Nord Corea [Discussione Ufficiale]

Andrea75 · 29 Novembre 2012

N. Korea’s Defense Chief Replaced by Hawk

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un has replaced his defense chief with a hawkish general in a shakeup apparently aimed at tightening his grip over the military, a report said Nov. 29.
Vice Marshal Kim Jong-Gak was sacked as defense minister after just seven months in office, Yonhap News Agency quoted an unnamed senior South Korean presidential official as saying.

He was replaced by Kim Kyok-Sik, a hawkish general believed to have orchestrated the North’s sinking of a South Korean warship and an artillery attack on a border island in 2010, it said.

Analysts said the re-shuffle, if confirmed, is the latest in a series of top-level personnel changes ordered by Kim Jong-Un since taking over after the death of his father, Kim Jong-Il, a year ago.

“Kim has tightened his grip over the military by replacing top military generals with those loyal to him,” Yang Moo-Jin, a professor of the University of North Korean Studies, told AFP.

In July, Hyon Yong-Chol, a little-known general, became chief of the general staff, a powerful post that controls the North’s 1.2-million-strong military.

He replaced Ri Yong-Ho, who had been regarded as one of Kim’s inner circle but was relieved of all his posts — officially because of “illness.”

Ri was a highly visible figure who helped support Kim following the death of his father, and his sudden departure sparked speculation that he might have been purged.

North Korea pushing ahead with new nuclear reactor: IAEA

North Korea has made further progress in the construction of a new atomic reactor, the U.N. nuclear chief reported on Thursday, a facility that may extend the country's capacity to produce material for nuclear bombs.
Pyongyang "has continued construction of the light water reactor and largely completed work on the exterior of the main buildings," Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said.

But, he told the IAEA's 35-nation governing board that the U.N. agency "remains unable to determine the reactor's design features or the likely date for its commissioning."

North Korea says it needs nuclear power to provide electricity, but has also boasted of its nuclear deterrence capability and has traded nuclear technology with Syria, Libya and probably Pakistan.

The light-water reactor is being built at the North's main Yongbyon nuclear facility, which consists of a five-megawatt reactor, a fuel fabrication facility and a plutonium reprocessing plant where weapons-grade material has been extracted from spent fuel rods.

Modificato 29 Novembre 2012 da Andrea75

TT-1 Pinto · 1 Dicembre 2012

L'agenzia di informazioni ufficiale KCNA (Korean Central News Agency) annuncia l'imminente lancio ....

DPRK to Launch Working Satellite ....

Pyongyang, December 1 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the Korean Committee for Space Technology issued the following statement Saturday:

The DPRK plans to launch another working satellite, second version of Kwangmyongsong-3, manufactured by its own efforts and with its own technology, true to the behests of leader Kim Jong Il.

Scientists and technicians of the DPRK analyzed the mistakes that were made during the previous April launch and deepened the work of improving the reliability and precision of the satellite and carrier rocket, thereby rounding off the preparations for launch.

The polar-orbiting earth observation satellite will blast off southward from the Sohae Space Center in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province by carrier rocket Unha-3 in the period between December 10 and 22.

A safe flight path has been chosen so that parts of the carrier rocket that might fall during the launch process would not affect neighboring countries.

At the time of the April launch, the DPRK ensured utmost transparency of the peaceful scientific and technological satellite launch and promoted international trust in the fields of space science researches and satellite launch. The DPRK will fully comply with relevant international regulations and usage as regards the upcoming launch, too.

http://www.kcna.kp/goHome.do?lang=eng

Un 'immagine risalente allo scorso Aprile ....

North Korean officials and foreign journalists leave the launch pad after a visit to see the rocket at Tongchang-ri space center, on April 8, 2012.

(Pedro Ugarte/AFP/Getty Images)

Modificato 1 Dicembre 2012 da TT-1 Pinto

Andrea75 · 3 Dicembre 2012

Countdown to Pyongyang’s Missile Launch: Unha Rocket Stages at Assembly Building (link con numerose immagini satellitari)

Preparations for a new North Korean rocket launch appear to be underway at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (commonly referred to as Tongchang-ri) located on its west coast. Based on DigitalGlobe satellite imagery released on November 23 and 26, trailers carrying the first two stages of an Unha (also referred to as the Taepodong-2) rocket were spotted parked near the main missile assembly building, a clear indicator that the rocket stages are being checked out before moving to the pad for an eventual launch.
Other launch-related activities are ongoing. Empty tanks spotted at four locations indicate that the propellant buildings at the pad have likely been filled in preparation for the fueling of the rocket. The instrumentation site for monitoring a launch is still incomplete—one temporary building with a possible antenna has been established at the site, but instrumentation trailers are still parked near the assembly building. There is increased activity at buildings used to house VIPs in the past, including construction of temporary covered parking structures. Additionally, major improvements have been made to the observation building and grounds.

Exactly why Pyongyang is moving towards firing a long-range rocket at this time of year, contrary to past practice when launches typically occurred in spring or summer, remains unclear. Speculation has focused on North-South competition prompted by the South Korean satellite launch that was planned for November 29. If Pyongyang follows past practice in preparing for a launch, it could be ready to fire a rocket as early as the end of the first week in December. However, past practice has also been to announce dates and hours for sea or air closure areas for the rocket’s first and second stage impact areas, and to file for a frequency plan for a satellite in advance. Since that has not happened yet, the window would appear to be closing for an early launch.

First and second stage trailers near the main assembly building.

Crane activity at the launch pad.

Probable empty fuel and oxidizer tanks

South Korea to reroute flights near path of North Korea’s planned long-range rocket launch

South Korea said Monday that it plans to reroute passenger flights over the Yellow Sea to avoid possible collisions with debris from a long-range rocket that North Korea plans to launch this month.
The Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs said it made the decision after learning that North Korea had informed China and Singapore of the flight path and other details of the launch.

Modificato 3 Dicembre 2012 da Andrea75

TT-1 Pinto · 3 Dicembre 2012

Fermatevi ....

Russia, China Urge North Korea To Drop Rocket Launch Plan ....

Russia and China urged North Korea on Monday not to go ahead with a plan for its second rocket launch of 2012, with Moscow saying any such move would violate restrictions imposed by the U.N. Security Council.

Fonte .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_12_03_2012_p0-523803.xml

TT-1 Pinto · 4 Dicembre 2012

Comunicato del Dipartimento di Stato USA ....

A North Korean "satellite" launch would be a highly provocative act that threatens peace and security in the region.
Any North Korean launch using ballistic missile technology is in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718 and 1874.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201345.htm

Andrea75 · 6 Dicembre 2012

NATO calls on North Korea to cancel rocket launch

NATO on Wednesday called on North Korea to cancel plans for its second rocket launch of 2012, saying it would violate U.N. resolutions and could further destabilize the Korean peninsula.
NATO ambassadors expressed "grave concern at North Korea's declared intent to launch a rocket using ballistic missile technology this month", an alliance statement said.

"Such an act would be in direct violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. It would risk exacerbating tensions in the region and further destabilizing the Korean peninsula," it said.

"We call on the North Korean authorities to meet their obligations under international law and comply fully with the will of the international community as expressed by the United Nations Security Council and the moratorium on missile launches," it said.

Andrea75 · 6 Dicembre 2012

Contatti Iran - Corea del Nord Iran–North Korea: cooperation in nuclear missiles? (segnalato anche nel topic 'Israele-Iran')

In North-West of North Korea the installation of all of the three stages of the long-range rocket was completed at the launch platform of the firing ground. A source in the South Korean government announced that news to the journalists today. Pyongyang has earlier announced that it plans to put into orbit a satellite. However, the South Korean news agency Yonhap reminds its audience that many countries are sure that North Korea is really planning to test it intercontinental ballistic missile able to carry a nuclear warhead. Practically simultaneously the Japanese news agency Kyodo announced that Iran sent a group of military specialists to North Korea for a joint testing of the new ballistic missiles.
The Moscow bureau of the Japanese news agency swore that the information about the visit of the Iranian military specialists to DPRK had been received from reliable diplomatic sources. Many experts believe that the rocket testing in DPRK are in fact secret testing of ballistic technologies, which is prohibited to North Korea by a special UN Security Council resolution.

It is possible that the visit of the Iranian missile specialists is related to that alleged launch. The Iranian military engineers visited DPRK during the unsuccessful launch of the Unha-3 rocket last April. And now in December the Iranians will once again witness the process of preparation for the launch of the same rocket model.

On September 1 this year in Teheran Iran and DPRK signed a treaty on the scientific and technical cooperation. There is no information about the specific directions of that cooperation. But the history of the relations between Pyongyang and Teheran in such sensitive areas of «science and technology» as rocket construction and nuclear studies gives some food for thought.

The Soviet rocket Skad with which the DPRK Army is equipped as well as its North Korean “children” and “grandchildren” served as the springboard for the development of the Iranian rocket technologies and rocket construction as a whole. According to general estimates, in 1991-94 Iran received about 300 Skad rockets of B and C versions from DPRK. And in 1997 Iran launched its own production of a modification of that rocket under the name “Shahab-1” (range of 300 km) and “Shahab-2” (range of 500 km) with the equipment from North Korea. The new rocket “Shahab-3” with the range of 1800 km was based on the North Korean “Nodong-1” rocket. Experts believe that those rockets were designed in DPRK with the financial assistance from Iran. Also, in 2009 it was announced that a group of Iranian experts was sent to North Korea to work on the rocket of the “Taepodong -2” class with the range of 4 000 km.

A tight cooperation between Teheran and Pyongyang is not limited to rocket construction. Iranian nuclear specialists were present at all nuclear tests conducted by North Korea beginning with year 2006.

