Libia - Discussione Ufficiale

[Andrea75]

Nuovo inviato USA New U.S. envoy to Libya pledges support

 

The U.S. envoy sent to Tripoli following the death of the American ambassador in an attack last month said on Monday the United States remained committed to supporting Libya.

 

Veteran diplomat Lawrence Pope said in his first comments since arriving in Libya last week that the United States would "continue on the path" of ambassador Christopher Stevens, who along with three other Americans was killed in what the United States has called a "terrorist" attack in Benghazi on September 11.

 

The incident has triggered a debate in Washington over whether the ambassador, and the U.S. mission in Benghazi more broadly, were given sufficient protection.

 

"The United States remains deeply committed to supporting the aspirations of the Libyan people as they build a sovereign, stable and economically prosperous nation," Pope said after talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Abdulaziz.

[Andrea75]

Una primavera neocoloniale e i misteri attorno alla morte di Gheddafi

 

Dopo la guerra civile e la morte di Gheddafi, il mondo occidentale che tanto ha contribuito al regime change ha abbandonato il paese. O meglio, il paese ma non le sue raffinerie. In un’intervista al Daily Telegraph, Rami el Obeidi – ex responsabile per i rapporti con le agenzie di informazioni straniere per conto del Consiglio Nazionale Transitorio – dà la sua versione dei fatti. L’ex capo dell’intelligence che rovesciò il vecchio regime ha dichiarato che le spie francesi riuscirono a localizzare il rais grazie al governo siriano, che fornì loro il numero di telefono satellitare di Gheddafi. Il presidente Bashar al-Assad avrebbe venduto il suo compagno tiranno allo scopo di “auto-conservarsi” strappando la promessa di un allentamento della pressione francese su Damasco.

 

La medesima versione è stata data dallo steso Obeidi al Corriere della Sera: “Allora si riteneva che Gheddafi fosse fuggito nel deserto e verso il confine meridionale della Libia assieme ad un manipolo di seguaci con l’intenzione di riorganizzare la resistenza […]. In realtà Gheddafi trovò rifugio nella città lealista di Sirte. Qui il Rais cercò di comunicare tramite il suo satellitare Iridium con una serie di fedelissimi fuggiti in Siria sotto la protezione di Bashar Assad […] e fu proprio il presidente siriano a passare il numero satellitare di Gheddafi agli 007 francesi. In cambio Assad avrebbe ottenuto da Parigi la promessa di limitare le pressioni internazionali sulla Siria per cessare la repressione contro la popolazione in rivolta”.

 

La teoria del complotto non è nuova nelle analisi delle vicende libiche. L’ex primo ministro del governo transitorio, Mahmoud Jibril, aveva già parlato del coinvolgimento di un “agente” esterno nell’operazione che aveva portato alla cattura e alla morte di Gheddafi.

 

Il ruolo delle potenze occidentali è stato più che mai preponderante nella primavera libica e la Francia si è dimostrata uno dei protagonisti principali nel rovesciare il regime gheddafiano. Fin dal principio l’esigenza di un intervento che approfittasse della situazione di instabilità nella regione per perseguire interessi nazionali è stata chiara. In particolare, fin dai primi passi del suo mandato, l’ex presidente francese Sarkozy ha tentato di restituire alla Francia una politica estera degna del suo passato. La profonda ingerenza negli affari libici rientrava in un piano più ampio di ritorno all’antica grandeur francese, opportunità che Sarkozy si era lasciato scappare nella precedente sollevazione tunisina. Con l’intervento in Libia, la posizione francese nello scacchiere del Mediterraneo è passata, fin dai primissimi giorni, dalla marginale e cattiva gestione delle rivolte tunisine alla leadership.

 

Per quanto numerosi analisti nostrani bypassino qualsiasi teoria del complotto insistendo sull’ondata delle rivolte e la fervente voglia di democrazia della popolazione libica, i fatti sembrano confermare il primario ruolo occidentale a fronte di una non coerente e non unanime opposizione libica al regime. Ma se Francia ed altri, dopo il fatidico 20 ottobre 2011, sono tornati ai loro affari domestici, il popolo libico è rimasto in balia di se stesso, senza una nazione e senza un leader. Bashar Assad, nel frattempo, è attaccato da più parti per i suoi crimini, ma la Francia, che per eliminare un dittatore ne ha aiutato un altro, rimane una delle intoccabili potenze occidentali. Ovvie conseguenze di una primavera neocoloniale.

 

 

.. riallacciandomi al discorso del post #901 segnalo che Tripoli prison suffers mass breakout (potenziale manodopera per chi vuole alimentare caos e dispordini)

 

More than 100 inmates have escaped from the al-Judaida prison in the Libyan capital, Tripoli.

The prisoners are said to be of various nationalities and officials say about 60 have so far been recaptured. It is not clear how the breakout happened.

 

... ed ecco un responsabile eccellente (o un agnello sacrificale) Hillary Clinton takes blame for US deaths in Libya

 

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says she takes responsibility for the failure in security at the US consulate in Benghazi, where the US ambassador to Libya was killed last month.

Mrs Clinton said ensuring the safety of US diplomatic staff overseas was her job, not that of the White House.

It comes ahead of the second campaign debate between President Barack Obama and Republican candidate Mitt Romney.

In all, four Americans died when the US consulate in Benghazi was attacked.

"What we had to do in the state department was keep focused not on why something happened - that was for the intelligence community to determine - but what was happening and what could happen," she told US TV channels.

"And that's what I was very much working on, day and night, to try to make sure that we intervened with governments. We did everything we could to keep our people safe, which is my primary responsibility."

Modificato 16 Ottobre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

U.S. to Help Create an Elite Libyan Force to Combat Islamic Extremists

 

The Pentagon and State Department are speeding up efforts to help the Libyan government create a commando force to combat Islamic extremists like the ones who killed the American ambassador in Libya last month and to help counter the country’s fractious militias, according to internal government documents.

