Rivolte in medio oriente

[Andrea75]

segnalo un articolo fortemente critico nei confronti di Obama Per il trionfo dell’islamismo nessuno ha fatto di più di Barack Hussein Obama

 

alcuni highlights

 

Nel 2010, dopo aver tergiversato tre mesi di fronte alle richieste di rinforzi formulate dai comandanti militari in Afghanistan, ha infine deciso di inviare 33 mila soldati annunciando però che li avrebbe ritirati dopo un anno e che nel 2014 tutti i militari alleati avrebbero lasciato il Paese. Un annuncio che sancito la sconfitta in Afghanistan, l’inutile sacrificio di oltre 3 mila caduti alleati e assicurato la vittoria (o ma non-sconfitta) ai talebani che da allora hanno adottato la tattica più idonea: sottrarsi per quanto possibile agli scontri durante le offensive del 2010 a Helmand e Kandahar per poi lanciarsi al contrattacco dopo l’avvio del ritiro degli alleati in attesa di marciare nuovamente su Kabul.

 

E’ vero che con Barack Hussein Obama alla Casa Bianca sono stati uccisi molti leader di al-Qaeda è lo stesso Osama bin Laden ma si tratta di successi più simbolici che concreti. I comandanti vengono rimpiazzati e il vecchio leader malato ormai non contava più molto mentre la sua uccisione, quando poteva essere agevolmente catturato vivo, getta molte ombre su quell’azione circa la quale nuove rivelazioni indicano sia stata decisa con riluttanza da Obama che ancora una volta tergiversò a lungo sul da farsi.

 

Obama che sta consentendo agli ayatollah di dotarsi di armi atomiche creando una frattura senza precedenti tra Washington e Gerusalemme e lasciando gli israeliani di fronte all’opzione militare. Solo incompetenza o un preciso disegno politico? Certo a “fottere gli amici” Barack Hussein Obama si è rivelato un vero maestro.

 

ha liquidato i migliori alleati dell’America in Nord Africa, i presidenti tunisino Ben Alì e l’egiziano Mubarak? Certo non si trattava di campioni di democrazia e diritti umani e civili (ma lo sono quelli che vogliono la sharia come fonte della legge?) ma a differenza degli islamisti erano filo-occidentali. Barack Hussein Obama ha fatto un bel regalo ai Fratelli Musulmani, che l’amministrazione statunitense definisce “islamici moderati” (ma la loro ambiguità è ormai evidente come dimostrano le diverse dichiarazioni rilasciate dai loro leader ai media occidentali e arabi, come insegnò a suo tempo Yasser Arafat) ma anche ai salafiti sostenuti dai petrodollari dei nostri “alleati” arabi del Golfo.

 

Per rovesciare Gheddafi, un dittatore divenuto da anni filo-occidentale, Barack Hussein Obama ha scatenato una guerra sciagurata nella quale Londra e Parigi miravano a sottrarre a Roma concessioni petrolifere e commesse e alla quale il presidente americano ha obbligato a partecipare anche l’Italia. Prima imponendoci l’uso delle nostre basi aeree e poi pretendendo che anche i nostri aerei bombardassero le forze lealiste. Un episodio che ha sancito il punto più basso della sovranità italiana, azzerata pochi mesi dopo con l’imposizione del governo di Mario Monti voluto da Bruxelles

 

Il saccheggio degli arsenali di Gheddafi ha consentito ai jihadisti di occupare mezzo Malì, parte del Niger e di minacciare con maggiore forza l’Algeria e i Paesi del Sahel ancora governati da regimi laici. Oggi l’Occidente mostra stupore per l’alleanza tra al-Qaeda e salafiti quando per dieci anni i volontari salafiti nordafricani si sono addestrati e hanno combattuto in Afghanistan e Iraq con i qaedisti.

 

In questi giorni ha avuto buon gioco il presidente russo Vladimir Putin (forse l’unico leader di peso internazionale ad avere un approccio lucido e pragmatico nei confronti delle cosiddette primavere arabe) nel sottolineare come “il Medio Oriente stia cadendo nel caos” con un chiaro riferimento anche alla guerra siriana.

