U.S. Army

[madmike]

li dovrebbe confermare chi ha scritto quella roba su wiki.... considerando che, comprensibilmente, le corazze sono la cosa più riservata degli attuali carri.

[vorthex]

non mi pare ci sia un passo su quella pagina che dica quanto affermato, almeno secondo il trova-parole di firefox.

potresti indicarci dove viene detta una cosa del genere e con quali fonti a sostegno?

[davide9610]

non mi pare ci sia un passo su quella pagina che dica quanto affermato, almeno secondo il trova-parole di firefox.

potresti indicarci dove viene detta una cosa del genere e con quali fonti a sostegno?

Armor Steel-composite-reactive blend

vs APFSDS: 700-800 with Kontakt-5 = 830-950mm; vs HEAT: 780-1000 with Kontakt-5 = 1,350–1,650mm[2]

 

Questo riguardo al T-90 fonte: "T-90". Fas.org. Retrieved February 7, 2010.

 

 

M1A2: Hull (turret) - 600(780) mm vs APFSDS, 800(1060) mm vs HEAT[8

 

Questo riguardo all'M-1A2 fonte: Steven J. Zaloga & Peter Sarson (1993), pp. 9, 10.

[Simone]

Beh, per l'Abrahms sono citati dati che risalgono al 1993, o prima, mentre le corazze russe prese in considerazione arrivano fino al 2010. Sono 17 anni in cui molto è stato fatto per migliorare queste armi difensive, sia sotto l'aspetto teorico, che pratico, che io sappia le caratteristiche delle più recenti ERA americane o comunque nell'ambito NATO sono riservate e,se esistono, dati, questi sono più che altro stime calcolate da analisti esterni.

Per quello che posso dire la necessità di proteggere i blindati è più sentita da parte russa e cinese che altrove, perchè l'esperienza del 1991 ha mostrato che per loro la probabilità di colpire per primi è molto ridotta,mentre quella di essere colpiti pericolosamente alta, per cui si rende necessaria una sorta di protezione robusta per non diventare bersagli e basta.

 

Sull'US Army , devo aggiungere che alcuni politici hanno proposto di riempirne i ranghi con i detenuti più robusti e violenti delle "prigioni-inferno" che molto numerose sono negli Stati Uniti e che, come e più che in Italia, sono sovraffollate. In queste prigioni i detenuti, spesso reclusoi per reati violenti, passano il tempo a fare esercizio fisico, come i militari, e sono violentissimi contro i loro compagni di sventura. Fisicamente potrebbero essere soldati,per cui è stato proposto di creare delle "squadre militari di detenuti" da mandare nelle zone più zeppe di terroristi ed insurgents; piuttosato cinicamente, queste due "piaghe" del'America, i detenuti violenti ed i terroristi insurgents potrebbero "annichilirsi" a vicenda e gli Americani non criminali nell'US Army potrebbero essere esposti a rischi minori

Modificato 5 Settembre 2012 da Simone

[madmike]

Beh, per l'Abrahms sono citati dati che risalgono al 1993, o prima, mentre le corazze russe prese in considerazione arrivano fino al 2010. Sono 17 anni in cui molto è stato fatto per migliorare queste armi difensive, sia sotto l'aspetto teorico, che pratico, che io sappia le caratteristiche delle più recenti ERA americane o comunque nell'ambito NATO sono riservate e,se esistono, dati, questi sono più che altro stime calcolate da analisti esterni.

Per quello che posso dire la necessità di proteggere i blindati è più sentita da parte russa e cinese che altrove, perchè l'esperienza del 1991 ha mostrato che per loro la probabilità di colpire per primi è molto ridotta,mentre quella di essere colpiti pericolosamente alta, per cui si rende necessaria una sorta di protezione robusta per non diventare bersagli e basta.

 

Sull'US Army , devo aggiungere che alcuni politici hanno proposto di riempirne i ranghi con i detenuti più robusti e violenti delle "prigioni-inferno" che molto numerose sono negli Stati Uniti e che, come e più che in Italia, sono sovraffollate. In queste prigioni i detenuti, spesso reclusoi per reati violenti, passano il tempo a fare esercizio fisico, come i militari, e sono violentissimi contro i loro compagni di sventura. Fisicamente potrebbero essere soldati,per cui è stato proposto di creare delle "squadre militari di detenuti" da mandare nelle zone più zeppe di terroristi ed insurgents; piuttosato cinicamente, queste due "piaghe" del'America, i detenuti violenti ed i terroristi insurgents potrebbero "annichilirsi" a vicenda e gli Americani non criminali nell'US Army potrebbero essere esposti a rischi minori

 

eh poi magari vediamo se a comandarli ci mandano il colonnello Trautmann....