The Obama administration quietly won Congress’s approval last month to shift about $8 million from Pentagon operations and counterterrorism aid budgeted for Pakistan to begin building an elite Libyan force over the next year that could ultimately number about 500 troops. American Special Operations forces could conduct much of the training, as they have with counterterrorism forces in Pakistan and Yemen, American officials said.

...

A final decision on the program has not been made, and many details, like the size, composition and mission of the force, are still to be determined. But American government officials say they have discussed the plan’s broad outlines with senior Libyan military and civilian officials as part of a broader package of American security assistance.

“The proposal reflects the security environment and the uncertainty coming out of the government transition in Libya,” said a senior Pentagon official who spoke on condition of anonymity because the program has not been officially announced. “The multimilitia fabric that’s providing security there needs to be brought into a more integrated national security system.”

 

Libya’s Congress Elects Interim Prime Minister

 

Libya Struggles to Curb Militias, the Only Police

 

Scores of disparate militias remain Libya’s only effective police force but have stubbornly resisted government control, a dynamic that is making it difficult for either the Libyan authorities or the United States to catch the attackers who killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens.

Shocked by that assault, tens of thousands of people filled the streets last month to demand the dismantling of all the militias. But the country’s interim president, Mohamed Magariaf, warned them to back off as leaders of the largest brigades threatened to cut off the vital services they provide, like patrolling the borders and putting out fires.

[Andrea75]

The Ground Truth from Benghazi

 

Consider the evidence on the ground. Protests in Libya are popular affairs. In Benghazi, they are a nearly daily occurrence, the latest being by several hundred policemen who block traffic each night outside the central Tibesti Hotel, demanding back pay.

These protests are preceded by a flurry of information on Facebook, and followed by a torrent of grainy cell phone pictures of the event. For the consulate attack, there was nothing.

I got to Benghazi on the 13th, as the first reporters began picking their way through the detritus, and stayed on to watch the anger against the militias build among the population -- along with indignation over the failure of police to show up and investigate the crime scene. (The image above shows the deserted consulate building as it looked last week.)

Plenty of people had a view of the dozen armed men gathering outside the back gate just prior to the attack, and all were adamant that there was no protest. The first the witnesses knew of the attack was the sound of gunfire from around the front of the embassy, followed by an attempt by a Libyan guard to escape through the rear. He was ordered back inside by the armed men who, say the witnesses, then fired through the back gate.

A genuinely organized attacking force would have blown open the gates. None of them show signs of damage, other than two bullets through one of the front gates and 22 through one of those on the back.

...

Getting into the compound was easy enough: the back wall is low and easy to scramble over. But once inside (according to testimony from State Department officials who insist on anonymity), the attackers got into a firefight with the guards. If so, why are the buildings not pockmarked with bullet strikes?

The compound's four buildings are burnt-out ruins, but this is due to arson. The only other damage is a single strike by a rocket propelled grenade above the main doors of the villa in the center of the compound.

Yet even this rocket was unnecessary: Fifteen feet away, the window of the ambassador's bedroom, part of a group of "safe rooms," has no grille. The attackers, if they had been organized, could have got in that way had they seen it. Instead it was looters and the curious, arriving at midnight with the battle over, who got in and found the ambassador, dead or dying, amid the smoke.

The biggest mystery of all is how the diplomats got away, escaping, by their own account, in a single armored jeep. The jeep took fire as it raced along the narrow unpaved road out of the front gate, but any organized attacking force would have blocked the road with a couple of vehicles.

The final mystery is why the attackers, having left the compound to burn at midnight, then waited more two hours before launching an attack on a second U.S. compound a mile away.

...

This suggests the Obama administration has some big questions to answer about why the consulate was not better fortified. Libya has about 500 militias. The attack was carried out using weapons available to all of them. Why, then, was the consulate not designed to resist such an attack?

But it does not suggest that America's Mideast policy is in tatters. Libya is not seething with anti-American resentment.

[Andrea75]

Former Gadhafi spokesman denies capture in Libya

 

Diplomatic cables show anxiety about Benghazi violence, protection level

 

A diplomatic cable sent by Ambassador Chris Stevens from Benghazi hours before the attack on the U.S. Consulate that killed him was largely devoted to the rising security threats in and around the city.

The cable, sent to the State Department, was released Friday by the chairman of the U.S. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Rep. Darrell Issa, R-California. It is among more than 160 pages of documents that paint a picture of persistent and unpredictable violence in and around Benghazi this year and an often fractious debate about resources for diplomatic security.

In the September 11 cable, the ambassador refers to a meeting nine days earlier in which the commander of Benghazi's Supreme Security Council "expressed growing frustration with police and security forces" being too weak to keep the country secure.

Another paragraph refers to the "expanding Islamist influence in Derna," a town east of Benghazi, amid reports linking "the Abu Salim Brigade with a troubling increase in violence and Islamist influence."

The Abu Salim Brigade was prominent among the opponents of former strongman Moammar Gadhafi.

The ambassador refers to another meeting on September 9 in which commanders of unofficial militia claimed that the Libyan Armed Forces depended on them to secure eastern Libya, and even supplied them with weapons.

The previous weekly report from Benghazi also referred to the "security vacuum," a consistent theme in the cables. In August, Stevens sent a cable titled "The Guns of August: Security in Eastern Libya."

He said the "absence of significant deterrence has contributed to a security vacuum that is being exploited by independent actors. ... Islamic extremists are able to attack the Red Cross with impunity."

"What we have seen are not random crimes of opportunity but rather targeted and discriminate attacks."

His final comment in the two-page document was: "Attackers are unlikely to be deterred until authorities are at least as capable."

[Andrea75]

Ancora ricostruzioni The Other 9/11: Libyan Guards Recount What Happened in Benghazi

 

una ricostruzione basata su:

TIME’s Steven Sotloff has talked to the guards for their account of what happened on the night of Sept. 11, 2012 and the early hours of the day after

 

Gaddafi’s Ghost: How the Tyrant Haunts Libya a Year After His Death

Modificato 22 Ottobre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

White House told of militant claim two hours after Libya attack: emails

 

Officials at the White House and State Department were advised two hours after attackers assaulted the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11 that an Islamic militant group had claimed credit for the attack, official emails show.