[madmike]

Analisi Difesa direi che nelle elezioni USA si è fortemente schierata coi repubblicani: oltre a quell'articolo c'e' una intervista a Luttwak e un altro articolo dello stesso tenore...

[vorthex]

beh, dice cose vere però... schierato o meno.

[madmike]

sul 'vere' discutiamo.

 

Barak Obama ha scatenato la guerra contro Gheddafi? Sarkozy no?

 

ha liquidato i Mubarak e il presidente Tunisino? Ah ecco. Alternative, soffocare nel sangue le rivolte con truppe USA?

 

E vero che con Barack Hussein Obama alla Casa Bianca sono stati uccisi molti leader di al-Qaeda è lo stesso Osama bin Laden ma si tratta di successi più simbolici che concreti. I comandanti vengono rimpiazzati e il vecchio leader malato ormai non contava più molto mentre la sua uccisione, quando poteva essere agevolmente catturato vivo, getta molte ombre su quellazione circa la quale nuove rivelazioni indicano sia stata decisa con riluttanza da Obama che ancora una volta tergiversò a lungo sul da farsi.

 

Abbiamo appena detto che invadere l'Afghanistan per Osama era cosa buona e giusta. Lo ammazza, e non va bene lo stesso? Perchè ce ne sono altri, MA VA???

 

ecco, schierarsi si può, basta non scrivere roba così.

 

Magari tiriamo fuori Analisi Difesa di qualche mese fa, ove Gaiani, sparando contro tutto e tutti sull'intevento in Libia, diceva:

 

Così la rivolta tribale libica nata da dispute storiche tra Tripolitania e Cirenaica e da una ripartizione non condivisa dei profitti dellexport di gas e petrolio è divenuta in Europa e negli Usa una sommossa contro un perdifo tiranno al quale pochi mesi or sono Barack Obama strinse la mano senza vergognarsene

 

quindi doveva vergognarsi di stringere la mano a Gheddafi, o vergognarsi di rovesciarlo?

 

http://cca.analisidifesa.it/it/magazine_8034243544/numero116/article_753638760455031857061871338625_7505023515_0.jsp

Modificato 19 Settembre 2012 da madmike

[vorthex]

Barak Obama ha scatenato la guerra contro Gheddafi? Sarkozy no?

avrebbe potuto non intervenire e lasciare i "grandi europei" in mutande.

 

a liquidato i Mubarak e il presidente Tunisino? Ah ecco. Alternative, soffocare nel sangue le rivolte con truppe USA?

tra scegliere un politica supina ed invadere un paese ne passa... mi pare.

 

Abbiamo appena detto che invadere l'Afghanistan per Osama era cosa buona e giusta. Lo ammazza, e non va bene lo stesso? Perchè ce ne sono altri, MA VA???

e che c'entra scusa?

il vero problema è stato parlare di una data di ritiro, mica l'aver ucciso Bin-Laden.

[madmike]

ah ecco, quindi, con una crisi economica senza precedenti (che si è trovato) e i disoccupati a casa oltre il 10%, l'alternativa era una guerra sine die per scopi che, ad oggi, consistono nel non fare riprendere il potere ai Talebani.

 

Io credo che non sia un eccellente presidente (per usare un eufemismo): ma da qui a scrivere che in Egitto ha avuto un atteggiamento 'supino'.... alternative? Spara Mubarak, che hai ragione tu?

[vorthex]

ah ecco, quindi, con una crisi economica senza precedenti (che si è trovato) e i disoccupati a casa oltre il 10%, l'alternativa era una guerra sine die per scopi che, ad oggi, consistono nel non fare riprendere il potere ai Talebani.

oggi è il giorno dell'aut-aut?

di alternative che non fossero "vi stiamo dicendo quando ce ne andiamo" se ne trovano e poi... volendo fare i bontemponi... l'industria di guerra crea sempre occupazione

 

Io credo che non sia un eccellente presidente (per usare un eufemismo): ma da qui a scrivere che in Egitto ha avuto un atteggiamento 'supino'.... alternative? Spara Mubarak, che hai ragione tu?

sempre meglio che avere un paese governato dai fratelli musulmani e, sempre tornando al discorso dell'aut-aut... le alternative ci stavano.

