India

[Andrea75]

Qualche notizia dall'India:

 

India-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Meet: The Hype and the Substance

 

India-Pakistan foreign minister level talks, held recently in Islamabad (September 7-8, 2012) to review the bilateral process, were significant on two important counts. First, adoption of a long delayed liberalized visa regime which brought immense joy to many who were facing lot of inconvenience in securing visa on both the sides of the divide; second, the revival of the joint commission that will look into new avenues of cooperation other than the already identified eight issues on which there is secretary level talks.

 

India’s Defence Industry: Need for Urgent Decisions

 

India’s growth prospects are increasingly uncertain, says a respected commentator. This was no doubt said before the Government of India (GoI) announced its decision on FDI in retail and 49 per cent in aviation. But Indians are known to swing from pessimism to euphoria with just one GoI announcement that is unlikely to quickly and radically reverse the assessments of our economic experts. Another news report talks of the government’s decision to go slow on higher FDI in defence production because of the concerns of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).2 Presently, the cap on FDI in defence is 26 per cent. Inflation shows no signs of coming down and the budget deficit is unlikely to remain under the projected figure. What does all this mean for military modernisation?

In a comment in these columns last year, this author had suggested that India needed to entice Western defence majors by making small investments3 in four or five major producers of defence equipment so that they remained interested in the Indian economy. If anything, things are looking even bleaker now with the Rupee falling by nearly 25 per cent in recent months. This means that defence procurement might come under increasing strain and the current defence budget may also end up surrendering sizeable amounts if decisions on capital acquisitions are further delayed.

 

India and Tajikistan: Building a long-term Strategic Partnership

 

Tajikistan’s importance for India lies in its geo-strategic location; it shares borders with China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and is located in proximity to Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). In India’s regional security calculus, Tajikistan assumes a significant place, especially in the context of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The infiltration of extremist forces into Tajikistan can have serious security implications for India because of its proximity to PoK and the likely impact of this on the situation in Kashmir.

In addition to its strategic location, Tajikistan is rich in hydroelectric power. It has the largest natural water resources in the region. In fact, 90 per cent of the water resources of Central Asia lie in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan has more than 65 per cent of the glaciers in the region. It is second largest producer of hydroelectricity in the Commonwealth of Independent States, after Russia. The country’s hydroelectric potential, according to official figures, is about 40,000 MW, which is around four per cent of the world’s hydroelectric potential. According to the official report Tajikistan’s National Strategy for Energy Sector Development 2006-2015, the country is likely to reach a production of 35 billion Kwh in 2015. Tajikistan also has deposits of more than 40 semi-precious stones, gold and silver. There are large reserves of mercury, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony and tungsten, and uranium deposits. These resources make Tajikistan a significant country in the region that offers many opportunities to India.

[Andrea75]

Un corposo volume dedicato interamente all'India L’India e gli altri

[Andrea75]

Segnalo un paper sul deterrente nucleare indiano Indian nuclear forces, 2012. E' breve e di agevole lettura.

Modificato 3 Ottobre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

segnalo un articolo risalente al luglio scorso che riguarda un test dell'AGNI I fonte e AGNI I Ballistic Missile Successfully Launched

 

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India approves 1,5 bln Russian missile buy

 

The Indian government approved a $1.5-billion deal to buy 200 air-launched variants of the Russian-Indian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and 10,000 Russian-made Invar anti-tank missiles.

 

The Deccan Herald Indian daily reported the approval for the deal was made on Thursday. India’s Cabinet Committee on Security cleared a request from the Indian Air Force to buy the missiles which will be deployed on its Su-30MKI strike aircraft. The first test of the air-launched missile is due in December, the paper says.

 

The 10,000 Invar missiles for India’s T-90 tanks will be procured from a Russian manufacturer, but in the future 15,000 will be produced under license by India’s Bharat Technologies, the paper says.

 

Invar, a laser-guided weapon fired from the T-90’s barrel, is based on the Russian 9M119M missile (NATO AT-11 Sniper).

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New defence procurement procedure in early 2013

 

A top defence ministry (MoD) official on Thursday revealed the Defence Procurement Procedure of 2011 (DPP-2011), which governs the buying of military weapons and equipment, would be modified in early 2013.

“The Defence Procurement Policy is undergoing changes; and the 2013 edition of the DPP will come out early next year,” said Air Marshal M Matheswaran, deputy chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), addressing a KPMG-organised defence industry gathering in New Delhi.

He said the new DPP would liberalise defence procurement further. This conformed to industry expectations, as it has been the trend in successive modifications to the DPP in 2005, 2006, 2008 and the currently valid DPP-2011. Matheswaran urged private industry to focus less on the high value, high technology weapons platforms (eg, aircraft and tanks) on which the big defence money is spent. Instead, he suggested, private industry should emulate the automobile parts industry by setting up manufacturing units that were part of a global supply chain. These small units would form the backbone of a countrywide defence industrial base.

[Andrea75]

segnalo il paper India - Indie n. 3-4/2012

 

Per la prima volta proponiamo ai lettori un numero doppio di IndiaIndie, con il proposito di esplorare la natura delle sfide che l’India, insieme agli altri paesi BRICS (Brasile, Russia, Cina, Sudafrica), deve affrontare nell’attuale congiuntura di crisi economica mondiale. Si tratta di un tema di enorme portata, che intendiamo introdurre avvalendoci dell’autorevole contributo degli studiosi C.P. Chandrasekhar e Jayati Ghosh.