The emails, obtained by Reuters from government sources not connected with U.S. spy agencies or the State Department and who requested anonymity, specifically mention that the Libyan group called Ansar al-Sharia had asserted responsibility for the attacks.

The brief emails also show how U.S. diplomats described the attack, even as it was still under way, to Washington.

...

There were indications that extremists with possible al Qaeda connections were involved, but also evidence that the attacks could have erupted spontaneously, they said, adding that government experts wanted to be cautious about pointing fingers prematurely.

U.S. intelligence officials have emphasized since shortly after the attack that early intelligence reporting about the attack was mixed.

Spokesmen for the White House and State Department had no immediate response to requests for comments on the emails.

 

3 e-mail dalla Libia

The records obtained by Reuters consist of three emails dispatched by the State Department's Operations Center to multiple government offices, including addresses at the White House, Pentagon, intelligence community and FBI, on the afternoon of September 11.

The first email, timed at 4:05 p.m. Washington time - or 10:05 p.m. Benghazi time, 20-30 minutes after the attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission allegedly began - carried the subject line "U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi Under Attack" and the notation "SBU", meaning "Sensitive But Unclassified."

The text said the State Department's regional security office had reported that the diplomatic mission in Benghazi was "under attack. Embassy in Tripoli reports approximately 20 armed people fired shots; explosions have been heard as well."

The message continued: "Ambassador Stevens, who is currently in Benghazi, and four ... personnel are in the compound safe haven. The 17th of February militia is providing security support."

A second email, headed "Update 1: U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi" and timed 4:54 p.m. Washington time, said that the Embassy in Tripoli had reported that "the firing at the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi had stopped and the compound had been cleared." It said a "response team" was at the site attempting to locate missing personnel.

A third email, also marked SBU and sent at 6:07 p.m. Washington time, carried the subject line: "Update 2: Ansar al-Sharia Claims Responsibility for Benghazi Attack."

The message reported: "Embassy Tripoli reports the group claimed responsibility on Facebook and Twitter and has called for an attack on Embassy Tripoli."

While some information identifying recipients of this message was redacted from copies of the messages obtained by Reuters, a government source said that one of the addresses to which the message was sent was the White House Situation Room, the president's secure command post.

Other addressees included intelligence and military units as well as one used by the FBI command center, the source said.

 

 

.... segnalo anche Plan for hunting terrorists signals U.S. intends to keep adding names to kill lists, la gurra con i droni si intensificherà

 

The U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, which carried out the raid that killed bin Laden, has moved commando teams into suspected terrorist hotbeds in Africa. A rugged U.S. outpost in Djibouti has been transformed into a launching pad for counterterrorism operations across the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

...

The United States now operates multiple drone programs, including acknowledged U.S. military patrols over conflict zones in Afghanistan and Libya, and classified CIA surveillance flights over Iran.

...

a blueprint that could help the United States adapt to al-Qaeda’s morphing structure and its efforts to exploit turmoil across North Africa and the Middle East.

A year after Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta declared the core of al-Qaeda near strategic defeat, officials see an array of emerging threats beyond Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia — the three countries where almost all U.S. drone strikes have occurred.

Modificato 24 Ottobre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

una conferma dell'articolo al post precedente E-mails: White House knew of extremist claims in Benghazi attack

 

qui si vedono gli indirizzi delle tre mail (notare gli orari differenti)

 

Two hours after the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, the White House, the State Department and the FBI were told that an Islamist group had claimed credit, government e-mails obtained by CNN show.

One of the e-mails -- sent from a State Department address to various government agencies -- specifically identifies Ansar al-Sharia as claiming responsibility for the attack on its Facebook page and on Twitter.

The e-mails raise further questions about the seeming confusion on the part of the Obama administration to determine the nature of the September attack and those who planned it.

The attack left U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans dead.

The day after it took place, President Barack Obama labeled the incident an "act of terror."

But in the days following the attack, White House spokesman Jay Carney maintained there was no evidence suggesting the attack was "planned or imminent."

The administration also suggested that an anti-Muslim video produced in the United States likely fueled a spontaneous demonstration in Benghazi as it had in Cairo, where the U.S. Embassy also was attacked.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland and Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, all cited the video as a motivating factor in the attack.

[Andrea75]

UK details cruise missile use in Libya campaign

 

The UK Ministry of Defence has disclosed new details about its use of precision-guided weapons during 2011's Libya campaign, including air- and submarine-launched cruise missiles."During Operation Ellamy, UK forces employed a combined total of around 80 [MBDA] Storm Shadow and [Raytheon] Tomahawk land-attack missiles," armed forces minister Andrew Robathan said in response to a parliamentary question in the House of Commons on 22 October. He declined to provide a more detailed split between use of the types, as this could "prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces".

In addition to firing Storm Shadow weapons (pictured above) during multiple sorties flown from the Royal Air Force's Marham base in Norfolk, the service's Panavia Tornado GR4s also used "around 230 Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone missiles", Robathan said. The MBDA type provided a lightweight precision-attack capability, including in urban areas.

[Andrea75]

Secret Report Criticizes NATO’s Command in Libya

 

The accidental release of a Danish Defense Forces’ (DDF) report critical of NATO’s command structures and inability to direct bombing missions in Libya in 2011 has provoked political controversy, after it emerged the Danish Air Force bought munitions from Israel.

...

The Libya Mission report, produced by the Air Force’s Tactical Command (FTK) unit, criticizes NATO for being unable to provide reliable intelligence on targets or to conduct bombing raids. The lack of adequate intelligence and mission coordination by NATO forced the Air Force and other participants to curtail operations against key targets, according to the report. It also states that NATO was unable to provide accurate assessments of collateral damage inflicted on the civilian population, forcing the Air Force to curb the number and scale of its missions.