[Andrea75]

Segnalo un altro commento (questa volta più pacato) alla politica mediorinetale di Obama Obama e l’inaspettato risveglio Arabo

 

ed un confronto, sempre relativo al medio oriente, tra la visione dei democratici USA vs repubblicani USA The Middle East in the Obama-Romney Rivalry

Modificato 20 Settembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

Due pesi, due misure. Le incongruenze dell’Occidente in Medio Oriente

[madmike]

Due pesi, due misure. Le incongruenze dell’Occidente in Medio Oriente

 

servizio ahime molto chiaro.

 

In un epoca di interconnessione delle informazioni, diventa poi difficile pretendere 'simpatia' nei confronti dell'occidente...

[Andrea75]

Salafism and Arab Democratization

[Andrea75]

Il dilemma Usa verso il mondo arabo

[Andrea75]

How the Arab Spring's Prisoner Releases Have Helped the Jihadi Cause

 

Many commentators have remarked that the jihadist movement has shown increased vigor recently, including al Qaeda's North African affiliate and the various Ansar al Sharia groups that emerged in multiple countries, but the prison releases have been an important part of this story that analysts have generally ignored.

 

Prisoners have gone free for a variety of reasons. Muammar Qaddafi's government used these releases as an offensive tactic early after the uprisings, setting prisoners free in rebellious areas in order to create strife there. As the rebellion continued, some prison governors decided for their own reasons (perhaps as a way of defecting) to empty prisons they were charged with guarding. Chaos allowed some escapes, as guards afraid of reprisals fled their posts; in other cases gunmen attacked prisons in order to release the inmates. And regimes that experienced less chaotic transitions, including Tunisia but especially Egypt, have been hesitant to continue imprisoning virtually anybody jailed by the old regime, including violent Islamists with blood on their hands.

 

The potential for danger was actually apparent very early in the events of the Arab Spring. In January 2011, even before Egypt's Hosni Mubarak was toppled from power, it was widely reported that thousands of prisoners had escaped from Egyptian jails, including militants. A lengthy hagiographical account of how "the mujahedin" had escaped from the Abu Za'bal prison soon appeared on the Ansar al Mujahedin Network, a jihadist web forum.

 

After Mubarak's fall, many people imprisoned by the old regime were let back on the streets. Hani al Saba'i, a figure with deep ties to the jihadist movement who runs the London- based Al Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies, published several lists of names of militant figures who had been released, beginning in February 2011. As he wrote on February 27, "This release is one of the positive outcomes of this popular Egyptian revolution that we hope to conclude with the application of the Islamic sharia."

[Andrea75]

Militant jihadists’ rise in Arab world imperils region’s stability

 

The proliferation of militant jihadi groups across the Arab world is posing a new threat to the region’s stability, presenting fresh challenges to emerging democracies and undermining prospects for a smooth transition in Syria should the regime fall.

From Egypt’s Sinai desert to eastern Libya and the battlegrounds of Syria’s civil war, the push for greater democracy made possible by revolts in the Middle East and North Africa has also unleashed new freedoms that militants are using to preach, practice and recruit.

The rise of militant jihadists in the region is one of the reasons that Western policymakers have been reluctant to arm the opposition in Syria as the country’s 19-month-old conflict intensifies.

Most of the new groups have emerged in response to local grievances, and there are few signs that they have established meaningful organizational ties with the global al-Qaeda terrorist movement or even have transnational ambitions, analysts say. But many of them embrace ideologies akin to those espoused by al-Qaeda and — as last month’s attack on the American diplomatic outpost in Benghazi illustrated — could threaten U.S. interests.

“The potential now for the globalization of these groups is there due to the fact that there is significant ideological similarity,” said Aaron Zelin, an expert on jihadist movements at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “The likelihood becomes greater if there is stigmatization of these groups as being part of al-Qaeda’s global jihad and if, in their own societies, they are pushed deeper into the fringes.”

 

 

Swiss are blocking $1 billion in ‘dictator’ funds from 4 Arab Spring nations

 

A Swiss official says the government has blocked almost 1 billion Swiss francs ($1.07 billion) linked to rulers in four Arab Spring nations.

