vorthex

ciao!

non si sa mai e per quale versione hai optato???

ma lo ha verniciato prima?

concordo con Pap!!!

ciao!

non finiscono mai, adesso saltano fuori anche articoli scandalosi da esponenti della CIA rettiliana: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA I, Howard Teicher, hereby state that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts presented herein are true, correct and complete. I further state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, nothing stated in this Declaration constitutes classified information. 1. My name is Howard Teicher. From 1977 to 1987, I served in the United States government as a member of the national security bureaucracy. From early 1982 to 1987, I served as a Staff Member to the United States National Security Council. 2. While a Staff Member to the National Security Council, I was responsible for the Middle East and for Political-Military Affairs. During my five year tenure on the National security Council, I had regular contact with both CIA Director William Casey and Deputy Director Robert Gates. 3. In the Spring of 1982, Iraq teetered on the brink of losing its war with Iran. In May and June, 1982, the Iranians discovered a gap in the Iraqi defenses along the Iran-Iraq border between Baghdad to the north and Basra to the south. Iran positioned a massive invasion force directly across from the gap in the Iraqi defenses. An Iranian breakthrough at the spot would have cutoff Baghdad from Basra and would have resulted in Iraq's defeat. 4. United States Intelligence, including satellite imagery, had detected both the gap in the Iraqi defenses and the Iranian massing of troops across from the gap. At the time, the United States was officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq conflict. 5. President Reagan was forced to choose between (a) maintaining strict neutrality and allowing Iran to defeat Iraq, or (b) intervening and providing assistance to Iraq. 6. In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp. The NSDD, including even its identifying number, is classified. 7. CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war. Pursuant to the secret NSDD, the United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat. For example, in 1986, President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran. This message was delivered by Vice President Bush who communicated it to Egyptian President Mubarak, who in turn passed the message to Saddam Hussein. Similar strategic operational military advice was passed to Saddam Hussein through various meetings with European and Middle Eastern heads of state. I authored Bush's talking points for the 1986 meeting with Mubarak and personally attended numerous meetings with European and Middle East heads of state where the strategic operational advice was communicated. 8. I personally attended meetings in which CIA Director Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons such as cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators in order to stave off the Iranian attacks. When I joined the NSC staff in early 1982, CIA Director Casey was adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect "force multiplier" that would allow the Iraqis to defend against the "human waves" of Iranian attackers. I recorded those comments in the minutes of National Security Planning Group ("NSPG") meetings in which Casey or Gates participated. 9. The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, munitions and vehicles to Iraq. 10. The United States was anxious to have other countries supply assistance to Iraq. For example, in 1984, the Israelis concluded that Iran was more dangerous than Iraq to Israel's existence due to the growing Iranian influence and presence in Lebanon. The Israelis approached the United States in a meeting in Jerusalem that I attended with Donald Rumsfeld. Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. The United States agreed. I travelled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz about Israel's offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so. 11. One of the reasons that the United States refused to license or sell U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was that the supply of non-U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was sufficient to meet Iraq's needs. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA made sure that non-U.S. manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq the weapons needed by Iraq. In certain instances where a key component in a weapon was not readily available, the highest levels of the United States government decided to make the component available, directly or indirectly, to Iraq. I specifically recall that the provision of anti-armor penetrators to Iraq was a case in point. The United States made a policy decision to supply penetrators to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files will contain references to the Iraqis' need for anti-armor penetrators and the decision to provide penetrators to Iraq. 12. Most of the Iraqi's military hardware was of Soviet origin. Regular United States or NATO ammunition and spare parts could not be used in this Soviet weaponry. 13. The United States and the CIA maintained a program known as the "Bear Spares" program whereby the United States made sure that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weaponry were available to countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for defense needs. If the "Bear Spares" were manufactured outside the United States, then the United States could arrange for the provision of these weapons to a third country without direct involvement. Israel, for example, had a very large stockpile of Soviet weaponry and ammunition captured during its various wars. At the suggestion of the United States, the Israelis would transfer the spare parts and weapons to third countries or insurgent movements (such as the Afghan rebels and the Contras). Similarly, Egypt manufactured weapons and spare parts from Soviet designs and provided these weapons and ammunition to the Iraqis and other countries. Egypt also served as a supplier for the Bear Spares program. The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's manufacturing capabilities. The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's sale of weaponry, munitions and vehicles to Iraq. 14. The mere request to a third party to carry out an action did not constitute a "covert action," and, accordingly, required no Presidential Finding or reporting to Congress. The supply of Cardoen cluster bombs, which were fitted for use on Soviet, French and NATO aircraft, was a mere extension of the United States policy of assisting Iraq through all legal means in order to avoid an Iranian victory. 15. My NSC files are currently held in the President Ronald Reagan Presidential Archives in Simi Valley, California. My files will contain my notes and memoranda from meetings I attended with CIA director Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates which included discussions of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs to Iraq. My NSC files will also contain cable traffic among various United States agencies, embassies and other parties relating to Cardoen and his sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states. 16. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq. My NSC files will contain documents that show or tend to show the CIA's authorization, approval and assistance of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq. 17. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents that will show that the highest levels of the United States government, including the NSC Staff and the CIA, were well aware of Cardoen's arrest in 1983 in Miami in a sting operation relating to the smuggling of night vision goggles to Cuba and Libya. My files will also show that the highest levels of the government were aware of the arrest and conviction of two of Cardoen's employees and his company Industrias Cardoen. 18. CIA Director William Casey, aware of Cardoen's arrest and the conviction of his employees and his company, intervened in order to make sure that Cardoen was able to supply cluster bombs to Iraq. Specifically, CIA Director Casey directed the Secretaries of the State and Commerce Departments that the necessary licenses required by Cardoen were not to be denied. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents showing or tending to show that CIA Director William Casey's intervention was in order to maintain Cardoen's ability to supply cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my memory and recollection. Executed on 1/31/95 Howard Teicher (signature appears on original) il link di questo articolo non lo posto neanche... porta ad uno scandoloso .pdf fotocopiato e scannerizzato di una battitura... tipicamente CIA

