Cina - Topic Ufficiale

[Andrea75]

Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader

 

Il clan di nonno Wen Jiabao smascherato dal New York Times

 

«Wen Jiabao, ricchezza colossale» E la Cina oscura il New York Times

 

Secondo il quotidiano Usa la famiglia del premier cinese avrebbe accumulato una fortuna di 2,7 miliardi di dollari

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Ci sono queste brutte cose in cui mi sembra che la distanza fra Cina e Italia si riduce, ma di molto.

[Andrea75]

The ‘Lucifer effect’ theory of Chinese governance

[Andrea75]

The secret story behind Xi Jinping’s disappearance, finally revealed?

 

n September, Chinese vice president and the man about to assume a 10-year term as China’s leader, Xi Jinping, disappeared mysteriously for two weeks. ... According to Kitto’s story, Xi was hit in the back with a chair hurled during a contentious meeting of “the red second generation.” These meetings of the Communist Party old guard’s elite and now-adult children, which includes Xi, come with a lot of baggage. Old rivalries, petty squabbles, and apparently fights that include flying chairs. Here’s Kitto:

 

The meeting turned violent. They went at it hammer and sickle. Xi Jinping tried to calm them down. He put himself physically in the crossfire and unwittingly into the path of a chair as it was thrown across the room. It hit him in the back, injuring him. Hence the absence, and the silence, and the rumours.

 

Colpito da una sedia?

 

 

 

La Cina fa un grande rimpasto dei vertici militari. Vincono Hu e Xi

 

Nella Repubblica popolare è in atto un vero e proprio rimpasto dei vertici militari che coinvolge tutte le principali cariche delle forze armate. Sembra che il presidente uscente Hu Jintao voglia emulare quanto già fatto a suo tempo da Jiang Zemin, ovvero collocare uomini a lui politicamente vicini in posizioni di potere nelle forze armate in modo da continuare a mantenere una certa influenza sulla prossima generazione di leader cinesi. Fra gli uomini considerati vicini a Hu e raggiunti da una promozione negli ultimi giorni c’è il generale Fang Fenghui, comandante della regione militare di Pechino e da poco nominato capo di stato maggiore dell’Esercito popolare di liberazione, la più alta carica militare in Cina. Il sessantunenne Fang diventa così il più giovane della storia nel suo ruolo e sostituisce il generale Chen Bingde. Il suo vice sarà Wang Guanzhong, già direttore dell’ufficio generale della Commissione militare centrale.

...

Un altro uomo considerato vicino a Hu Jintao, il tenente generale Wei Fenghe, ex vice capo di stato maggiore, è stato nominato comandante del Secondo corpo di artiglieria. È un incarico decisamente importante, perché si tratta del corpo che controlla la forza missilistica strategica.

Ecco le nuove nomine: al comando della regione militare della capitale è stato nominato il sessantenne tenente generale Zhang Shibo, ex comandante della guarnigione di stanza a Hong Kong. Zhang è stato a sua volta sostituito dal sessantenne tenente generale Wang Xiaojun, già comandante della regione militare di Shenyang. Il comando militare di Nanchino è stato invece affidato al cinquantottenne tenente generale Cai Yingting.

La girandola di nomine e promozioni ha interessato anche i dipartimenti del ministero della Difesa. A capo del dipartimento politico generale è stato messo Zhang Yang, uomo vicino a Fang Fenghui. Zhang è l’ex commissario militare della regione di Guangzhou e ha collaborato con il nuovo capo di stato maggiore fra il 2004 e il 2007. Zhao Keshi, il più anziano fra i generali promossi in questi giorni ed ex comandante della regione militare di Nanchino, è il nuovo capo del dipartimento logistico. A capo del dipartimento per gli armamenti è stato nominato Zhang Youxia, figlio del vecchio generale Zhang Zongxun, capo del dipartimento logistico negli anni settanta (sia Zhao che Zhang sono considerati vicini a Xi Jinping).

Anche l’aeronautica è stata coinvolta dal rimpasto. L’ex capo di stato maggiore dell’esercito, Ma Xiaotian, sostituirà Xu Qiliang come comandante delle forze aeree. L’ex commissario politico della regione militare di Chengdu, Tian Xiusi, diventerà commissario politico dell’aeronautica sostituendo Deng Changyou. La marina appare per ora esclusa dalla girandola di nomine, anche se c’è in vista una competizione per la leadership che vede due personalità di spicco contendersi la promozione: da una parte c’è il capo di stato maggiore della marina, ammiraglio Sun Jianguo; dall’altra c’è il sessantunenne vice ammiraglio Ding Yiping, figlio del vecchio rivoluzionario Ding Qiusheng, dato in vantaggio dai media cinesi.

 

 

 

 

segnalo anche quest'articolo che parla di un'altro 'alto papavero' cinese China’s ‘firefighter-in-chief’ ascending

 

Wang Qishan, China's vice premier ... Until six months ago, rumours swirled that Wang, a historian by training, might even take the place of Li Keqiang, the man anointed to replace Wen Jiabao as premier

Modificato 2 Novembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

Analysis: China's mission impossible - a date for Hu's military handover

 

Outgoing Chinese president Hu Jintao is keeping the nation and the rest of the world guessing over whether he will seek to hang on as armed forces chief, sources said, highlighting a potentially serious weakness in Beijing's succession planning.

 

The question of when Hu will hand over the reins as chairman of the Central Military Commission, the supreme decision-making body for the armed forces, is one of the biggest uncertainties surrounding China's current transition to a new administration.

[Andrea75]

China leaders consider internal democratic reform

 

China's outgoing leader and his likely successor are pushing the ruling Communist Party to adopt a more democratic process this month for choosing a new leadership, sources said, in an attempt to boost its flagging legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

 

The extent of the reform would be unprecedented in communist China where elections for the highest tiers of the party, held every five years, have been mainly exercises in rubber-stamping candidates already agreed upon by party power-brokers.

[Andrea75]

il numero di ottobre di Orizzonte Cina

 

Cina e Giappone verso lo scontro?

Come ha osservato Hu Shuli, in un articolo pubblicato su una rivista del gruppo indipendente Caixin e riprodotto nel quotidiano di Hong Kong South China Morning Post, la relazione economica sino-giapponese è talmente importante che dovrebbe essere nell’interesse nazionale cinese tenere separata l’economia dalla politica, ed evitare che una minoranza furiosamente anti-nipponica tenga in ostaggio la politica estera del paese. Nel 2011 il commercio con il Giappone ha rappresentato l’8,5% del commercio totale cinese. La Rpc costituisce il primo mercato per le esportazioni giapponesi, e il primo paese fornitore. Nei primi mesi del 2012, gli investimenti giapponesi in Cina sono cresciuti del 16%. Perciò Hu Shuli ritiene controproducente “premere il grilletto economico” contro il Giappone: l’assemblaggio dei prodotti per cui la Cina è divenuta la fabbrica del mondo dipende troppo dalle forniture o dagli investimenti giapponesi.