Nel primo saggio proposto, C.P. Chandrasekhar guida il lettore nella comprensione dello scenario di crisi che si sta attualmente profilando in India. Sfatando il mito di un’economia nazionale

‘scollegata’ dall’economia globale, l’autore invita a riflettere sulla crescente vulnerabilità dell’India a fronte del dispiegarsi di più ampie dinamiche di recessione, di rinnovate spirali inflazionistiche (in specie per quanto riguarda i prezzi del petrolio e dei beni alimentari), nonché dell’incedere della crisi finanziaria europea.

Nel saggio successivo, Jayati Ghosh propone un’articolata riflessione sul terreno delle politiche attraverso cui l’India, insieme agli altri paesi BRICS, potrebbe affrontare l’attuale difficile

congiuntura. Pur sottolineando le differenze talvolta profonde che esistono all’interno di questo raggruppamento di paesi, l’autrice individua altresì le potenzialità che potrebbero essere liberate attraverso un comune approccio ai temi dello sviluppo, capace di dare nuova centralità all’occupazione, alle politiche sociali e alla tutela dell’ambiente.

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper U.S.-India Military Engagement

 

The United States and India have begun to lay the foundation for a defense relationship that could decisively shape stability and security within the Indo-Pacific region. This formal engagement should continue at a pace that is, in modification of naval parlance, steady as they go.

 

At the same time, the challenge for both sides now is to focus on removing bureaucratic and policy obstacles in order to unlock the strategic value of this partnership. Doing so would help set the conditions for a secure environment so that the Indo-Pacific region can achieve its full potential as the economic, trade, and innovation engine for the 21st century.

 

 

e quest'altro Defense Reforms in India: Slow but Steady Progress

 

As an emerging power that the U.S. hopes to look upon as a net provider of security in the Indo-Pacific region, India’s national security decision-making apparatus needs to keep pace with its global ambitions. Despite modest progress in implementing defense reforms, many systemic weaknesses and structural shortcomings remain. In our latest Issue Perspective, Adjunct Fellow Brigadiar (Ret’d) Gurmeet Kanwal examines recent attempts to address some of these deficiencies including the Chandra Committee report.

[Andrea75]

India Tests Missile Interceptor

 

The Indian Army carried out a successful test on Friday of its Advanced Air Defense (AAD) anti-ballistic missile interceptor, IANS reported.

 

The AAD missile, fired from the Wheeler test range in the Bay of Bengal in Orissa state, hit a test target launched from India's Chandipur launch facility, also in Orissa. The army did not disclose what kind of rocket was intercepted.

 

Indian specialists are working on development of a national missile defense system, part of which will consist of interceptor missiles, India says.

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si fà seguito al post precedente Air Defence Interceptor Missile Successfully Destroys Ballistic Missile

 

The Interceptor Missile AAD launched by the Scientists of DRDO from Wheeler’s Island, Odisha successfully destroyed the incoming Ballistic Missile at an altitude of 15 Kms. The interception took place at 12.52hrs. The target missile, a modified version of Prithvi, mimicking the enemy’s ballistic missile, was launched from Launch Complex III, Chandipur. Long Range Radar and MFC Radar located far away could detect the Missile from take-off and tracked it through its entire path. The total trajectory of the incoming Missile was continuously estimated by the guidance computer and subsequently the AAD Missile was launched at an appropriate time to counter and kill the ballistic missile.

 

The Ring Laser Gyro based Navigation System in Target, Fibre Optic Gyro based INS in Interceptor, Onboard computers, Guidance systems, Actuation Systems and the critical RF Seekers used for the terminal phase have performed excellently. The AAD Missile system initially guided by Inertial Navigation system was continuously getting update of the target position by the Radar through a data link. The Radio Frequency (RF) seeker tracked the Missile & Onboard computer guided the Missile towards the Target Missile and hit the target. The Radio Proximity Fuse (RPF) exploded the warhead thereby destroying the target missile completely.

 

In this mission, a special feature of intercepting multiple target with multiple interceptor was demonstrated successfully. An electronic target with a range of 1500 Kms was launched and the Radars picked up the target missile, tracked the target missile subsequently & launched an electronic interceptor missile. This electronic interceptor missile destroyed the electronic target missile at an altitude of 120 Kms. All the four missiles were tracked by the Radars and all the guidance and launch computers operated in full operational mode for handling multiple targets with multiple interceptor. All the four missiles were in the sky simultaneously and both the interceptions took place near simultaneously. This has proved the capability of DRDO to handle multiple targets with multiple interceptors simultaneously. The complete Radar Systems, Communication Networks, Launch Computers, Target update Systems and state of the art Avionics have been completely proven in this Mission.

 

Dr VK Saraswat, SA to RM congratulated all the DRDO Scientists for this successful demonstration of the Air Defence capabilities. Distinguished Scientists and Chief Controllers of DRDO, Shri AvinashChander, Shri S.S. Sundaram, Shri Sundaresh, Director ITR Shri MVKV Prasad, & other top Scientists of DRDO were present. The whole operations were carried out under the guidance of Shri Adalat Ali, Programme Director ‘AD’.

 

Defence Minister Shri AK Antony lauded the DRDO Scientists for this spectacular achievement.

[Andrea75]

Failure Of India's Big Rocket Project Is Symbolic Of Deep Structural Problems

 

the successive failure of Indian GSLV missions, combined with India's stubborn secrecy and fierce independence in the space sector is giving rise to doubts about the scope of further future co-operations.

Although the failure of this signature launching vehicle is attributed to technical glitches, it is highly symbolic of the greater lack of clarity, purpose and direction in the Indian space program.

The Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) was originally intended to be India's signature launching vehicle, eventually to launch India's INSAT type satellites, and reduce dependence on foreign rockets.

In the early nineties, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, India was forced to develop independent launching vehicles. India originally tried to buy the technology to build a cryogenic upper stage from Russia, but was denied, under pressure from United States and other Western countries.

