F-22 Raptor - discussione ufficiale

[Rick86]

questo video per chi dice che l'F-22 nel dogfight non è uno tra i migliori...

 

E chi lo dice che l'F-22 non è uno tra i migliori?

 

:asd: semmai lo si dice di un altro aereo stealth

[butthead]

E chi lo dice che l'F-22 non è uno tra i migliori?

 

:asd: semmai lo si dice di un altro aereo stealth

 

perchè spesso leggevo cose tipo:

"l'F-22 sarà stealth però nel dogfight è detto che abbia un grosso vantaggio rispetto la famiglia dei Su-27 o con l'EFA"

Modificato 4 Giugno 2009 da butthead

[Rick86]

No, la frase corretta è questa:

 

l'F-35 sarà stealth però nel dogfight è un'anatra seduta rispetto a Flanker e Typhoon

 

L'F-22 è eccellente, unisce le doti di un caccia come il Typhoon o il Flanker alla Stealthness di un F-117, il tutto con radar e sistemi elettronici assolutamente al top nel mondo

Modificato 4 Giugno 2009 da Rick86

[Dominus]

Veramente si spera che sia il 35 che il 22 siano più furtivi dell'F-117...

[Bl4ckH4wk]

X Demon Lord: sì l'F-22 può fare il cobra di Pugachev

 

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-4306529957288052978

 

Si può fare..ma solo quando vola in rettilineo ;)

[brain_use]

La situazione mi pare a un punto di stallo: i giapponesi vogliono gli F-22, gli americani non vogliono darglieli.

A tutt'oggi, non se ne esce.

 

E' interessante però anche questa nota:

 

Japan's F-X program is aimed at buying 20-60 high performance F-22-like aircraft.

 

Ora, se il Giappone identifica in 20 il suo fabbisogno di caccia F-22-like, la cosa mi sembra proporzionata.

Ma se pensano alla cifra massima, 60, mi chiedo come questo numero sia conciliabile coi 187 -al lordo di attriti- dell'USAF.

Uno dei due sbaglia i calcoli, anche considerando le particolarità del contesto operativo giapponese.

[Rick86]

Gli americani sbagliano i calcoli, modestissima opinione personale. Basta guardare quanti F-15 hanno oggi nel loro inventario

[butthead]

Gli americani sbagliano i calcoli, modestissima opinione personale. Basta guardare quanti F-15 hanno oggi nel loro inventario

 

quoto, dovrebbero comprare più F-22 ma con la crisi economica si è tutto bloccato

[Dominus]

Non è questione di crisi economica, semplicemente trovano l'f-35 più rispondente ai loro requisiti, infatti lo stop della produzione del raptor era stato deciso anche prima dei problemi finanziari.

[Ospite intruder]

Veramente si spera che sia il 35 che il 22 siano più furtivi dell'F-117...

 

 

Voglio credere sia qualcosa di più di una semplice speranza.

[Dominus]

Voglio credere sia qualcosa di più di una semplice speranza.

 

 

I dati classificati sulla RCS non gliel'ho ancora chiesti, ma se pazienti fino alla seduta del congresso di lunedì massimo martedì te li faccio avere

[Blue Sky]

I dati classificati sulla RCS non gliel'ho ancora chiesti, ma se pazienti fino alla seduta del congresso di lunedì massimo martedì te li faccio avere

 

:asd:

 

Bene aspettiamo un tuo resoconto dettagliato, mi raccomando non dimenticare le tabelle comparative!

[paperinik]

Reuter reports that US Senate Appropriations Committee chair Senator Daniel Inouye [D-HI], has sent sent letters on the F-22 issue to Japanese ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki, and to American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Inouye reportedly supports repeal of the 1998 “Obey Amendment” that bans F-22 exports, and the USAF is also said to have decided to support exports to select countries. Reuters adds that there is even growing Congressional support to repeal the Obey Amendment in the face of North Korea’s stepped-up belligerence, and the prospect of significant job losses if F-22 production is closed per Gates’ FY 2010 budget. The exact quote from one of their sources is ”...decent support, but it’s not a slam-dunk.”

