 

Although the transition to the new SSBN is ongoing, recent Internet photos depicting at least two Jin SSBNs suggest that China has reached an unprecedented level of confidence in the sea-based leg of its strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, China's 2008 Defense White Paper states that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is enhancing its "nuclear counterattack" capability.² With the introduction of the DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the JL-2 missiles on Jin SSBNs, China is thus on the verge of achieving a credible nuclear deterrent based on a survivable second-strike capability.

 

 

Recent Developments

 

While the exact trajectory and scope of China's SSBN development remains unclear, a variety of data points are emerging. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assesses that although China built only a single Xia SSBN, it will build a "fleet of probably five Type 094 SSBNs . . . to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea presence."³ A variety of Chinese publications suggest that the SSBN forces of France and Britain—which have four vessels each, with one at sea at all times, two in refit, and one under maintenance—may serve as models for China and hence possible indications of its plans.⁴ One Chinese source, however, suggests that China will field six 094 SSBNs, divided into patrolling, deploying, and refitting groups.⁵ Consistent with this projection, another source suggests that these groups will comprise two SSBNs each.⁶

 

It is clear that at least two different hulls have already been launched, based on unusually high-resolution Internet and commercial satellite images that have emerged of one Jin in port at Xiaopingdao, two Jins in the water and perhaps one emerging from production at Huludao, and one at a newly-constructed submarine facility at Yalong Bay near Sanya on Hainan Island.⁷

 

Exactly how many different hulls are depicted in these photos remains uncertain, but the images of the facility on Hainan Island appear to provide some hints as to the PLAN's SSBN basing plans. The photo of the Jin at Yalong Bay suggests that the facility may be the base for China's future SSBNs. Images available on Google Earth suggest that the Hainan facility, with its more than 23-meter-wide and over 19-meter-high cave entrance, was designed to accommodate larger submarines such as the Jin, which appears to be about 148 meters long and 12 meters wide. Google Earth imagery of China's nuclear-powered submarine base at Jianggezhuang (with its approximately 13-meter-wide cave entrance) suggests that its maintenance tunnel may be too narrow to accommodate the Jin. There also appear to be few convenient pier locations at other ports for additional submarines. The Hainan facility, by contrast, has three piers and a possible degaussing facility, perhaps offering further rationale for its development as China builds additional submarines.⁸

 

 

China's Motives

 

Many analysts have focused on the survivability issue as the main reason for China's decision to proceed with the development of the Jin and the JL-2. Given the potential vulnerability of Chinese SSBNs to detection by adversary attack submarines and the challenges of locating dispersed road-mobile missiles, however, it would certainly seem that Chinese decision-makers must also have been considering other factors, including countering missile defense, increasing international nuclear prestige, and inter-service politics.

 

Chinese strategists appear to calculate that a nuclear dyad—composed of land-based strategic missiles and SLBMs—is required to enhance the credibility of China's nuclear deterrent in line with the requirements of the "effective counter-nuclear deterrence" posture discussed in recent Chinese publications. As "the most survivable type of (nuclear) weapon," an SSBN can allow China to deter third-party intervention in a regional conflict.⁹ Citing the development of the Jin, one Chinese source states, "If a war erupts across the Taiwan Strait one day, facing the danger of China waging nuclear war, it will be very difficult for America to intervene in the cross-strait military crisis."¹⁰

 

For more than four decades, China's stated policy has been that it will never use nuclear weapons first. Although recent statements by some Chinese commentators suggest that this may be under debate, it has nonetheless been reiterated consistently in several major publications on military strategy and doctrine. Accordingly, we interpret the Chinese comments here to mean not that China would be likely to launch nuclear weapons first in response to U.S. intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict, but rather that Chinese analysts believe strong SSBN capabilities would enhance deterrence by causing Washington to think twice about intervening in a conflict in which escalation control might be difficult.