With the development of indigenous Cryogenic engine, India became the sixth country in the World to posses the technology, which could be potentially used for civilian and military purposes.

Indian GSLV generally uses L40 liquid strap on boosters and old Soviet KVD 1 upper stage. But even though Indian military and ballistic missile programs were successful, as recently evident with the successful launch of Agni V ICBM, its civilian rocket and space program were mediocre at best.

The Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), a launcher vehicle used previously to launch civilian satellites was used as a model of GSLV programs, but it was not successful. Multiple versions of GSLV were launched in the last decade, with more than half of them failing due to technical difficulties. A brief stint of success in 2003- 04 was followed by successive failures.

The vehicle failed to reach orbit, lost control of liquid fuel booster, veered of designated trajectory and had to be destroyed over the Bay of Bengal, or failed to deliver payload in the last four missions. With an unprecedented failure rate, GSLV is gradually on its way to be the costliest misadventure of Indian strategic and space sector. The eighth launch is scheduled in 2013.

The causes of these failures are minor, according to the official bureaucratic rhetoric, and were attributed to minor technical malfunctions. There was no clear response to queries as to why five out of seven launches have resulted in total or partial failure.

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is also secretive and tightlipped about capability and weight of the satellites and why India is still unsuccessful in launching communication satellites more than 3000 KG, 36 Transponder class, whereas the nearby competitors like Japan and China, not to mention USA, Russia and European Space Agency have already moved on to triple that size.

There is no clarity and accountability when it comes to tax payer's money spent on space research, and no heads roll even when there are repeated failures. The lack of purpose is also evident as India lacks fixed and dedicated plan in the Space sector.

In an interview earlier this year, Dr. K, Radhakrishnan, chairman of ISRO, stated that India's main concern and thrust is in the area of applications and not manned space flights and space stations, unlike Russia, US or China. India with its massive population and democratic set up needs more communication satellite to cater to domestic needs, unlike China which is heavily centralized and controlled.

However that argument and logic falls flat as India is already planning for its second lunar mission in early 2014, Chandrayaan 2, and possibly a manned space mission by 2017.

In January 2011, the U.S. officially removed export controls on several subsidiaries of India's Defense Research and Development Organization and the ISRO. It was a clear signal that the United States would like to chart a new future of space co-operation with India.

American think tank Heritage Foundation also published a report around same time, calling for enhanced space and missile defence co-operation between India, Australia and United States, including satellite defence and interceptors, theatre based missile defence and most importantly future co-operation and joint space programs. However there seems to be lukewarm response and enthusiasm from the Indian side.

India's notorious reliance on Russian hardware is also a major hindrance when it comes to further cooperation with the West. Only with the benefit of hindsight would we be able to determine the trajectory of India's space co-operation with the West, or whether it takes any specific direction, but at this present point of time, it is safe to assume, that without any clear plan, or white paper, India's current space prospects are quite grim, and will continue in the chaotic and headless way for the near foreseeable future.

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper che analizza i rapporti US India India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement

 

U.S.-India engagement on shared security interests is a topic of interest to the U.S. Congress, where there is considerable support for a deepened U.S. partnership with the world’s largest democracy. Congressional advocacy of closer relations with India is generally bipartisan and widespread; House and Senate caucuses on India and Indian-Americans are the largest of their kind. Caucus leaders have encouraged the Obama Administration to work toward improving the compatibility of the U.S. and Indian defense acquisitions systems, as well as to seek potential opportunities for co-development or co-production of military weapons systems with India. In a report accompanying the FY2012 Defense Authorization (S.Rept. 112-26), the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed its belief that a deepened strategic partnership with India will be critical to the promotion of core mutual national interests in the 21st century.

The United States and India have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” that incorporates numerous economic, security, and global initiatives. Defense cooperation between

the two countries remains in relatively early stages of development. However, over the past decade—and despite a concurrent U.S. engagement with Indian rival Pakistan and a Cold War history of bilateral estrangement—U.S.-India security cooperation has flourished. American diplomats now rate military links and defense trade among the most important aspects of

transformed bilateral relations in the 21st century. The United States views security cooperation with India in the context of common principles and shared national interests such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability. After initial uncertainty, under President Barack Obama, senior Pentagon officials assured New Delhi that the United States is fully committed to strengthening ties through the enhancement of the defense relationship made newly substantive under President George W. Bush.

Many analysts view increased U.S.-India security ties as providing a perceived “hedge” against or “counterbalance” to growing Chinese influence in Asia, although both Washington and New Delhi repeatedly downplay such motives. While a complete congruence of U.S. and Indian national security objectives is unlikely in the foreseeable future, meaningful convergences are identified in areas such as the emergence of a new balance-of-power arrangement in the region.

Still, indications remain that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian strategic planners are divergent on several key issues, perhaps especially on the role of Pakistan, as well as on India’s relations with Iran. Moreover, given a national foreign policy tradition of “nonalignment,” Indian leaders are averse to forming any “alliance” with the United States and

are clear in their intention to maintain India’s “strategic autonomy.” Questions remain about the ability of the Indian economy to grow at rates sufficient to improve its security capabilities at the pace sought in both Washington and New Delhi. Despite these factors, U.S. leaders only expect India’s importance to U.S. interests to grow steadily, and they foresee India taking on new security roles commensurate with its status as a major power and stakeholder in the international system. This expectation is a key aspect of the Obama Administration’s policy of “rebalancing” or “pivoting” toward the Asia-Pacific, which is conceived as including the Indian Ocean region.