The following fact is both interesting and demonstrative. The North Korean nuclear program is based on the Plutonium variant, while the Iranian nuclear program is based on Uranium. Naturally, the North Korean testing was based on the Plutonium variant. And suddenly in 2010 according to the reports of the German Die Welt newspaper that referred to a US intelligence source DPRK conducted tests based on the enriched uranium that the Iranian nuclear program is based on. If that report reflects the reality, it means that the Iranian-North Korean cooperation has reached unusual heights. It is worth mentioning that North Korea has already been blamed for helping other countries in the area f nuclear research.

Here is the opinion of Vladimir Yevseev, a military expert and director of the Russian center of social and political studies:

"Iran and North Korea have a lot in common. Both countries are under international sanction due to ignoring the requirements of the UN and IAEA in the nuclear and rocket construction areas. North Korea has moved far in rockets and in nuclear studies. And Iran has prepared sufficiently qualified personnel and has created a good technological base including with the help of the North Korean experience. Especially given the fact that Iran due to its oil revenues has significant financial capabilities (even despite the sanctions), which are limited in North Korea's case. That is why these two countries that have difficulties in dealing with the rest of the world are very much interested in each other."

During the September visit of the North Korean delegation to Teheran Iranian top leader ayatollah Khamenei announced that «both countries must reach the goals they pose to themselves despite the pressure and the sanctions from the enemy forces». What exactly goals did he mean? – this question is now bothering many people. And the upcoming attempt to launch the North Korean rocket only attracts additional attention to that subject.

TT-1 Pinto · 6 Dicembre 2012

Stanno approntando il loro nuovo razzo .... ma, in fatto di missilistica, lasciano ancora alquanto desiderare ....

North Korea Readies Latest Rocket … But Still Sucks At Rocketry ....

North Korea’s latest satellite-carrying rocket is sitting on the launch pad, and now reportedly just needs to be fueled.

But the last time North Korea tried to send a satellite into orbit, the rocket blew up after 90 seconds and crashed into the sea.

Will Pyongyang repeat and succeed this time?

Maybe.

But don’t hold your breath.

Fonte .... http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/12/dprk-rocket/

"Battiam battiam le mani .... arriva il dittator ...."

Andrea75 · 7 Dicembre 2012

U.S. Navy Deploys Ships Before North Korean Launch

he United States has deployed naval ships equipped with ballistic missile defenses and is monitoring North Korea “very closely” ahead of an anticipated rocket launch, the head of U.S. Pacific Command said Dec. 6.
It was “logical” that U.S. naval ships in the region would be employed to track North Korea’s launch and “to the degree that those ships are capable of participating in ballistic missile defense, then we’ll position them to be able to do that,” Adm. Samuel Locklear told reporters at a Pentagon news conference.

The U.S. Navy took a similar approach “the last time they had (a launch),” Locklear said.

Two guided missile destroyers, the Benfold and the Fitzgerald, had been sent to the area ahead of the launch, CNN reported.

American naval ships had been sent to the region “so we understand if they do violate the U.N. Security Council (resolution) and launch a missile, what kind is it? What is it about? Where does it go? Who’s threatened?” he said.

The admiral added that U.S. forces would also be tracking any stray parts that might fall from the rocket.

Pyongyang has announced it will conduct between Dec. 10 and 22 its second long-range rocket launch this year, after a much-hyped but failed attempt in April.

... segnalo anche un articolo del CSIS North Korea’s Second Rocket Launch in 2012

On December 1, North Korea announced that it will launch a Unha-3 rocket between December 10 and December 22. This is the country’s second rocket launch in 2012 following its failed launch eight months ago on April 12. North Korea’s state news agency claimed the planned launch is an effort to put a Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit, exercising its right for peaceful activity in space. However, the country’s rocket launch using ballistic missile technology is widely believed to be a long-range missile test in disguise. North Korea is banned from testing any ballistic missile technology by UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 and is currently under UN sanctions for its previous tests. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressed deep concern at a recent meeting of the NATO-Russia Council and called on countries to put pressure on North Korea to suspend its planned launch. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of the United Nations and representatives of other countries like China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea have all expressed opposition and urged North Korea to comply with its UN Security Council obligations and call off its launch plan.

Q1: How often has North Korea undertaken these launches?

A1: North Korea has a long history of developing and testing ballistic missile technology. Its four most recent ballistic missile tests include two Taepodong missile tests in 1998 and 2006 and Unha-2 and Unha-3 rocket launches in 2009 and 2012. The April 2012 test was a failure. The 2009 test was more successful with successful separation of the first and second stages of the missile.

Q2: What if this test is successful?

A2: The successful launching of a satellite into orbit would suggest that North Korea has overcome a major hurdle in its efforts to demonstrate long-range ballistic missile capability. While there would still be some other remaining technological thresholds to cross, this would constitute a major advance on the North’s part to mate a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability with a growing nuclear weapons program. A successful test would raise as a topline national security issue for the Obama administration the specter of a direct North Korean threat to the U.S. homeland. This would (or should) thrust the North Korea issue to the top of the security agenda, along with Syria. Thus far, the president has not made a direct statement warning the North Koreans against a missile test, as he has done, for example, with regard to Syria’s possible preparations for chemical weapons warfare.

Q3: Is there anything different about this test?

A3: Unlike the April test, the North Koreans have not invited foreign journalists to view the launch, and they have not yet announced the launch to their domestic audience. This suggests that they might seek to cover up another failure or that they will declare it a success, regardless of the outcome.

Q4: Why doesn’t the international community simply accept that this is a satellite launch and not a military missile test?

A4: The North Koreans are basically disguising a military program as a civilian one. Should the satellite launch be successful, military application of the technology would almost certainly follow. The civilian space program would later follow after the military program. This was the path taken by both China and the Soviet Union in developing their missile force, which Pyongyang appears to be following.

Q5: Why now?

A5: No one ever knows for sure why the North Koreans do what they do. There are several possible theories. First, the timing of the launch coincides with the one-year anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s death. Second, Pyongyang may seek to test the resolve of new political leaders in China and South Korea. Third, the new leadership in Pyongyang may feel the need to demonstrate a successful test after the well-publicized failure of the April launch. The young leader does not have the credentials of either his father or grandfather and therefore may be held up to a performance metric in both the party and the military. The latter in particular has seen a number of high-level purges under Kim Jong-un. A fourth theory may be the simplest one: North Korea is determined to develop ICBMs, and they need to test their technology to see if it works, regardless of the political timing.

Q6: What does the road ahead look like?

A6: Some analysts believe a test is likely earlier in the December 10–22 window because the weather conditions appear ideal. This will likely be followed by U.S.- and South Korea–led efforts to condemn North Korea in the UN Security Council and lead perhaps to another resolution that seeks additional sanctions against entities involved in North Korean weapons development and proliferation. Our research at CSIS finds that since 1992, North Korea has done some sort of provocation (cruise/ballistic missile tests or other provocations) within an average 18 weeks of every South Korean presidential election. This suggests: (1) in the unlikely event that they do not test before the South Korean elections (December 19), they will almost certainly do so after the elections; and (2) even if they do test before the South Korean elections, we cannot rule out the possibility of more provocations in the weeks immediately following the election.

Modificato 7 Dicembre 2012 da Andrea75

Andrea75 · 10 Dicembre 2012

N. Korea Says It May Delay Controversial Rocket Launch

North Korea said it may delay a much-criticized rocket launch originally scheduled for as early as Dec. 10, as analysts say its efforts to mark a key anniversary were hampered by technical troubles.
Scientists were “now seriously examining the issue of readjusting the launching time of the satellite for some reasons,” the Korean Committee of Space Technology said in a statement carried by state media Sunday.

The committee gave no further details.

In a report late Dec. 9, South Korea’s Yonhap news agency, citing a government official in Seoul, said the North had stopped all preparations at the launch site in the country’s northwest.

Analysts said technical problems or snow, rather than overseas political pressure, are likely to be behind the delay in what the North calls a satellite launch, originally scheduled for between Dec. 10 and 22.

Some said the North’s new leader, Kim Jong-Un, may have been rushing the blast-off in a bid to mark the first anniversary of the death of his father and ex-ruler Kim Jong-Il on Dec. 17.

The impoverished but nuclear-armed nation insists the long-range rocket launch — its second this year after a much-hyped but botched mission in April — is for peaceful scientific purposes.

But the United States, and allies South Korea and Japan, say Pyongyang plans a disguised ballistic missile test that violates U.N. resolutions triggered by its two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

“Sunday’s announcement was only made by scientific authorities, meaning the most likely reason is either technical issues or weather conditions,” said Jang Yong-Seok from the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University.

A U.S. think-tank, the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, said Dec. 7 that preparations may have been delayed by heavy snow.

There had been “abnormal signs” indicating technical problems in launch preparations since the afternoon of Dec. 8, said Yonhap, citing an unidentified senior Seoul official.

“It looks like the problem is a technical one,” said the official quoted by Yonhap.

Pyongyang has apparently “rushed too fast” to time the launch to mark the Dec. 17 anniversary in a bid to drum up support for the young and inexperienced Jong-Un, said Yang Moo-Jin of Seoul’s University of North Korean Studies.

“It showed how desperate and time-pressed the North was to showcase its scientific breakthrough to its people on the key anniversary and subsequently rally support for the new leader,” Yang told AFP.

The North would have made the announcement of a potential delay via “a top party or military organ,” instead of the space committee, if it was intended to be a concession to the international pressure, he added.

Kim Jong-Un took over from his late father last December, the second father-to-son power transfer by the Kim dynasty that has ruled the isolated state with an iron fist for some 60 years.

