Alenia C-27J Spartan

[Enema_27]

Dove ?

magari... proprio a casa nostra! siamo stati per tutta la guerra fredda con i 104 a difesa dei nostri cieli, non ci vedrei nulla di peggio a rimanere con i Typoon fino al 2050.

[TT-1 Pinto]

Il Congresso interroga il CSM dell'USAF sull'affaire C-27J ....

 

Fonte: Aviationweek.com

 

Lawmakers Skewer USAF Over Budget Choices

 

By Jen DiMascio (Feb. 29, 2012)

 

Congress doesn’t read its witnesses Miranda rights before they testify, but past Pentagon statements were certainly used against Air Force leaders during a Feb. 28 hearing.

 

Given that the Air Force has rolled out a list of controversial cuts that gore oxen in congressional districts across the country for its fiscal 2013 budget request, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley and Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz had to expect some heat on Capitol Hill.

 

But in deciding to stop using Northrop Grumman’s Block 30 Global Hawk and the Alenia-made C-27J Spartan, the Air Force was reversing past positions and agreements. And that gave lawmakers plenty of ammunition to toss toward Donley and Schwartz.

 

Rep. Tom Rooney (R-Fla.) zeroed in on a letter written by Ashton Carter, the current deputy defense secretary, about six months ago. In that letter, Carter told the chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee that continuing the Global Hawk program was “essential” to national security and that there were no alternatives to the program.

 

Rooney says Congress has set aside $4 billion to be able to buy 21 Block 30 Global Hawks. “We’ve got 14 made, and now we have a decision to park this vehicle in a garage somewhere for God knows how long,” Rooney says, adding that is difficult for him to explain to his constituents. “What do I tell them?”

 

Schwartz responded that the Global Hawks would remain in “recoverable storage” and stressed that the Air Force is not talking about using the aircraft for spare parts. “We want to be able to have access to them and as circumstances change, perhaps there will be a time where they will come out of storage,” Schwartz says.

 

Through the course of the hearing, Schwartz explained that the situation has changed since six months ago. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reduced the demand for the Global Hawk’s persistent high-altitude surveillance. And in an environment where the Air Force is helping the Pentagon carve $487 billion out of its budget, ending the Global Hawk provides the Air Force with $2.5 billion over the next several years. “Not trivial,” he says.

 

Schwartz faced a similar line of questioning regarding the C-27J, an aircraft that the Air Force was buying to help support Army missions. The air chief acknowledged that buying the C-27J was a “personal commitment” from him to former Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey.

 

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.) pressed Schwartz on how the Air Force determined the C-27J is more expensive to operate than Lockheed Martin’s C-130 aircraft.

 

Schwartz said that basing and contractor logistics support helped affect the life-cycle cost of the aircraft. Plus, he took aim at one of the main arguments for buying the C-27J – that it can land on unimproved runways closer to the fight.

 

“There is not a single airfield in Afghanistan today that the C-27 is using that the C-130 cannot. That is the reality on the ground today,” Schwartz said.

 

Still, Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.), hinted that the Air Force may have a substantial public relations problem because the decision goes beyond halting the purchase of C-27Js. The Air Force may put them in storage.

 

“These are planes that are bought and paid for,” Courtney says. “It feels like a ‘60 Minutes’ moment in terms of the taxpayer.”

 

To that end, Schwartz says the Air Force could also sell them to other air forces around the world, and that other air forces are interested. “There’s a couple of options, which again haven’t played out and certainly that would happen in the next number of months,” Schwartz said.

 

But according to Courtney, Alenia North America, the manufacturer of the C-27J, isn’t very pleased “with us turning around and flipping the planes,” and members of Congress are still looking for answers.

 

“We’re struggling to understand why perfectly new planes are not being used,” he says.

 

"Miranda rights" .... http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miranda_warning ....

[TT-1 Pinto]

Andrea Nativi, insieme ad altri colleghi, fa il punto, sull'ultimo numero di "Aviation Week and Space Technology", sugli attuali difficili rapporti fra industria aerospaziale italiana e Pentagono ....