 

Another explanation for the Jin is that Chinese planners believe SLBMs launched from certain patrol areas might complicate U.S. missile-defense interception efforts "by being able to launch . . . along azimuths outside the [systems'] engagement zones."¹¹ Toshi Yoshihara of the Naval War College contends that "for at least the next two decades, missile defense . . . will have no answer to a capable SSBN patrolling the open ocean."¹² A Chinese analysis likewise states that SSBNs "are more capable of penetrating [missile] defenses."¹³

 

Yet another explanation for the decision to deploy the Jin is that Chinese leaders may view the ships as symbols of the PRC's emerging great-power status. The other permanent members of the UN Security Council—France, Britain, Russia, and the United States—all have modern SSBNs in their fleets, and Beijing may see the deployment of its own as a way to enhance its international prestige. This certainly appears to be true of nuclear-powered submarines in general. One Chinese-published analysis emphasizes the precise correlation between membership in the UN Security Council and the development of nuclear-powered submarines.¹4 Similarly, former PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing and others state that such submarines represent one of China's clearest claims to status as a "great power."¹⁵

 

Another possible explanation that should not be discounted is inter-service politics. Little or no empirical information on this topic is available since the politics of China's defense budget process are opaque to outsiders. But, it seems reasonable to speculate that the PLAN leadership may have pushed for the development of the Jin-class to ensure that the navy would have a role to play in the strategic nuclear-deterrence mission, thereby increasing its share of defense spending.

 

 

Operational Challenges

 

Notwithstanding the considerable progress reflected by the launching of at least two Jin SSBNs, the PLAN still faces at least three key challenges before it realizes a secure seaborne second-strike capability: reducing the probability of detection; at sea training of commanders and crew members; and coping with the nuclear command-and-control issues associated with the operation of SSBNs.

 

Chinese observers are well aware of the challenges of avoiding detection, as reflected by their analysis of capabilities allegedly demonstrated during the Cold War vis-a-vis Soviet submarines. With respect to China's assessment of the Cold War at sea, one particularly noteworthy publication is the Chinese translation of a Russian book, Secrets of Cold War Undersea Espionage, which alleges that "U.S. nuclear and conventional submarines would often lurk along the routes of Soviet warships . . . conducting intelligence activities." This volume also claims that "the SOSUS [sound Surveillance] system substantially helped the U.S. to cope with the capabilities of the Soviet submarine force," and credits the United States with building an "acoustic signature catalogue (resembling a fingerprint) for Soviet submarines."¹⁶

 

China must recognize that acoustic liabilities hampered Soviet SSBNs' effectiveness, so there is reason to believe that it has worked to address these issues. A variety of evidence—including Chinese research on acoustics, sound isolation couplings, and advanced composite materials; development of a relatively advanced guide-vane propeller by the late 1990s; and employment of advanced seven-blade propellers with cruciform vortex dissipaters in both its indigenous Song-class and imported Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines—suggests that the Jin may have significantly improved propellers and other quieting technology.¹⁷

 

Google Earth photos reveal the Jin to be larger in diameter than the Xia, and larger submarines have historically been quieter because noise reducing efforts and machinery occupy more volume.¹⁸ Moreover, subsequent-generation submarines are generally significantly quieter than those of earlier generations, so it may be expected that China has made progress in quieting its submarines as well. Nevertheless, the Jin is still a second-generation SSBN, and those of other nations have faced significant acoustic difficulties. Indeed, despite Russian technology and assistance, China is unlikely to have yet fully exploited all possible technologies given the major challenges involved.

 

Training is another potential challenge for China's emerging SSBN force. Although digital training and simulations can be useful, the only way other nations have become proficient at submarine operations is to take the boats to sea. Chinese exercises have increased in sophistication in recent years and currently encompass such categories as command and control, navigation, electronic countermeasures, and weapon testing.¹⁹

 

The PLAN has for some time pursued occasional nuclear-powered submarine missions of extended duration. In his memoirs, Admiral Liu Huaqing relates that he raised the priority of long-duration exercises for PLAN nuclear-powered attack submarines to test all parameters of new capabilities.²⁰ Apparently as part of these expanded activities, the author of a recent Chinese publication on the development of the PLAN's nuclear-powered submarine force asserts that the current PLAN Assistant Chief of General Staff, two-star Admiral Sun Jianguo, commanded the nuclear-powered attack submarine Han 403 during a mid-1980s mission of 90 days.²¹ Another Chinese source states that this mission broke an 84-day undersea endurance record previously held by the USS Nautilus (SSN-571).²²