[Andrea75]

Successful Flight Test of Agni-1

 

One of the Missile Units of Strategic Forces Command (SFC) fired the long range Agni-1 missile from the range facility at Wheelers Island, off the Odisha coast today. The trajectory of the missile which was tracked by a battery of sophisticated radars, observation stations and Naval Ships, fully met the tasked technical parameters

 

The DRDO developed medium range ballistic missile from the production lot was launched as part of regular training exercise by the armed forces from the range located at Wheeler Island. The Agni missile is equipped with advanced high accuracy navigation system and guided by an innovative guidance system. The improved Circular Error of Probability (CEP) achieved is a testimony to the efficacy of this missile system.

 

An SFC spokesman said, “Such launches, as part of our training schedule, fully validates the crew’s operational readiness to undertake launches in diverse operational conditions, as also the reliability factor of our missile systems developed indigenously”.

 

The launch was witnessed by Dr. Vijay Kumar Saraswat, SA to RM, DG DRDO & Secretary, Dept of Defence R&D, Shri Avinash Chander, Distinguished Scientist, Program Director Agni & Chief controller (Missiles and Strategic Systems), DR V G Sekhran, Director ASL and top brass of the Strategic Forces Command.

 

Dr. Saraswat congratulated the Armed Forces and all the DRDO personnel for the successful flight test.

[Andrea75]

Prithvi-II Missile Successfully Test-Fired

 

Army’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) successfully test-fired the Prithvi-II missile from the DRDO range facility at Chandipur off the Odisha coast today. The entire trajectory of the missile was tracked by a battery of sophisticated radars, telemetry observation stations, electro-optic instruments and naval ships.

 

The Prithvi-II missile is equipped with advanced high accuracy navigation system and guided by an innovative guidance scheme. The improved Circular Error Probability (CEP) achieved is a testimony to the efficacy of this missile system.

 

An SFC spokesman said, “the flight conveys our preparedness to meet any eventuality”; The mission “fully validated our operational readiness”. With this launch the Army’s Strategic Forces Command has successfully carried out in operational conditions launches of all the variants of Prithvi and Agni missiles.

[Andrea75]

... segnalo questo paper "Cina e India. Budget per la Difesa e principali programmi" http://www.cesi-italia.org/images/Cina_India_-_Budget_Difesa.pdf

 

 

I maggiori programmi delle Forze Armate indiane
Anche a fronte delle varie problematiche sopracitate, l’India è impegnata in un processo di modernizzazione delle proprie Forze Armate, che coinvolge maggiormente la Marina, ed in seconda istanza l’Aeronautica, mentre gli sforzi compiuti per migliorare il proprio Esercito non sembrano essere al pari degli altri due ambiti. Della spesa totale per quanto riguarda la componente “esercizio + investimento”, oltre il 60% del capitale è destinato al pagamento di rate di accordi già conclusi, mente il 29% è utilizzato per la conclusione di nuovi accordi. In particolar modo, la Marina assorbe ben oltre il 72% del bilancio ad essa destinato in programmi di ammodernamento, testimoniando la volontà del Paese di procedere all’assunzione di un ruolo di primo piano nella regione del Pacifico. Nonostante la modernizzazione del comparto Difesa del Paese, in una prospettiva di lungo periodo, riguardi maggiormente la Marina, il bilancio del 2012 ha assegnato una maggiore quota di risorse all’Aeronautica, per sopperire ai bisogni della competizione per il nuovo fighter MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft), competizione nella quale è risultato vincente il velivolo francese Dassault Rafale.
Un’ultima considerazione, infine, riguarda l’Esercito. I pochi sforzi effettuati dall’India in direzione di una modernizzazione dell’Esercito lasciano ipotizzare che il Paese abbia già optato per lo sviluppo di un proprio ruolo nella regione, ovverosia nell’implementazione delle proprie capacità gestibili in autonomia, in linea con il livello di ambizione del Paese, ed abbia quindi molto meno interesse verso l’approfondimento di capacità da esprimere in altri contesti, quali ad esempio le missioni internazionali.
Per quanto riguarda l’Esercito, i programmi maggiori riguardano la produzione indigena di un sistema di comunicazione tattico (TCS), l’acquisizione di 133 elicotteri leggeri destinati all’Army Aviation Corps, la costruzione di un nuovo IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) ed un generale programma di ammodernamento dell’artiglieria in dotazione.

● Il programma TCS prevede lo sviluppo nazionale di un sistema di comunicazione tattico, con un investimento pari a circa 1,54 miliardi di euro, che saranno finanziati all’80% dal Governo e al 20% dalle industrie selezionate. Le aziende selezionate sono la statale Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), associata a un consorzio privato formato da Larsen & Toubro (L&T), come prime contractor, e Tata Power SED e HCL Infosystems Limited, come sub contractor.
● Per quanto riguarda l’Aviazione dell’Esercito, i piani di New Delhi prevedono l’acquisto di 197 elicotteri light utility in sostituzione dei vetusti Chetak e Cheetah in dotazione, per un contratto dal valore di 577,37 milioni di euro. La competizione, più volte cancellata e ripresa, ha visto l’esclusione degli AW109 promossi dalla Agusta Westland, con il risultato di lasciare in gara l’AS550 della Eurocopter e il Ka-226 della Kamov. Il processo selettivo prevede che il vincitore dovrà fornire 60 nuovi elicotteri in condizioni di volo, mentre i restanti 137 verranno prodotti sotto licenza dall’azienda indiana Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Inoltre, le condizioni per le compensazioni
industriali riguardano offset di tipo diretto pari al 30% del valore dell’accordo. Qualora il contratto dovesse essere finalizzato, è previsto di aumentare la fornitura di un numero imprecisato di ulteriori elicotteri, probabilmente pari a circa 60 unità, da assegnare in dotazione alla IAF (Indian Air Force).
Nonostante lo stato di avanzamento della competizione, non è ancora chiaro se questa sarà portata a termine. Alcune dichiarazioni degli ultimi mesi, infatti, fanno pensare che il Governo indiano potrebbe sospendere la competizione e assegnare arbitrariamente la commessa alla HAL, che sta sviluppando il proprio modello di elicottero HAL Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) basato sul modello dell’elicottero multiruolo HAL Dhruv.