Analysts said the December 10-22 launch window was twice as long as the period set before the failed April launch, reflecting the difficulties technicians may encounter in the harsh winter weather of the Korean Peninsula.

Washington and Seoul have urged Pyongyang to scrap the launch while Tokyo has postponed talks originally planned this week with North Korea.

U.N. diplomats inside and outside the Security Council have reportedly started consultations behind the scenes on what action to take if Pyongyang goes ahead.

Japan, the United States and South Korea have agreed to demand the U.N. Security Council strengthen sanctions on North Korea to levels that match those on Iran, Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper said.

Andrea75 · 10 Dicembre 2012

North Korea Likely To Postpone Rocket Launch

An unnamed representative of North Korea’s Committee of Space Technology has released a statement announcing the possibility that the North’s rocket launch scheduled to take place sometime between 10 and 22 December is likely to be postponed.
The statement was carried on Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) cited no specifics behind the possible launch delay. The Space Technology spokesman did state that the launch team was in the final stages of launch preparation, but offered no additional details.

Satellite imagery has provided photos that indicate that inclement weather and heavy snow may be the underlying cause for the delay. Many reputable analysts are speculating that the delay may be a combination of foul weather and technical malfunctions. Some experts also believe that the delay may be the result of intense international condemnation and the threat of impending UN sanctions.

This latest in a string of rocket launches was initially scheduled to occur between 10 and 22 December, in all probability to mark the first anniversary of the death of the North’s former leader, Kim Jong-il, on 17 December. The timing of the launch also coincides with elections scheduled for 13 December in Japan and 16 December in South Korea, a coincidence that some analysts have called suspicious.

TT-1 Pinto · 11 Dicembre 2012

Smontate tutto .... compagni !

L'è tutto sbagliato, l'è tutto da rifare !

North Korea Dismantling Rocket To Fix Glitch ....

North Korea has started to dismantle a controversial long-range rocket on its launch pad in an apparent move to fix a technical problem but still looks likely to go ahead with the launch, South Korean news reports and experts said Dec. 11.

Fonte .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_12_11_2012_p0-526817.xml

Andrea75 · 12 Dicembre 2012

... lanciato North Korea carries out controversial rocket launch

North Korea surprised and angered the international community Wednesday by launching a long-range rocket that may have put an object in orbit.
The secretive North Korean regime said the rocket had successfully blasted off from a space center on its west coast and claimed the satellite it was carrying had entered its intended orbit. The launch followed a botched attempt in April and came just days after Pyongyang suggested it could be delayed.

Initial indications suggest the rocket "deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit," the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the joint U.S.-Canadian aerospace agency, said in a statement.

North Korea has previously claimed that two other rockets fired in the past 15 years had successfully launched satellites, but other countries say they fell into the ocean before completing the task.

North Korea's new leader burnishes credentials with rocket

North Korea successfully launched a rocket on Wednesday, boosting the credentials of its new leader and stepping up the threat the isolated and impoverished state poses to its opponents.
The rocket, which North Korea says put a weather satellite into orbit, has been labeled by the United States, South Korea and Japan as a test of technology that could one day deliver a nuclear warhead capable of hitting targets as far as the continental United States.

"The satellite has entered the planned orbit," a North Korean television news-reader clad in traditional Korean garb triumphantly announced, after which the station played patriotic songs with the lyrics "Chosun (Korea) does what it says".

The rocket was launched just before 10 a.m. Korea time (9 p.m. ET on Tuesday), according to defense officials in South Korea and Japan, and easily surpassed a failed April launch that flew for less than two minutes.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) said that it "deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit", the first time an independent body has verified North Korean claims.

North Korea followed what it said was a similar successful launch in 2009 with a nuclear test that prompted the United Nations Security Council to stiffen sanctions that it originally imposed in 2006 after the North's first nuclear test.

The state is banned from developing nuclear and missile-related technology under U.N. resolutions, although Kim Jong-un, the youthful head of state who took power a year ago, is believed to have continued the state's "military first" programs put into place by his deceased father Kim Jong-il.

Washington condemned Wednesday's launch as a "provocative action" and breach of U.N. rules, while Japan's U.N. envoy called for a Security Council meeting. However, diplomats say further tough sanctions are unlikely to be agreed at the body as China, the North's only major ally, will oppose them.

"The international community must work in a concerted fashion to send North Korea a clear message that its violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions have consequences," the White House said in a statement.

Japan's likely next prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who is leading in opinion polls ahead of an election on December 16 and who is known as a North Korea hawk, called on the United Nations to adopt a resolution "strongly criticizing" Pyongyang.

There was no immediate official reaction from the Chinese government, which is North Korea's only major ally.

China had expressed "deep concern" over the launch which was announced a day after a top politburo member, representing new Chinese leader Xi Xinping, met Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang.

... il comunicato del NORAD NORAD acknowledges missile launch

North American Aerospace Defense Command officials acknowledged today that U.S. missile warning systems detected and tracked the launch of a North Korean missile at 7:49 p.m. EST. The missile was tracked on a southerly azimuth. Initial indications are that the first stage fell into the Yellow Sea. The second stage was assessed to fall into the Philippine Sea. Initial indications are that the missile deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit. At no time was the missile or the resultant debris a threat to North America.

TT-1 Pinto · 12 Dicembre 2012

Evidentemente è arrivato il classico .... "Contrordine .... compagni !" .... ;)/>

North Korea Launches Rocket in Defiance ....

A rocket launch by North Korea in April was aborted after less than two minutes flight.

Wednesday’s launch came after the North carried out repairs on the rocket, which South Korean officials said had been removed from its gantry on Monday.

Fonte .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_12_11_2012_p0-527345.xml

TT-1 Pinto · 12 Dicembre 2012

"Kwangmyongsong 3-2" .... questo è il nome del satellite artificiale messo in orbita dalla Corea del Nord ....

North Korea 'successfully launches satellite' using Taepodong-3 rocket ....

By: David Todd (December 12)

Source: Flight International

North Korea has entered the space age, orbiting its first satellite, from a Taepodong-3 (Unha-3) rocket launch at 00:49 GMT on 12 December from the Sohae launch base at Tongchang-ri, on North Korea's west coast.

US Strategic Command has confirmed the Kwangmyongsong 3-2 spacecraft - described by North Korean sources as an Earth observation satellite built for the North Korean Institute for Electronic War, and thought to weigh about 100kg (220lb) - is in orbit: apogee 588km, perigee 495, inclination 97.4˚, period 95min 29s.

The flight, which took the rocket on a southward trajectory over the Yellow and Philippine seas, raised international protests. Neighbouring Japan cited concerns that North Korea would be able to convert such a rocket into a ballistic missile to carry nuclear weapons. North Korea has exploded nuclear devices before and is thought to be working on a nuclear missile warhead.

There were three failed orbital attempts prior to this flight: a Taepodong-3 (Unha-3) launch carrying the original Kwangmyongsong 3 satellite suffered a launch failure in April this year after a first-stage failure.

Before that, North Korea announced it had made a successful orbital launch in August 1998 from the Musudan-ri launch site on the east coast of North Korea using a Taepodong-1 launch vehicle. While North Korea claimed success, US Space Command noted the flight had ended in failure with the third stage of the rocket landing in the sea. As it was, there were suspicions in neighbouring nations that this was really a test of North Korea's ballistic missile technology rather than a true orbital attempt.

In April 2009, North Korea claimed to have launched its Kwangmyongsong 2 satellite in a launch attempt using the Taepodong-2 rocket, again from Musudan-ri. However, US Space Command and Russian space authorities again noted this flight ended in failure after a suspected second-stage fault.

After this record of failure, and with this latest success, it has been alleged Iran has been giving North Korea technical assistance. Iran has successfully launched its own satellites using similar rocket technology and there are fears an exchange of rocket and nuclear know-how is taking place.

Kwangmyongsong 3-2 has been given international number 2012-072A

Andrea75 · 13 Dicembre 2012

... per chi conosce la lingua North Korean state TV gets a little carried away in rocket-launch coverage

How excited is North Korean’s official news agency about the country’s first-ever successful launch of a satellite into orbit? I don’t understand Korean, but the sheer elation in this KCNA report is impossible to miss. The TV host’s initial announcement is followed with 30 seconds of swelling music over footage of a mountain sunrise. Then there’s more exuberance from the host, who speaks – shouts, really – in near sing-song. North Korea-watcher Martyn Williams says this video aired at 12:05 p.m. Wednesday, local time.
State-run KCNA also aired this video, in which a loudspeaker-laden van blares the announcement into some near-empty Pyongyang streets. As the New York Times’ Robert Mackey points out, it looks like it’s mostly just a professional dance troupe celebrating in the streets, though a few onlookers clap and dance along.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h7N5HJso9e8&feature=player_embedded

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cvgb7k8xW34&feature=player_embedded

For North Korea, next step is a nuclear test

North Korea rattled the world on Wednesday by putting a satellite into orbit using the kind of technology that appears to demonstrate it can develop a missile capable of hitting the United States.
Its next step will likely be a nuclear test, which would be the third conducted by the reclusive and unpredictable state. Its 2009 test came on May 25, a month after a rocket launch.

For the North and its absolute ruler Kim Jong-un, the costs of the rocket program and its allied nuclear weapons efforts - estimated by South Korea's government at $2.8-$3.2 billion since 1998 - and the risk of additional U.N. or unilateral sanctions are simply not part of the calculation.

"North Korea will insist any sanctions are unjust, and if sanctions get toughened, the likelihood of North Korea carrying out a nuclear test is high," said Baek Seung-joo of the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses.