Assecondando questi istinti nazionalistici, si rischia di mettere in ginocchio gran parte dell’industria cinese, con evidenti risvolti occupazionali e sociali. Inoltre, significherebbe mandare il segnale sbagliato agli investitori internazionali: Tomohiko Taniguchi, già portavoce del Ministero degli Esteri giapponese, ora docente alla Keio University, ha ammonito che molti businessmen giapponesi potrebbero accelerare lo spostamento degli investimenti (in parte già in atto) verso altri paesi nella regione, come la Birmania. Hu Shuli invece è ottimista, anche

se ricorda come la cooperazione economica non necessariamente crei fiducia (l’alto grado di interdipendenza tra Germania e Gran Bretagna nella seconda parte del XIX secolo non impedì, come sappiamo, lo scoppio in Europa della Prima guerra mondiale).

 

La politica estera di Pechino alla prova della complessità

Secondo la tradizione del pensiero strategico cinese il prerequisito essenziale della politica estera nazionale è un’attenta lettura delle “propensioni complessive dell’ambiente circostante” (shi, 势): la capacità di comprendere l’evoluzione dei fattori di potere che plasmano il quadro internazionale e, quindi, di assecondare le tendenze in atto traendone il massimo vantaggio. Si nota innanzitutto un mutato atteggiamento rispetto alla fisionomia e alle dinamiche di trasformazione dell’ordine internazionale: ritenuto nel 2002 “ingiusto e irrazionale, bisognoso di cambiamenti radicali”, nel 2011 esso viene giudicato più equilibrato nei propri assetti, caratterizzato da una sempre maggiore globalizzazione dell’economia e dall’affermarsi dei paesi emergenti. Si tratta di un’evoluzione in linea con l’auspicata transizione verso un sistema multipolare, che consente alla Rpc una maggiore libertà d’azione. Sono infatti venuti meno i vincoli imposti prima dalla Guerra fredda, poi dal “momento unipolare” statunitense, e infine dai negoziati per l’accesso alle principali organizzazioni internazionali (culminati con l’ammissione all’Organizzazione mondiale del commercio nel 2001).

Nell’attuale fase di indebolimento dell’Occidente le autorità cinesi intravedono uno spazio per una revisione della dottrina di politica estera prudente e attendista coniata da Deng Xiaoping e che si riassume nella linea guida:“si prenda tempo mantenendo un basso profilo, pur senza mancare di fare qualcosa” (taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei, 韬光 养晦，有所作为). Nella nuova formulazione utilizzata da Hu Jintao in occasione dell’undicesima Conferenza degli ambasciatori svoltasi a Pechino nel 2009 sono stati aggiunti quattro caratteri agli otto che

componevano la frase originaria, ponendo una maggiore enfasi sulla seconda parte, pur nel solco di una tradizione che sin dagli anni ’80 ha preso le distanze dall’avventurismo (principalmente retorico) dell’epoca maoista ...

Poiché l’evoluzione del lessico politico in Cina non è mai casuale, ci si può attendere che – dopo un primo biennio di assestamento e in assenza di gravi crisi – la nuova leadership cerchi di rendere il ruolo internazionale della Rpc più congruente con il suo peso economico.

Questa tendenza si è fatta più percepibile a partire dal 2009, quando, in concomitanza con il sorprendente recupero dell’economia cinese dopo la crisi finanziaria globale, varie azioni compiute da Pechino hanno generato una diffusa apprensione in Asia orientale: i forti vincoli imposti alla visita del presidente Usa Barack Obama (novembre 2009), l’atteggiamento poco costruttivo dei diplomatici cinesi alla Conferenza sul clima di Copenhagen (dicembre 2009), l’insolitamente dura presa di posizione contro la vendita di armamenti statunitensi a Taiwan

(gennaio 2010), l’atteggiamento ambiguo sull’affondamento della corvetta sudcoreana Cheonan (marzo 2010), la reazione del Ministro degli Esteri cinese Yang Jiechi quando, durante l’ASEAN Regional Forum di Hanoi (luglio 2010), è stato menzionato il contenzioso sul Mar della Cina Meridionale, l’escalation – per la prima volta con ricadute dirette anche in ambito commerciale – di un incidente con il Giappone al largo dell’arcipelago conteso delle Diaoyu/Senkaku (settembre 2010, con una riedizione, in queste settimane, esattamente due anni dopo), le forti pressioni contro la partecipazione alla consegna del premio Nobel per la pace in absentia al dissidente cinese Liu Xiaobo (ottobre 2010), e la mancata condanna dell’attacco dell’artiglieria nordcoreana all’isola sudcoreana di Yeonpyeong (novembre 2010).

 

Il ruolo della migrazione nell’economia cinese

Ad oggi, si possono identificare tre principali aspetti del fenomeno migratorio in Cina. Ci sono innanzitutto flussi di cittadini cinesi in cerca di opportunità all’estero. È un fenomeno con origini lontane nel tempo, che ha prodotto la cosiddetta “diaspora cinese”.

C’è poi la migrazione all’interno del paese, dovuta allo sviluppo economico degli ultimi trent’anni. Infine, più di recente, si osserva una crescente immigrazione dall’estero, costituita sia da una migrazione di ritorno che da nuovi flussi da altri paesi.

 

Il ruolo della Cina in Africa

Secondo Li, la cornice concettuale che ha ispirato le azioni cinesi in Africa ha una matrice profondamente diversa rispetto a quella che ancora oggi influenza la percezione occidentale del continente. Li contrappone l’immagine occidentale di un continente africano arretrato e bisognoso di aiuto, riflesso paternalistico del retaggio coloniale, alla consapevolezza cinese dei progressi compiuti negli ultimi cinquant’anni dal Continente nero, grazie al successo dei movimenti di liberazione nazionale e agli sviluppi sul piano della ricostruzione nazionale e dei diritti economici e sociali.

Ne deriva il rifiuto da parte cinese di un rapporto univoco donorrecipient – cui è sottesa l’idea di un filantropo condiscendente e civilizzatore che sostiene un ricevente umile e obbediente – a favore di un rapporto più simmetrico di partnership e beneficio reciproco.

 

Ue-Cina, il prezzo delle divisioni

.. questioni come la sospensione dell’embargo sulla vendita di armi alla Cina, il riconoscimento dello status di economia di mercato per il colosso asiatico, la protezione della proprietà intellettuale, il rispetto dei diritti umani e un maggiore accesso al mercato cinese per le imprese europee sono temi tuttora all’ordine del giorno, e sui quali il dialogo Bruxelles-Pechino non ha ancora trovato una soluzione.

...

L’Europa continua a essere un partner economico fondamentale per la Cina, ma se da un lato Pechino nutre ancora enorme interesse per aspetti quali il trasferimento tecnologico, dall’altro, specie in quest’ultima fase, tenta di sviluppare relazioni privilegiate coi partner più seducenti a seconda dei casi, Germania in primis, ovviamente.

