Nuova Guerra Fredda in arrivo?

[Scagnetti]

La Cina interessata all'Atlantico? China is angling to take over a U.S. airbase in the Azores

 

Ma l'articolista del National Review si è bevuto il cervello? Le azzorre non sono uno sperduto gruppo di scogli, ma parte integrale del Portogallo da almeno 500 anni, con una popolazione di 238.767 abitanti e non sono soggette a contese internazionali con altri stati. Sono una regione autonoma, sì ma pacificamente inserita nello stato portoghese.

 

If China controlled the base, the Atlantic would no longer be secure. From the 10,865-foot runway on the northeast edge of the island, Chinese planes could patrol the northern and central portions of the Atlantic and thereby cut air and sea traffic between the U.S. and Europe. Beijing would also be able to deny access to the nearby Mediterranean Sea.

 

È un po' come ipotizzare "se la Cina controllasse la Sicilia"....

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper sulla Japan Self Defence Force Defense Programs and Budget of Japan Overview of FY2013 Budget Request

 

1 Faced with an increasingly severe security environment, Japan is aiming at the solid implementation of effective and efficient defense programs towards building a dynamic defense force, in accordance with the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond” (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) and the “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011-FY2015)” (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010).

2. The following new roles of the defense force are emphasized as continuous initiatives:

○ Effective deterrence and response

○ Further Stabilization of the regional security environment

○ Improvements in the global security environment

In that regard, emphasis will be placed on functions that can be used for various activities and functions having asymmetric response capability*1, as well as non-substitutable functions*2.

To take all possible measures for defense of islands and for ensuring safety of seas and airspace surrounding Japan, etc., Japan will also improve its defense posture by selectively developing such functions as warning and surveillance, maritime patrolling, air defense, response to ballistic missiles, transportation, and command control communications.

3. Drawing lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will continue to maintain and formulate the necessary posture to further exert its capabilities in large-scale disasters and unconventional disasters.

4. Amid growing fiscal austerity, it is necessary to allocate resources selectively to truly necessary functions by carefully examining the details of the programs.

 

Interessanti sono le tabelle di Procurement e di R&S

[madmike]

si, sembra un articolo un poco 'catastrofico', peraltro basato su un concetto che è difficile da comprendere: i Cinesi che controllano l'Atlantico, con 20 aerei?

 

Mah....

[Andrea75]

Ma l'articolista del National Review si è bevuto il cervello? Le azzorre non sono uno sperduto gruppo di scogli, ma parte integrale del Portogallo da almeno 500 anni, con una popolazione di 238.767 abitanti e non sono soggette a contese internazionali con altri stati. Sono una regione autonoma, sì ma pacificamente inserita nello stato portoghese.

 

È un po' come ipotizzare "se la Cina controllasse la Sicilia"....

 

Il contesto in cui si sviluppa questa situazione e quello di un Portogallo in affanno economico e di una Cina con cospicui fondi da spendere.

Azzardo alcune ipotesi:

- la delegazione Cinese ha semplicemente fatto tappa in un paese dove potrebbe sviluppare rapporti economici / commerciali

- la delegazione Cinese è realmente interessata ad una struttura (civile e/o militare) nell'Atlantico: la Cina stà ragionando da potenza globale e per difendere i propri interessi deve (per essere credibile) avere strutture in tutto il globo

- si tratta di un messaggio politico agli USA: non esagerate con il 'Pivot to Asia-Pacific' oppure noi potremmo allargare i nostri orizzonti.

 

Personalmente propendo per il messaggio politico.

Modificato 7 Novembre 2012 da Andrea75

[Scagnetti]

O forse il messaggio politico lo vuole dare il National Review che è noto per essere alquanto schierato politicamente

 

Voglio dire, aumentare le preoccuppazioni anche quando magari non è il caso...

[Andrea75]

Russia ready for NATO talks on conventional forces cuts

 

Russia is ready for talks with NATO on limiting conventional military forces in Europe as long as the Western alliance does not bring politics into the picture, Russia's new envoy to NATO was quoted as saying on Thursday.

Alexander Grushko's remarks indicated Russia is prepared to return to discussions about limits on non-nuclear forces five years after President Vladimir Putin suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.

But the envoy's caveat suggested Russia will not accept questions about the legitimacy of its forces in two breakaway Georgian regions it recognized as independent states after a 2008 war, or in Moldova's Transdnistria region.

"The main thing is that consultations, if not to say negotiations, should start without any attempts at linkages with political issues," Grushko said in Moscow, according to the Interfax news agency.

"If an interest in arms control, and not some political issues, is placed at the center, there is a chance to begin a very focused conversation about what kind of control is needed today," state-run RIA quoted him as saying.

"The ball is in Europe's court. We await signals from our European partners that would bear witness to their interest."

The timing of the announcement, shortly after U.S. President Barack Obama's re-election, may have been meant to show the United States and its NATO allies that Russia is open to constructive talks on arms control but will not give ground easily.

[Andrea75]

segnalo un paper di commento alla "USA’s defense posture" Reasonable Defense A Sustainable Approach to Securing the Nation

[nik978]

Intanto vediamo se il ricorrente conflitto arabo isrealiano si internazionalizza o resta "locale".

Per ora di internazionle ci sono solo due missili iraniani finiti uno in mare uno in un campo (a parte le prese di posizioni di circostanza).. speriamo resti così... bella grana per Obama rieletto.

Modificato 16 Novembre 2012 da nik978

[Andrea75]

Rumors? Dichiarazioni elettorali? Messaggi diplomatici? Possible kingmaker calls for nuclear-armed Japan

 

Firebrand former Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, a potential kingmaker in next month’s general election, said Tuesday Japan must acquire nuclear weapons if it wants to be taken seriously.

At very least, avowedly pacifist Japan should examine what it would need to do to join the club of declared nuclear powers, the 80-year-old arch conservative told foreign journalists in Tokyo.

“I think Japan should at least carry out an analysis on going nuclear,” Ishihara said.

“The diplomatic voice of countries without nuclear weapons is overwhelmingly weak,” he said.

Ishihara has a long track record of saying controversial things and breaking cultural taboos. He has previously expressed the same thoughts on Japan — the only country on which a nuclear attack has ever taken place — getting atomic weapons.

[Andrea75]

Reflections on China’s Military Trajectory and the U.S. Pivot

 

After having spent its first year in office trying to enlist China into a “comprehensive partnership” of shared leadership to solve global challenges, in 2010 the Administration of President Barack Obama received a series of jolts from Beijing, that along with a growing chorus of concern from Washington’s friends in Asia, promoted what in late 2011 the Administration started calling a “Pivot” or “Rebalancing” of U.S. strategy toward Asia. A parallel U.S. Defense Department (DoD) strategy shift began before the Obama Administration with the 2003-to-2005 gathering consensus that China was largely pursuing an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy designed to prevent U.S. forces from thwarting Chinese ambitions such as forcing “reunification” with Taiwan and imposing control over the South China Sea. At an institutional level, DoD’s response was signified by the November 2011 establishment of the Air-Sea Battle Office, which ostensibly would seek craft joint-service solutions to anti-access threats, with care taken to announce it was not directed specifically at China, though meeting a Chinese-level of challenge was the measure for success.

Politically and militarily the Obama Administration has sought to add heft to its Pivot. North Korea’s savage March 2010 sinking of a South Korean corvette, followed by threatening Chinese pushback of U.S. and allied attempts to pressure Pyongyang, have resulted in improvements in bi-lateral U.S.-South Korean military cooperation, and have even spurred progress in trilateral U.S.-South Korean-Japanese strategic cooperation. China’s aggressive claims in the South China Sea has resulted in rising Southeast Asian demands for greater U.S. leadership and has prompted a revival in U.S.-Philippine military cooperation. To a previously planned shift in U.S. forces to Asia and a modest buildup on Guam, the U.S. started other small but politically significant deployments to Australia, and soon, to Singapore and perhaps the Philippines.

However, a crisis requirement to reduce U.S. government spending has forced reductions in the growth of U.S. military spending, forcing the Department of Defense to work within existing force levels, cancel some significant programs, plus extended modernization plans to attempt to give military credibility to the political Pivot. The Air Sea Battle Office is not charged with devising new programs to meet China’s challenge but to devise suggestions to enable better joint service cooperation, but the services do have their priorities, from the Navy’s preservation of its carrier and submarine force plus the development of new anti-ship missiles, to the Air Force’s top priority of a new manned or unmanned penetrating bomber, plus support for the Lockheed Martin F-35 as its only alternative to build a 5th generation combat force.