 

fonte??

[davide9610]

Quali sarebbero le stime della corazzatura di un M1A2 del 2010 sia contro gli HEAT sia contro gli APFDS ?

Modificato 5 Settembre 2012 da davide9610

[vorthex]

http://www.fprado.com/armorsite/abrams.htm

tendenzialmente, oggi, con le numerose sotto-varianti di A1 ed A2, si parla di carri dotati di inserti in DU di seconda o terza generazione: potremmo avere un M-1A1FEP con layer di terza generazioned ed un M-1A2 con layer di seconda, anche se, nel tempo, ci si standardizzerà unicamente sui layer di terza generazione.

 

comunque nessun timore, sono spessori notevolissimi e di diversa caratura rispetto alle ERA attaccate in modo posticcio dai russi (anche perchè sono corazzature passive, non reattive), tranne sul T-90MS, dove si sono orientati verso un montaggio più efficace.

Modificato 5 Settembre 2012 da vorthex

[Andrea75]

In un prossimo futuro avremo .... DARPA’s Cheetah Robot Bolts Past the Competition

 

DARPA’s Cheetah robot—already the fastest legged robot in history—just broke its own land speed record of 18 miles per hour (mph). In the process, Cheetah also surpassed another very fast mover: Usain Bolt. According to the International Association of Athletics Federations, Bolt set the world speed record for a human in 2009 when he reached a peak speed of 27.78 mph for a 20-meter split during the 100-meter sprint. Cheetah was recently clocked at 28.3 mph for a 20-meter split. The Cheetah had a slight advantage over Bolt as it ran on a treadmill, the equivalent of a 28.3 mph tail wind, but most of the power Cheetah used was to swing and lift its legs fast enough, not to propel itself forward.

 

To contribute to emergency response, humanitarian assistance and other defense missions, a robot needs to negotiate difficult terrain. Most rough-terrain robots use wheels or tracks to ride over bumps; however, the most difficult terrain demands the use of legs, as legs can step over both high obstacles and deep ditches. But coordinating the swing and lift of mechanical legs is more difficult than making wheels turn or tracks roll, and previous legged robots have been slow compared to wheeled or tracked ones. DARPA is working to create legged robots that don’t sacrifice speed for mobility on rough terrain.

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YqpO58x7vuE&feature=player_embedded

[Andrea75]

DARPA shows off Big Dog ground drone to USMC Commandant

 

http://www.military.com/video/logistics-and-supplies/military-equipment/boston-dynamics-rough-terrain-robot/1832724837001/

[Simone]

E' un primo passo verso il "Terminator" futuro? anche se non se ne parla, temo che nel Pentagono qualche alto ufficiale dalla mentalità tecnologica ne sia convinto, anche se questa è una scelta foriera di pericoli. Già adesso esistono macchine belliche che, in via teorica, potrebbero operare in modo completamente automatico (pensiamo ai droni armati che si attivano quando il sensore IR capta un segnale compatibile con una persona umana),però i rischi che la tecnologia sfugga al controllo esistono, sia pure remoti

[vorthex]

simone, dovresti avvertire Sarah Connor allora...

[Andrea75]

The myth of American military superiority

 

The American armed forces are "the best in the world." It has become such an unremarkable bit of conventional wisdom that the comment is usually prologue to some other point the speaker wants to make. Many think that because the United States spends multiples of any conceivable opponent or even combinations of them, has the largest modern navy and air force, and can operate all over the world, there is no conceivable enemy or enemies that can take on America successfully. The history of warfare is full of this kind of arrogance before the fall; it has occurred from the beginnings of recorded warfare until today. ... When I have suggested that America's military might not be "the best," the inevitable question is, "Against whom? Name an opponent who can beat us." History is not kind to those who are so sure they know the future, and in today's vapid culture the confident prediction of supremacy is articulated in the absence of anything beyond a superficial bean count of forces and hardware -- sometimes not even that. ... Instead, in the debate that today dominates the American political-military system on both sides of the political spectrum, two main props sustain the "we are the best" advocates. The first is America's spectacular performance on the battlefield when, even after the post-Cold War budget reductions of George H.W. Bush's and Bill Clinton's administrations, U.S. armed forces "used Saddam Hussein as a speed bump" in 2003. The second, they say, is America's vastly superior military technology, which, while expensive, gives the country the essential winning edge that no one can match.