N. Korea's launch causes worries about nukes, Iran and the Pacific

North Korea may not have 'full control' of satellite, U.S. official says

There were preliminary signs on Wednesday that North Korea may not be in total control of a satellite less than 24 hours after it was blasted into orbit, a U.S. official told CNN.
"There are some initial indications they might not have full control," the official said of the device that was the payload for North Korea's first successful long-range rocket launch.

The official, who has access to the latest U.S. assessment, declined to be identified by name due to the sensitive nature of the information.

The satellite, described by one U.S. defense official as a rudimentary communications satellite with limited capability, is on a Polar orbit, meaning it is moving between the North and South poles.

Since there are issues about control, the United States is not certain the satellite is in a fully stable orbit.

"We don't know. We are still trying to figure that out," the U.S. official said.

However, he also cautioned the satellite could stay in its relatively low altitude orbit for months before either burning up or falling back to Earth.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta alluded to the problem in an interview Wednesday that was to air on CNN's 'Erin Burnett OutFront."

"I think we still have to assess exactly what happened here," Panetta told Burnett in the interview.

Panetta said part of that scrutiny was to look at the final stage that launched the satellite into orbit "to determine whether or not that did work effectively or whether it tumbled into space."

The official cautioned that the North Koreans could resolve whatever technical issues they may be facing. While not necessarily fully handling the satellite, it is not thought to be spinning uncontrollably.

In a key indicator of a potential problem, there was no indication that North Korea's ground control had sent a crucial radio signal to the satellite, the official explained.

That type of signal is expected almost immediately as it is used to order the satellite to deploy solar panels that power its electronics.

Modificato 13 Dicembre 2012 da Andrea75

TT-1 Pinto · 13 Dicembre 2012

... per chi conosce la lingua ....

Sei proprio un gran ottimista .... :D/>

Il commento del settimanale britannico "The Economist" ....

Space cadet ....

KIM JONG UN, the boyish leader of North Korea, is showing a flair for publicity stunts, albeit defiant and dangerous ones.

On December 12th his tin-pot regime caught his own people and the rest of the world off-guard by firing a rocket into space and possibly putting a rudimentary satellite into orbit.

L'intero articolo .... http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/12/north-korea%E2%80%99s-rocket-launch?fsrc=nlw|newe|12-12-2012|4360612|36709872|EU

Andrea75 · 17 Dicembre 2012

... recuperati i rottami del razzoNorth Korean Missile Wreckage Edition

The wreckage of the North Korea's rocket is seen at the South Korea's Second Fleet Command's naval base on December 14, 2012 in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. The debris is the first stage of the long range rocket, that was launched on December 12.
The exact level of success of North Korea’s rocket launch on Dec. 12, may not be clear (some reports have debris hurtling out of control in space) but the message is clear: DPRK is pushing the nuclear envelope. Above is the first stage of the rocket that was collected by the South Korean Navy. More pictures of the rocket after the break:

Andrea75 · 17 Dicembre 2012

South Korea says North nuclear test highly probable

North Korea will likely conduct a third nuclear test following its successful launch of a long-range rocket in the face of global condemnation, a top South Korean official said Friday.
“A nuclear test is highly probable, and judging from analysis of intelligence, significant preparations have been made,” Unification Minister Yu Woo-Ik told a parliamentary committee, without elaborating.

“North Korea has a track record of conducting nuclear tests following missile launches whose aim was to develop a delivery system for nuclear warheads,” Yu said.

The North’s previous nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 were both carried out within months of long-range rocket launches.

Pyongyang insists Wednesday’s launch was a purely scientific mission aimed at placing a polar-orbiting earth observation satellite in space, but most of the world saw it as a disguised ballistic missile test.

The UN Security Council has condemned the latest launch and warned of possible measures over what the US called a “highly provocative” act.

Another nuclear test would prompt a much stronger reaction, including from China which, as the North’s only major ally and main economic benefactor, has previously resisted calls for tougher sanctions against Pyongyang.

Kim Jong Un’s pyrotechnics, although alarming for the world, are driven chiefly by domestic considerations

Sending a satellite into orbit requires much of the same technology as firing an intercontinental ballistic missile with an equivalent payload at, say, America—once re-entry expertise and accuracy have been mastered. So the success represents big progress in North Korea’s missile programme. It also raises the stakes in dealings with the recalcitrant regime, at a time of new administrations in America and China and just before elections in Japan (December 16th) and South Korea (December 19th). In South Korea’s presidential election, both main candidates had been talking of engaging with the North after a prolonged and tense stand-off under the outgoing president, Lee Myung-bak. Mr Kim’s provocative behaviour undermines the goodwill. In Japan, regional security is already a campaign issue. The rocket will reinforce a hawkish mood.
...

Some analysts think that the timing of the launch, just before the end-of-the-year holidays, may soften some of its negative international impact. A new South Korean government next year may still look for ways to re-engage the North and wave before it inducements to pursue reforms. “This is good timing for North Korea. There are two weeks for governments to make a fuss, and then the new year provides everyone with a chance to move on, both psychologically and politically,” says Narushige Michishita of the Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.

...

Although North Korea had announced its space plans to the outside world, the actual news of the launch was unexpected when it came. Only days before, North Korea had extended the time frame for the rocket’s take-off because of unexplained glitches. On December 11th what now look like erroneous reports from South Korea had said that the Unha-3 rocket was being dismantled at the Sohae space station north-west of the capital. There may have been some wishful thinking involved. Tacitly, the rival countries have engaged in a space race ever since the North unsuccessfully sought to launch its first rocket in 1998. Only last month, tech-savvy South Korea failed in its third attempt to put a satellite into orbit, partly because of faulty Russian technology.

Yet North Korea’s crowing should be put into perspective. Even with a satellite in space, experts say it is likely to be able to send only the grainiest of video images back to Pyongyang. Those pictures may simply confirm what much of the outside world already knows: that the country is so deprived of electricity that from space it is pitch-black at night, compared with the brilliant glow across South Korea, Japan and much of China.

Modificato 17 Dicembre 2012 da Andrea75

TT-1 Pinto · 19 Dicembre 2012

Rotola,rotola,rotola .... strada facendo rotola .... rimbalza qua e là ....

Kwangmyongsong 3-2 is in orbit but is "tumbling" and not transmitting ....

Fonte .... http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/hyperbola/2012/12/kwangmyongsong-3-2-is-in-orbit.html

Andrea75 · 19 Dicembre 2012

... un dettagliato studio sui missili coreani Unha-3 Class, Taep'o-dong-2B mod-4 Booster

(TD-2B mod-4) Fourth Experimental Satellite Launch Flight Test
The Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province, Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ri or Tongch'ang-dong West Coast Facilities (25)

Launch of the “Kwangmyongsong-3” (2), a polar-orbiting earth observation satellite

12-(2-16)-2012

Introduction

On December 12, 2012, North Korea time launched a Taepo-dong-2B (mod-4) space booster launch vehicle. The launch is expected to track on a flight near due south over the Yellow Sea. This open source analysis on the fifth satellite launch attempt reviews the open source information to clarify what actually took place as opposed to numerous errors prone reports identified.

The DPRK, North Korea’s continued insistence that it is “their sovereign legitimate right to have an indigenous satellite launching as a part of their peaceful space program to demonstrate its economic, & technological power”. This is certainly important in understanding that this effort is driven by the need for hard foreign currency for the regimes survival and internal political requirements as well as geopolitical desires. This raises the problem of its potential application as a Limited Range ICBM which the DPRK denies is its intent. Equally the fear is also what Iran has already gotten from North Korea‘s & what they may get in the future which is what drives the international concerns as written in the UNSC “resolutions” Number s, 1718, & 1874 etc., against such activities.( 1A, 2)

Taep'o-dong-2B (mod's 3, & 4) class Flight Test Record

Flight Date Success/Failure

1. Flight Test (1) 07-05-06 Failure

2. Flight Test (2) 04-05-09 Failure

3. Flight Test (3) 04-13-12 Failure - Admitted by DPRK

4. Flight Test (4) 12-12-12 Successful orbiting of satellite demonstration

The North KoreanTaep-o-dong-2B/Unha-3 revised booster that sports a new liquid propellant third stage apparently derived from Unha-1 booster design.

Build Up to the Experimental Flight Test Reports
The DPRK North Korea recently re-stated publicly that it intends to continue to attempt to place “keep launching working satellites ….. as their sovereign right to space development” in earth orbit before the UN on Nov. 15, 2012. This was also stated in late October 25/26, on DPRK State TV and before the UN committee on Oct 19, 2012 indicating “Our efforts for space development are an exercise of an independent right of a sovereign state and an exercise of a legitimate right under international law as a party to the Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.”. This shows the earlier origin of the decision to go forward with this launch when ready from the internal political leadership decisions. This would be in violation of UN resolutions 1718, and 1874. (1, 1A)

Add to the mix South Korea has concluded recently that the DPRK has completed all preparation for it next nuclear test when ordered . (3, 4)

This makes it clear that both the satellite launch and nuclear testing decision were taken at the same time as early as September through mid-October which became obvious during early November 2012 implementation operational.

The reports from South Korea, Defense & Intelligence ministry sources and imagery discussions at the time were entirely consistent with the initial reports of buildup to launch operations first reported on November 23, 2012 but it was initially detected in mid-October through Nov. 8 th 2012.

Static Test Firings

Multiple static test firings of the Unha-3/TD-2B mod-4 engines have already been accomplished as reported by http://38north.org/ on November 12, 2012 that were conducted during last August or early September 2012. (5) Those engines still had to be disassembled and then clean out and rebuilt with new seals and install in the booster and undergo full systems integration checkout before shipment from the factory for this flight.