● Il programma relativo al nuovo veicolo da combattimento della fanteria nasce dal bisogno di sostituire i vetusti BMP-2 in dotazione e prevede lo sviluppo di circa 2600 IFV Abhay. Il progetto, gestito dalla Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) nei cantieri di Avadi (Heavy Vehicles Factory), è iniziato negli Anni ’90 e sarebbe dovuto essere ultimato nel 2001, ma ha scontato anni di ritardo dovuti in particolar modo alle sanzioni statunitensi per i test nucleari indiani del 1998 (Pokhran-II). Di conseguenza, il programma ha accumulato diversi anni di ritardi, e il mezzo risulta ancora in fase di sviluppo.

● L’artiglieria indiana risulta essere soprattutto di produzione estera, in particolare risalente all’epoca sovietica. Pertanto, un ambito di approfondimento delle capacità dell’Esercito riguarda proprio la modernizzazione dell’artiglieria in dotazione, tramite un programma che prevede l'acquisto di 400 artiglierie semoventi da 155mm e 100 obici semoventi da 155mm, mentre è stato da poco soddisfatto il requisito per 145 obici ultraleggeri da 155mm, per il quale è stato selezionato l’M777 statunitense per un contratto dal valore di 508,09 milioni di euro. I principali competitor per le altre due competizioni in corso sono la BAE Systems Bofors, l’israeliana Soltam e la sudafricana Denel. Anche in questo caso, tuttavia, nel corso della competizione sono state riscontrate diverse irregolarità, sia da parte delle aziende estere, accusate dal Governo di aver tentato di corrompere i responsabili del processo selettivo, sia delle stesse istituzioni indiane. Tali problematiche hanno determinato la ripetuta chiusura e riapertura di una competizione dal valore di circa 1,54 miliardi di euro, con tutte le conseguenze economiche che ne derivano, e portato allo stremo il bisogno di sostituzione
dell’artiglieria indiana.

 

La Marina è, come ricordato, la Forza Armata che maggiormente sta canalizzando gli sforzi di modernizzazione di lungo periodo del comparto Difesa indiano. Il Paese è per tradizione ed ambizione proiettato verso l’assunzione di un ruolo predominante nell’Oceano Indiano, per il quale transitano gran parte delle rotte commerciali mondiali. I maggiori programmi, dunque, riguardano l’implementazione delle capacità di Marina d’Altura (Blue Navy), con l’acquisto pianificato di fregate missilistiche, sottomarini convenzionali e nucleari, cacciatorpedinieri e, soprattutto, il programma per l’acquisizione di tre portaerei. In merito, va ricordato che dal 1987 la Marina opera una portaerei leggera, la INS Viraat, una classe Centaur, ex-Royal Navy, che potrebbe rimanere in servizio sino al 2020.

● Il programma delle portaerei riguarda la produzione nazionale di due unità di portaerei classe Vikrant da parte dell’azienda indiana Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL), e l’acquisto dalla Russia di una terza unità. Il progetto di sviluppo nazionale riguarda la INS Vikrant, portaerei da 40.000 tonnellate in configurazione STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery), capace di impiegare 20 caccia HAL Tejas Mark 2 o Mikoyan MiG- 29K ed elicotteri Kamov Ka-31 e Westland WS-61 Sea King, e la INS Vishal,
portaerei CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) da 65.000 tonnellate, con possibile impiego di caccia indigeni (HAL Tejas) o esteri (PAKFA o Rafale M). Anche in questo caso, il programma, annunciato per la prima volta nel 1989, ha visto importanti ritardi, con il risultato che la prima portaerei dovrebbe entrare in servizio entro il 2020, mentre la seconda a partire dal 2021.
Anche per quanto riguarda la portaerei che dovrà essere fornita dalla Russia, si sono riscontrati numerosi ritardi nei tempi di consegna. L’accordo, siglato nel 1994, ha previsto un pagamento da parte dell’India di 615,86 milioni di euro per il refit della portaerei di fabbricazione sovietica Admiral Gorshkov, entrata in servizio nel 1987, oltre ad 769,82 milioni di euro per l’acquisto dei nuovi sistemi da impiegare a bordo e della componente ad ala fissa e rotante, tra cui 12 MiG-29K Fulcrum-D, quattro MiG-29KUB e sei elicotteri Kamov Ka-31 Helix. La consegna della nuova portaerei, denominata INS Vikramaditya, era inizialmente prevista per il 2008, ma numerosi ritardi ed un considerevole aumento dei costi, stimati attorno 2,62 miliardi di euro, hanno fatto sì che la nuova portaerei non sarà consegnata prima del 2013.
● L’azienda indiana Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) di Kolkata è impegnata nello sviluppo di quattro corvette nell’ambito del Project 28-4 Anti-Submarine Corvette iniziato nel 2005 sotto la supervisione del Navy's Directorate of Indigenisation. Tale programma ha accumulato due anni di ritardo nelle consegne, inizialmente previste a partire dal 2010, ed un aumento dei costi, dai 392,61 milioni di euro previsti a circa 846,80 milioni di euro.