 

Begrudging Ally

 

Italians grow concerned over access, fairness of U.S. military market

 

Andy Nativi (Rome) - Michael Bruno (Washington) - With Jen DiMascio and Amy Butler in Washington

 

 

Italians are developing a grudge when it comes to Pentagon procurement, and it may come back to haunt the U.S. government.

 

The latest source of frustration is the U.S. Air Force’s proposal to mothball 21 C-27J Spartans now on contract with U.S. prime L-3 Communications and the aircraft’s maker, Finmeccanica’s Alenia Aermacchi unit. At least 13 C-27Js have been delivered, and the Air Force plans to continue production of the final eight—in various stages of construction in Italy—because it would cost more to terminate the contract.

 

Finmeccanica was eager to use the U.S. purchase as a catalyst for foreign sales elsewhere, but angst in Italy grew over the years as the original projection for hundreds of Spartans was officially whittled down to 78, then 38 and now 21. Worse yet, talk emerged in February of possibly selling the U.S. lot, even overseas, meaning that the Italian company could wind up competing with its own product for what is already considered a small market.

 

It all seemed too much for Alenia Aermacchi CEO Giuseppe Giordo, who reportedly said the company would not support the original U.S. C-27Js if sold abroad, although he reiterated later that Alenia would support new Spartans sold through U.S. foreign military sales such as those considered for Australia.

 

But even U.S. lawmakers are noting the ire of Alenia regarding the possibility of the Air Force selling C-27Js to other countries. The company is not very pleased “with us turning around and flipping the planes,” Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.) told the USAF chief of staff, Gen. Norton Schwartz, last week in congressional hearings.

 

Moreover, the C-27J imbroglio comes on top of ongoing squabbling over Lockheed Martin’s Medium Extended Air Defense System (Meads), which the U.S. has been developing with Italy and Germany, but which the U.S. has decided to drop after its current development phase ends next year. Some U.S. lawmakers want it outright canceled before then, with pressure put on Rome and Berlin to renegotiate the terms of what would be early termination fees. And all of it comes after the high-profile cancellation in mid-2009 of the U.S. VH-71 presidential helicopter, under which Lockheed Martin would have provided a variant of the AgustaWestland AW101, as well as continuing concerns in Rome over potentially rising prices for Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, in which Italy is a founding partner.

 

Altogether, there is a growing perception in Italy that trying to compete to win U.S. defense programs is a precarious and risky affair, even if total technological transfer is agreed to or local production is arranged in Italy. An industry official says: “If you win, then they will find a reason to cancel the program and buy a real U.S. product instead.”

 

Likewise, Italians believe there is a tendency in Washington to give up too easily on projects—such as the USAF Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP)—in which they were interested in competing. AgustaWestland, another Finmeccanica unit, had been planning to offer a version of its commercial AW139, but the CVLSP is being canceled under the fiscal 2013 budget request (AW&ST Feb. 20, p. 23).

 

As a procurement officer in Italy points out, “Yes, the U.S. is promoting free trade and an open arms market—in our market—while they are considering their own market as a private affair for U.S. players only. The only way to do business there is therefore to become ‘Americanized,’ but in many cases this proves impossible as well.”

 

While Italy may have firmed up its JSF commitment—albeit reducing the original 131 aircraft requirement to 90, with the first three F-35As slated for delivery in 2014—this, too, is just aggravating the sense of an “unfair access opportunity” for Italian aerospace and defense products promoted in the U.S. The government of Prime Minister Mario Monti confirmed the F-35 buy recently for both the Italian air force and navy, even as record fiscal pressures there have rocked the country.

 

The F-35 attracted heavy criticism in Italy because it is the most important and expensive procurement program of record and also because it apparently is not providing the desired amount of technology transfer or involvement by local industries. Indeed, Gen. Claudio Debertolis, secretary general of the Italian defense ministry and the country’s armaments chief, wrote the Pentagon at the end of 2011 signaling that industrial and technological issues were still unsatisfactory, and mentioned the risks that these unresolved issues could create.