That Static test stand utilized on the Sohae Satellite Launching Station infrastructure is essentially identical to the Iranian static test facility built years ago outside Tehran Iran. The Iranian’s also having the No-dong-A and No-dong-B static test stands nearby at the same facility outside western Tehran, Iran. Those DPRK engine static test firings on the Sohae Satellite Launching Station infrastructure were completely separate from the KN-08 engine test firings conducted earlier on four occasions over sixteen weeks during 2011 and early 2012 at the static test firing and dynamic test facilities located on the Musudan-ri,” (Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground infrastructure in Hwadae County, in North Hamgyong Province. (75, 75A, 80, 80A, 87)

Those static test firings of the Taep-o-dong-2B/Unha-3 revised (mod-4) engines on the Sohae Satellite Launching Station infrastructure proved the first stage four No-dong-A’s engines clustered propulsion controllers modifications and others for its upper stages operation from the DPRK and Iranian cooperation for their application. This was a part of the Science & Technology transfer exchange agreement in practical operation.

The Sohae Satellite Launching Station launch pad, gantry umbilical tower at the launch site is capable of accommodating both the Unha-3 class Taep'o-dong-2B mod-4 booster as well as the in development future Taep'o-dong-3 space boosters with few modifications.

DPRK Dec. 1, 2012 Launch Intent Announcement

As if on “Q” the behind schedule DPRK main radio station announced what had been in the development stages going back to April 2012 or earlier timed for the present Five Year Plan actual schedule requirements.

“DPRK Dec. 1, 2012 Announcement “DPRK to Launch Working Satellite”

“Pyongyang, December 1 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the Korean Committee for Space Technology issued the following statement Saturday:

The DPRK plans to launch another working satellite, second version of Kwangmyongsong-3, manufactured by its own efforts and with its own technology, true to the behests of leader Kim Jong Il.

Scientists and technicians of the DPRK analyzed the mistakes that were made during the previous April launch and deepened the work of improving the reliability and precision of the satellite and carrier rocket, thereby rounding off the preparations for launch.

The polar-orbiting earth observation satellite will blast off southward from the Sohae Space Center in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province by carrier rocket Unha-3 in the period between December 10 and 22.

A safe flight path has been chosen so that parts of the carrier rocket that might fall during the launch process would not affect neighboring countries.

At the time of the April launch, the DPRK ensured utmost transparency of the peaceful scientific and technological satellite launch and promoted international trust in the fields of space science researches and satellite launch. The DPRK will fully comply with relevant international regulations and usage as regards the upcoming launch, too.

The launch will greatly encourage the Korean people stepping up the building of a thriving nation and offer an important occasion of putting the country's technology for the use of space for peaceful purposes on a new, higher stage.” (6)

Launch of the a polar-orbiting earth observation satellite “Kwangmyongsong-3” (# 2), flight path, stage impact areas, warning to Mariners and Airmen

This included information for watch, warning reports provided by the DPRK to the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunications Union and others as required by international law.

The data presently available seems to indicate a launch between 7 AM and 12 noon Local time between December 10-22, 2012 or thirteen days of launch windows. The first stage is to impact 20 kilometers south of the April launch failure impact point or about 140 km west of Buan in North Jeolla Province, South Korea. The first stage is expected to separate at an altitude of 150 km with impact in the sea about 280-450-500 km from the launch pad site at 39.660107 N, 124.7053203 E. The two piece payload shroud (fairing) will impact an area centered 87-88 kilometers west of the Jeju, southern Island south of the South Korean peninsula mainland. The Unha-3 second stage is to impact an area about 136 kilometers east of the Luzon Island of the Philippines over the Philippines trench region, over international waters between 3,150 - 3,950 kilometers from the launch site. Its third stage re-entry debris should impact about 3,200 km down range. All of the impact zones are smaller reflecting refinements of the systems performance verses the larger impact zones specified in April 2012 failure. (7)

The North KoreanSatellites/Unha-3 revised booster payload.

North Korea can fly out of this Tongch'ang-dong facility to polar orbit inclined just west of a due south inclination for an imaging/ERTS/RECSAT or weather imaging satellite launch or for a limited range LRICBM test without going over other countries territory. While a near due east flight out of Musudan-ni would be for a communications satellite probably for store dump military communications traffic or could be for an LRICBM test flight. This is the fourth satellite launch attempt by the DPRK. In truth �Earth observation satellite� description can cover a multitude of mission including Earth resources, mapping imagery, reconnaissance photo imaging and or radar imaging operations as well as weather in low earth polar orbit. A polar orbit satellite is not an advanced geostationary meteorological satellite which is launched from an equatorial orbit not polar orbit. Kwangmyongsong-2 was an experimental communications satellite as was also Kwangmyongsong-1 according to the North Korean News Agency KCNA. Satellite Details & Mission Data
On March 28, 2012, KCNA the official North Korean News Agency interviewed the vice director of the Space Development Department of the Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) answering the critical questions on the Earth observation satellites expected orbit, missions and payload mass. The two year useful life 100 kilogram satellite has multiple missions primarily built around ERTS earth resources satellite technology as well as the added benefit of meteorological weather forecasting. The rectangular box satellite sports four solar arrays of twin two panels for deployment with several external sensors one of which is a side looking instrument or camera on top and five antennas. (29) Close examination of the 1 meter tall satellite display revealed that there is only one fixed corner for the solar arrays with two hinges between the two panels on each side at the 90 degree point to fold around the satellite body. One hundred and eighty degrees from the solar arrays attachment point there are no attachments to hold the solar arrays around the body of the satellite except for launch. So the four solar panels to provide electrical power deploy from one corner creating a flat array away from the satellite body. The four sides of the satellite were obscured by the solar arrays with only the top and bottom visible. Whether this was the satellite flight article is questionable but it probably was a full working model utilized in ground testing.

The North Korean Satellites/Unha-3 revised booster payload.

It is to be launched into a polar solar (Sun) synchronous orbit at 500km high altitude with an inclination of 97.40 degrees with an orbital period of 94.737 minutes. (9) However this may in fact be incorrect based on new analysis developed. (See below from Ted Molcza) The DPRK is now emphasizing that it is a small earth observation polar orbiting satellite probably launched at 88.7 degrees inclination with a third stage limited performance plane change to 94.5 deg while close to a sun-synchronous launch would be at the previous indicated 97.40 degrees inclination which is believed to be outside the booster’s performance capability based on the launch corridor restraints. (9, 10, 11, 12, 13)

Satellite data Transmission

The satellite will broad cast its data in the UHF, radio band while its video will be in the X-band according to the International Telecommunications Union. The UHF band utilizes frequencies in the 300MHz to 3 GHz range with several frequency ranges reserved for satellite use. The X-band covers frequencies in the 7GHz to 12 GHz range for satellites.

Report: Suggest the DPRK Satellite Mission is Not as Previously Portrayed [vedi post precedente]

...

The launch site is located at 39.660107 N, 124.705203 E.

To be sun-synchronous, a 500 km orbit requires an inclination of 97.42 deg. At the latitude of the launch site, a trajectory that directly ascends to that inclination requires a launch azimuth of approximately 192.3 deg (12.3 deg west of due south). The azimuth from the launch site through the various impact zones downrange should agree closely with this value, typically within a degree or so, absent any significant yaw-steering (aka dogleg) early in the ascent.

The azimuth from the launch site to the midpoint of the southern boundary of the 2nd stage's impact zone (approx. 15.15 N, 124.26 E) is 181.0 deg, which is far from the required 192.3 deg.

I considered the possibility of an eastward dogleg early in the ascent, but the trajectory would have to turn toward approximately 192 deg azimuth well before the 2nd stage ceased firing, in which case the 2nd stage's impact zone should be oriented with its east and west sides pointing roughly toward azimuth 191 deg, but they do not. The west side points toward azimuth 181.8 deg, and the east side 179.8 deg - again far from the required value, and essentially identical to the azimuth calculated from the launch site. Therefore, there is no dogleg, which is not surprising, since it would involve over flying the Korean peninsula, probably including South Korea.

I do not see how North Korea could reach a sun-synchronous orbit from the new launch site without risk to populated areas. Launching directly toward the required 192.3 deg azimuth would result in a trajectory that skirts China's east coast near Shanghai. The rocket's second stage would over fly Taiwan, before impacting in a zone bordering within perhaps 50 km of the west coast of the northern Philippines.

To give a *very rough* idea of the effect of launching directly toward azimuth 192.3 deg, I have adjusted the longitudes of North Korea's NOTAMs:

A. 35-12-25N 123-42E

35-12-13N 123-20E

35-55-20N 123-33E

35-55-10N 123-51E

B. 15-08-19N 119-38E

15-09-35N 118-56E

19-24-32N 119-43E

19-23-08N 120-34E

I very much doubt that North Korea plans for its rocket stages to fall in the zones I have estimated, but it is for North Korea to explain the inconsistency between the orbit it claims to be targeting and the NOTAMs it provided.

... i dettagli forniti circa il lancio

DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Satellite Launch
Pyongyang, December 12 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK gave the following answer to questions put by KCNA Wednesday as regards the successful launch of the second version of satellite Kwangmyongsong-3:

The successful satellite launch in the DPRK was a desire at the behest of general secretary Kim Jong Il and part of peaceful work in line with the country's scientific and technological development plan for the economic construction and improvement of people's living standard.

All the people across the country are greatly excited at the news of the successful launch and progressives are extending sincere congratulations to them.

Hostile forces, however, are showing signs of sinister bid to take issue with the launch for peaceful purposes, while terming it "violation of resolution" of the UN Security Council.