“NATO’s command structure was not organized to lead an operation such as Operation Unified Protector when operations in Libya started,” the FTK report claims.

The report notes that the Air Force’s squadron of F-16 fighters had operated under U.S. command in the lead-in phase of the Libya campaign, but came under NATO’s command in April 2011. The change greatly reduced the quality and effectiveness of mission planning and execution.

“Unlike the U.S., NATO did not have adequate access to tactical intelligence to support the operation,” the report states.

 

 

... e Panetta on Benghazi attack: 'Could not put forces at risk'

Modificato 29 Ottobre 2012 da Andrea75

[Scagnetti]

Sì, ma anche prima di questo rapporto riservato danese sapevamo che le cose erano andate esattamente così.

 

Ad aprile era trapelata una valutazione riservata NATO sulle oeprazioni, se ne era discusso qui: http://www.aereimilitari.org/forum/topic/15480-operazioni-militari-in-libia/page__view__findpost__p__287595

Emergevano esattamente le stesse problematiche, come evidenziato dall'articolo del NY Times a cui si faceva riferimento in tale post:

 

"...a confidential NATO assessment paints a sobering portrait of the alliance’s ability to carry out such campaigns without significant support from the United States.

The report concluded that the allies struggled to share crucial target information, lacked specialized planners and analysts, and overly relied on the United States for reconnaissance and refueling aircraft.

 

....

 

Even with the American help in Libya, NATO had only about 40 percent of the aircraft needed to intercept electronic communications, a shortage that hindered the operation’s effectiveness, the report said.

 

But the report and more than 300 pages of supporting documents, copies of which were obtained by The New York Times, offer telling new details about shortcomings in planning, staffing and conducting the combat mission, as well as how commanders improvised to adjust.

 

The report also spotlights an important issue for the alliance that dates to the Balkan wars of the 1990s: that the United States has emerged “by default” as the NATO specialist in providing precision-guided munitions — which made up virtually all of the 7,700 bombs and missiles dropped or fired on Libya — and a vast majority of specialized aircraft that conduct aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, or I.S.R. in military parlance.

 

“NATO remains overly reliant on a single ally to provide I.S.R. collection capabilities that are essential to the commander,” the report said.

 

Information about targets in Libya was drawn largely from the databases of individual nations, and much of this could not be shared rapidly among NATO members and partners because of “classification or procedural reasons,”

 

The NATO command in Italy suffered from serious shortages of political and legal advisers, intelligence analysts, logistics planners, linguists, and specialists in selecting targets, called targeteers.

 

Da questo rapporto di Aprile, la NATO sembra indicare che avrebbe imparato la lezione (o meglio le 15 lezioni).

 

In quest'ottica si inquadrerebbe, oltre che la trasformazione della base di Sigonella, anche l'annuncio del prossimo investimento di oltre 2 miliardi di Euro in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance che hai postato oggi nella discussione ufficiale sulla NATO.

 

Che poi i Danesi siano insoddisfatti delle capacità C4ISR della NATO, mi lascia un po' perplesso. Infatti non è che la NATO sia un'entità estranea alla Danimarca. Se la Reale aeronautica militare danese non si preoccupa di dotarsi di uno straccio di assetto I.S.R. o AWACS, mi sembra pretenzioso poi lamentarsi di cattiva gestione delle informazioni. Certo mandare 6 F-16, di cui 4 operativi, a Sigonella, può sembrare una dimostrazione di muscoli.

Ma poi non ci si può lamentare se si hanno muscoli senza cervello...

Modificato 29 Ottobre 2012 da Scagnetti

[Andrea75]

... altri articoli (un pò datati), ma che non erano ancora stati segnalati

 

 

Qaddafi's Spawn

 

The Libyan leader's ouster dispersed masses of guns and refugees across the region. Already, Algeria has seen attacks by AQIM militants armed with Libyan weapons, Mali has been rocked by a coup led by armed nomads returning from Libya, Niger is struggling to cope with waves of refugees from Libya and Mali, and Tunisia's economy has been shattered by the loss of its most important trading partner.

 

 

Libya and the Obama Doctrine

 

The U.S. campaign was a success but a provisional and limited one. Qaddafi is gone, but his ouster will not become a model for future interventions.

[Andrea75]

CIA officials in Libya made key decisions during Benghazi attacks

 

CIA officials on the ground in Libya dispatched security forces to the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi within 25 minutes and made other key decisions about how to respond to the waves of attacks on U.S. installations on September 11, a senior American intelligence official said on Thursday.

[Andrea75]

CIA rushed to save diplomats as Libya attack was underway

 

WSJ: State Dept. and CIA had secret, botched deal for Benghazi security

 

New details on ambassador’s failed, fateful push for more security at Benghazi

 

In former Gaddafi stronghold, a sign of Libya’s deepening divide

 

Intelligence official offers new timeline for Benghazi attack

Modificato 2 Novembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

Italy court unfreezes Libya's Eni stake

 

An Italian court has unfrozen shares in Italian oil and gas group Eni held by the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) on behalf of the family of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, judicial sources said on Monday.

 

The 0.58 percent stake in Eni was seized earlier this year, together with a series of other Italian assets, at the behest of the International Criminal Court.

 

At the time of the seizure the assets held by LIA were worth an overall 1.3 billion euros ($1.58 billion).

 

The Court is expected to rule in September on unfreezing the remaining assets which include a stake in Italy's largest bank UniCredit.

[Andrea75]

Clinton to testify before Congress about Benghazi attack

 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will testify before Congress about an official investigation into an attack in September that killed four Americans in Benghazi, Libya, the House Foreign Affairs Committee announced Thursday.

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), who chairs the committee, said at a hearing on the Benghazi attack that Clinton “has committed to testifying before our committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee” on a report by the Accountability Review Board, a five-member panel formed to investigate the attack and make recommendations. Ros-Lehtinen did not specify when Clinton would testify but noted that the board is expected to finish its report by “early to mid-December.”