 

After the U.S. and Britain, Italy is the third investor in the program. The defense ministry made a massive effort to support the F-35 in the Italian parliament, yet opposition lawmakers are not giving up; thus, pressure will remain on Rome from within and without.

 

[Tuccio14]

Una bella analisi che compendia un po' tutti i pesci in faccia che Washington ci ha rifilato negli ultimi anni in tema di procurement militare. Se li mettiamo insieme vediamo che sono un bel po': a partire da VH-71, MEADS, C-27J, KC-767 potremmo passare dal JSF e dal CVLSP per finire volendo al T-X... Certo solo i primi sono stati veramente dei brutti affari di certo, ma anche gli ultimi si preparano ad essere delle belle gatte da pelare, eccezion fatta per il JSF che fa caso a se.

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"Per un pugno di Spartan". Sembra un film. Vogliono buttare ai pesci i nostri aerei? Che lo facciano pure,ma ci devono coprire d'oro. Che razza di contratti andiamo a firmare? Possibile che non abbiamo delle clausole a favore?

[Tuccio14]

Secondo me il problema è che per un cliente come lo erano gli USA prima di questi ultimi anni si saranno fatti salti mortali pur di accaparrarsi i contratti, ora è questione di interpretazione delle clausole...

[TT-1 Pinto]

E la Guardia Costiera .... ci sta facendo un pensierino ....

 

Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp told lawmakers last week that he has talked with Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz about the feasibility of transferring C-27Js to the sea service.

Fonte .... http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/03/air-force-coast-guard-talk-c27j-deal-031112w/

 

Potrebbe essere una buona soluzione .... gli aerei rimarrebbero in servizio negli USA e, conseguentemente, non ce li troveremmo sul mercato a far concorrenza ....

Da notare che, anni orsono, la USCG scelse lo EADS CASA HC-144 "Ocean Sentry" (una speciale versione del CN-235) al posto del C-27J ....

 

Intanto continua il malumore della classe politica USA per la cancellazione del programma da parte dell' Air Force ....

 

Lawmakers on Capital Hill are making no secret about their heartburn over the Air Force’s recent decision to kill its new C-27J Spartan joint aircraft.

.... mentre il CSM dell' US Army ha speso parole lusinghiere circa l'impiego dell'aereo in Afghanistan ....

 

Odierno told lawmakers that the C-27J “impacted very positively” on 82nd Airborne Division’s ability to accomplish its mission by delivering supplies to remote location

Fonte .... http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/03/09/csa-praises-doomed-c-27js-role-in-afghanistan/

[TT-1 Pinto]

Come se non bastasse .... ora si scoprono gli altarini ....

 

Dalla contesa a tre fra USAF, ANG e US Army sulla cancellazione del Programma C-27J escono ora nuove informazioni che suscitano ombre fosche sull'intera faccenda ....

 

.... l'USAF avrebbe truccato i conti ....

 

A 37-page briefing by Ohio Air National Guard Capt. Dave Lohrer contends the Air Force has intentionally inflated the life-cycle costs of the C-27J in documents provided to Congress to help justify the service’s decision to cancel the program.

Fonte .... http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120312/DEFREG02/303120002/U-S-Air-Force-Air-Guard-Lock-Horns-Over-Cuts?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE

[Tuccio14]

Mamma mia, è più sporca del previsto... Secondo me sta volta hanno un po' esagerato...

 

Nel frattempo, se veramente la USCG se li prendesse, sarebbe il secondo ente a dover integrare il COSO con un cargo serio dopo le forze aeree messicane.

[gepiro66]

Come thriller non c'è proprio male.... "Il complotto dello Spartan".

Certo che l'Air Force quando deve perseguire uno scopo sembra avere meno scrupoli della CIA di certi film.

A questo punto la cosa migliore sarebbe che l'US Army mandasse a quel paese la "jointness" e si riprendesse il programma, perchè a loro il C-27 serve davvero, come servirebbe anche all'USAF, pur se non vuole ammetterlo.