Colpa di Pechino o colpa di Bruxelles? Di sicuro, presentarsi divisi dinnanzi al fronte compatto degli interlocutori cinesi non porta alcun beneficio all’Unione europea.

 

La penetrazione cinese nel Caucaso meridionale

L’area è complessa e costringe i vari attori a perseguire strategie bilaterali piuttosto che un approccio regionale integrato. Il paese situato più a oriente, l’Azerbaijan, si affaccia sul Caspio ed è ricco di idrocarburi. A causa del conflitto sul Nagorno-Karbakh non ha relazioni diplomatiche con la vicina Armenia, che si colloca sull’asse Mosca-Teheran. Più a ovest, la Georgia ha

a sua volta sospeso le relazioni diplomatiche con la Russia (contro cui ha perso una guerra-lampo nel 2008), anche se le recenti elezioni parlamentari potrebbero mutare l’indirizzo del paese. La Cina si muove fra queste tensioni con cautela.

Cina - Azerbaijan

La Rpc è stata il primo paese dell’Asia orientale a sostenere ufficialmente l’integrità territoriale dell’Azerbaijan (secondo l’orientamento espresso in proposito dall’Onu) rispetto ai moti secessionisti del Nagorno-Karabakh, regione a maggioranza armena. La posizione assunta da Pechino su questo delicato dossier ha facilitato le relazioni con Baku (la capitale azera). La Cina vede l’Azerbaijan come il sesto membro del gruppo (sovente indicato come “5+1”) composto dagli “stans” ex sovietici, a completamento del quadro centroasiatico – sia per quanto riguarda il rifornimento degli idrocarburi, sia come raccordo attraverso cui far pervenire le proprie merci sui mercati occidentali.

Nel 2005 in occasione di una visita di stato del presidente azero Aliev nella Rpc furono firmati 13 accordi inter-governativi. ...

Cina - Armenia

La Rpc è il quinto paese esportatore in Armenia dopo Russia, Emirati Arabi, Georgia e Iran. La Cina ospita una diaspora armena (numericamente poco significativa) ... Ma sono significative soprattutto le visite istituzionali: nel 2010 il presidente Sergh Sargsyan è stato ospite a Shanghai per l’Expo, seguito poi dal primo ministro Tigran Sargsyan. Quest’ultimo ha condotto le negoziazioni nel settore economico che hanno portato a investimenti cinesi nel paese nonché alla creazione della maggiore joint venture armeno-cinese: la Shanna Synthetic Rubber Co., Ltd.

Cina - Georgia

La Georgia costituisce per la Rpc un accesso all’area del “Mediterraneo allargato”. Il paese, sulla costa del Mar Nero, è ben collegato soprattutto con la confinante Turchia. In occasione del ventennale dell’instaurazione dei rapporti diplomatici così si è espresso l’ambasciatore cinese a Tbilisi, Chen Jianfu: “Il fatturato del commercio bilaterale è aumentato più di 200 volte, da qualche milione di dollari nel primo anno dello stabilimento dei rapporti diplomatici a più di 800 milioni di dollari l’anno scorso. Entrambi i paesi stanno collaborando più strettamente nei settori della tecnologia, dell’agricoltura, delle infrastrutture e dell’energia.

[Andrea75]

=40077&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=51d3948f106a396dc262bd1a87bb2c4e"]Chinese ‘Expansion’ in Kyrgyzstan: Myth or Reality?

 

China’s economic “expansion” in Kyrgyzstan has been overwhelming. Almost all consumer goods sold in Kyrgyzstan are imported from China. One of the most popular professions in Kyrgyzstan is the so-called “chelnok,” or a small trader who resells goods he has personally purchased in China. Chinese goods are sold in the Dordoi market in Bishkek and the Karasu market in Osh province in southern Kyrgyzstan. The Dordoi and Karasu markets are not just major shopping and employment centers for Kyrgyzstan, but also among the main entry points through which consumer goods from China are exported onward to shops and markets in Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. According to estimates by Kyrgyzstan’s research institute “Proekt Buduschego,” the number of traders in Kyrgyzstan benefiting from re-exports of Chinese-origin goods has reached 800,000 (the total population is 5.5 million) (Kabar.kg, September 13). In addition, China exports scrap metal to the Kyrgyz Republic, and posters proclaiming, “Buy copper, bronze, aluminum,” can be seen hanging all over cities in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, human trafficking from Kyrgyzstan to China is a very big problem for this Central Asia republic. Many firms in Kyrgyzstan recruit local young women to travel to China and work as dancers in strip clubs and as prostitutes in Chinese brothels.

...

In noting events such as the October 3 rally in Bishkek, it is important to understand that Kyrgyz demonstrators who protest against foreign companies often do not really care about the level of foreign presence in their republic. After the first “Tulip” revolution in 2005, political protests in the Kyrgyzstan were allegedly connected with organized crime networks jockeying for power. And attacks against foreign as well as local companies have often been organized by local criminal leaders vying for control over these businesses or looking to extort money for “protecting” these companies (Kyrgyzstan newspaper “De facto,” August 30, 2011). Most participants in these rallies are unemployed people who are reportedly paid by its organizers. According to Bishkek-based human rights expert Toktaim Umatalieva, a participant of a rally “earns” $10–15 (Deutsche Welle, February 17, 2011).

Although Kyrgyzstan’s population does not intrinsically hold strong xenophobic views, nevertheless the prevalence of incidents of politically and criminally motivated rallies against foreign businesses significantly harms the Central Asian republic’s investment climate. In this situation, it is becoming doubtful that Chinese companies will decide to make further significant direct investments into Kyrgyzstan’s economy in light of the country’s ongoing instability.

[TT-1 Pinto]

Non è tutta farina del loro sacco ....

 

Engine Tech, Cyber-Espionage Key To China’s Progress ....

 

One important factor could act as a brake on China's rapid progress while another has almost certainly assisted it, to an unknown extent.

The limiting factor is engine technology: so far, all China's modern, operational fighters fly with Russian-supplied engines.

The positive factor is China's intense and apparently effective campaign of cyber-espionage against Western industries and governments.

Fonte .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_11_05_2012_p72-508358.xml

 

[Andrea75]

No surprises as China congress gives clues to new leadership

 

China's Communist Party congress offered the first clues on a generational leadership change on Wednesday as Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang took the first step to the presidency and premiership, respectively.

In a brief dispatch, Xinhua news agency said Vice President Xi and Vice Premier Li had both been elected to the party's Central Committee at the end of a key congress, though that result was never really in any doubt.

 

Chinese debate Xi Jinping’s views on reform

 

With Xi Jinping set to take over the leadership of China’s Communist Party on Thursday, China watchers, analysts and pro-democracy advocates are fiercely debating whether he is at heart a reformer or a stalwart product of the ruling system.