 

The senator confirmed sending the letter, but would not discuss its contents. Reuters claims that the letter conveyed some conclusions from a recent USAF study, which placed the estimated cost of developing an F-22 Export version at about $250 million per plane, assuming a production run of 40-60 planes. The USAF study also reportedly assumed that production of an F-22EX would begin in 4-5 years, with delivery beginning in 7-9 years following a re-start of the F-22 production line.

 

That price tag is about $80-100 million above the cost of a more-capable F-22A. It factors in average costs per plane for production line restart, and for substituting and integrating replacements for components that the USA still does not wish to export. The final cost per plane could certainly end up being higher, if the development and integration program runs over budget. It could also be lower, but only if the substitution program meets projections and one of 2 things happens: (1) The production line is not shut down, due to Congressional appropriations over the next 3 years; and/or (2) More F-22EXs are bought to spread out the F-22EX program’s development and restart costs, via additional Japanese buys or by adding other countries as F-22EX customers.

Defense Industri Daily

 

Ma posto che il difficilmente il Giappone otterrà la possibilità di mettere mano sul Raptor a breve (o comunque entro l'imminente chiusura delle linee produttive) e posto che la seconda delle due ipotesi mi sembra ancora più ardua da realizzare (salvo che all'improvviso Israele e Australia non ricomincino a premere anche loro per avere l'F-22 anzichè l'F-35): ha davvero senso (specie con la crisi economica) per i Nippon spendere 250 milioni di $ per 40-60 aerei (con una spesa complessiva variabile da 10 a15 miliardi di $) che non hanno nemmeno la piena capacità di un F-22A e su cui potrebbe mettere le mani non prima di 7-9 anni dal riavvio della linea d'assemblaggio?!

Modificato 9 Giugno 2009 da paperinik

[Rick86]

Dipende quali sono i requisiti richiesti.

 

Se parliamo di Giappone e Israele beh, decisamente si.

 

Forse ha un po meno senso per l'Australia, che a quel punto dovrebbe puntare ad una monolinea solo su F-22 o una doppia linea in numeri ridicoli.

[Tuccio14]

Dipende quali sono i requisiti richiesti.

 

Se parliamo di Giappone e Israele beh, decisamente si.

 

Forse ha un po meno senso per l'Australia, che a quel punto dovrebbe puntare ad una monolinea solo su F-22 o una doppia linea in numeri ridicoli.

Sempre che ai matti non venga in mente di comprarsi gli aerei giapponesi, non è totalmente da escludere...

[Dominus]

Sempre che ai matti non venga in mente di comprarsi gli aerei giapponesi, non è totalmente da escludere...

 

Dopo la crisi è da escludere visto come stanno messi

[Ospite intruder]

The Japanese Defense Ministry probably will delay its order for fighters under the F-X program until at least the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2011, a move that may lift Lockheed Martin’s chances of winning the competition.

 

The delay minimizes one of the chief advantages of competitors over the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II — their earlier availability.

 

By delaying its order the ministry is also giving the U.S. more time to change its mind regarding its ban on exporting Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors.

 

A deferral also gives the government more time to put an end to the country’s ban on arms exports, which prevents the Japanese industry from taking part in the main production run of whichever aircraft is chosen. An end to the ban is expected (Aerospace DAILY, May 27).

 

The problem with the delay is that the aircraft that the new fighters would replace, Japan’s remaining McDonnell Douglas F-4EJ Kai Phantoms, must soldier on for longer.

 

The ministry says that to compensate for the delay the Phantoms will be flown less intensively. That will extend their airframe lives but not prevent them from becoming steadily more obsolete.

 

Under earlier plans, the ministry proposed to request funding for F-X fighters in the financial year beginning April 1, 2010.

 

Under the F-X requirement, the ministry wants to buy 50 fighters to take over the Phantoms’ air-to-air role. It really wants the F-22 and will buy that stealth fighter if the U.S. will let Lockheed Martin sell it (Aerospace DAILY, June 4).