[TT-1 Pinto]

Dopo le accuse .... la replica dell'USAF ....

 

The Air Force has not been able to explain the numbers in Lohrer’s briefing, Kevin Williams, deputy director of the Air Force’s studies and analyses, assessments and lessons learned directorate, said at a March 16 briefing at the Pentagon.

 

Williams speculated that Lohrer might have been using outdated data that threw off his computations.

Fonte .... http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120319/DEFREG02/303190004/USAF-We-Didn-8217-t-Inflate-C-27J-Costs?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE

[TT-1 Pinto]

Ed ora .... la curiosità bipartisan dei Senatori ....

 

Democrats and Republicans, primarily from states where Air National Guard units fly or are slated to fly the aircraft, questioned the Air Force’s rationale for scrapping the fleet of 21 purchased aircraft.

Fonte .... http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120320/DEFREG02/303200010/Senators-Tell-USAF-Prove-C-27-Cost-Claims?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE

 

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Meno male che da quelle parti fanno domande,e non nascondono la testa sotto la sabbia. Ricordo che parlavano molto bene dello Spartan non più tardi di un anno fa,strano che da un pó girino cifre su costi di esercizio esagerati.

[TT-1 Pinto]

Come prevedibile ....

 

.... il Canada, dopo una decennale serie di ripensamenti e giri di valzer, ricomincia a pensare al velivolo SAR e, guarda caso, si trova di fronte ad un'offerta talmente favorevole che potrebbe non rifiutare .... e non sarebbe la prima volta ....

 

http://goo.gl/E4PPW

 

 

[TT-1 Pinto]

Dal "Daily Report" dell' AFA - Tuesday April 24, 2012

 

 

The Ultimate Flexibility

 

While the Air Force leadership seeks to divest (1) the C-27J airlift fleet in Fiscal 2013, saying it cannot afford to keep these aircraft given tightening budgets, the tiny transports are earning high marks from operators in Afghanistan.

 

"While the US Air Force standard mission tasking process requires 96 hours of notice, the C-27J has been 'time on target' in less than 24 hours, while operating under Army tactical control," said Capt. Steffen Landrum, the 702nd Expeditionary Airlift Squadron's liaison officer to the Army's 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, in an Army news report posted on April 23.

 

Landrum added, "For the troops out in the field, that is the ultimate flexibility."

 

C-27Js have been operating (2) out of Kandahar Airfield since August 2011 as part of the 702nd EAS.

 

Based on Landrum's calculations, the Army has saved $30 million during this span by fulfilling some missions with C-27Js instead of CH-47 Chinook helicopters, and the Air Force has saved "more than $3.8 million" by not having to operate strictly C-130s in direct-support roles.

 

The C-27J is "by far the better choice for the last tactical mile," said Lt. Col. Jeffrey Charette, 702nd EAS director of operations.

 

House defense authorizers will mark up the Pentagon's Fiscal 2013 budget request later this week, potentially weighing in on the C-27J's fate.

 

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno has expressed interest (3) in retaining the 21 C-27s already in the fleet.

 

Further, the Coast Guard reportedly is also interested in acquiring the airframes.

 

(Kandahar report (4) by Richard Barker)

 

I links .....

 

(1) .... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2012/January%202012/January%2031%202012/SpartanDispositionNotClearYet.aspx

 

(2) .... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2011/August%202011/August%2008%202011/C-27JsBeginOperationsatKandahar.aspx

 

(3) .... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2012/February%202012/February%2022%202012/ArmyHopestoHoldontoC-27Js.aspx

 

(4) .... http://www.dvidshub.net/news/87153/closing-last-mile#.T5YdJu2f_wy%23ixzz1svOirYBw

[TT-1 Pinto]

Ulteriori informazioni ....

 

DoD Buzz .... http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/04/24/far-from-dc-battles-c-27-gets-glowing-reviews/

 

Defense News .... http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120423/DEFREG02/304230004/C-27J-End-Not-Official-Yet-USAF-Moves-Forward?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE

 

Defense News .... http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120423/DEFREG02/304230010/Pentagon-Offers-Budget-Compromise-Placate-States

 

Air Force Magazine .... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Features/organization/Pages/box042512cog.aspx

 

Guarda caso .... sarà il C-130 a vincere la partita ....