[Andrea75]

opinione fuori dal coro Benghazi's Lesson: Diplomacy Can't Be Done on the Cheap

 

For conservatives, the Benghazi scandal is a Watergate-like presidential cover-up. For liberals, it a fabricated Republican witch-hunt. For me, Benghazi is a call to act on an enduring problem that both parties ignore.

 

One major overlooked cause of the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans is we have underfunded the State Department and other civilian agencies that play a vital role in our national security. Instead of building up cadres of skilled diplomatic security guards, we have bought them from the lowest bidder, trying to acquire capacity and expertise on the cheap. Benghazi showed how vulnerable that makes us.

 

Now, I'm not arguing that this use of contractors was the sole cause of the Benghazi tragedy, but I believe it was a primary one. Let me explain. ....

[Andrea75]

per chi fosse interessato sarà presentato questo libro 'Missione Libia 2011 - il contributo dell'AM'

 

A circa un anno di distanza dal termine dell’operazione sulla Libia, il volume ripercorre in 196 pagine i sette mesi di attività sull’altra sponda del Mediterraneo.

Mercoledì 28 Novembre alle ore 16,00 nella Sala “F. Baracca” della Casa dell’Aviatore in Roma, sarà presentato il libro “Missione Libia 2011 – Il Contributo dell’Aeronautica Militare”, edito dall’Aeronautica Militare – Edizione Rivista Aeronautica.

All’evento interverrà il Capo di Stato Maggiore dell’Aeronautica Militare, Generale di Squadra Aerea Giuseppe Bernardis.

Parteciperanno alla presentazione il Generale di Squadra Aerea Paolo Magro, Direttore per l’Impiego del Personale dell’Aeronautica Militare, il Generale di Brigata Aerea Claudio Salerno, Capo del 5° Reparto dello Stato Maggiore Aeronautica, il Colonnello Mauro Gabetta, Comandante del 37° Stormo di Trapani e il dott. Fabio Chiucconi, giornalista del TG2.

Il volume, curato dalla Redazione di Rivista Aeronautica, rappresenta un contributo importante per comprendere il ruolo delicato e centrale sostenuto dall’Aeronautica Militare durante la missione in Libia, evidenziando attraverso la ricostruzione dei fatti e le capacità espresse dalla Forza Armata quello che in realtà c’è dietro la campagna aerea di moderne operazioni militari quali sono state “Odyssey Dawn” e “Unified Protector”.

[giulo87]

Il Generale Bernardis parla dell'impiego dell'AM nelle operazioni in Libia: la politica impose il silenzio sui raids in Libia

Si parla di 1900 sortite, di cui 456 di attacco al suolo a partire dal 28 Aprile.In particolare 310 di ”attacco al suolo contro obiettivi predeterminati” e 146 quelle di ”neutralizzazione delle difese aeree nemiche” , senza contare gli ”attacchi a obiettivi di opportunità”,

 

Mio Link

[Andrea75]

... sempre sulle dichiarazion del generale Giuseppe Bernardis Missione Libia 2011, le operazioni "tenute nascoste agli italiani" rivelate dal generale Giuseppe Bernardis. 1900 raid e 456 bombardamenti

 

I bombardamenti dei caccia italiani sulla Libia sono stati tenuti nascosti per motivi politici. L'ammissione viene da una fonte particolarmente qualificata, lo stesso capo di stato maggiore dell'Aeronautica Militare, il generale Giuseppe Bernardis, che attribuisce questo deficit di comunicazione alla "situazione critica di politica interna" in cui viveva allora il Paese.

Bernardis presenta nel pomeriggio un libro edito dalla Rivista Aeronautica - "Missione Libia 2011. Il contributo dell'Aeronautica Militare" - in cui finalmente si racconta tutto di quella missione. E non ha peli sulla lingua. Negli oltre sette mesi di guerra in Libia, dal 19 marzo al 31 ottobre 2011, "è stata fatta un'attività intensissima - racconta - che è stata tenuta per lo più nascosta al padrone vero dell'Aeronautica Militare, che sono gli italiani, per questioni politiche, per esigenze particolari. C'erano dei motivi di opportunità, ci veniva detto, e noi chiaramente non abbiamo voluto rompere questo tabù che ci era stato imposto. Questo è il motivo per cui questo volume esce solo adesso, un anno dopo".

Oggi dunque apprendiamo che velivoli italiani hanno condotto in sette mesi circa 1.900 sortite, per un totale di più di 7.300 ore di volo. Le missioni di bombardamento vero e proprio - autorizzate dal governo Berlusconi il 26 aprile, la prima venne effettuata il 28 nell'area di Misurata - sono state 456, solo considerando quelle di "attacco al suolo contro obiettivi predeterminati" (310) e quelle di "neutralizzazione delle difese aeree nemiche" (146), senza contare gli "attacchi a obiettivi di opportunità", il cui numero è stato minore.

Il capo di stato maggiore ha sottolineato "con orgoglio" il contributo "di primordine" fornito dall'Aeronautica, che nelle missioni Odyssey Dawn e Unified Protector ha schierato nella base di Trapani caccia F16, Eurofighter, Tornado e Amx, oltre ad altri velivoli, impiegandone fino a 12 nella stessa giornata. Un apporto fondamentale per la buona riuscita delle operazioni a guida Nato e che è stato fornito "senza incorrere in alcun incidente e senza causare danni collaterali". "L'unico rammarico che ho avuto - scrive Bernardis nella prefazione del libro - è quello di non aver potuto fornire all'opinione pubblica un resoconto puntuale del nostro operato, per evitare ogni possibile strumentalizzazione. Questo volume colma in parte quel vuoto".

Parlando a braccio, il generale è però meno diplomatico e attribuisce questa carenza di informazione ad una precisa volontà politica di "non dire quello che si faceva". "A volte per questioni di politica interna - ha detto Bernardis - si impedisce al Paese di svolgere al meglio il suo ruolo di politica estera e questo non è possibile: non si voleva che si parlasse di questa missione perché c'era una situazione critica di politica interna".