While the political and military Pivot by the Obama Administration has generally received a bi-partisan welcome in Washington, one regular criticism is that the new strategy may not realize its full potential due to underfunding, despite Administration promises that defense spending cuts will not affect the U.S. posture in Asia. A second weakness is that in its attempt to be “nonconfrontational,” which does allow for acknowledgement that China is deepening its A2/AD challenge, the Pivot does not place this PLA buildup in the more pressing context of China’s preparations for future war on four fronts: Korea, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and against India. This means that simply countering China’s developing A2/AD is only the beginning of the military modernization/resource challenge facing the United States. A third challenge that the Pivot is simply not intended to address, but which is nonetheless directly related to the second and crying for response, is the increasing interrelationship between China’s development of a globally deployable military force and its buildup of nuclear and non-nuclear armed “allied” or even “proxy” states. This trend constitutes the unfolding of potentially many “Chinese Pivots” that could quickly overstress and thus limit or deter U.S. strategy. A fourth weakness of U.S. strategy, again one that the “Pivot” is not intended to confront but which in fact could constitute a decisive threat to this strategy, is the potential for a large Chinese nuclear “breakout.”

Though it may not be politically correct or economically opportune, it is the conclusion of this analyst that the U.S. must invest in new and in some cases expensive military system if it is to sustain a military edge against China that will continue to deter potential adventurism and possibly encourage China to consider non-military security solutions.

...

- Building Toward the Pivot of 2011

- Developing Air Sea Battle.

A focus of extensive inter-service and Department of Defense development and review, by early November 2011 the Pentagon announced the formation of its new Air-Sea Battle Office.14 Though in itself a military-diplomatic statement, the Obama Administration has gone to some length to deny that the new office’s main mission was “Anti-China,”15 but was to be focused on the “generic” anti-access challenge that could also come from other states like Iran. The new Air-Sea Battle Office reportedly is not advocating any “new” capabilities or programs for the U.S. Department of Defense. Rather, it is charged with proposing ways to better link existing capabilities and programs to promote its larger goal of leveraging far greater capabilities from better “jointness” between U.S. military services.16 One report notes that about 100 such proposals are being considered.

- Budgetary Uncertainty

- Addressing the Additional China Challenges

- Increasing A2/AD Challenges As China Prepares for War On Multiple Fronts

PLA is increasing this level of capabilities directed at forward deployed American forces in Asia at the same time that it is preparing for future large-scale conventional wars on multiple fronts. Its not just the PLA’s gathering integrated information/command/cyber/long-range strike forces that constitute the front of the spear of the PLA’s A2/AD challenge that should concern the U.S., but also the PLA gathering of modern “informationalized and “mechanized” Army forces increasingly deployed for potential Korean and Indian war scenarios, the large Army amphibious forces gathering for a potential conflict to settle the future of Taiwan, plus naval combat and Marine amphibious forces that could handily impose China’s claims to the South China Sea and undertake significant “raiding” operations against the Philippines, Malaysia or even Vietnam to punish their opposition to Beijing’s dictat.

- Korean/Japan Theater

- Taiwan Theater

- South China Sea Theater

- Indian Theater

- China’s Unopposed Proxy Campaign To Tie Down U.S. Forces

China’s continued creation of ever more dangerous proxy threats. Despite nearly three decades of complaining to Beijing about its nuclear and missile proliferation, while occasionally administering wrist-slap sanction, and decades of vigorous diplomacy to gain China’s “help” with North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Sudan, Syria and likely more to come, there is no U.S. policy that starts from the premise that China’s proliferation of nuclear and missile technology in addition to its building of proxy threats is in fact a deliberate indirect attack against the interests of the United States. There is no effort to identify publicly these Chinese actions which produce threats to more than just Americans, as there is no U.S. effort to lead a multilateral campaign of pressure. China’s proliferation and proxy-building should be a regular section in the annual DoD China Reports, but they are not.

- Could China’s Emerging Power Projection Capabilities Also Undermine the Pivot?

- Nuclear Anxieties and the Pivot

- Suggested Capabilities for the United States and its Asian allies to deter China into the 2020s

[Simone]

Mah, più un Paese si arricchisce di aziende manifatturiere, più i loro proprietari diventano influenti anche a livello politico e , almeno coloro che ragionano in termini economici, non gradiscono politiche che possano condurre ad un conflitto armato con tanto di incursioni aeree. Sappiamo che un cardine della strategia militare moderna è l'attacco alle fabbriche per "tagliare il nemico alla radice", cosa che potrebbe accadere anche in Cina in caso di ostilità, considerando che molte fabbriche sono vicine al mare.

Secondo me è un diritto di tutti gli Stati essere indipendenti e rispettati,però un conto e rendersi più forti e non farsi umiliare dai vicini, un altro è cercare di intimidire i vicini con atteggiamenti che ricordano molto da vicino la "politica imperiale" del XIX secolo. Mi ricordo una frase di James Baker, il "bullismo internazionale" non deve essere premiato

[Andrea75]

il punto di vista della Norvegia sull'Artico (a altro) Triple A – Building Confidence in the Arctic, Amazonas and the Antarctic

 

The first "A" – The Arctic

 

The Arctic is changing. I will focus three things:

 

It is affected by climate change - not as frozen as it used to be.

It is affected by a confident Russia reasserting its Great Power status - but also in this respect not as frozen as before - with the historical agreement on the demarcation lines with Russia, and good cooperation in areas like SAR, among others.

It is affected by global economic crisis, and will be affected by what strategy NATO will choose post ISAF. We have argued for the alliances need to focus on its core areas - bringing NATO home, and avoiding the development of a gap in the alliance, neither Transatlantic nor European.

 

The changes - in relation to the building of confidence in the High-North - happen mainly within three domains.

 

First, geophysical change is melting what used to be the playground of the polar heroes. September this year we registered the least amount of polar ice that we have ever seen. In 1979 the ice cap extension was approximately square kilometres 7.6 million. This September it was 3.6 – less than half.

 

Second, the Arctic is affected by geopolitical changes taking place worldwide. The economic crisis has left Europe with a serious struggle. Rivalry increases among the world's great powers, and conflicts might spread to the north. The USA is reorienting its attention towards the Pacific and Asia, resulting in less attention towards Europe.

 

Third, the Arctic is affected by geostrategic change. Russian military modernisation and activity is increased, including within the nuclear triad. Simultaneously NATO is gradually returning from Afghanistan reemphasizing its original tasks related to Article 5 in the Washington Treaty – collective defence of Allied territory.

 

The Norwegian policy approach to the Arctic region is this: "High North, Low Tension". The question is of course: Is this a mission impossible?

 

Our point of departure is this: a sound and peaceful Arctic region. In my view, the changes in our time have served us opportunities to develop stronger bilateral and multilateral relations and sustainable prosperity in the Arctic.

 

The stability in the Arctic - from a Norwegian perspective must be based on four main pillars.

 

NATO

The membership in NATO is the defining aspect of Norwegian defence policy. To a small nation the presence of, and more practically the training of allies is synonymous with stability and predictability. With our defence having gone through a major restructuring in the last fiteen years to become a modern, well equiped and highly trained organisation, we have great expectations to how the renewed emphasis on the allied Core Area and NATO's new strategic concept will be effectuated. In effect NATO needs to go backt to its core area. Bringing the Alliance home so to speak.

 

Essential contents will be informed decision making through enhanced situational awareness. We will make sure we have the ability to plug and play with the NATO Command system. And as ISAF is coming to an end, we expect an increase in allied training and exercise to enhance interoperability and credibility to operational concepts.

 

Modern and Capable Forces

Another important aspect is a modern and capable military force. Our procurement of new weapon systems is not to be considered a build-up – its modernisation. Our experience is that a robust, transparent and predictable military presence has a conflict preventive and stabilising effect. Our military structure is reformed to permit us to handle a crisis in the lower end on the scale ourselves, and in the upper end together with allies. By restructuring, and reforming we build a threshold - to prevent conflict - through modern defence capabilities.

 

The plan of acquiring up to 52 fifth generation combat aircraft is a major effort from the Norwegian government - to maintain future stability. In fact our F-16s have long since been in use on a regular basis, as a part of NATO Air Policing, identifying Russian flights close to our border. The committment to the F-35-programme is about building air capabilities relevant for the continued presence for Norway in our core areas in the High North.

 

Arctic Institutions

The third stabilising factor to the Norwegian approach to the Arctic is institutional frameworks. As a small nation Norway relies on the UN as the main arbritor to guard international law and state sovreignity. The UN recommendation concerning the Norwegian continental shelf surrounding Spitsbergen in 2009, was a result of a long term process.

