Difesa ABM USA

[picpus]

Come armi strategiche devi considerare un solo sottomarino sempre in mare, quindi si tratta sempre di deterrenza minima.

Non ha assolutamente le possibilità di effettuare un first strike o una politica di MAD come Russia e America.

Se volessero effettuare un "first strike", potrebbero farlo, mandando in mare tutti e 4 i sottomarini.

[Ospite intruder]

Israel, U.S. to Embark on Collaborative 'Upper-Tier' Missile Intercept Program to include Arrow 3 and Land-Based SM-3 Missiles

 

The United States and Israel have initiated development of an upper-tier component to the Israeli Missile Defense architecture, commonly known as 'Arrow 3'. The development is based on an architecture definition study conducted in 2006-2007, determining the need for the upper-tier component to be integrated into Israel's Ballistic Missile Defense system. According to Arieh Herzog, Director of Israel's Missile Defense Program, the main element of this upper tier will be an exo-atmospheric interceptor, to be jointly developed by Israel Aerospace Industries, (IAI) and Boeing.

 

A recent analysis by U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) assessing the proposed Israeli upper-tier alternatives including Arrow 3 and the planned land-based SM-3, determined that "the Arrow 3 alternative may have a reduced life cycle cost and potentially, offer better performance to meet Israel's requirements," confirmed Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director of the MDA. "The design of Arrow 3 promisses to be an extremely capable system, more advanced than what we have ever attempted in the U.S. with our programs" Gen. O'Reilly told the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services subcommitee for strategic forces. "This has to do with the seekers that have greater flexibility and other aspects, such as propulsion systems - it will be an extremely capable system" he said.

 

However, General O'Reilly expressed concern about the schedule proposed by the Israelis, "we don't say they (Israel) can't do it, we are very supportive of that program, but we are concerned about the schedule they proposed" said Gen. O'Reilly. MDA director said his main concern is the high risk level associated with missile developments, hence, meeting all the program's goals on the tight schedule proposed by Israel is unlikely. O'Reilly confirmed the agency proposed funding the Israeli upper tier project at a level consistent with historically authorized and appropriated funding levels. To mitigate the Arrow 3 development schedule risk, the U.S. will develop and prepare to deploy a land-based variant of the proven Aegis SM-3 missile to be able to meet Israel’s upper tier requirements.

 

 

 

 

What Makes the Israeli Technology Unique?

 

What are the new technologies that make the Israeli technologies so unique to get such high appraisals from the MDA director? Defense Update has tracked a system described by Dr. Joseph Hasson, chief missile designer at IAI MLM division, presented at a missile defense conference in 2008 and repeated this week in Israel. The presentation provided a hint about the potential paradigm shift for Exo-Atmospheric KV design, employing existing technologies, with simplicity and efficiencies yet unachievable with space vehicles. The new exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (KV) was claimed as a patent by Dr. Hasson and Dr. Galya Goldner from IAI MLM, both missile architects at IAI MLM division, which will also develop the Arrow 3.

 

The IAI team proposed a kill vehicle offering exceptionally large divert capability, meaning the kill vehicle will have exceptional capability to maneuver in space, close-in on a target with high probability of kill, at realistic (very high) closing speeds. Unlike common KVs utilizing space propulsion systems (such as liquid propellant or gas generators), the proposed KV will be propelled by an ordinary rocket motor, equipped with flexible nozzle (vector-thrust). Furthermore, this unique KV will also be fitted with a gimbaled seeker, obtaining hemispheric coverage for the seeker. By measuring the seeker's line of sight relative to the vehicle's motion, the kill vehicle would employ 'proportional navigation' deflecting the kill vehicle to divert its course and align exactly at target's fight path, hence achieving an accurate kill even at very high closing speeds and over long distances. Dr. Hasson claims the new concept is relatively simple, reliable and inexpensive and is based on mature technologies. Furthermore, its large divert capability and high agility are contributing to easing the requirements for detection and tracking systems, generally associated with remote-sensor assisted exoatmospheric kills.

 

Another presentation, by Dr. Idan Paiss, also from IAI MLM, discussed imaging systems in the visible, for ballistic missile interceptors. Dr. Paiss argued that a combined sensor utilizing visible and infrared elements would be suitable for ballistic missile intercept under all lighting conditions, furthermore, when provided with high density matrixes available today, such sensors could provide both target detection, discrimination and tracking as well as assisting line-of-sight measurement utilizing stars tracking.