Some contend that Xi will bide his time and consolidate his power before embarking on a bold political restructuring of the country’s Communist-run political system. Others see an inherently cautious operator who has no interest, and certainly no power, to dramatically reform the system. At most, they say, he might offer token reforms to stave off dissent and maintain the party’s ironclad grip on power.

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

 

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a “key supplier” of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran.

Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another PRC promise on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China’s commitment to nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions. The Bush Administration imposed sanctions on 20 occasions on various PRC “entities” (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some “serial proliferators.” Among those sanctions, in September 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions that effectively denied satellite exports, after a PRC company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the promise of 2000. In September 2003, the State Department imposed additional sanctions on NORINCO, a defense industrial entity, effectively denying satellite exports to China.

However, for six times, the State Department waived this sanction for the ban on imports of other PRC government products related to missiles, space systems, electronics, and military aircraft, and issued a permanent waiver in 2007. Since 2009, the Obama Administration has imposed sanctions on 10 occasions on multiple PRC entities for weapon proliferation-related activities. Skeptics question whether China’s cooperation in weapons nonproliferation warrants the U.S. pursuit of closer ties, even as sanctions were required against PRC technology transfers. Some criticize the imposition of U.S. sanctions targeting PRC “entities” but not the government. Others doubt the effectiveness of any stress on sanctions over diplomacy. In 2002-2008, the U.S. approach relied on China’s influence on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons. Beijing hosted the “Six-Party Talks” (last held in December 2008) with limited results. China’s balanced approach evolved to vote for some U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. Some still called for engaging more with Beijing to use its leverage against Pyongyang and Tehran. However, North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009 and military attacks against South Korea in 2010 prompted greater debate about the value of China’s roles. After much diplomacy, the PRC voted in June 2009 for UNSC Resolution 1874 to expand sanctions previously imposed under Resolution 1718 in 2006 against North Korea and voted in June 2010 for UNSC Resolution 1929 for the fourth set of sanctions against Iran. Still, concerns grew that China expanded nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, helped the DPRK, and could undermine sanctions against Iran (including in the oil/gas energy sector). Legislation includes sanctions against Iran in P.L. 111-195, P.L. 112-81, and P.L. 112-158, and S.Con.Res. 12.

[Andrea75]

A look at China’s new leaders who will rule alongside Xi Jinping in the apex political body

 

Xi Jinping: The new party leader is seen as a pro-market reformer and a staunch believer in party power. The son of a veteran revolutionary, Xi spent much of his career in economically vibrant provinces. Little known abroad, Xi took a side trip during a key visit to the U.S. this year to meet privately with the Iowans who had hosted him on a 1985 study tour when he was a mid-level provincial official in charge of the pork industry.

 

Li Keqiang: Expected to be the next premier, Li, 57, is a protege of outgoing President Hu Jintao. The two worked together in the Communist Youth League in the 1980s. Hu initially wanted Li to succeed him as party chief before accepting Xi. Li ran two important industrial provinces, and as vice-premier his portfolio includes health reforms, energy and food safety. Still, questions of inexperience on economy have dogged him as he prepares to take the post of premier, the top economy job in the country.

 

Zhang Dejiang: A vice premier who was called on to run the mega-city of Chongqing after the ouster of the ambitious but tainted Bo Xilai, Zhang is seen as a capable, low-key administrator. The son of a former army general, Zhang, 66, ran two economic powerhouse provinces and oversaw safety issues in recent years as a vice-premier. A Korean speaker, Zhang studied economics at North Korea’s Kim Il Sung University and is an ally of party elder Jiang Zemin.

 

Yu Zhengsheng: Yu, 67, is a member of the red elite, but with a problematic family history. His brother, an official in the secret police, defected to the U.S. in the mid-1980s. Yu’s pedigree helped salvage his career. His father was the ex-husband of a woman who later married Mao Zedong. A missile engineer by training, Yu has run the financial hub of Shanghai since 2007. His family connections to patriarch Deng Xiaoping kept his name in the running for promotion to the top leadership.

 

Liu Yunshan: As head of the party’s Propaganda Department for the past 10 years, Liu has tightened controls over domestic media even as he encouraged big state media to expand overseas to purvey the government’s line. Liu, 65, rose through the ranks in Inner Mongolia. He has a foot in each of two political camps. He started his career in the Youth League, outgoing President Hu Jintao’s power base, but in the past decade also served a conservative ideology czar who was a staunch supporter of party elder Jiang.

 

Wang Qishan: A technocrat with deep experience in finance and trade issues, Wang, 64, is a vice premier and a top troubleshooter. Over his career, Wang cleaned up collapsed investment firms in southern China, calmed Beijing amid the SARS pneumonia scare and, more recently, fended off U.S. pressure over China’s currency policies. Son-in-law of a now-deceased conservative state planner, Wang would bring added experience on economic policy.

 

Zhang Gaoli: A low-key technocrat who is said to adhere to the motto “Do more, speak less,” Zhang, 66, has presided over the development boom in Tianjin and less successful efforts to turn the northern port city into a financial hub. Trained as an economist, Zhang rose through state oil-and-gas companies in the south before entering government service. He has served in a string of prosperous cities and provinces and is a protege of party elder Jiang.

 

 

After months of mystery, China unveils new top leaders

 

Xi is joined on the new Politburo Standing Committee, the party's top decision-making body, by Li Keqiang, who is expected to replace Wen Jiabao as premier early next year.

Xi also succeeded Hu as head of China's powerful Central Military Commission, which oversees major national security and military affairs. That makes for a cleaner transition than in the past two power handovers, when the former party chiefs held onto the key military role for years afterward, using it to keep exercising considerable power and influence.

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Reuters prevede pochi cambiamenti nella Cina dei prossimi anni.

[Andrea75]

La voce del Partito Comunista Cinese Xinhua Insight: China's new helmsmen

 

... retroscena China's new leadership: A victory for Jiang Zemin and the princelings

 

Looking at the line-up of China's new leaders, two things stand out. First, Jiang Zemin, the 86-year old who was China's leader from 1989-2002, ought to be a very content man. Of the new seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), three owe political allegiance to Jiang, who almost literally returned from his grave to wield authority as Party elder in the selection of PSC members behind the scenes. (A year ago Jiang was reported to be dead or dying but obviously someone was jumping the gun.)

Outgoing leader Hu Jintao has only two allies in the new all-powerful group, the most important one being Li Keqiang, who will be the new Premier, and Liu Yunshan, who will presumably be in charge of propaganda. The new top leader, Xi Jinping (pictured), is neither directly a Jiang or Hu protégé but acceptable to both.

The remaining PSC member, Wang Qishan, who has been given the task of tackling corruption, is closer to Jiang than Hu, but reputed to be very much his own man. He could prove to be a key figure in the new leadership. Though Li Keqiang will formally be in charge of the economy, Wang can be expected to weigh in on major economic decisions. Wang is a historian by training but has been a influential economic leader in recent years.