The right to use outer space for peaceful purposes is universally recognized by international law and it reflects the unanimous will of the international community. So this issue is not one over which the UNSC can say this or that.

Only the DPRK's satellite launch is regarded as long-range missile launch for military purposes, "provocation" and cause of increasing tension. This is prompted by the hostility toward the DPRK.

The U.S. over-reacted to the DPRK's satellite launch in April out of hostile feelings which compelled the DPRK to reexamine the nuclear issue as a whole.

The concept of hostility will not be of any help, and confrontation will not help settle anything, either.

We hope that all countries concerned will use reason and remain cool so as to prevent the situation from developing to undesirable direction.

No matter what others say, we will continue to exercise our legitimate right to launch satellites and thus actively contribute to the economic construction and improvement of the,

Launch Event Sequence: From the DPRK Mission Control Displays

Event Timing Sequence:

1. Lift-off ----------------------------------------------------------------- 9:49:20 AM

2. Roll, pitch over -----------------------------------------------------

3. Max-Q ----------------------------------------------------------------- 9:50:10 AM?

4. Shroud Release ---------------------------------------------------

5. Korean Radar ------------------------------------------------------- 9:51:20 AM?

6. Acquired launch -----------------------------------------------------

7. NORAD acquired launch ----------------------------------------- 9:49:20 AM

8. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. First stage burn------------------------------------------------------ 120 seconds with 2-4 second start up added [wrong figures-156 Sec. - 160 sec. burn,, [shutdown, wrong figures - 98 km altitude 45 km down range], achieving a velocity of approximately 1,950 meters/seconds, approximately 45 kilometers down range at an altitude of 55-60 kilometers

10. First stage impact ----------------------------------------------- 9:52?, 138 km west of Byeonsan Penninsula The first stage is to impact 20 kilometers south of the April launch failure impact point or about 140 km west of Buan in North Jeolla Province, South Korea. The first stage is expected to separate at an altitude of 150 km with impact in the sea about 280-450-500 km from the launch pad site at 39.660107 N, 124.7053203 E.

11. The two piece payload shroud (fairing) ---------------------- will impact an area centered 87-88 kilometers west of the Jeju, southern Island south of the South Korean peninsula mainland. Achieving a velocity of approximately 1,975 meters a second - 2,000 meters/second at separation

12. Second Stage Burn Start ------------------------------------------- <200 seconds [168-180 seconds], achieving a velocity 3,975 meters/second with four steering engines and one main engine thrust chamber. This is a full No-dong-B stage in altitude configuration. Altitude of shut down , down approximately 315 kilometers with range distance of 470 kilometers

14. Second Stage Impact 2,600 km down range --------------- 10:05: AM, The Unha-3 second stage is to impact an area about 136 kilometers east of the Luzon Island of the Philippines over the Philippines trench region, over international waters between 3,150 - 3,950 kilometers from the launch site.

15. Third Stage Burn ----------------------------------------------------- 260 seconds achieving an orbital insertion velocity of approximately 7,600 meters/second - 7,750 meters/second

16. Third Stage km down range ---------------------------------------The actual 580 seconds after launch with an extra 13 seconds, achieving an altitude of about 500 kilometers and 1,700 kilometers down range at shutdown

17. Orbit Insertion ---------------------------------------------------------- 09:59:13 AM 567 seconds or the actual 580 seconds after launch with an extra 13 seconds

18. That is 9 Minutes 27 seconds 567 seconds total with satellite insertion the actual 580 seconds after launch with an extra 13 seconds into polar orbit at 499.7 km perigee altitude and 584.18 km apogee [500-588 km NORAD] altitude at the angle of inclination of 97.4 degrees. Period of orbit is 95.4 minutes and 29 seconds.

Ref. http://english.kyodonews.jp/photos , the data tables of unha-3 launch performance http://english.kyodonews.jp/photos/2012/12/198973.html , http://www.47news.jp/movie/general_national/post_8173

The 2012, Unha-3 is 30 meter long 2.4/2.5 meter diameter 120 tonnes thrust liftoff using 4 no-dong-A engines at 91 metric tonnes launch mass Unha-2 booster design shows a new third stage highly refined design liquid storable propellant stage based on second stage vernier’s and their separate engine pump system utilized in a similar design that Iran has flown successfully on its Safir-II space boosters second stage.

Propellants

The first stage propellant are strongly believed to be based on Scud-B propellant as noted from Soviet manuals which is TM-185 20% Gasoline, 80% Kerosene while its oxidizer is believed to be AK-27I 27% N2O4 + 73% HNO3 with Iodium inhibitor Nitrogen Tetroxide & Nitric Acid. Isp=226 seconds actual performance but 230 seconds with no steering vanes.

The second stage Propellant is known from Soviet Naval references manuals to be Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) while its oxidizer is known to be a derivation of Inhibited Red Fuming nitric Acid (IRFNA), ( 73% Inhibited Red Fuming nitric Acid (IRFNA) & 27% N204 = AK-27S) in the second and third stages. Isp. =296 second vac.(282-298 seconds)

The third stage uses the same propellants as the second stage with a liquid storable propellant attitude control unit with post boost maneuvering capability for satellite deployment.

Observation on DPRK Operational Launch Practices

The North Koreans like the Soviets and Chinese operate on the principle that the Russians have taught both. The booster and payload come from the dedicated factory ready to go but require ground testing in the horizontal assembly building for integration testing and pad installation testing. If any issues develop that they cannot resolve with what is available on site out of the accompanying trucks they have to send it back to the factory in north Pyongyang.

They also follow the rocket engine design criteria of “on” then “off” for their control with controller differential throttling and steering through vanes in the gas jet influence or steering vernier's engines separate from the main engines.

They assemble the booster one stage at a time on the so called universal mobile launch pad set up for the Unha-2 class booster Taep'o-dong-2B using the transporter erector an gantry umbilical tower crane. The pad and gantry umbilical tower are designed to accommodate both the Taep'o-dong-2B and new Taep'o-dong-3 space boosters with few modifications.

Taep’o-dong-2b, mod-4 & Taep’o-dong-3 application using the same launch infrastructure.

PROVISIONAL ESTIMATED: TD-3 design based on pad and heritage TD-2B, No-dong-B and KN-08/No-Dong-C missile systems designs as well as DPRK released art work of a larger space booster configuration.
The DPRK North Korea is building up to flight test of this next space launch as well as flight test of the KN-08 LRICBM. The attached drawing indicates the relative size of the systems. From left going right is the Taep'o-dong-2B and new Taep'o-dong-3 space boosters in the gantry and further to the right is the No-dong-B and the KN-08 ballistic missiles. The No-dong-B is the second stage of the Taep'o-dong-2B and the KN-08 is the heritage system for the postulated Taep'o-dong-3.

The gantry umbilical tower can easily have its service levels covered with tarps for environmental control prior to launch for wintertime operations. A launch much into January is indeed questionable due to weather constraints both on the ground and at altitude. It is built to military requirements for all weather operations so time will tell. Proper warnings are to be expected which has been their past practice.

First the last time I do not remember the third Stage, transporter and payload to have been visible until after the booster was on the launch pad. The third stage transporter is probably inside the staging area inside the assembly building and is therefore premature to expect right now. That is the assemble processes and check out requirements focus first on the basic first two stages then the integrated third stage and payload after that as a separate operation.

Comparisons North Korean (DPRK) and Iranian ballistic missiles & Space boosters through 2012

They had apparently produced 20 boosters by 2006 according to intelligence revealed by the then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld separate from the R&D elements copies so they are down to perhaps 18 boosters being updated as required back at the factory at this point. That is two boosters have been expended in experimental prototype flight testing and maybe one more has been sent the west coast launch site sites leaving about 17 boosters in their inventory some of which may be committed to sale for Iran.

Comparisons North Korean (DPRK) and Iranian ballistic missiles & Space boosters

This has still left this analyst unhappy with the large variables results except to say the original design underwent dramatic design changes during the 2001 through 2005 five year plan. Ultimately the rear gantry umbilical towers 42 inch tall railing will probably prove to be the real scaling answer along with the Solid motor third stage and the second stage 1.5 meter diameter dimensions identified that will finally define the close design dimensions. That has now been clarified by DPRK officials.

he North KoreanTaep-o-dong-2B/Unha-3 revised booster that sports a new liquid propellant third stage apparently derived from Unha-1 booster design and No-dong-B vernier propulsion engine

The Unha-3, Taep'o-dong-2Bm-mod-4 final design with its liquid fueled third stage for the 2012 experimental flight test
The 2012, Unha-3 is 30 meter long 2.5 meter diameter 120 tonnes thrust liftoff at 91 metric tonnes launch mass Unha-2 booster design shows a new third stage highly refined design liquid storable propellant stage based on second stage vernier’s and their separate engine pump system utilized in a similar design that Iran has flown successfully on its Safir-II space boosters second stage. (29)

Third Stage Design Change out to Liquid Iranian Derived Stage Design

The North KoreanTaep-o-dong-2Bm/Unha-3 revised booster that sports a new liquid propellant third stage apparently derived from Unha-1 booster design and No-dong-steering vernier propulsion engine The 30 meter long & 2.5 meters in diameter, 91 metric tonnes launch vehicle with 120 tonnes thrust Unha-2, 3/TD-2 booster’s, third stage is an Iranian derived liquid stage of the Safir program but much more sophisticated in this rendition difference from the failed solid motor design of the 2006 and 2009 launch. (27) (29) The third stage was lengthened from the solid motor based 3 meter stage to the liquid stage length of about 3.8 meters.

Scenarios on the Previous April 13, 2012 Failure reminiscent of the 2006 failure.