 

The new component will also require the integration of longer range detection, tracking and discrimination capabiity, beyond what the Green Pine and Advanced Green Pine radars, employed with the Arrow 2 are providing. Among the advanced sensors considered for Israel's future multi-tier system, are airborne electro-optical sensors deployed on high flying UAVs and future enhanced Green Pine radars, as well as the AN/TPY-2 radar already deployed in Israel, and operated by U.S. forces.

 

During the recent 'strategic dialog' meeting in Washington, this week Israel was assured the US will continue to support Israel's missile defense research and development - despite Israeli concerns that economic pressure would lead to cutbacks in the American funding. The teams, headed by US Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy and Defense Ministry Secretary-General Pinchas Buchris, also discussed a number of additional strategic issues. The US intention is to integrate the support for Israeli programs into the US defense budget.

 

Increasing Cooperation Between U.S. Israel Missile Defenses

 

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is requesting Congress to approve allocation of $120 million in next year's defense budget for the U.S.-Israeli cooperative missile defense efforts. "The United States and Israel have cooperated on missile defense for over twenty years" Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency said before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee. According to General O'Reilly, U.S.-Israeli collaboration have successfully grown through the years, from early feasibility studies to fully operational fully-operational missile defense architecture that has become fully interoperable with U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems elements. "New joint programs have advanced this cooperation: U.S. and Israeli industrial co-production of Arrow interceptors; the joint Short Range Ballistic Missile Defense Program’s David’s Sling Weapon System; and an initiative to provide Israel an upper-tier defense system." Said General O'Reilly.

 

MDA director indicated that significant events planned for this year will demonstrate the combined U.S. -Israeli missile defense capability. Among these are the Enhanced Arrow-2 tested in April 2009, successfully acquiring, tracking, and intercepting a separating target. The test Integrated the Israel based AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar for the first time.

 

Further integration with U.S. BMDS elements such as the AN/TPY-2, THAAD and Aegis BMD will be performed this summer during the bi-annual 'Juniper Cobra' exercise. The 'David’s Sling' weapon system developed jointly by Israel MOD and MDA addresses shorter range threats, exceeding the capability of PAC-3 system in certain parts of the envelope.

 

The first booster fly-out was successfully conducted in February 2009, with additional interceptor fly-outs scheduled later this year. The first intercept test is scheduled to occur in 2010. Additionally, MDA is coordinating with the U.S. Services to identify opportunities for U.S. utilization of the David’s Sling Stunner interceptor.

 

 

 

http://www.defense-update.com/products/a/arrow3_240509.html

[madmike]

Se volessero effettuare un "first strike", potrebbero farlo, mandando in mare tutti e 4 i sottomarini.

 

purtroppo no: gli SNLE hanno una organizzazione che e' la seguente:

 

Tandis qu'un premier assure une patrouille permanente, un deuxième est disponible à quai ou à la mer, en essais ou en entraînement, afin de pallier le risque d'une éventuelle avarie sur le premier. Quant aux deux derniers, ils sont en entretien, l'un de courte durée, l'autre de longue durée.

 

quindi UNO e' sempre in mare, uno pronto a partire, due sono in diversi stadi di manutenzione.

 

Ma e' normale per questo tipo di unita', visto le missioni che compiono. E' cosi' per tutti i paese che hanno SSBN: ovvio che, più se ne ha, più ce ne sono in pattuglia.

 

ps: un 'first strike' francese, considerando 96 atomiche da 150kt cadauna, sarebbe devastante per chiunque. Se poi pensiamo che i missili attuali hanno portata di 6000 km, ma l'M51 arrivera' a 8000, anche dal Golfo di Brest il range comincia a coprire un bel poco di paesi del mondo. Deterrenza, appunto.

Modificato 1 Giugno 2009 da madmike

[pandur]

ma come deterrenza minima avrei in mente più israele (mi sembra un totale di 200 testate circa) con l'eventualità di dover colpire molti bersagli su aeree molto estese, a fronte del loro territorio che è abbastanza facile da "spazzare via".

[Dominus]

Quella di Israele oltre che limitata numericamente è limitata a livello strategico, potendo colpire solo le aree del medio oriente, e a loro basta così.

 

Comunque le forze nucleari di GB e Francia sono progettate per una deterrenza minima, della serie tu mi potrai pure distruggere ma io mi porto dietro almeno 10 tue città, quindi non ti conviene.