 

The example of America's victory over Saddam is particularly inapt. Iraq's armed forces were a speed bump: Their leadership was hopelessly politicized and grossly incompetent, and their uniformed combat personnel were demoralized and unwilling to fight even before the first bombs were dropped. They were assessed as literally the worst in the world by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and as some have noted, the performance of the U.S. military leadership -- even at the field-command level -- in that war was an embarrassment.

 

In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces often showed real guts and skill at the tactical level, but the heroism of soldiers and Marines notwithstanding, it should be remembered that they have fought enemies with no air force or navy and not much infantry equipment beyond home-built road mines, AK-47 rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades.

 

L'articolo prosegue elencando limiti e mancanze di svariati sistemi d'arma USA ed esaminando le dichiarazioni della camapagna elettorale per la presidenza.

 

E' un articolo abbastanza tagliente e le argomentazioni esposte sono cristalline.

Però (commento a caldo) mi sembra che manchi di qualcosa: la considerazione del contesto e delle regole diverse che le parti in campo si danno.

Prendiamo ad esempio l'Iraq e l'Afghanistan. In quei teatri operavano gli USA, i ribelli/insorgenti/quadeisti , il popolo iracheno/afgano.

- la popolazione civile, inerme, è stata/rimane, in balia delle altre forze in campo che si combattono. Può avere più o meno chance di beneresse/miglioramento a seconda della parte che prevale, ma deve pagare comunque un prezzo salato (morti, miseria, devastazioni);

- gli USA intervengono in risposta ad un evento (11/9 - Afghanistan) o per "altri motivi" (Iraq), hanno come scopo la liberazione del paese ed il miglioramento generale delle condizioni di vita. Per fare questo usano il loro potenziale bellico, ma si danno - almeno sulla carta - delle regole di ingaggio (che sono autolimitazioni), e - impossibile negarlo - subiscono pesanti perdite ad opera di combattenti meno attrezzati;

- i ribelli/insorgenti/quadeisti hanno un solo scopo: imporre la loro visione; contro gli USA e contro chiunque si opponga (iracheni ed afghani inclusi), il loro unico limite eè di possedere armi meno sofisticate rispetto agli USA.

 

Ho citato (senza la pretesa di esaustività) alcuni punti che secondo me mancano nell'articolo segnalato. Se li avesse analizzati sarebbe stato davvero completo.

[madmike]

Andrea, infatti il testo si chiama 'il mito della supremazia (militare) americana', non 'analisi delle forze combattenti in Iraq e Afghanistan', che sarebbe stato quello che dici tu.

 

Peraltro, sono tutte cose corrette quelle che dici: ma che devono essere ben presenti nella mente del generale o del politico che si imbarca in queste avventure.

 

Ovvio che la popolazione civile paga prezzi altissimi (oh, non che nella seconda guerra mondiale non fosse così....) ma questo è dato dal tipo di guerra. E d'altro canto, non si può pretendere (come qualche anima candida ogni tanto scrive) che un guerrigliero affrontasse in una bella pianura Abrams, Bradley e A10 armato di AK ed RPG.

 

Fanno quello che devono e possono fare, sfruttando al meglio quello che hanno. Il mito della superiorità tecnologica, infatti, si ferma qui: nulla osta a dire che in una battaglia 'classica' lo US ARMY sia l'esercito più forte al mondo. Il problema è che quel tipo di battaglie non si combattono (quasi) più.

[viata 85]

Pronto il primo prototipo si Stryker con il nuovo scafo a V (DVH) anti-mina.

 

http://www.asdnews.com/news-45544/Army_Completes_First_Pilot_Stryker_Exchange_Vehicle.htm

 

Interessante il fatto che per ridurre i costi il nuovo scafo è stato progettato per poter ospitare tutti i componenti meccanici del vecchio scafo piatto (FBH).

Praticamente l'intenzione è quella di smontare i veicoli e ricostruirli montando tutte le vecchie componenti revisionate sulla nuova struttura a V.

[Andrea75]

Per diventare come Terminator Lockheed Martin HULC (Human Universal Load Carrier) Anthropomorphic Robotic Exoskeleton for Future Military Special Operations Forces (SOF)

 

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=qYHcMIbrS2Q

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KU95h6YCUuM&feature=player_embedded

[Andrea75]

An Updated Catalog of Army Weapon Systems

 

The U.S. Army has just published the 2013 edition of its annual Weapon Systems Handbook, which is filled with updated information on dozens of weapon systems, the military contractors who produce them, and the foreign countries that purchase them.