 

Since the Arctic Council was established in 1996, it has been the only framework which includes all Arctic states. An Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic was signed by the Arctic states in 2011. It is considered as a valuable forum to develop relations and activities. Especially in relation to our powerful neigbour in the East.

 

Russia

To develop the relationship with Russia is of vital importance. We know our neighbours – and our neighbours know us. We have a long term perspective.

 

An example of this perspective and close cooperation is the agreement on the demarcation lines with Russia in 2011, following nearly 40 years of interim solutions. A step forward of vital importance.

 

Norway relies on openness and communication with Russia, both regarding the Arctic in general and military activity. We conduct bilateral crisis management exercises within search and rescue, and even common military exercises have been carried out. A hot line between our headquarters enables instant communication in case of difficult situations.

 

But of course we will continue to monitor the activities, and the overall situation in the High North closely.

 

Conclusion

The Arctic has - to be more like the Amazonas, so to speak in - in temperature. And more like the Antarctic in relation to tension and transparency.

 

The High north is indeed not as frozen as it used to be during the Cold War, (neither in relation to ice, nor neigbours).

 

There is an increase in activity, interest and presence of both civilian and military activity - mainly in realtion to increased activity as a result of the opening of the northeastern sea route and the exploitation of energy resources in the area. Increased activity, attention, in the area - undelines the importance of transparency and building trust in the High North. I think it is extremely important for a low tension outcome.

 

We will maintain the warm invitation for both NATO presence and training in the High North.

 

With an active presence, showing a strong comittment, and relevant military capabilities in our most important area of strategic interest - the main objective of Norway in the Arctic is to avoid conflict and provide good conditions for sustainable prosperity. This requires active policies and cooperation among the parties, based on transparency, dialogue and predictability.

 

I would like to sum up our objective regarding stability in the Arctic in four words:

 

High North – Low Tension.

[Andrea75]

Cina vs India: viene militarizzato anche l'Himalaya Special Report: In Himalayan arms race, China one-ups India

 

It has all the appearance of an arms race on the roof of the world.

 

Asia's two great powers are facing off here in the eastern Himalayan mountains. China has vastly improved roads and is building or extending airports on its side of the border in Tibet. It has placed nuclear-capable intermediate missiles in the area and deployed around 300,000 troops across the Tibetan plateau, according to a 2010 Pentagon report.

 

India is in the midst of a 10-year plan to scale up its side. In the state of Arunachal Pradesh, new infantry patrols started on the frontier in May, as part of a surge to add some 60,000 men to the 120,000 already in the region. It has stationed two Sukhoi 30 fighter squadrons and will deploy the Brahmos cruise missile.

 

"If they can increase their military strength there, then we can increase our military strength in our own land," Defence Minister A.K. Anthony told parliament recently.

 

Reuters journalists on a rare journey through the state discovered, however, that India is lagging well behind China in building infrastructure in the area.

 

The main military supply route through sparsely populated Arunachal is largely dirt track. Along the roadside, work gangs of local women chip boulders into gravel with hammers to repair the road, many with babies strapped to their backs. Together with a few creaky bulldozers, this is the extent of the army's effort to carve a modern highway from the liquid hillside, one that would carry troops and weaponry to the disputed ceasefire line in any conflict with China.

 

India and China fought a brief frontier war here in 1962, and Chinese maps still show all of Arunachal Pradesh within China's borders. The continuing standoff will test whether these two Asian titans - each with more than a billion people, blossoming trade ties and ambitions as global powers - can rise peacefully together. With the United States courting India in its "pivot" to Asia, the stakes are all the higher.

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings in Vladivostok, Russia: Postscript, che analizza i risultati dell'ultimo veritice APEC

 

Russia hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC) week-long series of senior-level meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The 20th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, the main event for the week, was held September 8-9, 2012. It was the first time that Russia had hosted the APEC meetings, as well as the first APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting at which all the members were also members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

U.S. expectations for the 20th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting were relatively low for a number of reasons. First, several of the members’ leaders either did not attend (e.g., President

Obama), were effectively lame ducks (e.g., President Hu Jintao of China), or were facing political uncertainty at home (e.g., Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan), making it difficult for the members to consider major commitments. Second, in the eyes of U.S. officials involved in the preparations for the meetings, Russia’s lack of experience and past lack of commitment to APEC weakened the pre-meeting preparations for the Leaders’ Meeting. Third, by holding the Leaders’ Meeting in September (rather than in November, as in previous years), Russia foreshortened the time to work on various initiatives. Fourth, recent events and initiatives, including the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement negotiations, have raised questions within the Obama Administration about APEC’s role on the promotion of greater economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.

Despite the low U.S. expectations, U.S. officials indicate that they think the week-long event in Vladivostok was relatively productive. Below is a summary of the main results of these meetings, according to senior officials in the Obama Administration:

• The 21 APEC members1 agreed to lower their tariffs on 54 categories of environmental goods to no more than 5% by 2015.

• The APEC members endorsed a model chapter on transparency for reference when negotiating multilateral or bilateral trade agreements.

• The APEC members agreed to cooperate in developing policies and technology to promote sustainable agriculture, including encouraging the harmonizing of domestic regulations on food safety.

• An APEC report concluded that its members had improved the ease of doing business by an average of 8.2% between 2009 and 2011, fulfilling nearly a third of APEC’s goal to obtain a 25% improvement by 2015.

• The APEC members agreed to continue to promote technological innovation by developing non-discriminatory, market-driven innovation policies and fostering greater communication between academia, businesses, and governments.

U.S. officials are apprehensive, however, about APEC’s prospects for the next two years when first Indonesia and then China will be the host members. This report also examines the role of Congress with respect to APEC, including appropriations necessary to finance APEC’s secretariat and U.S. support of APEC activities.

[Andrea75]

In data 30/11/2012 il Dipartimento di Stato USA ha rilasciato un aggiornamento sull'andamento del programma "New START". Essendo un trattato bilaterale fornisce solo i dati dei paesi sottoscrittore: USA e Russia (fonte)

 

Dati effettivamente aggiornati al 1° setttembre 2012

New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE Fact Sheet November 30, 2012

(Data in this Fact Sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty. It contains data declared current as of September 1, 2012. Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the Treaty.)

 

Category of Data

 

Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers ......... (USA 806) ..... (Russian Federation 491)

 

Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers .......... (USA 1722) ......... (Russian Federation 1499)

 

Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers ... (USA 1034) ... (Russia 884)

 

Seguono altre tabelle di dettaglio (solo USA) per "ICBMs and ICBM Launchers", "SLBMs and SLBM Launchers", "Heavy Bombers".

 

... segnalo poi un paper del Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists che tratta di US nuclear forces, 2012

 

As of early 2012, the United States maintained an estimated 2,150 operational warheads. The arsenal is composed of roughly 1,950 strategic warheads deployed on 798 strategic delivery vehicles, as well as nearly 200 nonstrategic warheads deployed in Europe. In addition, the United States maintains approximately 2,800 warheads in reserve, bringing the total stockpile to nearly 5,000 warheads. In this article, the authors take a hard look at the US nuclear arsenal, and explore the next steps in the nation's nuclear strategy.

 

L'obiettivo finale del tratto New START porterà:

To comply with treaty terms, the Obama administration has decided that the United States will reduce, before February 2018, the number of its deployed strategic delivery vehicles to a maximum of 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 420 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010: 46). This constitutes a reduction, from current levels, of 48 SLBMs, 30 ICBMs, and 34 B-52Hs.

 

... nel frattempo si procederà alla modernizzazione dell'arsenale:

The most noteworthy change is a decision to defer, for at least five years, construction of the expensive Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos. Faced with ever-increasing cost estimates currently nearing $6 billion the plan to increase annual production of plutonium pits at Los Alamos from 20 to 80 is being reassessed.

However, plans for a new Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee projected to cost up to $6.5 billion continue to move forward. Another new measure, the decision to

slow the production rate of the W76-1 warhead, is intended to free up funds so that the new B61-12 bomb can be produced.