[pandur]

o anche qualcosa di più di 10... israele mi ricorda un pò il problema degli usa nella guerra fredda, che a parità di attacco avrebbero subito più perdite umane e materiali della russia...

[madmike]

Israele il problema non se lo pone in quei termini: mentre in Nebraska o in Texas qualcuno sarebbe sopravissuto, Israele sa benissimo che in caso di attacco nucleare non ci sarebbero sopravissuti. Non comunque in modo tale da garantire la sopravvivenza dello Stato cosi' come inteso, e del Popolo di Israele.

 

La deterrenza deve essere assoluta: NESSUN paese deve poter pensare di distruggere Israele, senza essere distrutto a sua volta, e per distrutto intendo raso al suolo. Un MAD anni 70 all'ennesima potenza.

[Ospite intruder]

Missile Defense Planning Guides Emerge

 

Much rides on the Pentagon's pending ballistic missile defense review, but a few core principles are emerging to guide the massive spending effort over the next several years, according to congressional testimony June 16 by top Defense Department officials.

 

DOD wants to redirect future efforts on early interception of missile threats because it forces potential adversaries to invest in costly responses, and the Department wants to make sure theater-based forces and allies are protected, even over legacy efforts to defend the homeland.

 

But even there, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system will be robustly supported and improved, asserted Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III, Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Army Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency. And any related collaboration with Russia and other NATO allies in Europe would send a powerful message to Iran and be worth pursuing, they said.

 

"We think 30 silos and 44 missiles addresses the threat we face," Lynn said in defense of DOD's fiscal 2010 budget request to cap the existing Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) fields in Alaska and California.

 

"What we need most is early detection and early tracking [of what comes] out of Iran," O'Reilly agreed. He and the other officials cited concepts of operations relying on both unmanned aircraft with powerful sensors, providing persistent coverage, and surveillance satellites with infrared capability offering global vision.

 

Still, while Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) members from all political sides seemed to accept the Pentagon's new push toward early phase interception and theater protection, several expressed reservations over capping GBI emplacements, as well as a perception that the Obama administration was equivocating on George W. Bush administration GMD deals with Poland and the Czech Republic. Sens. Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) and Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) warned that backing off Bush-era commitments would insult the NATO allies, while new Alaska Sen. Mark Begich (D) questioned the analysis behind the planned shift in the GMD program toward reliability and lifecycle support.

 

But the Defense officials took the SASC comments in stride, answering that several alternatives to European-based missile defense were being considered, and that the GMD system already has a "90-percent-plus" likelihood of defeating any North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile launch, the leading "rogue" threat to the United States now.

 

www.aviationweek.com

[picpus]

purtroppo no: gli SNLE hanno una organizzazione che e' la seguente:

 

Tandis qu'un premier assure une patrouille permanente, un deuxième est disponible à quai ou à la mer, en essais ou en entraînement, afin de pallier le risque d'une éventuelle avarie sur le premier. Quant aux deux derniers, ils sont en entretien, l'un de courte durée, l'autre de longue durée.

 

quindi UNO e' sempre in mare, uno pronto a partire, due sono in diversi stadi di manutenzione.

 

Ma e' normale per questo tipo di unita', visto le missioni che compiono. E' cosi' per tutti i paese che hanno SSBN: ovvio che, più se ne ha, più ce ne sono in pattuglia.

 

ps: un 'first strike' francese, considerando 96 atomiche da 150kt cadauna, sarebbe devastante per chiunque. Se poi pensiamo che i missili attuali hanno portata di 6000 km, ma l'M51 arrivera' a 8000, anche dal Golfo di Brest il range comincia a coprire un bel poco di paesi del mondo. Deterrenza, appunto.

Questa è l'organizzazione in tempi normali: ma se uno Stato, ad esempio, nella fattispecie la Francia, decide di effettuare un "First Strike", lo fa in modo di avere tutti e quattro (o, almeno 3, rinviando la manutenzione "di corta durata") gli SNLE disponibili!!! Mi sembra semplice o no?!

[madmike]

Ma non e' semplice no, non e' che questa cosa sia campata in aria, c'e' una motivazione tecnica.... o meglio, ad oggi l'organizzazione e' stata tarata su questo modello, in tempi di guerra fredda la Francia in effetti manteneva 3 SSBN in pattuglia (ma i Redoutable erano 6, non 4 come i Le Triomphant che, peraltro, hanno anche un assorbimento di personale maggiore).