I cannot get around the nagging feeling that at some point around Max-Q that the fairing shroud may have partially let go and in part collapsed on to the satellite but did not let go. It would have been shook loose about 80 seconds into the flight as the antenna covers on the top of the third stage just below the shrouds base were jettisoned. Following at the 90 seconds point of the flight with the one side attached solar panels being ripped from the satellite body one attachment corner. That damaged the satellite but did not destroy it over and above the suggested a combination of the APU start up on the second or third stage as well as the attitude control systems start up activation. However this thought is unproven speculation without more information.

*One is left wondering if the max-Q vibration frequency of the third stage was different from the rest of the booster structural frequency. Thus under maximum dynamic stress might have caused the shroud to fail and damage or destroy the satellite as well as exposing certain in flight antenna's. That in turn could have precipated a premature start of the second stage engines that failed to continue. Thus causing it to not start up when it should near the end of the first stage burn? It would appear that the DPRK engineering managers were somewhat concerned over this issue but went forward in spite of this potential hazard to their loss and quick identification of the failure mode of operation.

Note: They very quickly defined what went wrong with the last flight and have probably corrected that now:

DPRK Space Effort to Continue: Additional Launches to Follow during this Five Year State Plan

The Korean Central News Agency quote from the DPRK Committee for Space Technology (KCST) on April 15, 2012 as stating that “Scientists and technicians of the DPRK have already wound up the specific and scientific probe into the cause of Kwangmyongsong-3’s failure to enter its orbit.” And “All the scientific and technological data and previous experience gained this time will serve as a very precious boon to space development and a reliable guarantee for greater success in the days ahead.” It went on further to state “We have a comprehensive state plan for space development including expansion and strengthen of space development institutions as required by latest science and technology and continued launch of working satellites need for the country’s economic development. (66, 67)

For the DPRK Committee for Space Technology (KCST) to suggest they already understood what had gone wrong with this launch failure it must have been highly visible and quickly identified both during the launch and in the following days review. It suggests that it was initially a much more fundamental problem that manifested itself later on in flight.

Earlier on April 17, 2012 it had stated “We will expand and strengthen space development institutions and continue a variety of working satellites needed for economic development of the country including geostationary satellites under the state plan for space development.” (68)

The description of the failure from open sources show the result of a first stage propulsion controller induced asymmetrical thrust of the four engine cluster (none symmetry) launch failure that tried to steer the booster to the East as it began to pitched over going down range soon after clearing launch infrastructure launch facility area. Yes the first stage continued its full burn but was constantly loosing energy altitude performance compensating the steering issues. This ultimately created many of the other issues as previously suggested.

This was also seen in the July 5, 2006, Unha-3 Mod-3 launch failure that has now been corrected with Iran DPRK engineering technology exchange demonstrated in static test firing this last late summer. Yes the cooperative concentrated effort was successful in correcting the propulsion controller issues. However until proven through this experimental flight test to orbit it remains uncertain as to the success or failure of the applied tested solution.

Guidance System Performed

The guidance system performed from liftoff was much better than that seen with the 1998 Taep'o-dong-1 first satellite launch attempt. Taep'o-dong-1 flew near vertically before angling over and moving down rang but this Taep'o-dong-2 almost immediately curved over heading down range as a satellite launch should carry out in a very smooth flight pattern. It was even possible to see it correct its direction of flight as it moved down range soon after launch.

Launch Timing Question

It had a daily launch window from 7:00 A.M., to 12 Noon over the thirteen days of launch window. Launch weather for the 10-22 launch windows days appears to have upper altitude turbulence the entire period. The launch as things stand now appears set for Dec. 10, 2012 Monday morning.

North Pyongyang, Sanum-dong Missile Development Center Factory Infrastructure

The north Pyongyang, Sanum-dong Missile Development Center factory constitutes a vast facility, testing grounds and general R&D, production conglomerate as modern as and facilities in the high technology Western world. This is the result of studying the Google Earth images publicly available on line. It contains wind tunnels that are near identical to the most advanced US, NASA and USAF facilities. In deed the infrastructure is like combining the NASA Marshall Spaceflight Center, Langley Research center, Glenn Research Center and Ames Research Center, in addition to the Tullahoma, Arnold Air Force Base facilities with it Arnold Engineering Development Center. In some cases it reminds one of facilities that only the US has and they are near identical to the US designs. How they have achieved this is indeed an intriguing question with many implications.

Yes this infrastructure contains the General satellite Command & Control center. It also apparently handles much of the military aircraft development for the DPRK. The facility also utilizes other static test firing and dynamic test facilities located on the Musudan-ri,” ( Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground infrastructure in Hwadae County , in North Hamgyong Province) as well as the Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ri or Tongch'ang-dong, Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province infrastructure. This is beyond the Pyongyang surrounding general Space Program and Military Ballistic Missile R&D infrastructure all working under the same DPRK Government employer roof serving both so called civil and military requirements. The Pyongyang region also includes the Earth Station with its large Dishes and the General Satellite Monitoring Facilities with it multiple smaller dishes.

Iranian Participants Observers:

Iranian participant, observers from the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG), the Iranian liquid propellant launch vehicle design bureau organization, have been within the DPRK cooperating to help finish the development of the Taep’o-dong-2B, mod-4 space booster which affects the Iranian Simorgh IRILV booster series presently in development.

It reflects the latest ongoing commercial strategic technology transfer cooperative agreement programs relationship between the DPRK and Iran on missile and nuclear systems technology exchange.

Tracking, Range & Intelligence Observation Information Collection Efforts

Based on what North Korea has already given notice of it can be expected to clear required areas in the Yellow Sea through December 10-22, 2012 suggest that the launch from the West coast facility Tongchang-ri is going to fly out over the Yellow Sea in a near due south direction towards the equator not over South Korea and is as stated designed to place a satellite in near polar orbit that would be placed in orbit before flying over the Philippine region. The second stage impact zone is in the south Philippine Sea near Indonesia (New Guinea) near the Philippine Trench. Longer range flights could be flown out of the Tangch’ang-dong facility flying over South Korea to impact west of Australia 6,700 kilometers down range. The probability of the North Koreans flying out over North Korea or South Korean mainland I submit is highly improbable because of internal impact or avoidance of failure disaster issues much less threat issues confirming the polar orbit intent stated by the DPRK. To launch a satellite would be valid but an LRICBM would in part invalidate their clam of a space program for this booster proving the obvious dual purpose of the flights leading to external export to Iran for hard currency.

All previous international observation information gathering assets of South Korea and Japan in addition to the US are expected to commit to the data collection surveillance efforts. The two South Korean King Sejong and Yulgok Yi 7,600–ton, Aegis class Aegis–class destroyers’ equipped with 1,000 km radar’s, three Japanese Kongo Class Aegis–class destroyer’s equipped radar’s in addition to land based radars and SIGINT operations are to be part of the effort. Multiple US surveillance means such as land and sea based SIGINT and radar surveillance ships and crewed aircraft, stealth UAV’s in addition to sonar equipped ships of the various navy’s are certainly expected to be a part of the combined efforts. Down range ship based and land based surveillance efforts are to be assumed as also being a part of the regional effort. This like in 2006 and 2009 is to acquire the maximum independently crosses checked duplicative radar data as well as DPRK infrastructure operational data as is possible to correctly define the space booster’s systems performance or lack of performance as the case has been in the previous two experimental launch attempts. (18, 19)

Unfortunately in this case “The Japanese, the chief of staff of Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japan Navy) Sugimoto Masahiko said "The fact is our Aegis ships could not detect the rocket". He said radars of three Aegis ships deployed at the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan could not detect those. They were so far away from the impact point of the rocket because they were located on the points suited to intercept the rocket. Two Aegis ships seemed to be located in near Okinawa and another one ship in the Sea of Japan. The ship on the Sea of Japan was unnecessary and should have located it in the northern part of the East China Sea. Japan was not able to record the track of the rocket at all, except the radar of the antisubmarine patrol aircraft.” (52) In affect the Japanese data came from the combined efforts.

This would imply only South Korean & U.S., Land, Sea & Space assets were close enough to gather that critical data on the early part of the flight.

The US has put its Pacific Ocean deployed mobile oil–rig floating platform sea based large advanced 2,000 km range X-Band Radar-1 out of the Pearl Harbor home port on March 23, 2012 in preparation for monitoring the next TD-2 launch attempt. The U. S. Seventh Fleet has also committed five or six class Aegis destroyers along the launch corridor. Japan is putting its Maritime Self Defense Forces, Aegis class destroyer’s in the East China Sea also called the western Yellow-Sea near South Korea to monitor the Unha-3 launch for anti-ballistic missile defense but especially as a part of the U. S., South Korean and Japanese data gathering radar network and SIGINT electronic monitoring operations. Unfortunately the Japanese were deployed in a defensive configuration for this launch as previously noted.

The entire region around South Korea and Japan down through the Philippine region, western Pacific launch corridor is to have sea-based, land and space based systems sensors electronic monitoring of the entire flight for the maximum amount of duplicative data and provide for missile defense requirements if required. Besides the sea based Aegis class ships of the U.S., Japan and South Korea there are also land based SIGINT station in both Japan and South Korea as well as ground based radars and space tracking gear being prepared for this monitoring operation. All monitored data is being coordinated between the three nations and their deployed assets but especially for national security intelligence analysis. (18, 19) This effort did openly show real ranging errors that possible were precipitated by DPRK bi-static induced radar errors later corrected after the event by intelligence analyst. Those errors did manage to be released in the initial public official statements.

There is little doubt that DoD has imaged the launch pad activities regardless of weather, conditions, night or day on the round the clock operational basis by various means such as imaging stealth UAVs and stealth radar imaging UAVs.