 

Notwithstanding such reported achievements, and frequent shorter missions, Chinese submarine patrols have been relatively infrequent in most years—though the PLAN conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice the number of patrols in 2007.²³ As Jane's Navy International explains, "A patrol in this vernacular would seem to equate to a sustained seagoing deployment—lasting weeks at a time—to perform a specific task or mission, for instance: to 'track and trail' other submarines; participate in naval defense operations in coastal or extra-coastal areas; collect intelligence; or shadow surface units."²⁴

 

This increase in patrols and the overall priority accorded to China's submarine force development suggest that the PLAN's submarines are now able to range farther afield on a more frequent basis. Indeed, the evolving missions and growing capabilities of the Chinese submarine force "create the conditions for Beijing to opt for an increased submarine presence in the Western Pacific east of the Ryukyu Island chain."²⁵

 

While the trajectory of training specifically relevant to deterrent patrols remains opaque, the PLAN is striving to improve the rigor and realism of education and training across the board. Within this context, submarines have clearly been an area of emphasis and the PLAN is using a variety of methods to prepare its sailors for future wars. Official Chinese publications note, for example, that various types of simulators have been used to improve submarine training.²⁶

 

Communications Hurdle

 

Establishing and maintaining secure and reliable communications with SSBNs constitutes a major challenge for any country that desires a sea-based deterrent. Chinese military publications emphasize that the central leadership must maintain strict, highly-centralized command and control of nuclear forces at all times and under all circumstances, a principle Beijing will undoubtedly seek to apply to its SSBNs as well as its land-based nuclear forces.²⁷

 

The Central Military Commission (CMC), the PRC's highest-ranking military decision-making body, which is currently chaired by Hu Jintao, the President of China and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, exercises direct command and control over China's strategic missile forces through the Second Artillery Corps. Presumably, the CMC would also exercise direct command and control over deployed SSBNs through the General Staff Department or PLAN headquarters. Indeed, China's 2002 Defense White Paper states that submarines capable of assuming the "strategic nuclear counterattack mission" are under the "direct command" of the CMC.²⁸ Moreover, according to authors John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's SSBN force, like all other nuclear units, is overseen and coordinated by the Strategic Forces Bureau, under the Operations Department of the General Staff Department. This is intended to ensure that "Only the [Central Military Commission] Chairman . . . has the authority to launch any nuclear weapons after getting the concurrence of the Politburo Standing Committee and the [Central Military Commission]."²⁹

 

China's submarine force has reportedly employed high-frequency (HF), low-frequency (LF), and very-low-frequency (VLF) communications.³⁰ Researchers are working on a number of technologies that could be useful for secure communications with submarines, as reflected by recent publications discussing the prevention of enemy detection of transmissions between submarines and shore-based headquarters units.

 

In addition, Chinese analysts have also shown interest in the practices of the U.S. Navy's highly survivable TACAMO (Take Charge and Move Out) air fleet, which uses a wide range of frequencies to receive, verify, and retransmit emergency action messages between the U.S. national command authority and the nuclear triad.³¹ It remains unclear, however, to what extent centralized SSBN command, control, and communication is possible for China across the range of nuclear scenarios. This suggests another critical problem for the PLAN: ensuring the ability to communicate with SSBNs in an environment in which its command-and-control system has been degraded.

 

Beyond the problem of ensuring secure and reliable communications, the deployment of SSBNs also entails use-control challenges. Given the strong emphasis on centralized control of nuclear forces that is evident in official Chinese military and defense policy publications, it seems highly unlikely that the PLAN would conduct deterrent patrols without effective use controls. Presumably, China will strive not only to develop a communications capability that is robust enough to ensure at least one-way wartime connectivity between Beijing and the Jin-class SSBNs, but also to minimize the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch by implementing some combination of technical and procedural controls.