 

M. Valentin Zellweger, who as head of the Swiss foreign ministry’s international law department also oversees its task force for “potentate funds,” says the assets seized since early 2011 are tied to rulers in Syria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

[Andrea75]

Drone kills nine near formerly rebel-occupied Yemen town: sources

 

Nine suspected al Qaeda militants were killed in what a local security source and residents said was a U.S. drone attack on a farmhouse outside a town in southern Yemen.

[Andrea75]

Premessa: non conosco l'affidabilità della fonte. La cito e riporto la notizia così come la leggo.

 

AL-QARADAWI: “LA RUSSIA È IL NEMICO NUMERO UNO DELL’ISLAM E DEI MUSULMANI”.

 

In questo sermone, lo “shaykh di Aljazeera”, incita “gli arabi” (per lui intercambiabili con “sunniti”, indice della volontà di diffondere un settario “etno-nazionalismo religioso” spacciato per il “vero Islam”) a combattere i russi, i cinesi e gli iraniani a ragione della loro posizione sulla “questione siriana”: http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/3607.htm

...

È inoltre degno di nota ricordare che al-Qaradawi è la stessa “autorità religiosa” che, dagli schermi di “Aljazeera”, ha sempre invitato il suo vasto pubblico a stare dalla parte del separatismo kosovaro contro i serbi. Il risultato lo conoscono tutti: un narcostato in cui la “pulizia etnica” s’è realizzata per davvero e la più grande base Usa/Nato in Europa!

E si tratta del medesimo “shaykh” che continua a presentarsi, come i suoi omologhi del cosiddetto “Islam americano”, quale “sunnita” per lanciare anatemi verso tutti i musulmani che non aderiscono alla sua ideologia religiosa.

Tutti lo ricordano quando in piazza Tahrir sentenziò: “Gheddafi dev’essere ucciso”. E così è stato, grazie a quei “ribelli” indottrinati dai wahhabiti – che sunniti non sono – sostenuti dalla Nato, i quali ora vandalizzano santuari islamici individuati come centri della “superstizione sufi” ed ingaggiano una stupida guerra per bande il cui unico beneficiario è l’Occidente, libero di predare le ricchezze della Libia e di riportarla ad una “arretratezza” dalla quale era stata tratta solo grazie al “tiranno”.

 

e qui la biografia di Yusuf al-Qaradawi

[Andrea75]

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Leaders and their Networks

[Andrea75]

Losing Yemen. How this forgotten corner of the Arabian Peninsula became the most dangerous country in the world.

 

In the final presidential debate, more than 11 years after the Bush administration launched its global war on terror, President Barack Obama identified "terrorist networks" as the gravest national security threat facing America. But Yemen, which is home to the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate, has attracted precious little attention from either of the candidates in this election. In the recent foreign-policy debate, for instance, Yemen was mentioned only once; compare that to Iran, which was name-dropped 47 times.

In many ways, Yemen has become this war's laboratory, a place where the United States can test new ways to fight al Qaeda. In December 2009, Obama opened the campaign with a strike on what U.S. military planners believed was an al Qaeda training camp in southern Yemen. The cruise missiles equipped with cluster bombs hit their target, killing 55 people in minutes of bombing. But instead of the al Qaeda camp the United States thought it was hitting, it had bombed a Bedouin village where some al Qaeda fighters were staying. Just over a week later, on Christmas Day 2009, a would-be suicide bomber dispatched by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attempted to bring down Northwest Airlines Flight 253 over Detroit.

In the three year since, AQAP has repeatedly tried to strike the United States while the United States has responded with ramped-up drone and air strikes along with increased economic aid to the central government in Sanaa.

...

After inheriting Yemen's aid rollercoaster, the Obama administration soon established a new high in 2009 and then again in 2010 -- until popular protests forced the United States to cut funding and abandon Saleh altogether in 2011. Earlier this year, when Hadi, Saleh's long-time vice president, took over as part of a shortsighted political deal that gave Saleh immunity, the United States restarted its aid package to Yemen.

For the third year in a row, the U.S. set a new high in aid to Yemen -- this year it is $337 million -- and for the third year in a row AQAP set a new high with the number of fighters within its ranks. Current estimates range from 1,000 to a few thousand.