 

un'analisi per tipologia

Land-based ballistic missiles

The US Air Force operates a force of 450 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs split evenly across three wings: the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base (AFB) in Wyoming; the 91st

Missile Wing at Minot AFB in North Dakota; and the 341st Wing at Malmstrom AFB in Montana. Each wing has three squadrons, each with 50 missiles controlled by five Launch Control Centers. The United States will have to reduce its ICBM force, as required under New START, by at least 30 missiles, for a total of 420. The final number, however, has not yet been announced; it will depend on how many bombers the air force retains. A reduction to 400 missiles could be achieved by cutting one squadron from one of the three bases. A reduction

to 300 missiles could be achieved by cutting one squadron from each of the three bases. .... The air force is carrying out a multibillion dollar, decade-long modernization program to extend the service life of the Minuteman III to 2030

...

Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)

All of the US Navy's 14 Ohio-class SSBNs (eight based in the Pacific and six in the Atlantic) carry Trident II D5 SLBMs. Normally 12 of the SSBNs are considered operational, although the New START data released in December 2011 revealed that, as of September 30, 2011, only 10 SSBNs were carrying a full complement of missiles 24 SLBMs per SSBN (Kristensen, 2011c). If all 12 operational SSBNs carry 24 SLBMs (288 D5 missiles total), and if each missile carries an average of four warheads, then approximately 1,152 warheads are deployed.

Two warhead types are deployed on the D5s: the 100-kiloton W76/W76-1 and the 455-kiloton W88. ...

The 2010 NPR stated that the United States would deploy no more than 240 SLBMs at any given time. To help meet that goal, over the next five years four launch tubes on each SSBN will be rendered inoperative so that each deployed submarine will carry 20 SLBMs instead of 24. The navy has ambitious plans to replace 12 Ohio-class SSBNs with new submarines currently designated SSBN(X) at a cost of at least $80 billion. Each boat will carry fewer missiles than the current Ohio-class SSBN, perhaps as few as 16. To save money in the short term, the Obama administration has decided to delay construction of the first boat by two years to 2021, with a launch goal of 2028 and an enter-intoservice date of 2031. The first Ohio-class SSBN is set to retire in 2027, with the others to follow at a rate of one per year. Unless the Ohio-class SSBN service life is extended ... Beginning in 2015, the navy will begin

deploying the D5LE SLBM, a life-extended version of the D5, on its SSBNs; the new missile will also arm the new SSBN(X). The navy plans to procure 12 D5LE missiles in 2012 and to

continue purchasing them until it has a total of 108 D5LE SLBMs at a cost of more than $4 billion.

...

Strategic bombers

The air force operates 20 B-2 and 93 B-52H bombers, of which 18 and 76, respectively, are nuclear capable. Of these, only 16 B-2s and 44 B-52s are thought to be fully nuclear certified

and assigned nuclear weapons. The nuclear bombers are organized across three bases, each with one wing and two squadrons. ... Approximately 300 nuclear weapons for bombers are stored at Minot AFB and Whiteman AFB in Missouri, including B61-7, B61-11 (for B-2s only), and B83-1 gravity bombs, as well as W80-1 warheads carried on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs, for B-52Hs only). Central storage facilities at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico and Nellis AFB in Nevada hold hundreds of additional bombs and cruise missiles that could be returned to the bases if necessary. Plans to reestablish nuclear weapon storage at Barksdale AFB have apparently been abandoned (Airforce-Magazine.com, 2011; Ferrell, 2012). The air force is designing a new longrange bomber that will eventually replace the B-2 and the B-52H;

...

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons

We estimate that the US stockpile includes approximately 760 nonstrategic nuclear weapons (Norris and Kristensen, 2011). This includes: nearly 200 active nonstrategic B61 bombs

deployed in Europe; 300 inactive B61s in storage in the United States; and 260 W80-0 warheads for the navy's nuclear Tomahawks, which are in the process of being retired.

The B61 bombs in Europe are deployed at six air bases in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The Belgian, Dutch, and Turkish air forces (with F-

16s) and German and Italian air forces (with PA-200 Tornado aircraft) are assigned nuclear strike missions with the US nuclear weapons ... Some of the countries that host US nuclear weapons in Europe participate in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program; the United States has committed to equipping the new F-35 JSF with a nuclear capability: the B61-12, which

is under development. The B61-12 consolidates four existing B61 types into one and will be outfitted with a new tail kit assembly for increased accuracy. The B61-12 will be deliverable

by B-2 and B-52H bombers, as well as F-15E, F-16, and PA-200 Tornado fighter-bombers, and of course the F-35.6

[Andrea75]

... segue dal post precedente.

 

segnalo un articolo di commento all'applicazione del New STARTNew Detailed Data For US Nuclear Forces Counted Under New START Treaty

 

The data attributes 1,722 warheads to 806 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers as of September 1, 2012. This is a reduction of 15 deployed warheads and 6 deployed delivery vehicles compared with the previous data set from March 2012.

A large number of non-deployed missiles and launchers that could be deployed are not attributed warheads.

The data shows that the United States will have to eliminate 234 launchers over the next six years to be in compliance with the treaty limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers by 2018. Fifty-six of these will come from reducing the number of launch tubes per SSBN from 24 to 20, roughly 80 from stripping B-52Gs and nearly half of the B-52Hs of their nuclear capability, and destroying about 100 old ICBM silos.

The released data does not contain a breakdown of how the 1,722 deployed warheads are distributed across the three legs of the Triad. But because the bomber number is disclosed and each bomber counts as one warhead, and because 450-500 warheads remain on the ICBMs (downloading to one warhead per ICBM was scheduled to resume in 2012), it appears that the deployed SLBMs carry 1,104 to 1,154 warheads, or more than two-thirds of the total number of warheads counted by New START.

Just to remind readers: the New START numbers do not represent the total number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal – only about a third. The total military stockpile is just under 5,000 warheads, with several thousand additional retired (but still intact) warheads awaiting dismantlement. For an overview, see this article.

 

Ballistic Missile Submarines

The New START data shows that the United States as of September 1, 2012, had 239 Trident II SLBMs onboard its SSBN fleet, a reduction of three compared with March 2012. That is only enough to fill nine SSBNs to capacity, but it doesn’t reflect an actual reduction of SLBMs or SSBNs but a fluctuation in the number of SLBMs onboard SSBNs during overhaul. Each SSBN has 24 missile tubes for a maximum loadout of 288 missiles (48 tubes on two SSBNs in overhaul are not counted), but at the time of the New START count it appears that two or three of the 14 SSBNs were empty (including the two in refueling overhaul) and two or three were only partially loaded (in missile loadout).

It is widely assumed that 12 out of 14 SSBNs normally are deployable, but the various sets of aggregate data all indicate that the force ready for deployment at any given time may be closer to 10. This ratio can fluctuate significantly and in average 64 percent (8-9) of the SSBNs are at sea with roughly 920 warheads. Up to five of those subs are on alert with 120 missiles carrying an estimated 540 warheads – enough to obliterate every major city on the face of the earth.

Of the eight SSBNs based at Bangor (Kitsap) Submarine Base in Washington, the data indicates that three were out of commission on September 1, 2012: one had empty missile tubes (possibly because it was in dry dock) and two others were only partially loaded. This means that five SSBNs from the base were fully loaded and probably deployed with 120 Trident II D5 missiles carrying some 540 warheads at the time of the New START count.

For the six SSBNs based at Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia, the New START data shows that 103 missiles were counted as deployed on September 1, 2012. That number is enough to load four SSBNs, with two other SSBNs only partially loaded. The four deployed SSBNs probably carried 96 Trident II SLBMs with some 430 warheads.

 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The New START data shows that the United States deployed 449 Minuteman III ICBMs as of September 1, 2012, the same number that was deployed in March 2012. Most were at the three launch bases, but a significant number (321) were at maintenance and storage facilities in Utah. That included 58 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs retired in 2003-2005 but which have not been destroyed.

The New START data does not show how many warheads were loaded on the 449 deployed ICBMs. Downloading to single warhead loading was scheduled to begin in FY2012, but a completion has not been announced. The warhead number is 450-500. The 2010 NPR decided to “de-MIRV” the ICBM force, an unfortunately choice of words because the force will retain the capability to re-MIRV if necessary.

 

Heavy Bombers

The New START data shows that the U.S. Air Force possessed 141 B-2 and B-52 nuclear-capable heavy bombers as of September 1, 2012. Of these, 118 were counted as deployed, a reduction of four compared with March 2012. The data shows that only half of the B-2 stealth bombers are deployed.