[TT-1 Pinto]

La Grecia annulla (ufficialmente) l'ordine per gli ultimi quattro C-27J .... però ....

 

http://www.difesa.it/Sala_Stampa/rassegna_stampa_online/Pagine/PdfNavigator.aspx?d=28-04-2012&pdfIndex=31

 

.... alla fine è sempre il nostro paese che ci rimette .... Francia e Germania, chissà perchè, NO ....

 

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Si stanno veramente dando la zappa sui piedi da soli. Lo Spartan vola bene, e fa risparmiare danaro al contribuente USA, vola a 2.000$/h contro i 9.000$ dello Chinook che va direttamente a sostituire.

 

Per me, ci sono giochi di poteri intestini all'USAF e alla US Army che da sempre si battibeccano sulle competenze.

 

Vai al Link, Stripes.com

 

[gepiro66]

 

Per me, ci sono giochi di poteri intestini all'USAF e alla US Army che da sempre si battibeccano sulle competenze.

 

 

Questo è evidente.

Il programma C-27J in America era nato su un requisito dell'Us Army per sostituire i vecchi e inadeguati C-23 Sherpa, con una previsione di acquisto di 78 esemplari.

Il programma è stato poi fuso con un requisito dell'Usaf diventando Joint Cargo Aircraft (con prospettive ventilate fino a 270 esemplari), passato sotto il controllo dell'Usaf, che lo ha in qualche modo scippato all'Us Army per poi subito dopo iniziare a strangolarlo con la giustificazione dei tagli.

Così si assiste alla schermagliia tra l'aviazione, che cerca di minimizzare l'utilità dello Spartan, e l'Army (per la verità in compagnia degli ufficiali Usaf direttamente coinvolti) che ne magnifica le qualità dimostrate sul campo, sia sotto l'aspetto operativo che logistico, con costi decisamente inferiori rispetto ai CH 47 e C-130.

Davanti a questo teatrino diviene fin troppo facile malignare sugli stretti rapporti tra Lockeed Martin e Usaf.

Modificato 30 Aprile 2012 da gepiro66

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Ben detto ghepiro!

[TT-1 Pinto]

Davanti a questo teatrino diviene fin troppo facile malignare sugli stretti rapporti tra Lockeed Martin e Usaf.

Perchè .... c'erano forse dei dubbi sulla 'corrispondenza d'amorosi sensi' che intercorre fra loro ?

[gepiro66]

Perchè .... c'erano forse dei dubbi sulla 'corrispondenza d'amorosi sensi' che intercorre fra loro ?

 

Assolutamente no, però che arrivassero a farla così sporca....

Del resto è chiaro che ci sia l'ombra di Sikorski dietro l'affaire VH-71.

[TT-1 Pinto]

.... Air Force leaders now see the small cargo hauler as “a luxury it cannot afford in this era of cost-cutting.”

 

If the Spartan is an unaffordable luxury at $2B, it does beg the question of the JSF’s affordability at $395B.

 

We can afford the expensive one but not the cheap one?

Fonte .... .... http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/04/27/why-to-cancel-a-pentagon-procurement-program/

[-{-Legolas-}-]

Arrivano 138 M$ per tenere i C-27J al loro posto. Il provvedimento si inserisce all'interno di una iniezione di 3 miliardi di dollari, che l' House Armed Services Committee (HASC) ha stabilito necessari per conservare una lunga serie di programmi del Pentagono.

[Flaggy]

Direi che si vuole rimediare ad alcune "follie" che avrebbero portato alla rinuncia a programmi e mezzi nuovi di pacca...e che aveva dato origine a pesanti e più che giustificate critiche.

Passare come risparmio intelligente la messa a terra dei C-27 per sostituirli con i C-130 e degli RQ-4 block 30 per sostituirli con gli U-2 è un tantino opinabile.