● Per quanto riguarda i sottomarini, l’India è impegnata nello sviluppo di capacità sia convenzionali sia nucleari. Il programma dei nuovi sottomarini convenzionali riguarda l’acquisto dalla Francia di sei unità di sottomarini a propulsione diesel/elettrica/AIP classe Scorpène, per un valore dell’accordo pari a circa 3,08 miliardi di euro. Le nuove unità saranno assemblate nel cantiere navale indiano Mazagaon Dock Limited di Mumbai, e la prima unità dovrebbe entrare in servizio nel 2015.
Nell’ambito del progetto denominato Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), inoltre, l’azienda indiana Hindustan Shipyard Limited sta procedendo inoltre allo sviluppo di sottomarini a propulsione nucleare, di cui uno è già stato completato e quattro sono in fase di sviluppo. I nuovi sottomarini classe Arihant, che fanno seguito alla precedente dotazione indiana del sottomarino SSN russo classe Charlie, in leasing fino al 2011, costeranno circa 2,31 miliardi di euro e la prima unità entrerà in servizio nei primi mesi del 2013.

● Nell’ambito del Progetto 15B, sono attualmente in costruzione quattro ulteriori unità di cacciatorpedinieri lanciamissili classe Kolkata oltre alle tre già in dotazione, per un costo totale di circa 1,20 miliardi di euro. Il progetto è basato sul disegno dei cacciatorpedinieri classe Delhi, con l’implementazione delle caratteristiche stealth tramite l’installazione di un Flush Deck (ponte senza sovrastruttura).

● Nell’ambito del Progetto 17A, l’India prevede di costruire ulteriori sette unità di fregate stealth classe Shivalik di derivazione russa oltre alle tre già in dotazione, per un costo totale di 6,16 miliardi di euro del programma. I lavori, iniziati nel 2011, sono portati avanti nei cantieri di Mazagaon Dock Limited e di Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers, con la collaborazione di molte aziende estere.

● Un ulteriore programma riguardante la Marina è quello relativo alla sostituzione dei 29 Westland Sea King Mk.42 e dei sei Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King in dotazione. La competizione, già aperta e chiusa in passato senza arrivare ad un risultato, è stata indetta nuovamente nel 2011. Attualmente risultano in gara il consorzio NHIndustries con l’elicottero NH90, la Sikorsky con l’SH-60R ed Eurocopter con l’EC-725. L’Aeronautica indiana è, dopo la Marina, la maggiore destinataria dei fondi
indiani per la Difesa. Il Paese, infatti, deve ampliare la propria dotazione di caccia, per fare fronte a vari tipi di minacce che potrebbero provenire dai suoi principali
rivali, la Cina e il Pakistan. In particolar modo, il raffronto con la prima, dotata di circa 1600 caccia, risulta particolarmente sfavorevole per l’India, la cui dotazione di
600 caccia, tra cui molti velivoli obsoleti e risalenti alla Guerra Fredda, non risulta sufficiente per poter bilanciare l’assoluta preponderanza cinese. Le linee di volo,
inoltre, comprendono varie tipologie di piattaforme, con tutte le criticità che ne possono derivare dal punto di vista dell’uniformazione della logistica e dell’addestramento del personale e dei piloti.

● La maggiore competizione in termini di acquisizioni di armamenti che ha riguardato l’India negli ultimi anni è stata quella relativa alla selezione del nuovo caccia intercettore/multiruolo della IAF (Indian Air Force), dal valore di circa 20 miliardi di euro per 126 apparecchi. L’esito della gara ha visto la selezione del velivolo francese Rafale della Dassault, annunciata a gennaio 2012. Ad oltre 10 mesi dall’annuncio della selezione, tuttavia, non è ancora stato firmato alcun accordo, e ciò lascia ipotizzare che, a seguito di una competizione già di per sé caratterizzata da notevoli ritardi, anche la fornitura subirà un considerevole rinvio nel tempo, con tutte le conseguenze che ne possono derivare per l’efficienza operativa della IAF e riguardo ai propositi di colmare il gap con la Cina. Un ulteriore problema per il programma di acquisizione potrebbe derivare dal fatto che i primi 18 velivoli dovranno essere consegnati “pronti” (off-the-shelf) dalla Francia, mentre i successivi 108 saranno costruiti in loco dalla HAL. La catena di produzione del Rafale, infatti, non ha capacità di produrre un numero considerevole di apparecchi l’anno, a causa del fatto che per diversi anni il caccia non ha trovato sbocchi sul mercato estero. Pertanto, la fornitura dei primi 18 apparecchi dovrebbe essere completata non prima di due/tre anni dalla firma dell’accordo, che ancora, per diversi motivi, tarda a concretizzarsi.

● A metà 2012, nell’ambito del processo di selezione di un addestratore basico, la IAF ha comunicato di aver scelto il Pilatus PC-7 Basic Trainer Aircraft, con un contratto dal valore di 523 milioni di euro relativo a 75 apparecchi. Di questi, 12 dovranno essere consegnati a partire da dicembre 2012 ed entro due anni dalla firma del contratto. Inoltre, l’accordo prevede la possibilità di un’ulteriore fornitura, pari a 106 addestratori, da produrre in loco sotto licenza da parte della Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).
● Il programma di ammodernamento della componente elicotteri leggeri riguarda la futura acquisizione di 60/70 apparecchi, nell’ambito della competizione per il nuovo Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) gestita insieme all’Esercito, e che attualmente vede in gara la Eurocopter con l’AS550 e la Kamov con il Ka-226. Come già accennato, è possibile che il Governo indiano decida di sospendere tale competizione per favorire l’azienda nazionale HAL. Ciò sarà possibile solo se la HAL riuscirà a trovare partner internazionali capaci di fornire all’azienda di Bangalore l’expertise necessario alla produzione del nuovo elicottero.

● Nel budget 2012 rientra anche il pagamento per le ulteriori sei unità di C-130J Super Hercules acquistate a fine 2011, oltre alle sei già in dotazione, per un accordo dal valore di 923,79 milioni di euro, e per i dieci C-17 Globemaster III, comprati dall’India a giugno 2011 per un valore di 3,16 miliardi di euro. Entrambi gli accordi saranno finanziati dal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) statunitense.