si, molto carino!

facendo varie ricerche nella rete, ho visto che esistono alcuni articoli, tutti fatti con un taglia e cuci di questo, dove si parla di queste misteriose culture. un tipico esempio ne è questo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._support_...e_Iran-Iraq_war la cosa divertente è che l'articolo parla di alcune società che poi sono state incriminate, quindi, non provano che gli americani sono dei "cattivoni", anzi, prova il contrario, ma i complottisti non lo capiscono

io non penso riusciremo a superare il girone.

l'idea è mia ed io sarò il presidente della commissione giudicante, composta da alcuni fidi collaboratori

in 23anni non ho mai visto donne veramente sensibili mai, sempre e solo sensibili quando faceva loro comodo.

io dico solo FORZA OLANDA

qualcuno mi aiuta a trovare la discussione dove se ne parla? non sono riuscito a trovarla nel forum.

battibeccando col solito catto-comunista di turno su di un altro forum è spuntato fuori questo articolo, cosa ne pensate? vi sembra attendibile? US Companies Sold Iraq Billions Of NBC Weapons Materials By William Blum The Progressive Magazine http://www.progressive.org/ April 1998 Issue 3-26-2 (Note - This four year old article contains extremely relevant information for today...) The United States almost went to war against Iraq in February because of Saddam Hussein's weapons program. In his State of the Union address, President Clinton castigated Hussein for "developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them." "You cannot defy the will of the world," the President proclaimed. "You have used weapons of mass destruction before. We are determined to deny you the capacity to use them again." Most Americans listening to the President did not know that the United States supplied Iraq with much of the raw material for creating a chemical and biological warfare program. Nor did the media report that U.S. companies sold Iraq more than $1 billion worth of the components needed to build nuclear weapons and diverse types of missiles, including the infamous Scud. When Iraq engaged in chemical and biological warfare in the 1980s, barely a peep of moral outrage could be heard from Washington, as it kept supplying Saddam with the materials he needed to build weapons. From 1980 to 1988, Iraq and Iran waged a terrible war against each other, a war that might not have begun if President Jimmy Carter had not given the Iraqis a green light to attack Iran, in response to repeated provocations. Throughout much of the war, the United States provided military aid and intelligence information to both sides, hoping that each would inflict severe damage on the other. Noam Chomsky suggests that this strategy is a way for America to keep control of its oil supply: "It's been a leading, driving doctrine of U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s that the vast and unparalleled energy resources of the Gulf region will be effectively dominated by the United States and its clients, and, crucially, that no independent indigenous force will be permitted to have a substantial influence on the administration of oil production and price." During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq received the lion's share of American support because at the time Iran was regarded as the greater threat to U.S. interests. According to a 1994 Senate report, private American suppliers, licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce, exported a witch's brew of biological and chemical materials to Iraq from 1985 through 1989. Among the biological materials, which often produce slow, agonizing death, were: * Bacillus Anthracis, cause of anthrax. * Clostridium Botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin. * Histoplasma Capsulatam, cause of a disease attacking lungs, brain, spinal cord, and heart. * Brucella Melitensis, a bacteria that can damage major organs. * Clostridium Perfringens, a highly toxic bacteria causing systemic illness. * Clostridium tetani, a highly toxigenic substance. Also on the list: Escherichia coli (E. coli), genetic materials, human and bacterial DNA, and dozens of other pathogenic biological agents. "These biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction," the Senate report stated. "It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and removed from the Iraqi biological warfare program." The report noted further that U.S. exports to Iraq included the precursors to chemical-warfare agents, plans for chemical and biological warfare production facilities, and chemical-warhead filling equipment. The exports continued to at least November 28, 1989, despite evidence that Iraq was engaging in chemical and biological warfare against Iranians and Kurds since as early as 1984. The American company that provided the most biological materials to Iraq in the 1980s was American Type Culture Collection of Maryland and Virginia, which made seventy shipments