[Andrea75]

Army Awards New Expanded Defense Communications Contract

 

The Army has awarded a new, expanded defense contract, which will enable the acquisition of hardware, software, services and data in support of the Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications-Tactical, or PEO C3T, mission over a five-year ordering period.

 

The Global Tactical Advanced Communication Systems, known as GTACS, and Services contract is one of the largest defense contracts the Department of Defense plans to issue within the next few years. By utilizing the GTACS contract and its group of 20 defense contractors, it is expected that the government will realize significant cost savings, while enabling industry to quickly fill needed mission requirements with innovative solutions.

 

"This is a one-stop shop for a very broad range of hardware and services," said Lt. Col. Greg Coile, the Army's product manager for Satellite Communications, or PdM SATCOM. "The contract's range, flexibility and consolidation capabilities will enable the Army, Department of Defense and other agencies to spend more efficiently and get needed capability into the hands of Soldiers at a faster pace."

 

The GTACS contract was awarded on Oct. 31, and will be managed by PdM SATCOM under Project Manager Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, or PM WIN-T, which provides the Army's tactical communications network. PM WIN-T is assigned to PEO C3T, which develops, fields and supports fully networked capability sets, connecting the fixed command post to the commander on-the-move to the dismounted Soldier.

 

During the five year ordering period of the GTACS contract, it is expected that the needs of PEO C3T will evolve in response to the changing requirements of the Soldier and emerging threats. The GTACS contract is designed to provide the flexibility and responsiveness needed to support the mission of PEO C3T and its PMs.

 

Created as a replacement for the World Wide Satellite Systems, or WWSS, contract, GTACS is a five-year Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity, or IDIQ, contract with an expansive scope. It covers the hardware, software, equipment and data necessary to support PEO C3T, with an emphasis on tactical SATCOM. GTACS is a base contract and PdM SATCOM will issue delivery/task orders there under. Instead of awarding multiple contracts, the Army can now award numerous delivery/task orders from a single contract.

 

"The GTACS contract will provide for centralized competitive contracting to support PEO C3T in acquiring state-of-the-art solutions to the C3T community ranging from research and development, production through the sustainment of the equipment lifecycle," said Barbara Hansen, contracting officer/branch chief at Army Contracting Command -- Aberdeen Proving Ground. "The large multiple award IDIQ contract type allows for competition among both small and large contractors and is anticipated to reduce administrative redundancy to the maximum extent practicable, provide the best solutions to government requirements and provide cost savings as a result of increased competition."

 

An IDIQ contract such as GTACS is designed to have a group of contractors that can support any task the government requires as long as it is within the scope of the Statement Of Work, or SOW, which identifies the work to be performed by the contractor. This type of contract allows for shortened timelines for awarding delivery/task orders, which in turn saves the government money and provides critical equipment and services to the Soldier in a timely manner, said James Sawall, GTACS lead.

 

The GTACS contract provides for three functional areas -- research and development, production and deployment, and sustainment and logistics.

 

"This means that no matter where a program of record is in the acquisition lifecycle, its managing organization can utilize this contract to support its requirements," Sawall said. "The GTACS contract enables the customer to develop a concept, then produce, test, field and sustain that concept with one contract. It's simplified and consolidated the entire process."

 

The GTACS selection process resulted in an award to 20 prime contractors that are granted the opportunity to compete for the broad spectrum of work that is anticipated under the contract in order to provide the optimum resolution of requirements. The GTACS contract contains two suites of contracts; one specifically composed of small business prime contractors, and the other suite composed of both large and small business prime contractors.

[Andrea75]

segnalo questo paper Army Corps Supplemental Appropriations: Recent History, Trends, and Policy Issues

 

Under its civil works program, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers plans, builds, operates, and maintains a wide range of water resources facilities. The Corps also plays a prominent role in responding to domestic natural disasters, in particular riverine and coastal flooding events. The Corps can assist in flood fighting at the discretion of its Chief of Engineers in order to protect life and property, principally when state resources are overwhelmed. The Corps is also authorized to protect and repair its own facilities in the event of flooding, and to operate a program, the Rehabilitation and Inspection Program (RIP), that funds the repair of participating nonfederal flood control works (e.g., levees, dams, dunes) damaged by flooding events. Repairs under this program are funded by the Corps’ Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE) account. The Corps also undertakes a variety of other activities at the request of FEMA under the National Response Framework, which are outside the scope of this report.