 

Apart from the Lockheed Martin contenders, the country is considering the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-15FX Eagle, the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale. The latter is considered a long shot, and its manufacturer appears not to be putting so much effort into the competition as the others are.

 

A lack of information on the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II is forcing the ministry to spend more time studying the requirement, the Yomiuri Daily says. That focus on the two Lockheed Martin aircraft is a hint that the F-35, now formally recommended to Japan by the U.S. administration, is at least a strong contender, and possibly the favorite if the F-22 remains unavailable.

 

www.aviationweek.com

[pandur]

se è già stato postato mi scuso in anticipo.

 

ma volevo solo farvi presente che quantità assurda di "belinate" ci propina discovery:

 

[Ospite intruder]

Murtha Lends Support For More F-22s

 

Jun 25, 2009

 

 

 

By David A. Fulghum and John M. Doyle

www.aviationweek.com

 

 

Another senior U.S. congressman says he supports production of 20 more F-22s for the U.S. Air Force, and maybe Japan too, keeping the Lockheed Martin production line functioning for another few years.

 

Such an extension would allow Japan to raise the money for design of a version of the Raptor that can be exported, says Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee.

 

The plan would give commonality and interoperability to defense of the western approaches to Japan, lower the cost of the stealthy fighter to customers, and enable a deterrent to China faster than waiting for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, he says.

 

Murtha credits authorship of the plan to Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and its defense subcommittee, who fleshed out details from the U.S. Air Force and the Japanese government.

 

But there are vocal opponents, including leaders of the Senate Armed Service Committee, who told Aviation Week they oppose buying more Raptors (Aerospace DAILY, June 24). Still, House counterparts last week earmarked $369 million in the 2010 defense authorization bill to begin procurement of more Raptors, which cost about $140 million apiece.

 

Inouye found out that the Japanese were willing to pay $300 million to prepare an export version of the F-22, Murtha told a small group of defense writers June 24 in Washington. “If you look at the threat, you have to consider China. You need the equipment in place so that someone doesn’t miscalculate. China is going to be competing with us for energy. So where they will be competing [in Asia], we should have someone available besides ourselves.”

 

But the sale and Japan’s funding of the project will take two or three years. And Murtha’s staff calculates that preparing the F-22 for export will cost “substantially more” than $300 million.

 

“We can reach a compromise,” Murtha says of Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ proposal to end the program as planned. “The problem is, what we do [with F-22 production] in the meantime. The secretary — speaking for the White House — is adamant about not buying any more F-22s. The little bit of advanced procurement that the [House] Armed Services Committee put in didn’t help us much with the $3 billion we need for 20 F-22s,” which is desired to keep the production line open.

 

Yet, other challenges remain, including some that led Pentagon leadership to stick with the 187-aircraft cap first set by the George W. Bush administration. Former Pentagon acquisition chief John Young repeatedly cited stealth-based maintenance issues last year in criticizing further purchases.

 

“Maintenance of the F-22 has been a big problem,” Murtha acknowledges. “Cost has been as high as $50,000 per hour. You expect this because it’s in the initial stages of deployment. The F-22 is 19 years old and improvements have been made yearly. That’s one of the reasons why it’s so expensive.”

 

The top House defense appropriator and Vietnam veteran also voiced a dark prediction for defense funding, indicating that if the Defense Department does not get the systems it wants soon, it will lose the opportunity. “Defense is going to start to go down,” Murtha says. “There’s no question about it. The public has lost interest [in Iraq]. Talk now is about Iran and health care. You’re going to see a sea change in interest about what’s going on in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

[zander]

Ancora nubi sull'F-22.

 

Un ex tecnico esperto in materiali radar assorbenti che ha lavorato per F-117, B-2 e infine F-22, sostiene che LM abbia mentito sulle reali capacità delle vernici atte a ridurre le segnature radar e visive dell'F-22.

 

Nell'articolo sotto riportato è specificato che questo ingegnere sia stato licenziato da LM per "non aver eseguito le istruzioni", e dall'articolo sembra che le istruzioni fossero "tacere sulle carenze delle vernici dell'F-22".