The second observation is that China has been taken over by princelings. 'Princelings' is a colloquial Chinese political term for the sons and daughters of revolutionary Communist leaders. They are strongly resented by many Chinese because they are looked upon as having advanced their careers and amassed fortunes because of their privileged backgrounds. The fall of princeling Bo Xilai exposed the extent of corruption which surrounds the offspring of those who founded the People's Republic of China.

In addition to Xi Jinping, two of the PSC members are princelings, and Wang Qishan is reportedly the son of a high-level official and married to a princeling. Regardless of whether princelings are competent leaders, they do not evoke respect or confidence, especially among the younger generation of Chinese, who yearn to see their country reform into a more just and equitable society.

Both the opaque way in which the leaders of China were (yet again) selected behind closed doors and the outcome reflect how estranged the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has become from the country's populace.

[Andrea75]

China's Economic Espionage

 

Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, launched China’s rise by reforming the economy and opening the country to the West. With this opening, however, came a long-running, state-sponsored espionage program to acquire advanced technology and accelerate the growth of China’s civil and military industries. And when Western companies first went into China, they believed that the damage from espionage was tolerable, part of the cost of doing business in the world’s fastest-growing market, and that they could “run faster” to create new technologies, thereby minimizing any loss. But what was tolerable when China was a developing economy is no longer acceptable when it is the second-largest economy in the world and a potential military competitor.

China is not the only country to use economic espionage, but it is the most aggressive. In key industries -- telecommunications, aerospace, energy, and defense -- the strategy has worked well. Now, the new Chinese leadership risks seeing the boost from spying undercut both China’s international leadership and its quest for indigenous innovation.

HOW THEY DO IT

China’s efforts combine official collection programs with the efforts by individuals, companies, and civil agencies. This reflects China’s broad approach to foreign intelligence gathering -- instead of relying on officers under official cover, China uses businessmen, researchers, and students to assemble information. The targets include contracts, merger and acquisitions plans, and above all, technology.

There are dozens of cases. The efforts are bold and ambitious -- a single program once targeted dozens of companies, foreign governments, and Tibetan activists. Google lost search technologies that helped its Chinese competitor. Chinese spies sat on Nortel’s networks for years, harvesting data until the company went out of business. Spies hacked into U.S. nuclear labs and stealth research centers. When Germany helped build China’s high-speed trains, it found its own design dumped for an indigenous product that looked remarkably similar. Coca-Cola, planning to acquire a Chinese firm, suddenly saw its networks hacked for business information -- what the head of Britain’s MI5 called “normal business practice” for Beijing. China's government, which has spent billions to control the Internet, cannot argue that it is unwitting of these acts. In fact, it supports them.

Companies that are victims often conceal their losses; many are not even aware of what has been taken. Estimates of losses to businesses from espionage range up to a trillion dollars, but these are based on anecdote, extrapolation, and bad math. Whatever the dollar loss, economic espionage shifts the terms of engagement in China’s favor and accelerates programs as diverse as stealth fighters and automobile parts.

Serious as it may be, this is not an existential threat or a “death by a thousand cuts.” To make use of stolen technology, the information must be accurately translated from English to Chinese (no easy task) and then given to someone with the necessary skills and an industry ready to apply it.

...

SOME STATESMANSHIP IS IN ORDER

China’s national strategy to acquire technology illicitly from Western companies handicaps its own development. Beijing’s economic plans have for decades emphasized the need to build indigenous high-tech industries and reduce dependence on foreign producers. Pilfering Western technology is a crutch that keeps China from moving up the “value chain” and becoming a nation of innovators. There is a puzzling lack of faith in China’s own strengths. Its companies and inventors will do better if they compete fairly, if China embraces a global approach rather than “techno-nationalism.” But without outside pressure, Beijing has concluded that now is not yet the moment to tame the decades-old effort to pilfer technology.

Obama reportedly raised espionage with Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping -- a good start that needs to be followed by action, which could range from simple steps such as denying visas or ejecting attachés to threatening new restrictions on cooperation and trade.

[Andrea75]

segnalo l'articolo Meet The New China - Same As The Old China?, corredato da un utile riepilogo

 

[nik978]

Nessuno che mette come primo posto il tentavio di femrare la migrazione dalla campagne?

E ridurre la bolla immobiliare??

per me questi sono i due problemi più grossi della cina assieme all'obbligo di sviluppare il mercato interno...

[Andrea75]

The Chinese Party Congress Wrap-Up: 3 Surprises

 

Surprise 1: Jiang Zemin's return. Even though "retired" President Jiang was reportedly terminally ill several years ago, he re-inserted himself vigorously into the personnel decisions at the 11th hour. The spritely 86-year-old hardly appeared like someone who had been on his death bed, charging around the Chinese capital with a mission. Indeed, at least three of the seven members on the 18th Politburo Standing Committee turned out to be Jiang's proteges, while outgoing President Hu Jintao was only able to get one true protege, Li Keqiang, into the ruling body.

 

I assume now that the transition is complete, Jiang will again fade into the shadows, having accomplished what was likely his political swan song. Jiang's high-profile outing, and his ostensible success in reprising his role as a powerful patron of top personnel, seem to reinforce the prevailing view that Hu has been a weak leader. Or at the very least, he wasn't as capable politically to maneuver around the institutional interests or Jiang's continued hold on aspects of political power to achieve his objectives. Some have even interpreted Hu's reign as merely riding the wave of policy dividends and economic inertia that Deng Xiaoping and then Jiang Zemin had already unleashed.

 

Surprise 2: The "Hu legacy." Speculation was rife that Hu would maintain his grip on the Chinese military just as Jiang did after he formally stepped down. Yet Hu ceded the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) to new President Xi Jinping immediately, a move that took many by surprise.

 

One explanation for Hu simultaneously relinquishing his posts at the party and the military is that he had already stuffed the CMC with enough allies that he felt less compelled to stay. Yet this would contradict the "Hu is weak" argument if he had enough clout to influence PLA personnel decisions. Might Hu's unexpected action be a subtle revenge move against Jiang? That is, Hu's clean break can be viewed as an attempt to institutionalize the transition process, in direct contrast to Jiang's arbitrary interpretation of procedural norms and conventions by willfully extending his longevity in the seat of power and repeated interventions in personnel. In fact, as John Garnaut reports in the Sydney Morning Herald:

 

The security officials wanted to know about the origins of Ji [Pomin]'s animosity towards Jiang and Ji did not let them down. In Ji's view, Jiang had made China virtually ungovernable by refusing to cede full authority to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002.

 

He told me -- perhaps with some bravado -- he spent three hours lecturing his captors on how Jiang had derailed China's efforts to institutionalise its leadership successions and had paralysed China's political process, while they dutifully took notes.

 

Even Xi weighed in to commend Hu for his action, portraying the outgoing chairman's decision as putting the country's interets first. Hu may have been a weak politician, but he may have made a strong political statement against his predecessor and salvaged some of his legacy.