 

Comunque, detto ciò, anche il mandare in mare 3 SSBN, quando normalmente ce n'e' uno, e' un segnale inequivocabile (e il 'bersaglio' lo sa... ). A quel punto forse si rischierebbe anche un colpo preventivo.

 

 

ps: mi scuso, visto ora, per l'OT, visto che il tema e' un altro....

Modificato 19 Giugno 2009 da madmike

[Simone]

ora che il sistema AEGIS si è mostrato ingrado di "ingaggiare" anche satelliti in orbita bassa-comunque rispettabile,visto che si parla sempre di500km-, che come è noto orbitano a velocità di circa 7,8km/s,per gli USA la possibilità di proteggersi dalle minacce "balistiche" è quantomeno molto aumentata.

L'unico successo in passato fu quello ottenuto dal missile "aria-orbita" ASM-135,lanciato da un f-15 in cabrata di 65gradi nella stratosfera, anche perchè si riteneva praticamente impossibile realizzare un missile intercettore di dimensioni tutto sommato contenute in grado di raggiungere quote orbitali partendo dalla superficie.

Modificato 21 Febbraio 2010 da Simone

[Gian Vito]

Non è del tutto esatto:

 

An adapted version of the nuclear armed Nike Zeus was used for an ASAT from 1962. Codenamed Mudflap, the missile was designated DM-15S and a single missile was deployed at the Kwajalein atoll until 1966 when the project was ended in favour of the USAF Thor-based Program 437 ASAT which was operational until 6 March 1975.

 

(Da Wikipedia)

[Simone]

Mi pare di aver capito che la difesa anti-balistica USA avrà due "linee-di-placcaggio", per usare un linguaggio ruigbystico/footballistico, contro le minacce maggiormente realistiche, ovvero possibili lanci della disperazione da Iran e NordCorea: un primo tentativo con i sistemi AEGIS- standard Missile dai mari immediatamente adiacenti, e una successiva difesa- posso dirlo?- di punto con i Patriot o eventualmente gli Arrow.

Mi sembra, da profano, un buon compromesso, fra necessità di contenere i costi di un sistema che deve essere in allerta 24h su 24, e quella di garantire una effettiva protezione, usando tecnologie e logistica già esistenti o comunque dallo sviluppo già assicurato.

Ci sono però ancora alcuni passaggi da compiere: fino ad oggi i test compiuti con gli SM3 erano rivolti ad intercettare bersagli la cui traiettoria era già nota in anticipo agli operatori di bordo, tanto è vero che le navi-radar e la nave-lanciatrice avevano occupato le opportune posizioni-presumibilmente quelle ottimali- già molto tempo prima della partenza del bersaglio, mancano degli esperimenti contro missili di cui NON si conoscono nè punto di lancio, nè traiettoria.

[juil789]

Sapte darmi delle informazioni a riguardo?

Oltre ai missili Patriot PAC3 e SM3 ci sono altri tipi di missili in servizio?

 

a proposito dei 2 tipi di missile qui citati mi sento di dire che mentre gli SM3 hanno dato ottimi risultati (nei molti test fatti)

i Patriot Pac3 quando sono stati usati in guerra (e contro un missili di 1,5 generazione come lo Scud) ha dato risultati non proprio eccezionali

[Simone]

Da quello che ho letto, anche qui sul Sito!, i problemi evidenziatisi durante la Prima guerra del Golfo erano in gran parte dovuti al programma del computer di guida, il quale dirigeva la testata contro il "bersaglio più grande"; in effetti lo stadio propulsivo degli Scud accompagna la testata fino alla fine della fase "ascendente", e-pur staccandosi dalla testatapropriamente detta- per inerzia segue una traiettoria molto simile alla prima. ecco che talvolta il missile puntava contro il lungo cilindro dello stadio propulsivo!

[Andrea75]

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) source

 

alcune immagini

 

test di lancio

 

intercettore in volo

 

schema operativo

 

i componenti del sistema

 

Questo è l'AN/TPY-2 (THAAD Ground-Based Radar - GBR), costruito da Raytheon

 

il lanciatore

 

 

 

Ecco un confronto tra il "THAAD", il "Patriot PAC-3" ed il "naval SM-3 Standard missile"

THAAD missiles have an estimated range of 125 miles/ 200 km, and can reach a maximum altitude of 93 miles/ 150 km. By comparison, the Patriot PAC-3 has an estimated range of 12 miles/ 20 km, while the Boeing-Israeli Arrow 2 has an estimated range of 54 miles/ 90 km and can reach a maximum altitude of 30 miles/ 50 km. The naval SM-3 Standard missile, chosen as the theater defense weapon for the US-Japan ABM research program, has an estimated 300 statute mile/ 500 km range, but is believed to have a lower altitude maximum than THAAD.