of the anthrax-causing germ and other pathogenic agents, according to a 1996 Newsday story. Other American companies also provided Iraq with the chemical or biological compounds, or the facilities and equipment used to create the compounds for chemical and biological warfare. Among these suppliers were the following: * Alcolac International, a Baltimore chemical manufacturer already linked to the illegal shipment of chemicals to Iran, shipped large quantities of thiodiglycol (used to make mustard gas) as well as other chemical and biological ingredients, according to a 1989 story in The New York Times. * Nu Kraft Mercantile Corp. of Brooklyn (affiliated with the United Steel and Strip Corporation) also supplied Iraq with huge amounts of thiodiglycol, the Times reported. * Celery Corp., Charlotte, NC * Matrix-Churchill Corp., Cleveland, OH (regarded as a front for the Iraqi government, according to Representative Henry Gonzalez, Democrat of Texas, who quoted U.S. intelligence documents to this effect in a 1992 speech on the House floor). The following companies were also named as chemical and biological materials suppliers in the 1992 Senate hearings on "United States export policy toward Iraq prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait": * Mouse Master, Lilburn, GA * Sullaire Corp., Charlotte, NC * Pure Aire, Charlotte, NC * Posi Seal, Inc., N. Stonington, CT * Union Carbide, Danbury, CT * Evapco, Taneytown, MD * Gorman-Rupp, Mansfield, OH Additionally, several other companies were sued in connection with their activities providing Iraq with chemical or biological supplies: subsidiaries or branches of Fisher Controls International, Inc., St. Louis; Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., Princeton, NJ; Bechtel Group, Inc., San Francisco; and Lummus Crest, Inc., Bloomfield, NJ, which built one chemical plant in Iraq and, before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, was building an ethylene facility. Ethylene is a necessary ingredient for thiodiglycol In 1994, a group of twenty-six veterans, suffering from what has come to be known as Gulf War Syndrome, filed a billion-dollar lawsuit in Houston against Fisher, Rhone-Poulenc, Bechtel Group, and Lummus Crest, as well as American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) and six other firms, for helping Iraq to obtain or produce the compounds which the veterans blamed for their illnesses. By 1998, the number of plaintiffs has risen to more than 4,000 and the suit is still pending in Texas. A Pentagon study in 1994 dismissed links between chemical and biological weapons and Gulf War Syndrome. Newsday later disclosed, however, that the man who headed the study, Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg, was a director of ATCC. Moreover, at the time of ATCC's shipments to Iraq, which the Commerce Department approved, the firm's CEO was a member of the Commerce Department's Technical Advisory Committee, the paper found. A larger number of American firms supplied Iraq with the specialized computers, lasers, testing and analyzing equipment, and other instruments and hardware vital to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, missiles, and delivery systems. Computers, in particular, play a key role in nuclear weapons development. Advanced computers make it feasible to avoid carrying out nuclear test explosions, thus preserving the program's secrecy. The 1992 Senate hearings implicated the following firms: * Kennametal, Latrobe, PA * Hewlett Packard, Palo Alto, CA * International Computer Systems, CA, SC, and TX * Perkins-Elmer, Norwalk, CT * BDM Corp., McLean, VA * Leybold Vacuum Systems, Export, PA * Spectra Physics, Mountain View, CA * Unisys Corp., Blue Bell, PA * Finnigan MAT, San Jose, CA * Scientific Atlanta, Atlanta, GA * Spectral Data Corp., Champaign, IL * Tektronix, Wilsonville, OR * Veeco Instruments, Inc., Plainview, NY * Wiltron Company, Morgan Hill, CA The House report also singled out: TI Coating, Inc., Axel Electronics, Data General Corp., Gerber Systems, Honeywell, Inc., Digital Equipment Corp., Sackman Associates, Rockwell Collins International, Wild Magnavox Satellite Survey, Zeta Laboratories, Carl Schenck, EZ Logic Data, International Imaging Systems, Semetex Corp., and Thermo Jarrell Ash Corporation. Some of the companies said later that they had no idea Iraq might ever put their products to military use. A spokesperson for Hewlett Packard said the company believed that the Iraqi recipient of its shipments, Saad 16, was an institution of higher learning. In fact, in 1990 The Wall Street Journal described Saad 16 as "a heavily fortified, state-of-the-art complex for aircraft construction, missile design, and, almost certainly, nuclear-weapons research." Other corporations recognized the military potential of their goods but considered it the government's job to worry about it. "Every once in a while you kind of wonder when you