Booster Recovery Efforts after the Launch Attempt

The waters off the South Korean coast have a depth of about 40 - 70 - 80 -100 meters with the first stage upper propellant tank recovered and other sections expected soon.

Andrea75 · 28 Dicembre 2012

... in preparazione un terzo test nucleare? http://38north.org/2012/12/punggyeri122812/

New Analysis of Past Activity at Test Site: Structures Identified?
Operations at the southern tunnel site at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility, where experts suspect Pyongyang will conduct its next detonation, began in 2009 or 2010. Over time, some 8,000 cubic meters of rubble were excavated with spoil piles covering 4,000 square meters. By spring 2012, the site appeared almost ready for a test. A satellite image from April 18 shows a train of mining carts on top of the spoil pile and random unidentified structures or objects on or near the piles (see figure 1). Such patterns may be indicative of preparations to emplace the nuclear device and diagnostic equipment in the test chamber as well as to deliver stemming material and spoil to seal the shaft.

A comparison of the pile taken over a six-week period from the beginning of March to mid-April 2012 shows a high level of activity as spoil was extracted from the tunnel (see figure 2). The vehicles, structures, and unidentified objects were at different locations in each image indicating movement.
Figure 2. Comparative look at spoil and tent cover activities, March-April 2012.

The above images also reveal what appears to be a tent cover or awning not previously identified in satellite imagery analysis. The structure, near the tunnel entrance, is perhaps 20 meters long and 10 meters wide and probably erected in inclement weather—such as snow—and otherwise removed. One possible explanation is that the cover protects recording and monitoring equipment just outside the tunnel. Sensors inside the tunnel and on the nuclear device itself, designed to collect data just prior to detonation, will be destroyed by the blast. Electrical cables from these sensors transmit the measurements to the recording and monitoring equipment outside the tunnel that can survive the test. The structure may also serve as a protected receiving area for items to be emplaced in the tunnel.
A box-like object is visible when the tent cover is removed (see figure 3). This structure may contain racks of recording and diagnostic equipment. That would be consistent with practice in the United States and elsewhere. The test monitoring package needs to be near the tunnel entrance in order to keep the electrical lines between the sensors in the test chamber and the monitoring equipment as short was possible given the very transient phenomenon of a nuclear detonation. The recording and monitoring equipment would then pass the processed signals to the control center, perhaps two buildings, labeled southern area support buildings, where scientists and engineers would be at their consoles to control and monitor the test.

A newly emplaced larger structure is also visible in the October 3 imagery. With the onset of snow, the tent cover is in place. If our analysis that the tent and box-like object are related to recording and diagnostic equipment is correct, this new structure may contain consoles or workstations run by engineers for calibrating the sensors in the tunnel and the recording and monitoring equipment in the box next door as well as to ensure they are working properly. (There is a footpath barely visible in the December 13^th imagery running from the right side of the tent to the tunnel entrance.) During the test itself, there would be no personnel in this structure because of its proximity to the tunnel entrance.

If the box and larger structure are related to test monitoring one possibility is that the North Koreans would make the structures transportable so that the equipment could be used at various sites. Instead of building temporary structures, it might make more sense to use standard size shipping containers to house and transport the sensors. Indeed, both structures are similar in dimensions to standard size Conex containers that could serve this purpose and which the North Koreans are known to use for commercial shipping as well as to carry tanks of rocket fuel.

Recovering from Storm Damage: A Water Problem?

Rainfall during the summer and into early fall washed away much of the spoil pile as well as a considerable part of the access road and its bridges. Imagery from October 3 shows a concerted effort to repair the damage just two weeks after the last typhoon struck. A new access bridge had been erected, and construction of the new bypass road started. The washed out spoil pile provides an indication of the huge quantity of rock excavated from the tunnel.

Figure 3. Flood damage and possible test monitoring equipment near tunnel entrance, October 3, 2012.

By November 19 (see figure 4), a little more than seven weeks later, the repair effort seems to have been completed. Tire tracks now run from the bypass road to the southern area support buildings. The new bridge appears to be wider than before. The tent cover has been raised with the snowfall.
One interesting development is the stream of water running from a location close to the tunnel entrance (a December 13 image shows it coming from the tunnel itself), under the bridge, and down the valley that is also discernible in subsequent images even with snow cover. The stream is noteworthy for two reasons. First, if water is seeping into the tunnel, the North Koreans will have to continuously run pumping equipment and drainage to pass the water through each sealable segment of the tunnel.[3] It is important to remove the leaking water as well as to address the resulting humidity and condensation on the sensors in order to prevent the tunnel from flooding, possibly damaging the nuclear device, and to ensure that the sensors emplaced along the tunnel work properly.

Secondly, the stream of water indicates that the volcanic rock of the mountain may be porous or fractured enough to release radionuclide byproducts from a nuclear detonation that would allow foreign monitoring to distinguish whether the device uses highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

Figure 4. Test tunnel entrance, November 19, 2012.

December 2 imagery reveals the traffic flow pattern at the site (see figure 5). The road is dark where movement has melted the snow. The traffic appears limited to the bypass road, the tunnel entrance and the two southern area support buildings. (The fact that there is movement between those buildings and the tunnel entrance and not to other structures supports the conclusion that they may function as the control center for the test.)
Figure 5. Activity near tunnel entrance, December 2, 2012.

Imagery from December 13—almost two weeks later—provides the best view of the area to date. The tent cover is clearly shown. The stream of water runs along the topside of the tent structure and appears to originate from the tunnel. No discernible vehicle tracks enter the tent area. There are three possible explanations: 1) all necessary equipment for a test is in place in the tunnel; 2) no attempts to install new equipment have been made since the last snowfall the first week of December; or 3) the tent area is indeed not used for staging. The trace of an apparent footpath runs from the right side of the cover to the tunnel entrance, indicating that workers have been moving between both areas.
Figure 6. Activity near tunnel entrance, December 13, 2012.

Conclusions
The North Koreans have restored the capability to conduct a nuclear test at the south tunnel of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility in the aftermath of rains this past summer and fall. They continue to maintain the test site at a state of readiness that could allow them to conduct a detonation as soon as two weeks after such a decision is made. One wildcard, however, is the stream of water that appears to be coming from the tunnel entrance, indicating a possible problem with seepage, that could adversely affect a nuclear device and sensors intended to gather data on and monitor the test. Whether this problem is under control or has been solved remains unclear.

Andrea75 · 2 Gennaio 2013

... apertura dal Nord http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/world/asia/north-koreas-leader-kim-jong-un-makes-overture-to-south.html?ref=world&_r=0

The North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, called for an end to the “confrontation” with rival South Korea on Tuesday in what appeared to be an overture to the incoming South Korean president as she was cobbling together South Korea’s new policy on the North.

TT-1 Pinto · 2 Gennaio 2013

Sorpresa ....

Sorpresa, la Corea del Nord chiede pace in tv ....

Fonte .... http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/esteri/sorpresa-corea-nord-chiede-pace-tv-frase-possibile-lavorare-870369.html

Andrea75 · 9 Gennaio 2013

... segnalo questo paper: North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf

North Korea has been among the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the official name for North Korea). Negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have consumed the past three U.S. administrations, even as some analysts anticipated a collapse of the isolated authoritarian regime. North Korea has been the recipient of well over $1 billion in U.S. aid and the target of dozens of U.S. sanctions.
This report provides background information on the negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program that began in the early 1990s under the Clinton Administration. As U.S. policy toward Pyongyang evolved through the George W. Bush and Obama presidencies, the negotiations moved from mostly bilateral to the multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States). Although the negotiations have reached some key agreements that lay out deals for aid and recognition to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization, major problems with implementation have persisted. With Six-Party Talks suspended since 2009, concern about proliferation to other actors has grown.
After Kim Jong-il’s sudden death in December 2011, it appears that his youngest son, Kim Jongun, has steadily consolidated his authority as supreme leader. Pyongyang had shown signs of reaching out in 2011 after a string of provocative acts in 2010, including an alleged torpedo attack on a South Korean warship and an artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, but has continued its pattern of alternating between overtures and provocations. Bilateral agreements with the United States in February 2012 involving the provision of aid and freezing of some nuclear activities fell apart after Pyongyang launched a rocket in April 2012. Confidence for further negotiations dimmed further after another, more successful, launch in December 2012.
The Obama Administration, like its predecessors, faces fundamental decisions on how to approach North Korea. To what degree should the United States attempt to isolate the regime diplomatically and financially? Should those efforts be balanced with engagement initiatives that continue to push for steps toward denuclearization, or for better human rights behavior? Should the United States adjust its approach in the post-Kim Jong-il era? Is China a reliable partner in efforts to pressure Pyongyang? Have the North’s nuclear and missile tests and attacks on South Korea demonstrated that regime change is the only way to peaceful resolution? How should the United States consider its alliance relationships with Japan and South Korea as it formulates its North Korea policy? Should the United States continue to offer humanitarian aid? Although the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea is the nuclear weapons program, there are a host of other issues, including Pyongyang’s missile program, illicit activities, and poor human rights record. Modest attempts at engaging North Korea, including joint operations to recover U.S. servicemen’s remains from the Korean War and some discussion about opening a U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang, remain suspended along with the nuclear negotiations.
This report will be updated periodically. (This report covers the overall U.S.-North Korea relationship, with an emphasis on the diplomacy of the Six-Party Talks. For information on the technical issues involved in North Korea’s weapons programs and delivery systems, as well as the steps involved in denuclearization, please see the companion piece to this report, CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin. Please refer to the list at the end of this report for CRS reports focusing on other North Korean issues.)

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