Unfortunately the bomber data is misleading because it counts 30 retired B-52G bombers stored at Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona as “deployed” at Minot AFB in North Dakota. The mischaracterization is the result of a counting rule in the treaty, which says that bombers can only be deployed at certain bases. As a result, the 30 retired B-52Gs are listed in the treaty as deployed at Minot AFB – even though there are no B-52Gs at that base. According to Air Force Global Strike Command, “There are no B-52Gs at Minot AFB, N.D…In accordance with accounting requirements, we have them assigned to Minot and as visiting Davis-Monthan.” The actual number of deployed heavy bombers should more accurately be listed as 88 B-2A and B-52H, with another 53 non-deployed (including the 30 at Davis Monthan AFB.

All of these bombers carry equipment that makes them accountable under New START, but only a portion of them are actually involved in the nuclear mission. Of the 20 B-2s and 91 B-52Hs in the Air Force inventory, 18 and 76, respectively, are nuclear-capable, but only 60 of those (16 B-2s and 44 B-52Hs) are thought to be nuclear tasked at any given time. None of the aircraft are loaded with nuclear weapons under normal circumstances but are attributed a fake count under New START of only one nuclear weapon per aircraft even though each B-2 and B-52H can carry up to 16 and 20 nuclear weapons, respectively. Roughly 1,000 nuclear bombs and cruise missiles are in storage for use by these bombers. Stripping excess B-52Hs and the remaining B-52Gs of their nuclear equipment will be necessary to get down to 60 counted nuclear bombers by 2018.

 

Conclusions and Recommendations

The New START data released by the State Department continues the decision made last year to release the full U.S. unclassified aggregate numbers, an important policy that benefits international nuclear transparency and counters misunderstandings and rumors.

The latest data set shows that the U.S. reduction of deployed strategic nuclear forces over the past six months has been very modest: 6 delivery vehicles and 15 warheads. The reduction is so modest that it probably reflects fluctuations in the number of deployed weapon systems in overhaul at any given time. Indeed, while there have been some reductions of non-deployed and retired weapon systems, there is no indication from the new data that the United States has yet begun to reduce its deployed strategic nuclear forces under the New START treaty.

Those reductions will come slowly over the next five-six years to meet the treaty limits of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles by February 2018. But almost two years after the New START treaty entered into force, it is clear that the Pentagon is not in a hurry to implement it.

[Andrea75]

... terza parte: The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions. Si tratta di un paper molto dettagliato in cui si possono trovare i vari dettagli del trattato New START e dati analitici delle armi schierate per entrambi i paesi.

 

 

The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee both held hearings on the treaty. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament—the Duma and Federation Council—approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification.

New START provides the parties with seven years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber.

New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty’s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits. The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side’s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.

New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.

The Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START will strengthen strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security. They contend that New START will contribute to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by convincing other nations that the United States is serious about its obligations under the NPT. This might convince more nations to cooperate with the United States in pressuring nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapons.

Critics, however, question whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Some also consider the U.S.-Russian arms control process to be a distraction from the more important issues on the nonproliferation agenda.

[Andrea75]

Trimming Nuclear Excess: Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces

 

 

United States Nuclear Posture: Status and Trends

The Department of Defense (DOD) stockpile currently includes approximately 4,650 nuclear warheads for delivery by more than 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft. Of these, approximately 1,950 strategic warheads are thought to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles and at bases with deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers; an additional 200 non-strategic nuclear warheads are at bases with operational aircraft. Another 2,500 strategic and non-strategic warheads are thought to be in storage for potential uploading onto delivery platforms if necessary or as replacements if one or more warhead types develop technical difficulties. Another 3,000 retired, but still intact, warheads in Department of Energy (DOE) custody are awaiting dismantlement (see Table 3).

In order to meet the limitations of the New START Treaty of no more than 1,550 accountable deployed strategic warheads and 700 accountable deployed strategic delivery vehicles by 2018, the DOD is currently dismantling so-called “phantom” platforms that are not assigned nuclear warheads but count against the treaty limit because of nuclearcapable equipment. Later in the decade, reduction of nuclear-armed missiles will begin to trim the deployed nuclear forces to no more than 420 ICBMs, 240 SLBMs and 60 bombers. As a result, by the early 2020s the arsenal might include 700 deployed launchers with 1,790 warheads; under New START rules, this force would count as only 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, since nuclear-capable bombers are counted as only one warhead, regardless of the number they may be assigned. An additional 1,800 warheads in reserve for a total stockpile of roughly 3,600 warheads (see Table 3).

Future decisions may reduce the warhead level, for example in response to the Obama administration’s ongoing, but delayed, review of nuclear targeting and alert level requirements.

 

il paper prosegue analizzando le diverse categorie (missili balistici intercontinentali, missili balistici intercontinentali lanciati da sottomarini, bombardieri, materiale nuclerare non strategico)

 

Russian Nuclear Posture: Status and Trends

Russia does not disclose information about the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile, or publish the detailed categories of aggregate data produced under the New START Treaty. Occasionally, official statements at NPT Review conferences have made reference to overall reductions, but without providing actual numbers. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference, for example, the Russian delegation declared that “compared to 1991, the total stockpile of nuclear weapons has been reduced more than fivefold,” and that “Russia has cut down its arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons fourfold.” Since then, Russia has stopped updating these public announcements. Instead, at the 2010 NPT conference, the Russian government simply repeated the 2005 statement as if no additional reductions had been made during the intermediate five years.

In addition, the U.S. government, which during the Cold War published detailed estimates of Soviet nuclear forces, has stopped doing so and today provides essentially no information to the public about the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal. As a result of this secrecy, uncertainty and worst-case rumors abound in the news media and international arms control community about the status and trend of Russian nuclear forces. Consequently, making reliable estimates is becoming more difficult. Instead of providing its own estimates, the Pentagon in 2012 cited unspecified unclassified estimates that “Russia has approximately 4,000 to 6,500 nuclear weapons…of which approximately 2,000-4,000 are non-strategic – or ‘tactical’ – nuclear weapons.” This report estimates that there are approximately 4,500 nuclear warheads left in the Russian stockpile, of which roughly 2,000 are non-strategic warheads (see Table 4).

What is clear, however, is that Russia already is below the New START Treaty limit and is not legally required to reduce its deployed strategic forces further. The aggregate data as

of September 1, 2012, accredited Russia with 1,499 warheads on 491 deployed strategic delivery vehicles.22 This corresponds to 51 warheads and 209 delivery vehicles below the

treaty limit six years before the treaty’s limits take full effect in February 2018. While the published New START Treaty aggregate data provides a general overall snapshot of Russia strategic nuclear forces and some limited indications of how warheads are distributed, the limited data does not provide any information about how the ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers are structured. What is known is that the strategic forces are in the Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces 20 Federation middle of a generational transformation that involves phasing out four Cold War ballistic missiles and replacing them on a less than one-for-one basis with three new missiles. Russia reportedly spent $860 million (RUB27.4 billion) on nuclear armaments in 2012 and plans to spend $3.3 billion (RUB101.15 billion) on the nuclear complex in 2013-2015, or an average of $1.1 billion. Through 2020, Russia plans to spend approximately $70 billion on its nuclear triad.

The retirement of the four old systems will eliminate approximately 350 ICBMs and SLBMs by the early 2020s. To compensate, Vladimir Putin stated shortly before the 2012 election that Russia would produce “over 400” ICBMs and SLBMs in the next 10 years. Such a production rate of more than 40 missiles per year, which presumably includes missiles intended for deployment as well as those intended to replace missiles expended in missile tests, would be significantly above the production rate that Russia has demonstrated during the past decade.

Between 2002 and 2012, Russia deployed an average of six new ICBMs per year, retrofitted its Delta IV SSBNs with the Sineva missile (a modified SS-N-23), and produced perhaps

two boatloads of Bulava missiles, or less than 200 missiles in total. It seems doubtful that Russia’s military production complex, which is plagued by corruption and mismanagement,

will be able to double missile production in the next decade. As a result, the strategic nuclear missile force might even decline further, even without a new arms control treaty, to just below 400 missiles with 1,480 warheads by 2022 (see Figure 3). The deployed force would be even smaller, perhaps 350 missiles with 1,260 warheads. The key variable in this projection is how many warheads each RS-24 carries (this report estimates three to four) and how many RS-24s Russia will be able to produce and deploy.

 

il paper prosegue analizzando le diverse categorie (missili balistici intercontinentali, missili balistici intercontinentali lanciati da sottomarini, bombardieri, materiale nuclerare non strategico)

 

Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Nuclear Reductions

...