 

Surprise 3: Xi's likeability. Xi's first outing as the new face of China was widely applauded as positive. Perhaps it was the baritone voice or the body language suggesting a man more comfortable in his own skin, I was struck by the positive reception to Xi both within China and among foreign observers who watched. To be fair, it didn't take much for Xi to exceed what were already abysmal expectations from a public accustomed to Hu's colorlessness for a decade. Xi didn't need soaring rhetoric to impress -- moving from a robot to a human was sufficiently distinctive. What's more, Xi's capable command of proper Mandarin, unlike Hu's Anhui-dialect laced Mandarin, did not escape notice among Chinese netizens -- many of whom are of the generation in which standard Mandarin became the social norm. Without even trying, Xi projected an image, by virtue of his Mandarin skills, of a politician who is cross-generational.

 

Yet there seemed to be more than simply the contrast between the new leader and the one of yesteryear that impressed the Chinese public. Many noticed that not only did Xi begin his inaugural speech with an apology for the leadership's tardiness (they were 45 minutes late arriving on stage), he also specifically thanked journalists for their hard work. Whether sincere or not, in an environment in which journalists and the Communist Party do not have the best of relationships -- since the latter relishes obstructing the work of the former -- Xi's comments was a kind gesture at the very least. Even more, his speech was not larded with turgid party-speak that usually obfuscates more than it clarifies -- the Deng Xiaoping theory, three represents, and scientific outlook development that Hu was so fond of never appeared in Xi's address. Chinese weibo users clearly noticed too. Courtesy of Helen Gao again, here's a particularly popular insta-assessment from a Chinese writer Yang Hengjun:

(Quick translation: Assessing President Xi's speech: one, used language and diction uncommon in these occasions, appeared endearing; two, immediately apologized to everyone for being late; three, mentioned leading the party and Chinese people, Chinese nation and state toward the path of co-prosperity, only mentioned "chinese characteristics" once, badass! four, emphasized strictly dealing with party discipline and corruption; five, the word "people" appeared many more times than "party"; six, stressed mutual understanding between China and the world in conclusion.)

 

Indeed, segments of his speech even echoed recognizable elements in a stump speech during a U.S. election, particularly as he ticked off what Chinese people want: education, stable job, good income, reliable social security, better health-care services ... and to have a better life for ourselves and our children. Nowhere was economic growth mentioned. Another Chinese netizen with the weibo handle "pretending to be in New York" agreed with Xi's characterization:

(Quick translation: Actually most people don't have outsized expectations. They simply want a normal life -- a window can be rolled down normally in a taxi, a webpage can be opened normally, can buy a normal kitchen knife without being subject to real-name registration, eating at a normal restaurant without having to worry about "gutter oil", can buy a house through a normal process, can breath normal air ... today I heard a basically normal speech, and so there is some hope for giving normality a shot.)

 

In fact, when comparing Xi's speech from that of Hu 10 years ago (right column below), the annotated version above pointed out differences. Clearly, Xi had omitted virtually all theoretical jargon that appeared in the third paragraph of the Hu speech, instead refocusing on people and alluding to the party's internal problems.

[Andrea75]

How many more Tibetans will sacrifice themselves?

 

When a downtrodden Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire in protest after his vegetable cart was confiscated by officials, this desperate act of self-sacrifice was seen as a catalyst for a revolution that became known as the Arab Spring.

Contrast this with China, where almost 80 people -- men and women -- have self-immolated since 2009 in protest against Beijing's poor treatment of Tibet, according to rights groups. Yet details of these cases are often sketchy and difficult to verify, such is the stranglehold China has over the region.

As a result the issue has yet to gain real traction internationally.

Beijing has consistently rejected claims it is guilty of oppression in the region and insists Tibetans enjoy religious freedom and better living standards under its rule.

Yet the self-immolations continue.

This week, a 34-year-old father of two burned himself to death in front of a mine in the western province of Gansu, while another 25-year-old man set himself alight near a monastery in neighboring Qinghai province -- which borders Tibet, known by China as the Tibet Autonomous Region. Both cases were confirmed by China's state-run Xinhua news agency.

According to the Tibetan government-in-exile and Tibetan rights groups, the victims died chanting slogans calling for freedom for the Tibetan people and the return from exile of their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.

This brought the number of deaths by self-immolation to 15 in November alone -- the same month that China's political elite ushered in its next generation of leaders during the 18th Party Congress. In their keynote addresses, leaders, both old and new, appeared to strike a conciliatory tone.

In his first speech as Communist Party leader last week, Xi Jinping stressed the need for unity in a country where the Party was becoming too distant from the people. This followed predecessor Hu Jintao's comments to Congress delegates that the Party "should consolidate and develop socialist ethnic relations of equality, unity, mutual assistance and harmony so that all ethnic groups in China will live and develop together in harmony."

But activists warn that if the Chinese government continues to tighten its grip on the Tibetan people in the name of stability, it will only create more resentment. They point to the growing list of young victims prepared to take such extreme action, which they say reflects a desperate and painful state of mind for many.

The Tibet Autonomous Region is heavily policed by Chinese security forces, with Internet content controlled by local authorities and access by foreign media largely prohibited, making reliable information almost impossible to come by.

Pro-Tibetan groups such as the International Tibet Network, say thousands of people have died over the years under China's tenure, through torture, execution, suicides and starvation -- though CNN cannot verify these claims.

The groups also claim Tibetans have gradually become the minority population in their own homeland, as Han Chinese -- China's main ethnic group -- have migrated to the region. London-based Free Tibet says the construction of a rail link to Tibet's capital, Lhasa, in 2006 -- part of China's Western Development Strategy (WDS) -- was intended to cement its control over the restive western regions of China, particularly Tibet and Xinjiang, where separatism remains strong.

"The incidents are a clear indication of the genuine grievances of the Tibetans and their sense of deep resentment and despair over the prevailing conditions in Tibet," Tibetan leader in exile, Lobsang Sangay, said earlier this year. His government-in-exile has repeatedly called on the international community to intervene to prevent further bloodshed.

Chinese authorities insist that self-immolations are isolated incidents and most Tibetans do not sympathize with or support such actions. A senior official from Sichuan, a province with a large Tibetan population that has seen the most self-immolation cases so far, says he knows exactly who's to blame -- the Dalai Lama: the man Beijing calls a "terrorist."

"They plot, incite and instigate -- the root cause for such acts is the Dalai Lama clique," Li Changping told CNN. "His loyalists have called those who committed self-immolation national heroes or freedom fighters, vowing to build them monuments and rewarding their families with lots of money."

The Dalai Lama has long denied China's assertion that he's seeking Tibetan independence, saying he wants only an autonomy that would offer protection for their traditional Buddhist culture.