Il capo di stato maggiore ha anche accennato al caso del navigatore di Tornado Nicola Scolari, il maggiore che aveva compiuto la prima missione in Libia e che ai giornalisti aveva candidamente spiegato che il caccia aveva pattugliato, senza che fosse stato necessario usare i missili contro i radar nemici. Ignazio La Russa, ministro della Difesa dell'epoca, aveva giudicato quelle dichiarazioni inopportune con conseguente immediato ritorno dell'ufficiale al suo Stormo, a Piacenza. "Venne mandato via perché aveva fatto solo il suo lavoro", ha detto Bernardis (Scolari, in ogni caso, non ha avuto alcuna conseguenza negativa per quelle sue affermazioni e la sua carriera è proseguita spedita).

[Andrea75]

U.S.-Approved Arms for Libya Rebels Fell Into Jihadis’ Hands

 

The Obama administration secretly gave its blessing to arms shipments to Libyan rebels from Qatar last year, but American officials later grew alarmed as evidence grew that Qatar was turning some of the weapons over to Islamic militants, according to United States officials and foreign diplomats.

No evidence has emerged linking the weapons provided by the Qataris during the uprising against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi to the attack that killed four Americans at the United States diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in September.

But in the months before, the Obama administration clearly was worried about the consequences of its hidden hand in helping arm Libyan militants, concerns that have not previously been reported. The weapons and money from Qatar strengthened militant groups in Libya, allowing them to become a destabilizing force since the fall of the Qaddafi government.

The experience in Libya has taken on new urgency as the administration considers whether to play a direct role in arming rebels in Syria, where weapons are flowing in from Qatar and other countries.

The Obama administration did not initially raise objections when Qatar began shipping arms to opposition groups in Syria, even if it did not offer encouragement, according to current and former administration officials. But they said the United States has growing concerns that, just as in Libya, the Qataris are equipping some of the wrong militants.

The United States, which had only small numbers of C.I.A. officers in Libya during the tumult of the rebellion, provided little oversight of the arms shipments. Within weeks of endorsing Qatar’s plan to send weapons there in spring 2011, the White House began receiving reports that they were going to Islamic militant groups. They were “more antidemocratic, more hard-line, closer to an extreme version of Islam” than the main rebel alliance in Libya, said a former Defense Department official.

The Qatari assistance to fighters viewed as hostile by the United States demonstrates the Obama administration’s continuing struggles in dealing with the Arab Spring uprisings, as it tries to support popular protest movements while avoiding American military entanglements. Relying on surrogates allows the United States to keep its fingerprints off operations, but also means they may play out in ways that conflict with American interests.

“To do this right, you have to have on-the-ground intelligence and you have to have experience,” said Vali Nasr, a former State Department adviser who is now dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, part of Johns Hopkins University. “If you rely on a country that doesn’t have those things, you are really flying blind. When you have an intermediary, you are going to lose control.”

 

Libya's Tribal Conflicts tratta da fonte

[Andrea75]

... è stato reso pubblico il report dei risultati delle indagini sugli eventi del 11 settembre 2012 che hanno portato alla morte dell'amabasciatore americano Christopher Stevens in Libia: Report

 

In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi determined that:

 

1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and machine gun fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against U.S. personnel at two separate facilities – the SMC and the Annex – and en route between them. Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks. The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks, which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.

 

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department (the “Department”) resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a “shared responsibility” by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post, resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.

The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi’s staffing, with talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.

Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. Board members found a pervasive realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission was not a high priority for Washington when it came to security-related requests, especially those relating to staffing.

The insufficient Special Mission security platform was at variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment, although DS funded and installed in 2012 a number of physical security upgrades. These included heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows, concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense Notification System.

Special Mission Benghazi’s uncertain future after 2012 and its “non-status” as a temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the working-level in the field, with very limited resources.

In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post, Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was inadequate. At the same time, the SMC’s dependence on the armed but poorly skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for security support was misplaced.

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours.

Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks but at no time were there ever any specific, credible threats against the mission in Benghazi related to the September 11 anniversary. Ambassador Stevens and Benghazi-based DS agents had taken the anniversary into account and decided to hold all meetings on-compound on September 11.

The Board found that Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to Benghazi independently of Washington, per standard practice. Timing for his trip was driven in part by commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap between principal officers in Benghazi. Plans for the Ambassador’s trip provided for minimal close protection security support and were not shared thoroughly with the Embassy’s country team, who were not fully aware of planned movements off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular, caused Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.

Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi functioned collegially at the working-level but were constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels. Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field, there appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.

 

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems and the Libyan response fell short in the face of a series of attacks that began with the sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by dozens of armed attackers.

The Board found the responses by both the BML guards and February 17 to be inadequate. The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously.

The Board found the Libyan government’s response to be profoundly lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and near absence of central government influence and control in Benghazi. The Libyan government did facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan government also provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate remaining U.S. personnel and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi to Tripoli on September 12.

The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference.

 

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.

 

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.

 

... alcuni articoli di commento

 

Benghazi Panel Strongly Assails Role of State Dept. in Attack

 

The investigation into the attack on the diplomatic mission and the C.I.A. annex in Benghazi that resulted in the deaths of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans also faulted State Department officials in Washington for ignoring requests from the American Embassy in Tripoli for more guards for the mission and for failing to make sufficient safety upgrades.

The panel also said American intelligence officials had relied too much on specific warnings of imminent attacks, which they did not have in the case of Benghazi, rather than basing assessments more broadly on a deteriorating security environment. By this spring, Benghazi, a hotbed of militant activity in eastern Libya, had experienced a string of assassinations, an attack on a British envoy’s motorcade and the explosion of a bomb outside the American Mission.