 

Notwithstanding the recent series of revelations about China's emerging SSBN force, a number of unanswered questions that have major implications for the future of China's sea-based deterrent remain. Three stand out as particularly important. First is the issue of how many SSBNs China will ultimately build, which will determine deterrence patrol tempos. Second, it remains unclear whether China will attempt to create bastions for its SSBNs in areas close to the mainland or deploy them to more distant patrol areas-a decision which will no doubt be informed in part by the capabilities of the JL-2 SLBM, which remains under development. Third, China is unlikely to reveal any information about its plans for coping with the command-and-control challenges associated with the deployment of a sea-based deterrent force, which could influence crisis stability and the security of China's retaliatory capability.

 

While these uncertainties remain, the investment already made in SSBN hulls and shore facilities indicates that the program represents a major effort to move beyond the ill-fated Xia and take China's deterrent to sea. In addition, the emergence of photos of at least two Type 094 submarines—and the apparent willingness to allow Western analysts to see them—appears to signal a new level of confidence on Beijing's part, and perhaps even a nascent recognition that modest increases in transparency could actually support China's strategic interests. Continued progress in this direction may be essential to avoiding a repeat of the Cold War at sea waged by the U.S. and Soviet navies in part to secure the undersea portion of their nuclear triads.

 

 

 

 

 

1. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, p. 56.

 

2. "China's National Defense in 2008" (Beijing: State Council Information Office, January 2009), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/China_English2008.pdf.

 

3. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), "Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force," 20 December 2006, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ONI2006.pdf.

 

4. See, for example, Ming Zhou, "In Direct Proximity to French Nuclear Submarines," Naval & Merchant Ships No. 9 (2005), pp. 18-21.

 

5. Jian Jie, "The Legend of the Virtuous Twins," World Outlook, no. 448 (August 2002), p. 23.

 

6. Lin Changsheng, "The Combat Power of China's Nuclear Submarines," World Aerospace Digest, no. 103 (September 2004), p. 33.

 

7. Hans M. Kristensen, Strategic Security Blog; "A Closer Look at China's New SSBNs," 15 October 2007; "Two More Chinese SSBNs Spotted," 10 October 2007; "New Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarine Spotted," 5 July 2007.

 

8. Hans Kristensen, "New Chinese SSBN Deploys to Hainan Island," 24 April 2008, Strategic Security Blog.

 

9. Zhang Feng, "Nuclear Submarines and China's Navy," Naval & Merchant Ships (March 2005), p. 12.

 

10. "China's at Sea Deterrent," Military Overview, no. 101, p. 53.

 

11. Michael McDevitt, "The Strategic and Operational Context Driving PLA Navy Building," Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right-Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2007), p. 512.

 

12. Toshi Yoshihara, "U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and China's Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: A Preliminary Assessment," in Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, William Murray, and Andrew Wilson, eds., China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 340.

 

13. Wang Yifeng and Ye Jing, "What the Nuclear Submarine Incident Between China and Japan Tells Us About the Ability of China's Nuclear Submarines to Penetrate Defenses, Part 1," Shipborne Weapons (January 2005), pp. 27-31.

 

14. Lin Changsheng, p. 27.

 

15. Liu Huaqing, The Memoirs of Liu Huaqing (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 2004), p. 476.

 

16. Zykov and Baikov, Secrets of Undersea Espionage (Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Press, 2006), pp. 10-12.

 

17. Gao Yun, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Nuclear Submarines," National Defense, no. 6 (1996), p. 45. Zhao Hongjiang, "Study of Replacing Techniques for Flexure Joint-Pipe of Main Circulating Water-Piping," China Ship-Repair, no. 6 (1997), pp. 21-23. Ren Yongsheng and Liu Lihou, "Advances in Damping Analysis and Design of Fiber Reinforced Composite Material Structures," Mechanics & Engineering 26, no. 1 (February 2004), pp. 9-16. Shen Hongcui et al., "Submarine Guide Vane Propeller for Increasing Efficiency and Reducing Noise, Journal of Ship Mechanics 1, no. 1 (August 1997), pp. 1-7.

 

18. See Tom Stefanick, Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 274, Figure A6-5.

 

19. Office of Naval Intelligence, Handbook on China's Navy 2007, p. 34.

 

20. Liu Huaqing, pp. 474-77, 494.

 

21. Peng Ziqiang, The Research and Development of Chinese Nuclear Submarines (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 2005), p. 286.