After more than a decade of on-again, off-again aid to Yemen, the al Qaeda branch in Yemen is stronger than it was on September 11, 2001. The money the United States has spent in Yemen has enriched dozens and the missiles it has fired into the country have killed hundreds -- and yet AQAP continues to grow.

[Andrea75]

segnalo due paper 'istituzionali' Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

 

The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, began a political crisis that has defied resolution. The crisis since 2011 has been more intense than previous periods of unrest in Bahrain, and demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities have not satisfied by reform efforts instituted since 1999. The bulk of the Shiite majority in Bahrain says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but many in the Sunni minority government of the Al Khalifa family believe the Shiites want outright rule.

In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully

suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, a “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on only a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s dismissal of all of the government’s reform proposals. The government asserts it has implemented most of the BICI recommendations—an assertion corroborated by a national commission appointed to oversee implementation and a “follow-up committee.” However, the upholding of prison sentences for prominent dissidents and government refusal to agree to more substantial political reforms, have stoked continued frequent demonstrations. Adding to the deadlock is that neighboring Saudi Arabia, which has significant political and economic influence over the Bahraini government, is backing hardline Al Khalifa officials that oppose compromise. Some fear that the unrest could evolve into violent insurgency, a concern increased by the discovery of bombs and other weaponry in 2012. Five bombs went off in Bahrain on November 5, 2012, killing two non-Bahrainis.

The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime’s past reforms, but it has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses, urged the regime to undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas to narrow government-opposition differences. The U.S. position on has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime to containing Iranian power. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. Beyond that facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can potentially use to protect itself and support any military effort against Iran. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement

(FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.

 

Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations

 

This report provides an overview and analysis of U.S.-Yemeni relations amidst evolving political change in Yemeni leadership, ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operatives at large in Yemen’s hinterlands, and international efforts to bolster the country’s stability despite an array of daunting socio-economic problems. Congress and U.S. policymakers may be concerned with prospects for stabilizing Yemen and establishing strong bilateral relations with future Yemeni leaders.

On November 23, 2011, after eleven months of protests and violence that claimed over 2,000 lives, then President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen signed on to a U.S.-backed, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered transition plan. In line with the plan, Yemen held a presidential election in February 2012 with one consensus candidate on the ballot—former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi. He received 6.6 million votes and, on February 25, 2012, he was inaugurated before parliament.

Many Administration officials have declared that AQAP, the Yemeni-based terrorist organization that has attempted on several occasions to attack the U.S. homeland, is the most lethal of the Al Qaeda affiliates. In recent years, the Administration and Congress have supported an increased U.S. commitment of resources to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Many analysts assert that Yemen is becoming a failed state and safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives and as such should be considered an active theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations. Given Yemen’s contentious political climate and its myriad development challenges, most long-time Yemen watchers suggest that security problems emanating from Yemen may persist in spite of increased U.S. or international efforts to combat them.

For FY2013, the Obama Administration is requesting $72.6 million in State Departmentadministered economic and military aid for Yemen. The Administration ceased outlays of

previously appropriated aid for Yemen during the past year due to political unrest there, although the delivery of some aid resumed in September 2011.

[Andrea75]

Terroristi o no? Hezbollah divide Europa e Stati Uniti

 

L’Europa ha deciso di non designare i militanti del gruppo libanese Hezbollah come membri di un’organizzazione terroristica. Una presa di posizione che ha scontentato non poco i vertici di Washington, e che è stata criticata dagli Usa per bocca di John Brennan, capo del controterrorismo della Casa Bianca, a margine di una conferenza organizzata a Dublino alla fine del mese scorso. Brennan, che ha inserito Hezbollah in cima alla lista delle minacce alla sicurezza di Usa ed Europa, ha dichiarato che la decisione europea potrebbe seriamente minare gli sforzi del controterrorismo internazionale.

 

Sempre durante l’intervento di Dublino, il capo dell’intelligence a stelle e strisce ha affermato che anche il ripetersi dei pagamenti dei riscatti per liberare gli ostaggi europei ha reso più difficile difendere gli Stati Uniti e i suoi cittadini. Secondo Brennan, il gruppo sciita libanese starebbe addestrando dei militanti di al Qaeda in Yemen e Siria. Proprio per questo, già nel 1995, gli Stati Uniti hanno designato Hezbollah come un’organizzazione terroristica globale e hanno proibito a tutti i cittadini statunitensi di fornire al gruppo sostegno materiale o finanziario.