Comunque non sembra che le carenze siano imputabili a prestazioni di stealthness quanto a quelle di manutenibilità.

 

Inoltre viene ricordato che nel 2008, un F-22 ebbe problemi ai motori dovuti all'ingestione di una striscia di vernice staccatasi dalla superfice.

 

Infine l'articolo lancia un po' di luce sulle vernici dell'F-22.

La verniciatura consiste in tre strati:

- il primer, per una migliore aderenza della vernice sulla superficie;

- una vernice conduttiva con fiocchi d'argento miscelati a materiali poliuretanici per assorbire le onde radar incidenti

- la vernice esterna, aggiunta a materiali metallici per ridurre il calore, che abbassa i rischi di essere rilevati da radar nemici.

 

Ex-F-22 engineer to sue Lockheed for stealth design

By Stephen Trimble

 

A stealth expert on the F-117 and B-2 programmes intends to file suit against Lockheed Martin later this week for concealing alleged deficiencies with the stealth coatings for the F-22.

 

The pending lawsuit accuses Lockheed of knowingly providing defective coatings used to reduce the aircraft's radar and visual signatures, and covering up the problem by adding 272kg (600lbs) worth of extra layers.

 

The lawsuit comes after the Department of Justice declined an opportunity under the Fair Claims Act to take up the case under seal.

 

Now, Darrol Olsen, who was fired by Lockheed in 1999, has turned to the US District Court in California's central division to seek justice.

 

Olsen wants to be re-instated with back-pay plus interest since losing his job more than a decade ago, says Samuel Boyd, Olsen's attorney. Olsen also is asking the court to order Lockheed to pay the US government $50 million for each of the 183 F-22's currently ordered, says Boyd. That amount equates roughly to the cost of the allegedly compromised stealth technology on each jet.

 

Lockheed was not immediately able to comment on the lawsuit.

 

Olsen began his Lockheed career in 1979 at Skunk Works, where he worked on developing new composite materials for the F-117, according to court documents. Olsen bounced between the F-117 and Northrop's B-2 programme during the 1980s, finally returning to support Northrop's B-2 flight test programme in 1990.

 

In 1995, Olsen finally joined Lockheed's materials and processes engineering group in Marietta, Georgia, to work on the low observables system for the F-22.

 

The F-22 requires three layers of coatings to reduce its radar signature, according to Olsen's statements in his case.

 

A primer seals the surface of the aircraft skin and helps with the adhesion of the next layer. Next, a conductive coating with silver flakes mixed with polyurethane materials is applied to keep radar waves from bouncing back to the emitter source. Finally, a topcoat layer has properties, including metallic materials, to reduce heat, which lowers the risk of radar detection.

 

"If those coatings are not effective, the other stealth measures of the aircraft's design are negated," the lawsuit says.

 

Olsen claims he witnessed Lockheed management misleading USAF officials about the quality of the stealth coatings. Olsen's supervisors instructed him not to speak at meetings with USAF officials.

 

In 1998, Olsen claims he refused to participate in an award ceremony that falsely honoured his team for solving problems he knew still persisted.

 

Lockheed also schemed to avoid government inspections of the coatings, secretly shipping batches of the stealth materials to the homes, the lawsuit states.

 

Although Olsen was fired for "failure to follow instructions" in 1999, the lawsuit says, he believes the problems have never been fully addressed.

 

 

 

In March 2008, an F-22 sustained major damage after a small strip of stealth coating inside the engine nacelle peeled off and was ingested by the fan blades of the Pratt & Whitney F119 engine.

 

In November, John Young, who stepped down in May as under secretary of defence for acquisition, technology and logistics, told reporters he was concerned about the F-22's stealth, or low observable, maintenance requirements.

 

"I would highlight in general the maintenance on the airplane is too high," Young said. "They're struggling with some of the LO and other issues, and there's clearly work that needs to be done there to make that airplane both capable and affordable to operate."