 

22. Huang Caihong et al., Nuclear Submarines (Beijing: People's Press, 1996), p. 91.

 

23. Hans Kristensen, "Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008," Strategic Security Blog, 3 February 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/02/patrols.php.

 

24. Richard Scott, "China's Submarine Force Awaits a Cultural Revolution," Jane's Navy International, 1 January 2008, www.janes.com.

 

25. ONI.

 

26. Liu Jian, "Submarine Academy Emphasizes Teaching and Training Under Complex and Emergency Conditions," People's Navy, 15 December 2006, p. 1.

 

27. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, ed., The Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 369-71.

 

28. "China's National Defense in 2002" (Beijing: State Council Information Office, December 2002), www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm.

 

29. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 120.

 

30. Garth Hekler, Ed Francis, and James Mulvenon, "Command, Control, and Communications in the Chinese Submarine Fleet," in Erickson, Goldstein, Murray, and Wilson, pp. 212-28.

 

31. Wang Xinsen, "The Call of the Devil: Submarine Communications Aircraft," Naval & Merchant Ships, no. 287 (August 2003), pp. 42-45.

 

Dr. Erickson is an associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College. He is coeditor of the Naval Institute Press books China Goes to Sea (July 2009), China's Energy Strategy (2008), and China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force (2007).

 

Dr. Chase is an assistant professor in NWC's Strategy and Policy Department. He is the author of Taiwan's Security: External Threats and Domestic Politics (Lynne Rienner, 2008).

 

 

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/...p?STORY_ID=1907

[SU-27]

Mi scuso per l'enorme ritardo, io stesso non mi sono accorto subito degli ultimissimi aggiornamenti.

 

Che si può dire, lavori di completamento o di demolizione?

 

[Simone]

Non voglio fare il pedante ma ricordo un libro d scritto non da P N'guyen come credevo, ma da Norman Polmar "The Naval Institute guide to Soviet Navy" pag 30 e seg ove si fa cenno ad esercitazioni di epoca sovietica in cui dei missili balistici "intermedi" erano stati lanciati contro la posizione di "gruppi navali nemici" la cui posizione era stata fornita da un RORSAT di passaggio.

In un altro topic avevo scritto "cruise montati su ICBM" che aveva suscitato qualche ilarità; e se invece di un cruise si montasse un "comune" missile anti-nave come il brahmos o simili? protetto da un scudo termico "espulso" ad una quota "troposferica", il missile si attiverebbe come se fosse lanciato da un aeroplano e cercherebbe il suo bersaglio.

Il problem principale potrebbe essere adattare il missile terminale alle alte accelerazioni della partenza e del rientro, ma non mi paiono insormontabili

Modificato 8 Settembre 2009 da Simone

[Dominus]

Non voglio fare il pedante ma ricordo un libro del 1993 scritto da P N'guyen in cui si fa cenno ad esercitazioni di epoca sovietica in cui dei missili balistici "intermedi" erano lanciati contro la posizione di "gruppi navali nemici"-ovviamente in esercitazione- la cui posizione era stata fornita da un RORSAT di passaggio.

 

Si ma dal momento che hai l'informazione del rorsat + il tempo di volo del missile + il fatto che il gruppo navale può essere disposto in centinaia di km quadrati o metti una testata nucleare ad alta potenza sull'MRBM o non hai nessuna speranza di colpire alcunchè, senza considerare che oggi i RORSAT non ci sono più e che, comunque, non erano certo dei lacrosse...

 

Quanto alla guida terminale non è assolutamente un problema di poco conto, anzi!

 

Se calcoli quanti sforzi si siano fatti per ridurre il CEP dei BM da cinquant'anni ad adesso e dove si è arrivati con le tecnologie più avanzate potrai facilmente capire che inserire una guida terminale in un aggeggio che rientra a 4-7km/s per beccare un bersaglio piccolo piccolo come una nave sia tutt'altro che un prolbema di facile soluzione...

[M-47]

Ormai è certo che la ex Varjag, ben lungi dal venire demolita o trasformata in casinò, è in corso di completamento ,ammodernamento e ristrutturazione.