Finally, the report blamed two major State Department bureaus — Diplomatic Security and Near Eastern Affairs — for failing to coordinate and plan adequate security. The panel also determined that a number of officials had shown poor leadership, but they were not identified in the unclassified version of the report that was released.

 

Review of Benghazi attack faults ‘grossly’ inadequate security, leadership failures

[Andrea75]

... segnalo questo paper La Libia dopo le elezioni

 

La situazione attuale della Libia fornisce alcuni motivi di fiducia ed al contempo molti spunti per essere preoccupati e pessimisti: le elezioni parlamentari del 7 luglio u.s. sono state per lo più regolari e non hanno dato luogo ad una maggioranza dichiaratamente islamista come nel resto del Nord Africa ma l’apparente normalità della situazione parlamentare si accompagna alla forte instabilità sul versante della sicurezza interna e del controllo dei confini.

Quest’ambivalenza viene confermata se si guarda al lungo periodo: da un lato, si registra una solida rendita petrolifera che è già tornata ai livelli precedenti al conflitto, dall’altra permane la difficoltà di (ri-)costruire le tipiche strutture dello stato, come l’esercito e la burocrazia, la cui carenza è un elemento di decisiva debolezza per il paese.

Il processo elettorale non ha ancora dato luogo alla formazione di un governo, sebbene sia stato recentemente nominato primo ministro Ali Zidan. Contestualmente, il processo costituzionale rimane bloccato di fronte alla scelta se demandare la redazione della nuova carta ad una commissione eletta o nominata. In ogni caso, la scadenza inizialmente prevista per il referendum confermativo della nuova costituzione (quattro mesi dalla prima riunione del parlamento) dovrà molto probabilmente essere rinviata.

I fedeli al vecchio regime sono, insieme alle milizie salafite, una delle maggiori minacce alla stabilità della Libia e anche l’attacco dell’11 settembre contro il consolato americano a Bengasi potrebbe essere stato opera di una delle due forze, o addirittura di una combinazione tra le due. Allo stesso tempo, alcune delle milizie di tendenza islamista sono state integrate nella struttura statale sotto le insegne delle Forze di Scudo Libiche (parallele all’esercito) e del Comitato Supremo di Sicurezza (SSC) che tuttavia sembrano non rispondere in alcun modo alle autorità civili. Rimane al contempo molto grave l’esplosione dei conflitti locali nelle “periferie” meridionali e orientali del Paese, che mettono in luce la natura non strettamente militare delle minacce alla sicurezza della Libia: giocano un ruolo molto forte l’indeterminazione dei diritti di proprietà, l’incerto quadro giuridico, il clientelismo nella gestione delle risorse, oltre alla mancata integrazione delle minoranze.

La situazione economica, al contempo, mostra netti segnali di miglioramento, dovuti però in gran parte al ritorno ai livelli pre-bellici della produzione petrolifera. Il superamento della struttura tipica dei Rentier States, ricchi di idrocarburi e poveri di rappresentanza politica, sarà una delle sfide per il futuro.

Dopo aver fornito un quadro politico ed economico della Libia post-elezioni parlamentari, il presente studio evidenzia anche alcune aree di possibile intervento sia per il nostro Paese che per l’Europa: il sostegno al processo costituzionale, la revisione delle politiche sull’immigrazione, la fornitura di expertise per il processo di costruzione di un efficiente apparato statale.

[Andrea75]

... ancora sull'attentato di Bengazi http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/benghazi-report-and-diplomatic-security-funding-cycle?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20121227&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=5f7aef0ce17443f9b6dd6b84ba4a6499

 

 

Predictable Inquiries

The cycle by which diplomatic security is funded begins as officials gradually cut spending on diplomatic security programs. Then, when major security failures inevitably beset those programs, resultant public outrage compels officials to create a panel to investigate those failures.

The first of these panels dates back to the mid-1980s, following attacks against U.S. facilities in Beirut and Kuwait and the systematic bugging of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. These security lapses led to the formation of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, chaired by former Deputy CIA Director Adm. Bobby Inman. The law that passed in the wake of the Inman Commission came to be known as the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which requires that an accountability review board be convened following major security incidents.

There are a few subsequent examples of these panels. Former Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. William Crowe chaired an Accountability Review Board following the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998. And after the Benghazi attacks, an Accountability Review Board was chaired by former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. The Dec. 18 report was the findings of the Pickering board.

Predictably, the review boards, including Pickering's, always conclude that inadequate funding and insufficient security personnel are partly to blame for the security breaches. In response to the reports, Congress appropriates more money to diplomatic security programs to remedy the problem. Over time, funds are cut, and the cycle begins anew.

Funding can be cut for several reasons. In times of financial austerity, Congress can more easily cut the relatively small foreign affairs budget than it can entitlement benefits budgets. Cuts to the overall State Department budget generally result in cuts for security programs.

Moreover, rivalries among the various State Department entities can affect spending cuts. The Diplomatic Security Service's budget falls under the main State Department budget, so senior diplomats, rather than Diplomatic Security Service agents, represent the agency's interests on Capitol Hill. Some within the security service do not believe that senior diplomats have their best interests at heart when making the case for their budgets -- at least until a tragedy occurs and Congressional hearings are held to air these problems. For their part, others in the department resent the Diplomatic Security Service for the large budgetary allocations it receives after a security failure.

More than a Matter of Funding

With Congress and the presumed next Secretary of State John Kerry now calling for increased spending on diplomatic security, the financial floodgates are about to reopen. But merely throwing money at the problems uncovered by the accountability review boards will not be enough to solve those problems. Were that the case, the billions of dollars allocated to diplomatic security in the wake of the Inman and Crowe commission reports would have sufficed.

Of course, money can be useful, but injecting large sums of it into the system can create problems if the money provided is too much for the bureaucracy to efficiently metabolize. Government managers tend to spend all the money allocated to them -- sometimes at the expense of efficiency -- under a "use it or lose it" mentality. Since there is no real incentive for them to perform under budget, managers in a variety of U.S. government departments spend massive amounts of money at the end of each fiscal year. The same is true of diplomatic security programs when they are flush with cash. But the inevitable reports of financial waste and mismanagement lead to calls for spending cuts in these programs.