Nuclear Guidance Review: The Obama Administration has nearly completed a strategic review that reportedly involves a reassessment of U.S. nuclear targeting requirements and alert levels to identify options for reducing nuclear forces further. While the study itself apparently is complete, President Obama will has to choose among a range of options and issue a new Presidential Policy Directive to the military for adjusting nuclear force planning. Part of the conclusions may form the basis of a new arms control treaty with Russia, but some decisions can probably be implemented unilaterally.

- Recommendation: The Obama administration should complete and publicly present the main conclusions of its strategic nuclear targeting review.

- Recommendation: I addition to unilateral adjustments of the U.S. nuclear posture, the results of the strategic review should form the basis of a U.S. proposal to Russia for a follow-on START Treaty to reduce U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear forces to 500 delivery vehicles and 1,000 warheads.

 

Ballistic Missile Submarines: Both the United States and Russia can make changes to their SSBN postures to reduce force levels and operations. The United States plans to reduce the number of missile tubes on each SSBN from 24 to 20 in 2015-2016. Later in the decade, it might also retire two of the 14 SSBNs early. Each of the next-generation SSBN (SSBNX) will only have 16 tubes compared with 24 tubes on the each SSBN today. The decision to reduce the fleet of 14 SSBNs each with 24 SLBMs to 12 SSBNs each with 16 SLBMs – a reduction of 144 missiles or more than 40 percent, combined with the decline in deterrent patrols and operational tempo, raises questions about the size of the force and the need to continue to retain two full crews for each SSBN. The trend suggests that the SSBN posture for some time has been significantly in excess of national security needs at the unnecessary expense of taxpayer dollars, and that it is scheduled to remain too high for the next two decades.

- Recommendation: Reduce the Ohio-class SSBN fleet to 12 boats and the number of missile tubes on each SSBN to 16 within the next few years, the force level that has already been decided for the SSBNX. This would also permit retirement of more than 700 warheads.

- Recommendation: Within the next decade, reduce the number of Ohio-class SSBNs further to eight or ten to better match the Russian level.

- Recommendation: Reduce the maximum capacity on each SLBM to four warheads. Eliminate the reconstitution hedge of reserve warheads.

 

The outlook for Russia’s SSBN force is less clear but it appears to be heading toward eight submarines with 156 missiles by 2022. The replacement of Delta III and Delta IV SSBNs

with the Borei SSBN will result in a slightly smaller SSBN force but with greater missile and warhead capacity. This increase is caused by the improved Borei SSBNs (fourth and subsequent hulls) being equipped with 20 missile tubes instead of the 16 on Delta SSBNs, and because the new Bulava SLBM carries six warheads instead of three and four on the SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 (Sineva) it replaces.

- Recommendation: Curtail the number of missile tubes on improved Borei SSBNs to 16, the same as on existing Delta SSBNs.

- Recommendation: Reduce the maximum capacity on each SS-N-23 (Sineva) and Bulava SLBM to four warheads. Eliminate the excess warheads.

 

Operations of SSBNs can also be curtailed and adjusted to better fit today’s security environment. The U.S. SSBN fleet has continued a high tempo of operations with two crews

to ensure uninterrupted deterrent patrols and four to five of its deployed SSBNs on alert. Russia has not been able to match this performance but has recently announced that it

intends to resume continuous patrols.

- Recommendation: Remove the requirement for prompt launch of SLBMs and reduce SSBN operations to focus on ensuring a secure retaliatory capability.

- Recommendation: Reduce to one crew per SSBN.

 

 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles: The United States and Russia should take steps to better realign their highly asymmetrical ICBM forces. The large U.S. ICBM force on high alert with a significant warhead upload capacity drives Russian worst-case planning and fear of vulnerability of its smaller but highly MIRVed ICBM force. Under current plans, the ratio of MIRVed missiles in the Russian ICBM force is expected to nearly double within the next decade. The START II treaty included an important agreement to ban multiple warheads on ICBMs. That ban should be revived and incorporated into the next treaty. To reduce the growing asymmetry in U.S. and Russian ICBM forces, and to pave the way for de-MIRVing, important steps can be taken. The U.S. ICBM force is already being downloaded to single-warhead loading, but the capability to reconstitute the offloaded warheads back onto the missiles should be

eliminated, and the missile force reduced to better match the size of the smaller Russian ICBM force and allow Russia to de-MIRV its ICBM force as well.

- Recommendation: The United States should eliminate MIRV capability from its Minuteman III ICBM force and retire the reconstitution hedge warheads.

- Recommendation: The United States should reduce the ICBM force to 300 Minuteman III missiles by reducing one squadron from each of its three ICBM bases. This initiative could be combined with a proposal to Russia to de-MIRV its ICBMs (see below).

- Recommendation: Russia should declare how many ICBMs and of what types it plans to deploy when.

- Recommendation: Russia should immediately reduce the warhead loading of mobile RS-24 ICBMs to one warhead, the same loading on the SS-25 it is replacing.

- Recommendation: Russia should de-MIRV its ICBM force in coordination with the U.S. reducing its ICBM force to 300 missiles.

- Recommendation: Russia should terminate plans to field a “heavy” ICBM

 

Heavy Bombers: The United States is designing a next-generation bomber to replace the B-52Hs and B-1B, and later B-2s, beginning in the mid-2020s. A total of 80 to 100 aircraft

is envisioned. Russia has plans to introduce a new bomber around 2020, but it seems more likely that the service life of existing bombers will be extended.

- Recommendation: The United States should remove the capability from B-52H bombers to carry and deliver nuclear gravity bombs. This would permit retirement of several hundred warheads from the stockpile.

- Recommendation: Russia and the United States should reduce the maximum ALCM capacity on each bomber to six missiles. The next arms control treaty should address actual loading capacity or, at the least, not provide such a large discount to bomber weapons (e.g., each bomber might count as three to fourweapons instead of one).

- Recommendation: Russia should limit its ALCM inventory to one type.

- Recommendation: The United States should delay initial nuclear capability on its next-generation bomber to enable existing bombers to serve that role as long as possible.

 

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Short-range, or non-strategic, nuclear weapons are a leftover from the Cold War, where they were designed and fielded for use in regional battlefield-like scenarios.37 Since 1991, the United States and Russia have drastically reduced their stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear warheads, but large inventories remain – a

leftover that becomes more important as strategic forces are reduced. With the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff gone from Europe and elsewhere, non-strategic nuclear weapons should be reduced and, wherever possible, eliminated. NATO doctrine has already transitioned beyond non-strategic nuclear weapons by stating only that it is strategic nuclear forces that provide the ultimate security guarantee to the alliance.38 The nearly 200 nuclear bombs the United States deploys in Europe are only there because NATO has not yet been able to figure out how to withdraw them due to assurance requirements, particularly of some allies in Eastern Europe. In Northeast Asia, where all U.S. nonstrategic weapons were withdrawn in 1991, some Japanese and South Korean officials apparently still have a hard time accepting that fact.

NATO’s newfound concern about the disparity with Russia’s larger inventory of nonstrategic nuclear weapons is misguided, first because NATO hasn’t cared much about the disparity for the past two decades, and second because the Alliance unilaterally has eliminated all other categories than air-delivered bombs and even cut the remaining bombs in Europe by more than half since 2004. Indeed, at the same time that NATO begun to express concern over the disparity of U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces, the U.S. has unilaterally (with NATO’s blessing) retired its last non-strategic naval nuclear weapon, thus further increasing the disparity. Moreover, the size and composition of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces are not determined by U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces but by the Russian military’s conviction that non-strategic nuclear weapons are needed to compensate for Russia’s inferior conventional capability against U.S. and NATO superior conventional forces. Instead, the continued presence of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe has become a convenient excuse for Russian officials to reject talks about reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons in general.

To break this stalemate, the United States needs to work to convince NATO to withdraw the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. Importantly, there are indications that

the new French government is considering changing the previous government’s opposition to a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe.39 Continued assurance of

NATO allies with non-nuclear means should be done in a way that doesn’t deepen Russian concern over NATO’s conventional capabilities – and thus reinforces a Russian need

for non-strategic nuclear weapons to compensate.

Both sides need to significantly decrease secrecy and increase transparency of their nonstrategic nuclear forces. Excessive secrecy fuels rumors and worst-case assumptions that

block or complicate arms control efforts. Transparency, on the other hand, defuses suspicion and improves the ability to develop the best options to reduce non-strategic nuclear

weapons.

- Recommendation: The United States and Russia should announce the size and history of their non-strategic nuclear warhead stockpiles.

- Recommendation: The United States and Russia should increase transparency of their non-strategic nuclear forces, starting by disclosing the sites where they are no longer deployed, jointly developing inspections for verifying the absence of the weapons, and following up by declaring where the remaining nuclear weapons are stored.