In recent years a number of natural disasters have required Corps response and repair activities with costs running into the billions. Congress provided most of these funds through supplemental appropriations. Over the 10-year period FY2003 to FY2012, Congress appropriated $25.5 billion in supplemental funding for the Corps through 12 supplemental appropriations acts (including P.L. 111-5, or ARRA). This was approximately half of the total amount received by the Corps in annual appropriations over the same period. Of the $25.5 billion, about $21 billion (82%) was for actions to respond to riverine and coastal flooding or other natural disasters. The majority of this funding was for response and repair related to Hurricane Katrina and the 2005 storm season ($16 billion). In addition to the disaster funding, Congress provided the Corps with non-disaster related supplemental funds, including $4.6 billion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5) and $39 million for facility security and other expenditures.

Hurricane Sandy’s impact on the East Coast is raising questions about how to fund Corps natural disaster response and recovery activities, including infrastructure investments in hurricane and flood protection. This report summarizes recent trends in supplemental funding for the Corps, particularly related to natural disasters. It provides summary data and analysis on Corps funding over the last 10 years and includes a general discussion of how the Corps funds emergency actions at its own facilities and elsewhere.

[Andrea75]

Army Engineers Design, Build Roadway Threat Detection System

 

Explosives along roadways remain an unrelenting hazard for deployed Soldiers.

U.S. Army engineers have developed a system for detecting possible threats by identifying potential threat locations on unimproved roads.

The Shadow Class Infrared Spectral Sensor-Ground, known as SCISSOR-G, could allow Soldiers on a route clearance patrol to achieve greater standoff ranges during missions, said Jim Hilger, chief of the Signal and Image Processing Branch within the U.S. Army Communications--Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center's Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate at Fort Belvoir, Va.

CERDEC is one of the seven research and development organizations that comprise the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command.

The SCISSOR-G is a complementary system to radars. It can perform region of interest cueing of threats at greater standoff distances, which can be further interrogated by the radar as the vehicle gets closer to the threat, Hilger said. The system provides a route clearance patrol with increased standoff range for potential threat detection.

"If you can increase the threat detection in front of the vehicle, you give the operators a chance to do what they need to do to further interrogate it," Hilger said. "You can see [the threat] before you get to it."

The Army recently deployed the SCISSOR-G prototype to theater for 90 days of test and evaluation by Soldiers, Hilger said.

"We are giving the route clearance patrol the ability to look for cues and clues while they're on the move," Hilger said. "They're generating the information live. They're not waiting for an intel brief to give them photographs or a data feed from an [unmanned aerial vehicle]."

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization requested that CERDEC NVESD take an existing sensor designed for detection from the air and adapt it for use on a ground vehicle, Hilger said. The SCISSOR-G is the Army's first detection system of its type embedded with a route clearance patrol.

The SCISSOR-G consists of a sensor and a multi-sensor graphical user interface, or MS GUI. The sensor is mounted on a vehicle, usually a Husky, using a 10-inch turret with state-of-the-art infrared and high-definition color cameras. The MS GUI has a touch screen monitor to control the turret and cameras.

The MS GUI is flexible enough to enable the sensor control and data visualization to be on the same vehicle as the turret or in a trailing vehicle. The two components of the system enable a single operator to monitor the roadway for threats in real time, Hilger said.

When SCISSOR-G is configured for two vehicles, commands and data are transmitted via a radio link. If the MS GUI operator in the sensor vehicle detects a threat, he would alert the lead-vehicle driver to a specific area for threat confirmation.

Hilger emphasized that the detection of an irregularity or clue does not necessarily mean that a threat is present. Information is provided to the MS GUI operator to determine whether further investigation is required based on the threat signature.

The SCISSOR-G is the result of more than 10 years of research into techniques for explosive threat detection, Hilger said. Twelve CERDEC NVESD personnel from three branches combined their areas of expertise to complete the project in the past year-and-a-half.

The Army Test and Evaluation Command conducted testing on the SCISSOR-G before its deployment to theater.