Qualche giorno fa, alla nave attualmente in bacino a Dalian, è stata reinstallata una delle parti dell'isola, che era stata asportata recentemente. E' assai probabile che il grosso elemento sia sostitutivo di quello precedente, in quanto appare evidente l'esistenza di nuove cornici destinate a ricevere dei radar planari anche sul lato sinistro dell'isola.

 

Ma la certezza circa il vero scopo dei lavori sulla Varjag è data dalla scoperta di una grande struttura a terra la cui localizzazione non è ancora certa, costituita da un edificio di enormi proporzioni sul tetto del quale è stata installata una copia del ponte dell'ex portaerei sovietica, completa di isola e di Sky Jump.

Per quanto il tutto appaia ancora in via di realizzazione, è del tutto evidente che l'isola della struttura a terra è simile a quella della Varjag, così come la si sta modificando.

Altro dato assai interessante è costituito dalla presenza sul ponte di quelli che potrebbero essere dei mock up di un J-11 di una nuova versione (almeno a giudicare dalla presenza di una grande gobba dietro l'abitacolo e del muso differente ma coperto purtroppo da un telone ), e di un grosso elicottero, quasi certamente la versione cinese del Super Frelon.

Quale possa essere lo scopo preciso della realizzazione dell'opera, non è certo. Potrebbe trattarsi di una sorta di simulatore di appontaggio e decollo in dimensioni naturali e assai realistiche. Ovviamente mancherebbe la parte fondamntale delle condizioni di rollio e beccheggio di una vera nave, ma a queste potrebbero al momento venire destinati simulatori magari da installare sotto il ponte, all'interno dell'edificio che lo sostiene.

Infine appare evidente che l'acquisizione di portaerei è ormai divenuto l'obbiettivo primario della PLAN che sembra voler recuperare con tutti i mezzi il divario con le altre marine del Pacifico.

 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_61c9f8a90100ep4z.html

 

http://bbs.wforum.com/wmf/bbsviewer.php?trd_id=38368

[M-47]

Le ultime informazioni disponibili localizzano la nuovissima struttura a Wuhan presso il “China Ship Design Institute” di Wuhan-

L'aereo ripreso potrebbe essere una nuova versione del Su 33 (un solo velivolo era stato venduto alla Cina dall'Ucraina), o addirittura il mock up del J-15, aereo imbarcato di concezione cinese, ampiamente ispirato all'aereo russo.

 

http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/navy/lates...html#post108121

 

Per quanto riguarda la reinstallazione di parti dell'isola in luogo di quelle asportate in precedenza si veda:

 

http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/navy/lates...html#post107876

[Dominus]

Se davvero quelle cornici preludono ad un radar a facce planari allora non sarà solo una "nave esperienze" ma contano di farla diventare la prima vera portaerei cinese.

[M-47]

In effetti è così. D'altra parte le due cose non sono antitetiche.

I cinesi non hanno alcuna esperienza di portaerei, ne STOBAR, né CATOBAR. e per quanto possano sforzarsi di accelerare il processo di familiarità con l'aviazione imbarcata ad ala fissa, sanno perfettamente che occorreranno parecchi anni per ottenere risultati accettabili.

L'esperienza italiana in questo campo la dice lunga. Sono stati necessari parecchi anni di studio e addestramento per ottimizzare l'impiego degli Harrier e del Garibaldi.. Con tutto ciò, anche la Cavour sta divenendo pienamente efficiente solo ora, a quasi tre anni dalle prime uscite in mare. E avrà appena avuto il tempo di rendere gli AV 8B operativi che dovrà pensare all'imbarco degli F35.

Bisogna poi tener conto del fatto che al momento la Cina sta impiegando solo tecnologie ex sovietiche con qualche contaminazione locale, e che il percorso per realizzare una portaerei davvero cinese sarà piuttosto lungo.

In questo senso, ad esempio, la marina indiana gode di notevole vantaggio, sia nella esperienza di impiego di portaerei con sky-jump, sia per quanto riguarda unità dotate di catapulte a vapore (per quanto abbandonate da decenni ), anche se le croniche ed incredibili lungaggini nel procurement potrebbero far perdere parte di quel vantaggio.

 

Nel link che segue sono presenti foto dell'isola dell'impianto di Wuhan ancora più recenti e interessanti. Per accedere ad alcune delle foto é però necessario registrarsi.