During an address to Japanese lawmakers in Tokyo earlier this month, he blamed "narrow-minded Communist officials" for seeing Buddhist culture as a threat. He then called on Chinese authorities to investigate and address the causes of the recent surge in self-immolations. "I always ask the Chinese government: Please, now, thoroughly investigate. What is the cause of these sort of sad things?"

Beijing's claim over the region is rooted in history.

It says Tibet has been a part of China since the 13th century, when the Mongol empire, which conquered China and formed the Yuan dynasty, also conquered Tibet. Western and central parts of Tibet are administered by China as the Tibet Autonomous Region, while eastern parts of the region fall under China's Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan and Gansu provinces.

After several decades of de facto independence beginning in 1912, Tibet was over-run by China's People's Liberation Army in 1950 to enforce the newly-formed People's Republic of China's claim of sovereignty over Tibet.

In 1959, thousands of Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lama's palace in Lhasa — the Tibetan capital -- to protect him against what was rumored to be a plot by the Chinese military to abduct him. The gathering turned into an all-out revolt against Chinese rule, which was suppressed by the PLA. The Dalai Lama fled to India, where he has remained in exile ever since.

 

Solo una considerazione: se si dovesse seguire l'esempio cinese per le rivendicazioni territoriali l'Italia potrebbe rivendicare l'Europa e l'intero bacino del Mediterraneo conquistato da Roma

[Andrea75]

Is China Buying Russia’s Su-35 Fighter?

 

Though not in the bag yet, defense industry analysts and sources in Moscow have confirmed that Beijing and Moscow are negotiating the first Russian export sale of the twin-engine Sukhoi Su-35 multi-role fighter.

If the deal goes forward, China’s fighter capabilities become much greater and the military challenge to regional powers increases. The Su-35s Saturn engines give it a unique supermaneuverability capability.

The principle hurdle has been overcome, said a U.S. defense analyst. Russia has just “caved-in” to demands by China to reduce the initial procurement from 48 fighters to 24 fighters.

“The negotiations on price and other conditions of this deal will take place the next year,” said Vasiliy Kashin, a researcher at the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST). “Such negotiations can also be quite difficult. The contract, I think, is not likely before 2014.”

...

There are fears China will only procure 24 fighters with the intention of reverse engineering and copying the fighter, as they did with the Su-27SK.

In 1995, China secured a production license to build 200 Su-27SKs, dubbed the J-11A, for $2.5 billion from the Shenyang Aircraft Corp. In 2006, Russia cancelled the deal after 95 aircraft when it discovered China had reverse engineered the aircraft and was secretly producing an indigenous copy, the J-11B, with Chinese-built avionics and weapons.

There are also suspicions China will only want the Su-35 engine for the twin-engine Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter. The engine in the Su-35 and the T-50 is the Saturn AL-117S, which is an upgraded variant of the AL-31FN. China already imports the AL-31FN from Russia for the single-engine Chengdu J-10 fighter.

“If they procure one spare for every four installed [on China’s Su-35], which you don’t really need, then that’s a warning sign,” said the U.S. source. “There is no fixed ratio for spare engines to installed engines [for the deal] at this time.”

[Andrea75]

In China, Hidden Risk of 'Shadow Finance'

 

Facing the loss of his business when the government decided to nationalize small coal-mine operators for safety reasons, Wang Pingyan went on a buying binge.

The farmer-turned-entrepreneur figured that to stay in business, he had to get bigger, say former employees and others familiar with his business. Since state-owned banks were reluctant to lend to him—a common problem for private businesses in China—he turned to private investors. In total he raised about 5 billion yuan ($794 million), according to these people.

Three years later, Mr. Wang is in financial trouble. The price of coal has plunged by 20% since early last year, causing him to default on several of his loans and landing him in detention.

Even though state banks provided no direct funding, they aren't necessarily off the hook. The biggest loan to Mr. Wang was 3 billion yuan and came from China Credit Trust Co., one of China's biggest nonbank providers of credit. The firm raised the money from customers of China's largest bank, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd. 601398.SH +0.26% ICBC acted as an agent for China Credit.

Mr. Wang couldn't be reached for comment. A representative of his company, Zhenfu Energy Group, declined to comment.

ICBC said in a statement that according to Chinese laws, agent banks "are not responsible for investment risks" associated with those private loans. It also said the bank has "strictly implemented" its agent agreement with China Credit.

Mr. Wang's case highlights the hidden risks to banks from their links to China's fast-growing "shadow-finance" industry, a term for all types of credit outside formal lending channels.

Shadow finance in China totals about 20 trillion yuan, according to Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., or about a third the current size of the country's bank-lending market. In 2008, such informal lending represented only 5% of total bank lending.

The sector is lightly regulated and opaque, raising concerns about massive loan defaults amid a softening economy, with ancillary effects on the country's banks. Banks often work with private lenders by selling loans to them or marketing investments on their behalf for a fee.

"Regular banking and shadow banking are not isolated from each other. Many activities in the two systems feed into each other, and could influence each other if things start to deteriorate," wrote Xiao Gang, chairman of Bank of China Ltd., in an editorial in the China Daily newspaper.

Although China Credit has the legal responsibility to repay investors, according to Chinese law, "for reputation's sake and potential social stability reasons, a portion of these loans can be banks' contingent liabilities," said David Cui, China strategist with Bank of America Corp.'s BAC -0.66% Merrill Lynch unit.

Others agree. "Banks might be held liable if bank representatives didn't adequately evaluate the products' risks for their clients," said Peng Junming, a former official at the People's Bank of China who now runs his own investment firm, Empire Capital Management LLP.

How Mr. Wang's situation gets resolved will help set a precedent for how informal loans get worked, analysts say.

Mr. Wang, who is in his early 40s, went into the coal business a decade ago. According to former employees and associates, Mr. Wang's troubles began in 2009 when the government in northern Shanxi province, responding to several mining accidents, launched a campaign to force small coal mines to shut down or sell to state-owned enterprises. Only operators producing three million metric tons of coal annually would be allowed to stay in business.

Over the next three years, Mr. Wang amassed about 5 billion yuan of high-interest-rate debt from private investors and lenders to make acquisitions, say people with direct knowledge of his finances. His company currently has five coal mines and one coal-washing plant.

ICBC, acting as China Credit's agent, recommended the investment to its wealthy customers. It offered returns of between 9.5% and 11.5%—much higher than bank deposit rates. A prospectus issued by China Credit included standard disclosures on risk, but offered no detail on Mr. Wang's business and financing activities, people who have seen it say.

Assets at Mr. Wang's company were valued at 6.4 billion yuan as of the end of 2011.

"Nothing looked wrong when my ICBC manager recommended it to me," said one investor, who said he bought the minimum 3 million yuan tranche.

China Credit in June said Mr. Wang's company had been sued three times in the second quarter, "all because of off-balance-sheet fundraising from the private sector." China Credit said Zhenfu didn't disclose those debts in its balance sheet.

China Credit added that it is cooperating with regulators in their probes into Mr. Wang's financials, and that it "will resort to legal means if necessary" to protect investors.