- Recommendation: The United States and Russia should develop a framework for reducing and eventually eliminating non-strategic nuclear forces. The framework should include a combination of unilateral and negotiated steps and a verification regime for verifying the status and reductions of non-strategic nuclear forces.

- Recommendation: As a good-will gesture in response to the U.S. retirement of the TLAM/N, Russia should retire its nuclear land-attack sea-launched cruise missiles.

- Recommendation: Russia should eliminate the remaining nuclear capability for ground-launched forces, as promised by the presidential nuclear initiatives in 1991/1992.

- Recommendation: The United States should declare its intension to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Europe, and work with its NATO allies toward that goal.

- Recommendation: The United States should, in consultation with its allies, cancel the B61-12 life-extension program and instead perform a bare-bone lifeextension of the B61-7 for the B-2 bomber.

 

Nuclear Stockpile and Production Complex: The United States has disclosed the size and history of its nuclear weapons stockpile, and Russia needs to follow this example (Britain and France have also disclosed the size of their stockpiles). Both countries should also disclose the history and annual dismantlement of retired warheads to remove concerns about cheating and to demonstrate to the international community their sincerity about reducing and destroying nuclear weapons. To that end, the growing disparity of deployed and non-deployed ballistic missile warheads is a particular concern, with the United States maintaining a significant inventory of reserve warheads while Russia has no or only a limited upload capability, because it fuels Russian suspicion that the United States cannot be trusted and is retaining a capacity to break out of arms control agreements.

Over the course of two decades, the United States has invested billions of dollars in a modern stockpile stewardship program that enables it to verify, refurbish and re-certify existing nuclear warhead types without producing new ones. Not much is known about the Russian warhead program but it is assumed to rely much more on reproduction of existing warhead types and production of new ones. Limiting warhead production capacity in both countries is important to making arms reductions irreversible and reducing concerns about treaty breakout scenarios. The United States is already collaborating with Britain and France on their stockpile stewardship programs, and it should explore how it could collaborate with Russia to help reduce its warhead production capacity while continuing to verify the reliability of existing warheads.

- Recommendation: Russia should announce the total size and history of its nuclear weapons stockpile.

- Recommendation: The United States and Russia should announce the size and history of their annual nuclear warhead dismantlements.

- Recommendation: Russia should curtail production of nuclear warheads to one of its two remaining plants.

- Recommendation: The United States should eliminate its hedge of reserve warheads intended to increase (reconstitute) the warhead loading on ballistic missiles.

- Recommendation: The United States should cancel the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) and Uranium Production Facility (UPF) and instead upgrade existing facilities to meet low-rate refurbishment of warheads.

- Recommendation: The United States and Russia should explore options for designing an improved Russian nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program that can maintain the reliability of existing warheads but reduce a need to produce new warheads.

[Andrea75]

... segnalo questo articolo; è una opinione sull'opportunità di mantenere (o meno / o in numeri inferiori) l'attuale arsenale nucleare USA How many nukes does it take to be safe?

 

the United States is moving ahead with plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons — an even more destructive force — with no serious public discussion.

Twenty years from now, how many nuclear warheads on strategic submarines will the United States need? That’s not an abstract question. The country is engaged in a costly, ambitious modernization of its nuclear weapons complex and development of a new generation of delivery systems — new strategic submarines, bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles that will be operating more than 50 years from now.

Start with the Navy’s plan for 12 new SSBN-X strategic submarines to replace the 14 Ohio-class subs now in service. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the program, released Dec. 10, asks whether the Navy can stay within the cost targets for their procurement ($4.9 billion each) and whether each sub should carry 16 or 20 missiles.

But shouldn’t the questions be more basic, such as who is the enemy and how many subs would be needed to deter that enemy?

There will be at least four or five warheads on each of the 16 ICBMs carried on each of the new subs. Their destructive power will be eight to more than 20 times that of the atomic bomb that all but destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.

...

It’s agreed that nuclear weapons don’t deter terrorist groups. And if history is any guide, the more the United States and other nuclear-armed countries modernize their weapons, the more tempting it is for other countries to want nuclear arsenals.

So how many warheads does the United States need over the next 40 years to deter others?

That’s a multibillion-dollar question, and among those President Obama and his new national security team will have to wrestle with as they try to tighten Defense spending.

I have written before that it’s time to get a rational, long-range nuclear strategy because the cost of replacing the nation’s three nuclear delivery systems will top $100 billion and require another $300 billion over the next 10 years to keep them operational.

...

Since 1991, when the Iron Curtain fell, both the United States and Russia have sharply reduced not just their overall stockpiles but their deployed weapons. According to a study released last week by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, both sides are down to roughly 4,500 strategic warheads and bombs apiece, and by 2018 will have just 1,550 operationally deployed as required by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which took effect Feb. 5, 2011.

Ironically, after signing the treaty, the two countries began modernizing their nuclear forces.

By the end of the decade, the deployed U.S. force may be 400 single-warhead, land-based ICBMs; 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles with three to five warheads each; and 60 strategic bombers, which each count for only one warhead though they carry more than one bomb. Beyond that, there are to be some 1,600 stockpiled warheads or bombs, Kristensen says.

Why do we need that size of a nuclear arsenal for the next 50 years?

Why 12 and not 10 subs, for example? Under construction plans, the Navy will go down to 10 operational boats between 2029 and 2041, as old Ohio-class submarines are retired before new ones are finished, according to the CRS study. What new threat requiring another 90 sub-launched warheads will be arising after 2041?

A new Presidential Policy Directive is due to be presented to the military shortly, a paper in which Obama will set nuclear force planning for the rest of his administration. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, the president said he wanted to “put an end to Cold War thinking . . . reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same.”

[Andrea75]

... riprendo l'argomento di un mio precedente post di questa discussione (il #99) che si riferiva ad un presunto interesse cinese nell'Atlantico. Se ne discute ancora ...

 

Red Star Over the Atlantic?

 

 

Writing at World Politics Review, my NWC colleague Nikolas Gvosdev urges the United States to think ahead in case China establishes a global presence, but to do so without succumbing to the kind of action-reaction dynamic that typified Cold War competition. Not every Chinese move warrants an American reply. This is sound advice.

Nick mentions Wen Jiabao’s much-discussed stopover in the Azore Islands, which could represent the prelude to a Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic. As the U.S. Air Force radically scales back its presence in the islands, Beijing could fill the void.

Maybe. There’s no ruling out unwise policy. China has blundered repeatedly in the East China and South China seas over the past few years, creating needless problems for itself. But on the positive side of the ledger, its leadership has been admirably circumspect about taking on extraregional commitments. Its reach has not exceeded its military grasp. Apart from the counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, it has kept its forces concentrated in East Asian waters and China proper.

But suppose Beijing does multiply its out-of-area commitments. Rather than fret about an extraregional China, I say bring it on.

The more burdens Beijing shoulders outside the Far East, the more it must disperse finite physical power—diluting the military assets it can apply to any given contingency without leaving commitments elsewhere uncovered. It will have less military might to spare for adventures like grabbing parts of Southeast Asian states’ exclusive economic zones or mounting a challenge to the forward American presence in the Western Pacific.

China, it seems, may soon discover the joys of juggling competing demands on scarce resources and policy energy. Asia is a far less permissive setting than the Americas. Consequently, Beijing may also discover that multitasking is even harder for a global power that inhabits a tough neighborhood, has abundant unfinished business close to home, and has courted few partners and allies to help advance its interests.

Strategic thinkers have struggled with questions of concentration and dispersal since time immemorial. Carl von Clausewitz counsels that the best policy is to be very strong, both in general and at the decisive time and place. Easier said than done. Setting priorities becomes nightmarish when national interests are at stake in many places at the same time.

Welcome to the club, China.

[Andrea75]

... segnalo questo paper "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments" http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf

 

 

A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which
rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, “My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” However, the Administration focused its efforts in 2010 on securing Senate advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
The Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT “education” campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, but there were no hearings on the treaty in the 111th or 112th Congresses. As of December 2012, 183 states had signed the CTBT and 157, including Russia, had ratified it. However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 36 had ratified. Seven conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, most recently on September 23, 2011.
Nuclear testing has a long history, beginning in 1945. The Natural Resources Defense Council states that the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. (Of the U.K. tests, 24 were held jointly with the United States and are not included in the foregoing U.S. total.) The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT. North Korea announced that it conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Since 1997, the United States has held 27 “subcritical experiments” at the Nevada National Security Site, most recently in December 2012, to study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives. It asserts these experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Russia reportedly held some such experiments since 1998.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program seeks to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. Its budget is listed as “Weapons Activities” within the request of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous component of the Department of Energy. Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act.