[Andrea75]

... apre una fabbrica di elicotteri http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/141332/russian-helicopter-plant-to-open-in-india.html

 

 

During the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India, Russian Helicopters, a subsidiary of Oboronprom, part of Russian Technologies State Corporation, and Elcom Systems Private Limited, part of the Indian investment conglomerate SUN Group, signed in New Delhi an agreement to set up in India a modern industrial facility for manufacturing of Russian helicopter models, namely helicopters of the Ka- and Mi- brands.

The joint venture will have the capacity to produce key helicopter units and carry out final assembly of the machines as well as engage in ground and flight testing. It is expected that the enterprise will start with production of components for the multirole Ka-226T helicopter. The enterprise will serve as an industrial base for hi-tech Russian rotorcraft products in India.

"India is a traditional partner of Russian Helicopters in terms of helicopter deliveries. The creation of a joint Russian-Indian enterprise marks a new stage and also a logical continuation of our joint efforts in light of the growing demand for Russian helicopter models," said Dmitry Petrov, CEO of Russian Helicopters.

According to Petrov, the joint venture will help drive the development of India's aerospace industry and provide for effective application of advanced Russian technologies. It will also make it possible to organize the training of Indian engineers and promote the development of highly qualified personnel across the entire production chain.

Moreover, the enterprise will be eligible to implement offset projects under various procurement tenders in India where Russian rotorcraft are involved. The holding company and Elcom Systems also reached an agreement on plans to create a joint Helicopter Academy in India for the training of flight and technical personnel.

Vladimir Putin's visit to India resulted in the signing of a set of documents aimed at strengthening military-technical cooperation between Russia and India, including in helicopter manufacturing. India is a traditional buyer of Russia aircraft and presently has a fleet of 280 Russian-made helicopters.

 

[Andrea75]

... secondo questo articolo, in prospettiva (dal punto di vista delle portaerei), l'India sarebbe avvantaggiata rispetto alla Cina http://cimsec.org/carriers-of-the-indo-pacific-maritime-great-game/ Carriers of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game

 

 

Nothing has been as over-hyped since August 2011 as China’s aircraft carrier program. After the former Soviet carrier Varyag, fully refurbished by the Chinese and renamed Liaoning, took its first “test drive”, thousands of blog posts, press pieces, and scholarly articles argued about possible regional and global implications. Is this single ship a regional or even global threat? What about the balance in the East and South China Seas?

Stay calm, people. After a few tests, China’s Navy – the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – has shown it is in fact still years away from having an operational aircraft carrier, let alone integrated carrier strike group.

Moreover, if a navy wants to have a single operationally available aircraft carrier at any one time, it needs at least two, and better still three carriers in rotation: the one in operational status, one in the shipyard, and one in training and work-ups. According to these numbers, it is unlikely that the PLAN will be able to sustain a “blue water” carrier presence before 2020 based on projected shipbuilding schedules.

Even the first flights of a J-15 Shark from Liaoning’s deck were more PR event than step towards a credible carrier force. It’s one thing to launch a single fighter under controlled and planned conditions. Conducting dozens of flight movements per hour in wartime requires a significant increase in capabilities and training. To reach this, China must still walk a long road.

 

Eye on India

 

However, while most observers were busy with Liaoning, Asia’s only operational aircraft carrier, India’s INS Viraat, has largely been left out of the discussion (sorry, Thailand, but your never-operating carrier is not a serious asset). The first reason why India’s carrier must be taken more seriously than China: operational experience. India has been operating its current carrier since 1987 (the now-decommissioned INS Vikrant began service in 1961), and already has in place the necessary supply chains and logistics that the PLAN lacks. China’s maritime “Long March” could take longer than Mao’s to gain all the experience India already has. And while both China and India could turn to Russia for potential assistance, only the latter would likely receive carrier support – whether logistics or training – from the U.S., France, or the U.K.

 

Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Indian commanders already conduct serious exercises with their helicopter and fighter pilots integrated with their carrier crews. China, due to the lack of capacity (i.e. a carrier at sea) has not yet started the most crucial parts of its carrier training. Russian experts warn it may take the Chinese another decade to learn how to “efficiently” run carrier operations. Meanwhile, India’s next carrier INS Vikramaditya (former Soviet Admiral Gorshkov), due the benefits of Russian support, is already training in Arctic waters and is expected despite delays to enter service in late 2013 or 2014. The indigenously built INS Vikrant is slated to be commissioned in 2015. In consequence, whenever the PLAN’s first carrier is operational, India will have at least two well-trained counterparts (Viraat is set to decommission in 2020). Furthermore, India will generally be able to maintain one operational carrier off-shore while China, at least initially, will not.

New Delhi and The Three Carrier Big Boys

Beside Russian support – generous, but not free – India participates in joint exercises with the navies of the other two “Carrier Big Boys,” the U.S. and France. The PLAN is far from such trials and, beyond search and rescue (SAR), these navies by policy will not conduct full-scale combat training with a Chinese carrier, their possible future foe.

For instance, in April 2012, the U.S. and India conducted the 15th joint naval Exercise Malabar; which also included warships from Australia, Japan, and Singapore. Training with the U.S. means that India has the opportunity to look at and, thereby, learn from the skills of the world’s best carrier-operating navy. However, Indians pilots have not yet been reported taking off from U.S. carriers. Also unprecedented but not improbable, India’s carrier officers, pilots, and crews could hone their skills training side-by-side with the world’s best counterparts. This is something Chinese sailors are probably never going to experience. China’s fighter pilots had to travel to Brazil for portions of their carrier flight training.