One of the private lenders who sued Mr. Wang is Gao Tanlin, who runs a property-development company. "He came to me for money to make acquisitions," Mr. Gao said. "I've known him for a while. He's credible, so I lent him 100 million [yuan]."

 

The loan from Mr. Gao has an annual interest rate of 36%, more than four times the official lending rate in China. Early this year, the 100 million yuan loan came due and Mr. Gao went to Mr. Wang to ask for his money back. "He said he has no money," Mr. Gao recalled.

 

Mr. Gao sued Mr. Wang in a local court in May. The lawsuit helped trigger concerns over Mr. Wang's ability to pay off the 3 billion yuan investment arranged by China Credit.

 

[Andrea75]

per provare a fare un pò di chiarezza nel mondo cinese A Guide to China’s Upcoming Leadership Transitions

 

China, the only Communist Party-led nation in the G-20 grouping of major economies, is in the midst of a sweeping set of political transitions that began in 2011 and could conclude as late as 2014. The most important of the transitions is to take place at the next of the Party’s quinquennial national congresses, the 18th Congress, scheduled to open on November 8, 2012, and at a Central Committee meeting immediately afterwards, at which the Party is to appoint a new General Secretary and a new collective leadership. Four months later, at the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013, China is to appoint new State and National People’s Congress leaders.

The Party’s new General Secretary, assumed to be Xi Jinping, is expected to be named State President, while another member of the collective Party leadership, current Vice Premier Li

Keqiang, is expected to be named State Premier. So far unclear is whether China’s current top leader, Hu Jintao, will give up his post overseeing China’s military at the 18th Party Congress, or whether he will retain the military job for two more years, until 2014.

The U.S. Congress has a strong interest in China’s upcoming leadership transitions. China is the United States’ second largest trading partner and largest supplier of imports, as well as being the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt. Both countries are major players in global efforts to tackle the European debt crisis, rein in the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, and manage instability in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring. China’s military modernization is now a factor in U.S. strategic planning. Who the new Chinese leaders are, the inter-personal dynamics among them, and their policy inclinations will have significant implications for U.S.- China relations and for the China’s role in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Congress also has an interest in understanding China’s upcoming political transitions as a means of evaluating China’s progress, or lack thereof, toward giving its citizens a meaningful role in the development of their political system.

This report is intended to provide Congress with a guide to the transitions, covering their distinct features and specific issues of interest, including the Party’s next steps in the ongoing scandal involving Bo Xilai, the former Chongqing Party Secretary and Politburo member who fell from grace after his wife was implicated in the murder of a British businessman. This report also previews some of the challenges facing China’s new leaders, starting with the requirement to consolidate their power. Xi Jinping would be the first top leader in the post-Mao Zedong era not personally selected by Deng Xiaoping, the dominant political figure of the era. He and his colleagues will also have to contend with not one but two retired Communist Party General Secretaries jockeying for influence behind the scenes, and with an irreverent micro-blogging Chinese public primed to pounce on their mistakes. Policy challenges for China’s new leaders include determining the appropriate role for the state sector in an ambitious shift in economic growth models, re-conceiving China’s foreign policy, and deciding how to respond to growing public expectations for political reform. The United States has a strong interest in how China’s new leaders choose to approach all those challenges.

[Andrea75]

Numero di novembre di Orizzonte Cina

 

- viene dato ampio risalto all'ultimo congresso che ha portato i noti cambiamenti ai vertici dello stato; ci sono dei profili di ogni componente del Comitato permanente dell’Ufficio Politico

 

- I rapporti Australia-Cina nel secolo asiatico

 

- Cina-Stati Uniti: nemici immaginari

 

- La Cina in Asia centrale

 

- Segnali di stabilità dall’economia cinese

 

- Brevetti e marchi in Cina

 

- Dagong, il rating europeo si farà in Italia

 

- L’ultima rivoluzione del Partito

 

- I “principi rossi” e la stirpe vittoriosa di Xi Jinping

 

-

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper China’s Economic Conditions

 

Prior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization 33 years ago, China maintained policies that kept the economy very poor, stagnant, centrally controlled, vastly

inefficient, and relatively isolated from the global economy. Since opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world’s fastest-growing economies, with real annual gross domestic product (GDP) averaging nearly 10% through 2011. In recent years, China has emerged as a major global economic and trade power. It is currently the world’s second-largest economy, largest merchandise exporter, second-largest merchandise importer, second-largest destination of foreign direct investment (FDI), largest manufacturer, largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and largest creditor nation.

The global economic crisis that began in 2008 greatly affected China’s economy. China’s exports, imports, and FDI inflows declined, GDP growth slowed, and millions of Chinese workers

reportedly lost their jobs. The Chinese government responded by implementing a $586 billion economic stimulus package, loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending, and providing various incentives to boost domestic consumption. Such policies enabled China to effectively weather the effects of the sharp global fall in demand for Chinese products, while several of the world’s leading economies experienced negative or stagnant economic growth. From 2008 to 2011, China’s real GDP growth averaged 9.6%, although it has slowed somewhat in 2012.

Some economic forecasters project that China will overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy within a few years, although U.S. per capita GDP levels are expected to remain much larger than those of China for many years to come. However, the ability of China to maintain a rapidly growing economy in the long run will depend largely on the ability of the Chinese government to implement comprehensive economic reforms that more quickly hasten China’s transition to a free market economy; rebalance the Chinese economy by making consumer demand, rather than exporting and fixed investment, the main engine of economic growth; and boosting productivity and innovation. China faces numerous other challenges as well that could affect its future economic growth, such as widespread pollution, growing income disparities, an undeveloped social safety net, and extensive involvement of the state in the economy. The Chinese government has acknowledged that its current economic growth model needs to be altered. In October 2006, the Chinese government formally outlined a goal of building a “harmonious socialist society” by taking steps (by 2020) to lessen income inequality, improve the rule of law, enhance environmental protection, reduce corruption, and improve the country’s social safety net (such as expanding health care and pension coverage to rural areas). In addition, the government announced plans to rebalance the economy and boost innovation.

China’s economic rise has significant implications for the United States and hence is of major interest to Congress. On the one hand, China is a large (and potentially huge) export market for the United States. Many U.S. firms use China as the final point of assembly in their global supply chain networks. China’s large holdings of U.S. Treasury securities help the federal government finance its budget deficits and keep U.S. interest rates low. However, some analysts contend that China maintains a number of distortive economic policies (such as an undervalued currency and protectionist industrial policies) that undermine U.S. economic interests. They warn that efforts by the Chinese government to promote innovation could mean that Chinese firms will increasingly pose a “competitive challenge” to many leading U.S. industries. This report surveys the rise of China’s economy, describes major economic challenges facing China, and discusses the challenges, opportunities, and implications of China’s economic rise for the United States.

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Il maggior detentore del debito pubblico americano estero, sta diventanto il Giappone. Articolo dal The Daily Beast