The FY2012 appropriation for Weapons Activities was $7.214 billion. The FY2013 request is $7.577 billion; P.L. 112-175, making continuing appropriations for FY2013, provided funds at that rate through March 27, 2013. Congress also considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests, operated by the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission.
The FY2013 request for that contribution is $33.0 million, plus $3.5 million as a special contribution to the organization. P.L. 112-175 provided funds for these contributions as well. This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects a U.N. resolution on the treaty, FY2013 continuing appropriations, and stockpile stewardship experiments. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated “Safeguards” and Net Assessments, by Jonathan Medalia, discusses safeguards— unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties—and their relationship to the CTBT. CRS Report R42498, Energy and Water Development: FY2013 Appropriations, coordinated by Carl E. Behrens, provides details on stockpile stewardship.

[Andrea75]

... paper sulla protezione del materiale nucleare A New Rule to Protect Radioactive Material: Background, Summary, Views from the Field http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42868.pdf

 

 

This report analyzes 10 C.F.R. 37, a forthcoming rule promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Physical Protection of Byproduct Material.” “Byproduct material” includes specified types of radioactive material other than uranium or plutonium. The rule regulates byproduct material of types and in quantities that could be used to make a “dirty bomb.”
Congress may find this analysis of interest for several reasons: Congress attaches great importance to protecting the United States against terrorist threats; the rule will affect the many industrial, research, and medical activities nationwide that use radioactive materials, thereby affecting many constituents and raising cost-benefit issues; and there is wide concern about regulation and radiation more generally.
NRC may regulate through orders or rules. Both have the effect of law. If prompt action is required, NRC may issue orders to its licensees. After 9/11, NRC issued orders to enhance radioactive material security. Orders went to licensees of irradiators having a large amount of radioactive material (2003), manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material (2004), licensees transporting radioactive materials in quantities of concern (2005), and others.
NRC prefers, however, to regulate through rules. The rulemaking process is transparent, as it solicits public comments and revises draft rules to reflect them, a process that may take years, whereas NRC may issue orders with little or no public involvement. An order applies only to licensees receiving it, while a rule applies to all current and future licensees. Accordingly, NRC began a rulemaking process to consolidate the security orders into a rule. It solicited public comments in the June 15, 2010, Federal Register. 10 C.F.R. 37 incorporates many provisions of the orders. Its main areas are:
• Background investigations and access control programs, setting trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) requirements for persons granted unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern.
• Physical protection requirements during use, requiring licensees to establish a written security program, coordinate with local law enforcement, and be able to monitor, detect, and assess theft of radioactive material.
• Physical protection in transit, requiring transporters of radioactive material to follow certain procedures. To assess impacts of the rule, CRS interviewed 14 radiation professionals, including state regulators, university radiation safety officers, manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material, and a transportation specialist. They noted such impacts as:
• T&R adjudication: Some interviewees felt requirements were burdensome; others could meet requirements easily. Some felt human resources staff lacked expertise needed to adjudicate T&R; others were confident in staff capability.
• Cooperation with local law enforcement: Some interviewees felt that cooperation was excellent. Some found it improved greatly once the threat had been explained. Others found poor cooperation. Still others noted that multiple emergencies or the size of an officer’s patrol area could delay response.

• Transportation security: NRC relinquishes parts of its regulatory authority to certain states. One interviewee felt the Department of Transportation, not NRC and states, should regulate transport of radioactive materials to establish uniform national requirements: “when transportation requirements are set by many [state] regulators and by federal interstate commerce rules as well, compliance with transportation regulations can become very complicated.”

 

The analysis raises several general points:
• The orders imposed many requirements on licensees. Since the rule incorporates many of these requirements, it imposes less additional regulatory burden than would have been the case if the orders had not been issued first.

• Since the rule requires many actions regardless of facility size, it would appear to impose a proportionately larger burden on small licensees.

• The rule implements a layered defense. The ability of one layer to offset weaknesses in others should improve security but cannot guarantee it.
• Further steps—such as requiring licensees to install more monitoring equipment or mandating more stringent requirements for adjudicating personnel reliability—might increase security beyond what the rule provides. Whether their costs are worth potential benefits is a matter for political judgment.

 

[Scagnetti]

Una tattica "non convenzionale" cinese proiettata in uno scenario di attacco a Taiwan o a un gruppo portaerei americano.

 

Centinaia di droni "stupidi" già operativi destinati a saturare le difese aeree assieme a missili da crociera e aerei d'attacco convenzionali e/o stealth:AS HIGHLIGHTED ON THIS SITE AS A THREAT FOR YEARS: CHINA’S CONVERTED SURPLUS FIGHTER DRONE FORCE EYEBALLED FROM SPACE

 

For years I have mentioned that China has had a program running for over a decade that converts surplus PLAAF fighters into rudimentary drones. Based primarily on the J-6 (MiG-19 clone) J-7 (MiG-21 clone) platforms,....

 

As I have reiterated for some time, this capability is not about turning old fighters into UCAVs or even primarily full scale aerial targets for that matter, it is about deflating a potential enemy’s qualitative advantage vis-a-vis a quantitative advantage. In other words, deploying into an air combat environment a couple hundred unmanned fighter jets, some possibly packing rudimentary electronic warfare gear and/or drop tanks full of high explosives, combined with the hundreds of land and sea based cruise missiles and fighter aircraft, will undoubtedly overwhelm a technologically superior force’s ability not only defend their interests in the region, and in Taiwan’s case, even their own homeland…

If such a tactic were employed, how fast would Taiwan’s air to air missile stocks run dry, even assuming that their fighter aircraft survived such an onslaught in the first place?

 

 

 

There is a cunning genius to China’s order of battle when it comes to an aerial attack on Taiwan, just overwhelm Taiwanese air defenses with an onslaught of hundreds of aerial targets, drones, cruise missiles, and fighters, and there is a good chance that their air force that remains after such an attack is only a shadow of its previous operational self. Such a strategy also fits into China’s emerging low observable fighter programs very well. If you overwhelm an air defense system and its associated fighter aircraft with hundreds of juicy targets, it is easier to use your low signature advanced platforms to sneak by unscathed to take them out.

China’s creative form of fighter aircraft recycling gives the PLAAF a capability that is alarmingly tailored toward a conflict over Taiwan, but that is not to say that is capability cannot be used against other potential foes, such as a US carrier strike group operating within a few hundred miles of its coast. A massive barrage of anti-ship cruise missiles, air launched, sea launched and shore launched, as well as a large salvo of full-scale drones, not to mention their sprouting DF-21D antiship ballistic missile system, could overwhelm a Carrier Strike Group’s elaborate layered defenses. In other words, when it comes to US expeditionary combat capability off China’s shores, China’s unmanned fighter drone program could be used in itself as yet another component of their ever evolving anti-access strategy. In essence, this capability, along with many others, could keep US Carrier power out of the fight in a battle over Taiwan as they would have to send combat aircraft into an extremely volatile environment to strike targets, or even provide air defense capability, at the edge of their combat radius. Additionally, these otherwise valueless converted drones are not just decoys, they also serve a nasty offensive purpose, they are rudimentary cruise missiles.

 

 

China’s retired fighter to drone conversion program is just one more example of their brilliant multi-faceted strategy to deny America and Taiwan the ability to bring their most capable weapon systems to bear in a combined fashion.,,,

 

In the end, I believe that China is capable of deploying operational “drone swarms” long before America, albeit of vastly lower complexity and questionable re-usability…

 

[vorthex]

avranno letto Uragano Rosso.

bisogna capire, però, le capacità di simulazione di questi drone... perchè se un Mig-19 drone, simula un Mig-19... non serve a molto.

[Scagnetti]

Certo io non difendo a spada tratta tutto quello che il buon Tyler di Aviationintel.com scrive, spesso con terminologia pittoresca e un po' sensazionalistica (ad esempio la foto che ho riportato anche io alla fine del mio post, lungi dal mostrare sciami di droni operativi potrebbe mostrare velivoli dismessi tenuti ordinatamente all'aperto in conformità ai trattati internazionali).

 

Però la teoria, di far terminare le scorte di missili per ridurre lo squilibrio qualitativo è interessante (anche Israele ha avuto qualche preoccupazione ultimamente)....

Modificato 18 Gennaio 2013 da Scagnetti