 

www.flightglobal.com

 

Speriamo solo che se questi problemi fossero reali e non ancora risolti, non abbiamo in fututo ripercussioni su programmi come l'F-35.

Modificato 5 Luglio 2009 da zander

[paperinik]

Le difficoltà manutentive del rivestimento del Raptor sono state alcune delle ragioni che ne hanno determinato una precoce chiusura della produzione.

Un rapporto frutto di uno studio indipendente destinato al Dipartimento della Difesa e al GAO di circa un anno fa, già metteva in risalto gli enormi problemi connessi alla manutenzione (in generale) dell'F-22.

 

In particolare poi, la manutenzione della vernice richiede un'intervento altamente specializzato e risulta essere molto costosa, con l'ulteriore limite che può essere svolta solo in alcuni centri particolarmente attrezzati. Queste condizioni hanno determinato seri ostacoli ostacoli all'impiego estero del Raptor, specialmente in quegli scenari (Iraq e Afghanistan) dove le condizioni climatiche sono estreme. Motivo per cui allo stato attuale il Raptor non ha ancora ricevuto il suo battesimo del fuoco.

Modificato 6 Luglio 2009 da paperinik

[cama81]

riguardo le vernici del F-35 si sa nulla circa possibili problemi simili ?

[ilclod]

riguardo le vernici del F-35 si sa nulla circa possibili problemi simili ?

 

Be', diciamo anche che i progetti per gli ATF sono un pochino più datati del JSF. E' possibile che nel frattempo qualcosa sia cambiato.

Qualcuno potrebbe anche dire che se non è zuppa è pan bagnato, e, visti i problemi degli ultimi tempi, non lo biasimerei.

[Dominus]

Trattandosi di un progetto di vent'anni più giovane e studiato per essere più flessibile e spendibile direi che senz'altro hanno trovato una soluzione.

 

Non dimentichiamo che le caratteristiche stealth richieste all'F35 non sono quelle dell'F22.

[paperinik]

Ecco ho ritrovato l'articolo relativo ai problemi di manutenzione del Raptor a cui facevo riferimento (se non ricordo male lo aveva già postato Legolas in una di queste 40 e passa pagine).

 

The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) has learned from internal Pentagon sources that stealth maintenance on the F-22 fighter aircraft is the primary cause of its maintenance headaches, which are in turn undermining its mission capability. POGO believes that this may be the primary reason for Defense Department Acquisition Chief John Young’s findings that the F-22’s mission capable rate was too low to waste additional taxpayer dollars on further procurement.

 

One of the key justifications for the F-22 is that it will achieve air-superiority advantage by its low observability (LO), or stealth. When fully operational, LO suppresses the F-22’s visual signature, radar signature, infrared signature, electromagnetic emissions, and sound. The F-22’s LO is designed to provide improved survivability and lethality against air-to-air and surface-to-air threats.

 

However, sources tell POGO that LO maintenance hours accounts for over half of all maintenance time, not only significantly reducing the mission capability of the plane, but also undermining the [uS Air Force’s] claim that the F-22 will “have better reliability and maintainability than any fighter aircraft in history.”

 

LO maintenance hours, which include time for the planes to cure, translate into time that the F-22 is not operable. As a result, there are concerns that there will be too many F-22’s unable to fly when they are needed. Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz has stated publicly that given these stealth issues, the F-22’s mission capable rate is only 60 percent.

 

“At a total of $354 million per plane this new information shows the F-22 is not only the most expensive but also the most difficult fighter aircraft to maintain—and it isn’t even experiencing combat stress,” said Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the Project On Government Oversight.

 

“Congress and the Defense Department should recognize these dollars would be better spent on modernized F-15s or F-16s. More procurement of the F-22 isn’t smart strategically or financially.”

 

Congress has given the Defense Department a March 1 deadline to determine whether to buy more F-22s or to shut down the plane’s production line.

 

Founded in 1981, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) is an independent nonprofit that investigates and exposes corruption in order to achieve a more accountable federal government.

Modificato 6 Luglio 2009 da paperinik