If the U.S. government is ever going to break the cycle of funding cuts and security disasters, the Diplomatic Security Service will need to demonstrate wisdom and prudence in how it spends the funds allocated to them. It will also be necessary for Congress to provide funding in a consistent manner and with an initial appropriation that is not too big to be spent efficiently.

Beyond money management and a consistent level of funding, the State Department will also need to take a hard look at how it currently conducts diplomacy and how it can reduce the demands placed on the Diplomatic Security Service. This will require asking many difficult questions: Is it necessary to maintain large embassies to conduct diplomacy in the information age? Does the United States need to maintain thousands of employees in high-threat places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan at the expense of smaller missions, or can the critical work be done by hundreds or even dozens? Is a permanent U.S. presence even required in a place like Benghazi, or can the missions in such locations be accomplished by a combination of visiting diplomats, covert operatives and local employees?

At the very least, the State Department will need to review its policy of designating a facility as a "special mission" -- Benghazi was designated as such -- to exempt it from meeting established physical security standards. If the questions above are answered affirmatively, and if it is deemed necessary to keep a permanent presence in a place like Benghazi, then security standards need to be followed, especially when a facility is in place for several months. Temporary facilities with substandard security cannot be allowed to persist for months and years.

Host Countries

As they consider these issues, officials need to bear in mind that the real key to the security of diplomatic facilities is the protection provided by the host country's security forces as dictated by the Vienna Convention. If the host country will not or cannot protect foreign diplomats, then the physical security measures mandated by security standards can do little more than provide slight delay -- which is what they are designed to do. No physical security measures can stand up to a prolonged assault. If a militant group armed with heavy weaponry is permitted to attack a diplomatic facility for hours with no host government response -- as was the case in Benghazi -- the attack will cause considerable damage and likely cause fatalities despite the security measures in place.

The same is true of a large mob, which given enough time can damage and breach U.S. embassies that meet current department security standards. The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, a state-of-the-art facility completed in 2009, was heavily damaged by a mob of pro-Gadhafi supporters in May 2011 and rendered unserviceable.

In another example, a large crowd caused extensive damage to the U.S. Embassy in Tunis and the adjacent American School just three days after the Benghazi attack. In that incident, Tunisian authorities responded and did not provide the attacking mob the opportunity to conduct a prolonged assault on the embassy. Though the mob caused millions of dollars worth of damage to the compound, it was unable to breach the main embassy office building. Without host country security support, there is little that can be done to assure the safety of U.S. diplomats, no matter what happens to security budgets.

... una delle conseguenze e che la CIA ha avuto il permesso si formare un proprio "piccolo" esercito ombra, il Global Response Staff (GRS) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cias-global-response-staff-emerging-from-shadows-after-incidents-in-libya-and-pakistan/2012/12/26/27db2d1c-4b7f-11e2-b709-667035ff9029_story.html?hpid=z2

 

The rapid collapse of a U.S. diplomatic compound in Libya exposed the vulnerabilities of State Department facilities overseas. But the CIA’s ability to fend off a second attack that same night provided a glimpse of a key element in the agency’s defensive arsenal: a secret security force created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

Two of the Americans killed in Benghazi were members of the CIA’s Global Response Staff, an innocuously named organization that has recruited hundreds of former U.S. Special Forces operatives to serve as armed guards for the agency’s spies.

The GRS, as it is known, is designed to stay in the shadows, training teams to work undercover and provide an unobtrusive layer of security for CIA officers in high-risk outposts.

But a series of deadly scrapes over the past four years has illuminated the GRS’s expanding role, as well as its emerging status as one of the CIA’s most dangerous assignments.

Of the 14 CIA employees killed since 2009, five worked for the GRS, all as contractors. They include two killed at Benghazi, as well as three others who were within the blast radius on Dec. 31, 2009, when a Jordanian double agent detonated a suicide bomb at a CIA compound in Khost, Afghanistan.

GRS contractors have also been involved in shootouts in which only foreign nationals were killed, including one that triggered a diplomatic crisis. While working for the CIA, Raymond Davis was jailed for weeks in Pakistan last year after killing two men in what he said was an armed robbery attempt in Lahore.

The increasingly conspicuous role of the GRS is part of a broader expansion of the CIA’s paramilitary capabilities over the past 10 years. Beyond hiring former U.S. military commandos, the agency has collaborated with U.S. Special Operations teams on missions including the raid that killed Osama bin Laden and has killed thousands of Islamist militants and civilians with its fleet of armed drones.

CIA veterans said that GRS teams have become a critical component of conventional espionage, providing protection for case officers whose counterterrorism assignments carry a level of risk that rarely accompanied the cloak-and-dagger encounters of the Cold War.

 

[madmike]

sempre della serie 'ma che ci siamo andati ad inventare'.....

 

Il Pentagono ha riunito nella base siciliana di Sigonella la forza d'intervento rapido approntata per evacuare in caso di necessità l'ambasciata di Tripoli e i cittadini statunitensi che non hanno ancora lasciato la Libia ormai in preda al caos. Si tratta di unità di forze speciali appartenenti ai Navy Seal e a circa un centinaio degli oltre 500 marines presenti nelle basi spagnole di Rota e Moròn, la cui mobilità è assicurata da due aerei cargo C-130 e 6 "convertiplani" MV 22 Osprey, aerei in grado di mutare l'assetto dei motori atterrando e decollando come elicotteri. Velivoli già impiegati dai marines in Afghanistan rivelatisi preziosi in operazioni d'emergenza in cui non è sempre possibile disporre di aeroporti. "Così saremmo pronti a rispondere rapidamente se necessario, se le condizioni in Libia peggiorassero o se ci fosse richiesto" ha spiegato il portavoce del Pentagono George Little.

 

http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-05-14/marines-navy-seal-sigonella-110651.shtml?uuid=AbdtkjvH