 

http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/navy/lates...os-88-4714.html

[M-47]

I forum di argomenti militari di tutto il mondo questi giorni si sono occupati spesso sia dell'ammodernamento della Varjag, sia della struttura di addestramento e studio in costruzione a Wuhan.

Riguardo a quest'ultima c'era un folto gruppo di appassionati che sosteneva che si trattasse di un “fake”, una vera e propria enorme bufala, per quanto ben congegnata, prodotta con PS. .

Ovviamente le ricerche su Google si sono fatte frenetiche e finalmente qualcuno è riuscito ad individuare la “porterei terrestre” nel settore in basso a destra della foto del link che segue, e che risale a qualche settimana fa, contrariamente alle strisciate disponibili sul web che in quella zona sono del 2007, quando la costruzione non era ancora incominciata. .

Nel frattempo ci si è anche resi conto che la stampa cinese aveva dato notizia della costruzione dell'impianto già da più di un anno, aggiornandola man mano che procedeva.

Accertato che non c'è stato né trucco né inganno, resta il mistero sulla reale funzione dell'impianto e sulle caratteristiche anche costruttive (struttura in calcestruzzo o acciaio?) che potrebbero rivelare parecchie cose.

 

 

http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthrea...2227&page=8

 

http://browse.digitalglobe.com/image...geWidth=natres

[M-47]

Come è possibile vedere nel link che segue, i lavori stanno procedendo velocemente. Rimangono ancora forti perplessità sull'impiego della struttura che alcuni vorrebbero come un banale parco a tema, pur essendo stata realizzata presso un importante istituto di ricerca.

La risposta definitiva verrà data molto probabilmente nel momento in cui si dovranno installare le apparecchiature elettroniche ed in particolare i radar. Se questi dovessero essere autentici, appare evidente la scelta cinese di realizzare (in grande) quanto hanno già fatto i francesi per le fragate Horizon, gli inglesi per le nuove portaerei e, in precedenza, gli Stati Uniti per i sistemi AEGIS.

 

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showp...p;postcount=918

[Rick86]

Guardate che non è tanto il decollo o l'atterraggio degli aerei quello per cui i cinesi hanno costruito quella piattaforma.

Gli inglesi hanno qualcosa di simile, dove addestrano con gli ormai dismessi Harrier FA2 ( ) gli addetti alle operazioni di volo a movimentare gli aerei sul ponte, gli addetti alla torre di controllo a gestire gli aerei in decollo ed atterraggio ecc...

In pratica un vero e proprio simulatore "terrestre" del ponte di una portaerei dove gli aerei (col motore funzionante) vengono solamente spostati sul ponte.

 

A quel punto che sia o meno tecnicamente possibile atterrare su quella piattaforma conta poco.

 

RNAS Culdrose ecco qua quello che hanno gli inglesi.

[cloyce]

AGGIORNAMENTO.

 

http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTg3OTYzNzU2.html

E' lento a caricare. (aspettate con calma)

 

L'esistenza del Naval Flanker della PLAN sembra ormai confermato.

 

In seguito ad alcune foto diffuse su internet qualche mese fà, ora è spuntato fuori questo video che toglie ogni dubbio.

 

Pare che la PLAN abbia proprio intenzione di avere Caccia + Piloti & Equipaggio già addestrati a partire dal Day One.

 

Stime varie danno l'entrata in servizio del Varyag entro il 2012. Corrono proprio di fretta.

Modificato 8 Luglio 2010 da cloyce

[cloyce]

Nuova immagine del Naval Flanker.

 

 

[cloyce]

Breve aggiornamento sullo stato della portaerei Varyag.

 

Ultime foto :

 

 

Conminciano a prender forma le finestre.

Modificato 15 Agosto 2010 da cloyce

[TecnoLover69]

comunque a me pare di aver letto di un progetto di aereo cinese imbarcato....anche se a mio parere adotteranno i su-33 naval flanker.... comunque volevo chiedere se avevano incrociatori a propulsione nucleare tipo l'imbarcazione russa classe "Kirov"

Modificato 2 Settembre 2010 da vorthex