sell something to a certain country," said Robert Finney, president of Electronic Associates, Inc., which supplied Saad 16 with a powerful computer that could be used for missile testing and development. "But it's not up to us to make foreign policy," Finney told The Wall Street Journal. In 1982, the Reagan Administration took Iraq off its list of countries alleged to sponsor terrorism, making it eligible to receive high-tech items generally denied to those on the list. Conventional military sales began in December of that year. Representative Samuel Gejdenson, Democrat of Connecticut, chairman of a House subcommittee investigating "United States Exports of Sensitive Technology to Iraq," stated in 1991: "From 1985 to 1990, the United States Government approved 771 licenses for the export to Iraq of $1.5 billion worth of biological agents and high-tech equipment with military application. [Only thirty-nine applications were rejected.] The United States spent virtually an entire decade making sure that Saddam Hussein had almost whatever he wanted. . . . The Administration has never acknowledged that it took this course of action, nor has it explained why it did so. In reviewing documents and press accounts, and interviewing knowledgeable sources, it becomes clear that United States export-control policy was directed by U.S. foreign policy as formulated by the State Department, and it was U.S. foreign policy to assist the regime of Saddam Hussein." Subsequently, Representative John Dingell, Democrat of Michigan, investigated the Department of Energy concerning an unheeded 1989 warning about Iraq's nuclear weapons program. In 1992, he accused the DOE of punishing employees who raised the alarm and rewarding those who didn't take it seriously. One DOE scientist, interviewed by Dingell's Energy and Commerce Committee, was especially conscientious about the mission of the nuclear non-proliferation program. For his efforts, he received very little cooperation, inadequate staff, and was finally forced to quit in frustration. "It was impossible to do a good job," said William Emel. His immediate manager, who tried to get the proliferation program fully staffed, was chastened by management and removed from his position. Emel was hounded by the DOE at his new job as well. Another Senate committee, investigating "United States export policy toward Iraq prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait," heard testimony in 1992 that Commerce Department personnel "changed information on sixty-eight licenses; that references to military end uses were deleted and the designation 'military truck' was changed. This was done on licenses having a total value of over $1 billion." Testimony made clear that the White House was "involved" in "a deliberate effort . . . to alter these documents and mislead the Congress." American foreign-policy makers maintained a cooperative relationship with U.S. corporate interests in the region. In 1985, Marshall Wiley, former U.S. ambassador to Oman, set up the Washington-based U.S.-Iraq Business Forum, which lobbied in Washington on behalf of Iraq to promote U.S. trade with that country. Speaking of the Forum's creation, Wiley later explained, "I went to the State Department and told them what I was planning to do, and they said, 'Fine. It sounds like a good idea.' It was our policy to increase exports to Iraq." Though the government readily approved most sales to Iraq, officials at Defense and Commerce clashed over some of them (with the State Department and the White House backing Commerce). "If an item was in dispute, my attitude was if they were readily available from other markets, I didn't see why we should deprive American markets," explained Richard Murphy in 1990. Murphy was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1983 to 1989. As it turned out, Iraq did not use any chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces in the Gulf War. But American planes bombed chemical and biological weapons storage facilities with abandon, potentially dooming tens of thousands of American soldiers to lives of prolonged and permanent agony, and an unknown number of Iraqis to a similar fate. Among the symptoms reported by the affected soldiers are memory loss, scarred lungs, chronic fatigue, severe headache, raspy voice, and passing out. The Pentagon estimates that nearly 100,000 American soldiers were exposed to sarin gas alone. After the war, White House and Defense Department officials tried their best to deny that Gulf War Syndrome had anything to do with the bombings. The suffering of soldiers was not their overriding concern. The top concerns of the Bush and Clinton Administrations were to protect perceived U.S. interests in the Middle East, and to ensure that American corporations still had healthy balance sheets. - William Blum is the author of "Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II" (Common Courage Press, 1995).