 

Sono più di vent’anni che alcuni paesi europei, Francia in testa, si rifiutano di allinearsi con le posizioni di Washington. I dubbi provenienti dall’Europa sono diversi, ma forse il più importante è legato al ruolo che Hezbollah ha svolto in Libano fin dalla guerra civile degli anni ’80, ovvero quello di fornitore di servizi sociali estesi per la popolazione. Altro dubbio riguarda le azioni di mantenimento della pace delle Nazioni Unite, coordinate dall’Ue, in suolo libanese. L’intervento vede l’Italia e la Francia in prima linea dopo la guerra tra Hezbollah e Israele del dicembre 2008-gennaio 2009. Accusare di terrorismo i seguaci di Hezbollah provocherebbe una rottura ideologica con una numerosa componente della popolazione libanese, con conseguenze pericolose per i contingenti militari che operano nella regione.

 

 

U.S. Fears Hezbollah Operative Held in Iraq May Go Free

 

A senior Iraqi official has told the Obama administration that Iraq no longer has a legal basis to hold a Lebanese Hezbollah operative who has been accused of helping to kill American troops in Iraq, and United States officials are concerned that he may soon be released, American officials said Sunday.

American officials said that the United States ambassador in Baghdad, Robert S. Beecroft, had been instructed to seek a meeting with Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq to urge that the Hezbollah operative, Ali Musa Daqduq, be kept in detention.

At the same time, however, American officials are worried that their efforts may fall short, and they quietly informed Congressional leaders last week that there was a risk that Mr. Daqduq may soon go free.

Modificato 12 Novembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Andrea75]

Three Israelis killed by rocket fired from Gaza Strip; Israel intensifies air offensive

 

Israeli jets and drones hit dozens of targets overnight in an intense air campaign against militant targets in the Gaza Strip the day after a missile strike killed the Hamas military chief in an operation that raised the specter of an all-out conflict.

Israeli officials said Wednesday’s attacks were aimed at crippling the military capabilities of Gaza-based militants who fire rockets into southern Israel and warned that it could evolve into a ground operation.

But the barrage of rockets fired from Gaza continued unabated. Three Israelis were killed early Thursday when a rocket struck an apartment building in Kiryat Malakhi in southern Israel, Israeli police said.

A spokesman for the Hamas-run Health Ministry in Gaza, Ashraf al-Qedra, said eight Palestinians had been killed, including two children and four other civilians.

Residents in Gaza said militants have begun firing rockets at Israeli targets from inside teeming Gaza city, making direct Israeli strikes on the populous city likely.

“We are at the start of the event and not at its end,” said Defense Minister Ehud Barak, pledging to do “whatever is necessary to restore quiet to the south.”

Representatives of Hamas, which Israel and the United States consider a terrorist organization, said they also have no intention of backing down. The assassination of Ahmed al-Jabari, the Hamas military commander, “is a serious crime, and they crossed the red line,” said Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman. “It’s time to declare war.”

Egypt’s Islamist-led government also condemned Jabari’s assassination, and announced the withdrawal of its ambassador to Israel.

Israeli officials ordered all residents living within 25 miles of the Gaza Strip to stay indoors, in shelters or in safe rooms. Israel also dropped leaflets overnight into Gaza warning residents to “stay away from Hamas and other terror organizations, operatives and facilities that pose a risk to their safety.”

Israeli jets and drones hit dozens of targets throughout the Mediterranean enclave early Thursday, including munitions warehouses and residential buildings that the military said operated as warehouses. The military said it targeted more than 100 long- and medium- range rocket launching sites and several launch squads overnight, doing “significant” damage to stockpiles that include Iran-supplied Fajr-5 missiles.

If drawn out, the Israeli campaign could paralyze the crowded Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, trigger barrages of retaliatory attacks from the organization and its regional allies, and upend already cool relations between Israel and Egypt.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed the situation with President Obama and Vice President Biden on Wednesday evening. Obama also spoke to Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.