 

[Andrea75]

... segnalo questo paper "The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress" http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41597.pdf

 

 

 

In April 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program that had been underway since 2000 and was at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts. In lieu of the cancelled FCS manned ground vehicle (MGV), the Army was directed to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations and would incorporate combat lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army reissued a request for proposal (RFP) for the GCV on November 30, 2010 and plans to begin fielding the GCV by 2015-2017. On August 17, 2011, the GCV program was approved to enter the Technology Development Phase of the acquisition process and a day later, the Army awarded two technology development contracts: $439.7 million to the General Dynamics-led team and a second contract for $449.9 million to the BAE Systems-Northrop Grumman team.
Starting in May and running through June 2012, the Army tested a number of foreign candidates during a Network Integration Exercise. This test informed the Army’s Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which is a requirement before the GCV program can progress to the next developmental phase. The AoA reportedly found no suitable existing, less expensive combat vehicles that could meet the Army’s GCV requirements. In addition, the Army is said to be considering including an active protection system (APS)—perhaps the Israeli Trophy system—for inclusion on the GCV, but past experiences in terms of technical feasibility and cost will likely play a factor in any decision to initially field the GCV with an APS capability.
The Administration’s January 26, 2012, Major Budget Decision Briefing not only introduced a new Asia-Pacific strategic focus, but also delayed the GCV program for a year due to the SAICBoeing protest. While some might consider this a setback, it can also be viewed as an endorsement of the GCV program by the Department of Defense (DOD). The FY2013 budget request for the GCV was $639.874 million for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), reflecting a one-year delay in the program and a $1.7 billion program cut. The FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act fully funds the Administration’s FY2013 GCV Budget Request.
Potential issues for Congress include the role and need for the GCV in a downsized Army that will likely have fewer armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs). The Administration’s announcement of a strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region presents questions as to the necessity for ABCTs and, by association, the GCV. GCV affordability also remains a key consideration for Congress. The Army contends that the average unit production cost for the GCV will be between $9 million and $10.5 million. The Pentagon’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) estimates that the average unit production cost will be in the $16 million to $17 million
range, meaning the Army would need an additional $7.2 billion to acquire 1,874 GCVs. A November 2012 Congressional Budget Office report on the GCV provides a range of GCV technical issues for congressional consideration. A report suggests DOD is considering significant budget cuts in the GCV program from FY2014 to FY2018, which could have a major impact on
the GCV program. This report will be updated.

 

[Andrea75]

The US Army is following up on its presolicitation for EMD phase of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) with meetings with interested companies starting next Monday. http://contracting.tacom.army.mil/majorsys/ampv/Invitation%20to%20Schedule%20Face-to-Face%20Mtgs.pdf

 

 

The AMPV team would like to offer the opportunity for potential prime vendors to meet and provide feedback regarding the AMPV information that has been posted on the AMPV website. To date, the Government has released DRAFT sections of the Request for Proposal (RFP), includes the DRAFT Performance Specifications and summary of the tentative acquisition approach, for industry to review and provide written feedback. The Government will schedule face-to-face meetings with individual potential prime vendors and members of the AMPV team as described below.
These meetings are limited to industry presentations ONLY and is not a question and answer forum. The Government requests interested companies provide constructive feedback on the AMPV information that has been released, to date, in order to assist the Government in refining its requirement; however, companies are given the discretion to present whatever it deems necessary.
Appointments can be scheduled starting January 7, 2013. Appointments are limited to two hours and are being scheduled between 0800-1100 and 1300-1500, Monday through Friday (excluding Federal holidays).

 

[holmes7]

Iniziano i test sul campo dell'infrastruttura Warfighter Information Network — Tactical, or WIN-T, Increment 2

 

http://defensetech.org/2013/05/03/army-to-test-battlefield-network/

 

 

 

Qui in dettaglio di cosa si compone http://tactical-communicator.com/pdf/Commanders_Handbook_v1.6.pdf

 

 

 

 

[holmes7]

Si ri-aggiornano le tecniche di addestramento

 

 

 

 

At Fort Irwin's National Training Center in Calif., the most combat-hardened forces in the history of the U.S. Army are relearning how to wage war. The goal? To prepare for complex-hybrid wars in the future

Modificato 14 Maggio 2013 da holmes7

[holmes7]

Test di attacco elettronico per i Gray Eagle

 

http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065979507&channel=defence&subChannel=systems

 

 

 

Anche l' US ARMY ha un anti access strategy !

 

 

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2013/05/13595102

Modificato 24 Maggio 2013 da holmes7

[holmes7]

Anche l' US ARMY vuole un ruolo nel Pacifico.

 

http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/commander-army-back-pacific-19293950#.UakxrUCTgo4