solo i forni per questa gente... solo i forni...

ma quando si farà una miss aereimilitari???

eheheh... cara mia, mica ascolto metal IO S.A.M. - Chaos And Confusion http://www.myspace.com/projectsam

avevo letto male la domanda, pardon il B-52 porta 30tonnellate di bombe, il Tu-95 "solo" 15.

no.

certo che si, le testate nucleari esplodono solo quando devono esplodono,

ciao!

ciao!

se vuoi fare un danno credibile, devi fare in mondo che il cingolo sia rotto e le maglie saltate. ovviamente il danno deve essere nella parte inferiore del treno di rotolamento. un altra soluzione è quella di creare un cingolo spezzato in un punto, ad esempio in corrispondenza della ruota di rinvio o della ruota dentata e fare un estremità che poggia a terra ed una che penzola dalla ruota (cosa non facile, bisogna stare attenti all'inclinazione del mezzo). ancora, potresti creare un foro che rappresenta un colpo che ha colpito il cingolo. se, invece, le hai incollate male e non riesci a staccare le singole maglie, ti consiglio di guarnire i cingoli con abbndante fango e/o neve, in modo da coprire il misfatto. in ogni caso, sono sconsigliati danni nella parte superiore del treno di rotolamento, perchè totalmente irrali.

nono, qua bisogna fare una precisazione, il fondo per i terremotati è una truffa! ben hanno fatto a toglierli i soldi.

mmm, non so. non conosco il grado di dettaglio dei cingoli del kit italeri. essi sono a nastro unico o maglie singole??? ed il livello di dettaglio quale è? attenzione, inoltre, a riproporre un danno realistico