In a statement, a State Department spokesman reiterated U.S. support for “Israel’s right to defend itself.” The spokesman, Mark Toner, also condemned the recent rocket fire from Gaza and expressed regret for “the death and injury of innocent Israeli and Palestinian civilians caused by the ensuing violence.”

 

How will Egypt respond to Israeli strikes on Gaza?

 

The Egypt-Israel relationship has remained generally stable since the Egyptian revolution, and Egypt has held up its end of the embargo, but analysts have worried that an Israeli assault on Gaza could change Cairo’s calculus. So far, the fighting is limited to Hamas missiles and Israeli airstrikes, but the Israeli military has signaled its readiness to send ground troops.

Egypt has already recalled its ambassador from Israel over the Gaza strikes, something it threatened to do in August over an Israeli airstrike that killed three Egyptians. Despite rumors, Israeli officials tell Reuters they have not recalled their own ambassador. Perhaps the best-case scenario would be that Israeli-Egyptian tensions escalate no further and that Egypt, possibly with some assurances from the United States, restores full diplomatic relations with Israel.

Another possibility is something more like Turkey’s response to the 2008 “Operation Cast Lead” Israeli ground invasion of Gaza, which led to a significant breakdown in Israeli-Turkish diplomatic and military cooperation — once relatively strong for the region.

...

Israel’s relationship with Egypt is unique, though, and includes some particularly important provisions. There’s no indication that Egypt is considering lifting its embargo of Gaza, but doing so would probably deal an enormous blow to Israeli-Egyptian relations. If Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi were looking for a way to escalate his retaliation against Israel for its strikes on Gaza, this might be one way he could potentially choose to do it.

The worst-case scenario would almost certainly be Egypt walking away from the Camp David Accords, under which it has maintained its peace with Israel for three decades.

[Andrea75]

Considering an Israeli Ground Assault in Gaza

 

 

A ground operation now would likely look very similar to Cast Lead in design and tactics, since Cast Lead was considered an operational success and its mission was similar to the current one. However, there are two notable differences. First, in the southern theater during Cast Lead, Egyptian security forces worked to secure the Rafah crossing from their end and allowed Israeli forces to engage the Philadelphi route. Egypt now has a very different government, which brings into question its willingness to support a ground operation. Cairo has already announced that the Rafah Crossing will remain open. This creates an even more serious imperative for Israeli units to cut the supply lines in the south of the Gaza Strip to Gaza City. Israeli ground forces may need to physically occupy the Egypt-Gaza border because naval strikes and airstrikes may not accomplish the mission. This would be a slight expansion on the action taken in 2008-2009 and could bring Israeli forces into uncomfortably close contact with Egyptian forces.

 

Second, in the north, the potential range of the Fajr-5 missile expands the potential firing zone that needs to be cleared. As stated earlier, Cast Lead focused on Gaza City and its surrounding areas in clearing operations. In order to degrade militants' abilities to reach Tel Aviv with the Fajr-5's expanded range, the IDF will need to clear all potential firing areas to just south of Nusayrat. In theory, this would require the isolation of a larger area and the potential use of more forces or require more time to accomplish.

 

Tactically, IDF troops entered the Gaza Strip during Cast Lead by operating at night and creating their own crossing points as opposed to using previously established points. They also relied heavily upon combat engineers, armored construction equipment including unmanned D9 bulldozers, and dog teams to establish their own avenues of approach instead of using common routes through Gaza. Ground units also worked in heavy conjunction with air assets for reconnaissance and close air support, and had access to comprehensive artillery support. This allowed them to avoid improvised explosive devices, heavily mined primary access routes, ambushes and counterattacks militants had planned near the assumed IDF approaches.

 

In a likely ground incursion, we can expect IDF to use similar tactics that have been refined even further over the past four years, but we must assume that militants in Gaza will not make the same mistakes twice and will use different tactics in order to inflict more damage on ground forces. Already in this round of fighting, unconfirmed reports have emerged saying that militants are using MANPADS. If these rumors are true, it could force a more limited role for rotary-wing air support as well as anti-tank guided missiles and thus seriously hamper the firepower, cover and protection provided by armor.