Moreover, the U.S. is joined by France in using their carriers as political means of improving strategic ties with India. In 2011 the French Navy sent its carrier Charles de Gaulle, accompanied by surface vessels and a nuclear sub, to India for a joint exercise. Of course, this was also an advertisement for the French carrier-capable Rafale fighter, which India has since purchased. Operating combat-proven (Libya), NATO-interoperable fighters from carriers is surely a positive. Meanwhile, the competition is mostly working with slight improvements on copied Soviet and Russian designs. While China is developing a flat-top capable stealth fighter (the J-31), it will take years before it reaches full operational capabilities and production. In response to the threat of a Chinese carrier with J-31s, India could opt for the F-35C or a carrier-capable version of the Russian T-50 PAK FA. The U.S. and Russia would probably sell everything to New Delhi to keep a resurgent India in their camp.

Given all these advantages there can be no doubt that India’s already operating carriers deserve much higher esteem than China’s refurbished test-object in Dalian shipyard. However, it’s time to put the carriers into the geo-strategic context.

India’s Lasting Geo-strategic Advantage

For all its current carrier edge over China, India will not become a U.S.-like carrier superpower; but nor does it need to. Look at the Indian Ocean on the map and you’ll see the world’s most important sea-lanes running in front of the Indian military’s ports and air bases. Some of the most critical geostrategic hotspots and maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait, and the Gulf of Aden are nearby. For example, from its Andaman and Nikobar bases, India could easily block the northern entry of the Malacca Strait in the event of conflict.

By comparison, the PLAN has natural access only to the Malacca Strait, and to reach it must traverse the South China Sea, which can easily be filled with the subs and vessels of neighboring nations’ and the U.S. Navy. Thus, due to geography, the PLAN would have a far more difficult time exerting control on, or re-opening, access to the chokepoint than the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy would have a good deal easier job of accessing the South China Sea than the PLAN the Indian Ocean. Additionally, India has no “island chains” from which opposing forces can launch strikes, and therefore does not need to concentrate on Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) and instead can focus on freedom of action.

 

The Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game

Finally, in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game – how I like to describe what is going to happen in the map at top over the next 50 years – the better cards are in India’s hand.

As mentioned, India has the geographic edge. New Delhi’s maritime lifelines cannot easily be blocked. And, if someone tried, India’s carriers, surface vessels, subs, and air bases are within striking distance of the chokepoints. Furthermore, India has the better demography, with a younger (average) population base than China’s, which is “getting older before it gets rich.” This is important, because the Achilles Heel of the PLAN’s carrier program is the development of the Chinese population. Changes in society and government could reverse Beijing’s decisions in the carrier case. In 2060, India is expected to be the third or second largest economy in the world. Hence, it will have the money and the technology to sustain its number of carriers at an even higher rate than present.

With this in mind, whoever worries in the U.S. or Europe about these Chinese carriers, which could patrol the Indian Ocean’s SLOCs, should remember that India will be there too. So will other countries, like Australia. It’s time to recognize that of the two Indo-Pacific neighbors only one can as yet legitimately claim to be a global maritime power.

Besides, it won’t all come down to naval power in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game. Of course, as the U.S. military recognizes, it must incorporate Air-Sea, but Space and Cyber must play integral roles too. Remember, all ships and fighters are worth nothing without satellite communications and a working cyber infrastructure. Therefore, wordy though it is, an Air-Sea-Space-Cyber-Battle is the way ahead (or perhaps Air-Sea+?); perhaps not only for the U.S., but for those developing their influence in the Indo-Pacific too.

 

[Andrea75]

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/141538/india-tests-ship_launched-brahmos-missile.html

 

India Tests Sea-Based Brahmos Missile

 

NEW DELHI --- The Indian Navy successfully tested on Wednesday a highly-maneuverable version of a sea-based Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, an Indian defense source told RIA Novosti.
The missile was fired from an unspecified warship off the coast of Vishakhapatnam in Bay of Bengal in a 34th test by the Indian military.
The source said the missile made a “double-maneuver in S-form” and hit the designated target ship just one meter above the waterline, “ripping through the ship’s hull.”
India has recently updated BrahMos missiles by installing the advanced satellite navigation systems from Russia's Kh-555 and Kh-101 strategic long-range cruise missiles, adding GPS-GLONASS technology to the existing doppler-inertial platform.
“After acquiring the target, the missile flies toward it with high precision, constantly receiving updated coordinates from a satellite navigation system,” the source said.
The BrahMos missile has a range of 290 km (180 miles) and can carry a conventional warhead of up to 300 kg (660 lbs). It can effectively engage targets from an altitude as low as 10 meters (30 feet) and has a top speed of Mach 2.8, which is about three times faster than the U.S.-made subsonic Tomahawk cruise missile.
BrahMos is based on the Russian-designed 3M55 Yakhont (SS-N-26) missile. Sea- and ground-launched versions of the missile have been put into service with the Indian Army and Navy. The flight tests of the airborne version were expected to be completed by the end of 2012.
The Indian Air Force is planning to arm 40 Su-30MKI Flanker-H fighters with BrahMos missiles.
Russia and India recently agreed to develop hypersonic BrahMos 2 missile capable of flying at speeds of Mach 5-Mach 7.

 

 

http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20100715/159821982.html

 

[TT-1 Pinto]

A piccoli passi verso l'autarchia ....

 

New Indian Defense Policy Favors Domestic Sourcing ....

 

India’s defense ministry has unveiled a new set of rules aimed at boosting the country’s indigenous defense industry by making procurement from foreign vendors only a last option.

The Defense Acquisition Council (DAC), the top decision-making body of India’s defense ministry, has cleared amendments to the Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP) to give priority to domestic public and private sector firms for major military procurements, thus reducing the country’s dependence on imports.

 

Fonte .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_04_22_2013_p0-571769.xml

 

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