 

Ecco la lista dei test effettuati con alcune note source

 

Alcuni dati tecnici source

Specifications

 

Note: Data given by several sources show slight variations. Figures given below may therefore be inaccurate!

 

Data for THAAD:

Length 6.17 m (20 ft 3 in)

Diameter booster: 34 cm (13.4 in); KV: 37 cm (14.5 in)

Weight 900 kg (2000 lb)

Speed 2800 m/s (9200 fps)

Ceiling 150 km (93 miles)

Range > 200 km (125 miles)

Propulsion Pratt & Whitney solid-fueled rocket

Warhead none ("hit-to-kill")

[Andrea75]

THAAD agli Emirati Arabi Uniti source

 

Un contratto per 1.96 bilion USD per la fornitura di 2 sistemi d'arma

 

"Lockheed Martin is pleased the U.S. Government and the United Arab Emirates have reached an agreement on a path forward for the first Foreign Military Sale of the THAAD Weapon System," said Tom McGrath , vice president and program manager for THAAD at Lockheed Martin. "We look forward to working with our customers to deliver this important capability."

[Andrea75]

Consegnata la prima batteria THAAD allo US Army source

[Andrea75]

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) source e source

 

Si tratta di un sistema di difesa integrato basato su dei sensori aerei e ideato per la difesa da un attacco missilistico

I sensori aerei sono posizionati su due palloni aerostatici: uno per il radar di sorveglianza, l'altro per il radar di controllo del fuoco.

La componente terreste/navale può variare: Patriot, Aegis/Standard Missile o SLAMRAAM.

 

 

[TT-1 Pinto]

La Russia è tuttora contraria e ....

 

.... will use computer modelling to show how a missile shield the United States and NATO are deploying in Europe could threaten its security ....

 

 

Fonte .... .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_05_03_2012_p0-454109.xml

[TT-1 Pinto]

Ora siamo alle minacce ....

 

Dal "Daily Report" dell' AFA - Friday May 04, 2012

 

Those Crazy Ruskies

 

Russia's top military official warned on May 3 that Russia would consider a preemptive strike on US and NATO ballistic missile defenses in Eastern Europe if the United States and its NATO allies did not take Russian concerns over their presence into consideration, according to press reports.

 

"A decision to use destructive force preemptively will be taken if the situation worsens," stated Russian Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov at an international missile defense conference in Moscow attended by senior US and NATO officials, reported the Los Angeles Times.

 

Makarov said Russia might decide to station short-range missiles in its Kaliningrad exclave near Poland as "one possible way of incapacitating the European missile defense infrastructure, reported Radio Free Europe.

 

US and NATO officials maintain that the European BMD system would defend against Iranian missiles aimed at Europe, and could not take out Russian ICBMs.

 

"We've made clear for many years now that there's no intent, desire, or capability to undermine the Russian strategic deterrent," said State Department spokesman Mark Toner during a briefing in Washington, D.C., after Makarov made his comments.

 

"There's no reason for Russia to take military countermeasures to missile defenses that will not affect the strategic balance between the United States and Russia," added Toner.

(Toner transcript)

 

[-{-Legolas-}-]

E' risaputo che Obama, ha fatto sapere a Putin attraverso Medvedev, di essere intenzionato a rinegoziare alcuni termini di questo scudo, in cambio di tempo fino alle elezioni di Novembre in USA. Quindi penso che rimarrà tutto in stallo fino ad allora.

[vorthex]

si ma vogliamo vederle queste simulazioni...

[Andrea75]

Segnalo questo articolo Scudo missilistico NATO: tensioni e minacce

[TT-1 Pinto]

Putin vuole garanzie .... non interferenze ....

 

Moscow will seek closer ties with the United States but will not tolerate interference in its affairs and wants guarantees a U.S. missile shield will not be used against Russia, under terms of a decree signed by President Vladimir Putin on Monday ....

 

 

Fonte .... .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_05_08_2012_p0-455622.xml