 

Many of the conditions, geographic settings and stated goals of the current mission are similar to Operation Cast Lead, so one can assume that the potential upcoming ground phase would be similar as well. That being said, some differences have emerged that would likely force an expanded role for ground forces, and the mission stays the same only until the first exchanges of fire happen, as militants and other political actors would also be able to influence how events unfold. With the evolution of the battle, a ground operation is becoming increasingly likely and with the transition to the ground phase of operations casualties, tensions, and political ramifications will only intensify.

[Andrea75]

Shifting Sands: Security and Development for Egypt’s Sinai

 

Escalating tensions in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula have become a serious headache for the country’s new rulers and a major test for Mohamed Morsi’s presidency. As the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) struggles to revamp the country’s ailing economy, deliver on its campaign pledges, and restore Egypt’s regional clout, widespread lawlessness along Egypt’s eastern border risks undermining these efforts while further complicating the MB’s nascent relationship with the West.

Reports of an increased penetration of radical jihadist groups in the Sinai surfaced soon after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 and have since grown into a key domestic and foreign policy challenge for Egypt’s new government. Beginning in August 2011, and following a first cross-border raid by Jihadi militants into Israeli territory, the Egyptian government approved a large-scale military operation in the Sinai in an attempt to re-establish central authority over Egypt’s eastern governorates. The anti-insurgency campaign, dubbed “Operation Eagle,” has had mixed results and over a year since its inception many of the problems problems plaguing Egypt’s Sinai remain unaddressed.

If managed improperly, tensions in the Sinai could have destabilizing effects on Egypt, the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, and Israel, potentially dragging the three into an escalation that

could send ripples across the region. Given that a stable Sinai is in the interest of all parties and the region as a whole, the West should develop a two-track policy focusing on security

and development for the area while devising strategies that could lay the groundwork for increased cooperation between the three neighbors.

[Andrea75]

US looks to furnish Yemen with new observation aircraft, probably Seabird Seeker

 

The US government is looking to equip Yemen with 25 light observation aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) work, it was revealed on 14 November.

 

A request for information (RfI) issued by the US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) calls for a light aircraft for the ISR role that will also be capable of providing in-country pilot training.

 

In a list of requirements, NAVAIR has set out some very specific criteria for the aircraft it is looking to field. These criteria state that it must be a commercial off-the-shelf pusher-propeller piston-engine aircraft of high-wing monoplane and tail dragger design. It should have side-by-side seating for two crew members, must be capable of operating out of austere locations, and should be sea transportable in a 40-ft ISO shipping container.

[Andrea75]

più poteri Egypt’s President Morsi takes sweeping new powers

 

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi took extensive new powers for himself Thursday, freeing his decisions from judicial review and ordering retrials for former top officials, including ex-president Hosni Mubarak.

The decree, issued a day after Morsi won international praise for fostering a cease-fire in Gaza, appears to leave few if any checks on his power. The president said all of the decisions he has made since he took office in June — and until a new constitution is adopted and a parliament elected — were final and not subject to appeal or review.

The announcement, read on state television by Morsi’s spokesman and broadcast repeatedly with accompanying nationalistic songs, shocked many in this struggling country, and street protests quickly erupted.

Morsi’s broad assertion of control came less than 24 hours after a diplomatic triumph in arranging the cease-fire in Gaza had given new credence to Morsi’s international bona fides. And it raised questions about whether Egypt might be headed to a return of its Mubarak-era arrangement on the world stage: a country praised for bringing stability to a volatile region and tolerated for abusing rights at home.

Muslim Brotherhood officials, with whom Morsi is allied, said the measures were necessary to ensure the country’s full and healthy return to democracy.

“This level of immunity for presidential decrees is indeed unprecedented, but it is necessary, and it is controlled by a time frame” that ends with the election of a new parliament, said Gehad el-Haddad, a senior Muslim Brotherhood adviser. “This constitutional declaration cements the way forward in terms of time frame and powers.”

But the decision raised immediate concerns among many liberal activists who had already been worried that Morsi had taken a distinctly authoritarian air in the three months since he swept out the top ranks of the military and sidelined what had long been a powerful independent institution in Egypt. Egypt’s short-lived parliament was dismissed by the country’s high court shortly before Morsi took power, so legislative powers also are concentrated under the president. Taking the courts out of the equation means there will be no judicial review of Morsi’s decisions.